APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After a 2006 divorce, both parties petitioned the trial court in 2009 for a modification of the parenting plan and to hold the other parent in contempt. The trial court slightly modified the parent visitation schedule and held the father in contempt for violating the parenting plan’s provisions on spring break and medical expense reimbursement. On appeal the father asserts that the trial court erred in the contempt rulings, in not giving him primary custody or substantially equal parenting time and in not holding the mother in contempt. We reverse the father’s contempt for his actions during spring break. In all other respects we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The trial court dismissed this case on the ground that the plaintiff credit card company failed to timely respond to discovery requests. We reverse, concluding that the trial court erred in dismissing the case without sufficient evidence of contumacious conduct on behalf of the plaintiff.

Byron Becton (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of six counts of aggravated rape. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged each alternative count, entering three judgments of conviction for aggravated rape by use of force or coercion while armed with a weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be a weapon. The trial court also imposed an effective sentence of sixty-five years. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions and that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Christopher Scott Mayberry, was indicted by the Humphreys County Grand Jury in June of 2010 for two counts of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine. After a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of the sale of methamphetamine. The trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the sale of cocaine. After a sentencing hearing, Appellant was sentenced to ten years for each conviction, to be served concurrently. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions for the sale of methamphetamine. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

In June 2003, John E. Allen, Jr. ("the Petitioner") pleaded nolo contendere to one count of criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery and received a six-year sentence. More than eight years later, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The State sought dismissal on statute of limitations grounds. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s claim for relief, and this appeal followed. The Petitioner’s sole argument on appeal is that our supreme court’s decision in Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), should be applied retroactively. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Duane M. Coleman, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of second degree murder. He was sentenced to thirty-two years as a Range II, multiple offender. State v. Duane Coleman, No. M1998-00663-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 31858, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 18, 2000). He unsuccessfully appealed his conviction. Id. at *14. Petitioner also unsuccessfully filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Duane Coleman v. State, No. M2008-02180-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2890676, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul. 23, 2010). Petitioner subsequently filed a "Motion for Relief From Judgement" based upon Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, on March 5, 2012. In this motion, Petitioner argued that his constitutional rights were violated by the imposition of enhancement factors and the imposition of 100% release eligibility without being found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. His argument was based upon the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The habeas corpus court determined that the motion under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure was uncognizable and treated the motion as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court then summarily dismissed the petition. We have reviewed the record on appeal. We agree with the habeas corpus court’s determination that the motion should be treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Additionally, we conclude that prior case law has determined that a Blakely violation does not apply retroactively and renders a judgment voidable instead of void. See Timothy R. Bowles v. State, No. M2006-01685-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 1266594, at *2-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 1, 2007) Therefore, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Robert L. Conley, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine, possession with the intent to sell or deliver one-half gram of cocaine, and possession with the intent to use drug paraphernalia and his effective fourteen-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations and by dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Ronald McKnight, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated burglary. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifteen years as a career offender. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

The defendant, Joseph R. Bledsoe, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order declaring him a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender, claiming that the convictions used to support the designation were not valid. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The State appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of relief to the Petitioner, Kenneth Bartley, contending that (1) the court erred in admitting the affidavit of Dr. James Murray; (2) the Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) the Petitioner is entitled to no relief on his previously determined claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Doris Nell Jones, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to eighteen years in incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on an untimely notice of appeal and the absence of a motion for new trial in the record. State v. Doris Nell Jones, No. M2007-00791-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 544576, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 27, 2008), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. June 1, 2009). The supreme court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its opinion in State v. Byington, 284 S.W.3d 220 (Tenn. 2009). On remand, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Doris Nell Jones, No. M2009-01102-CCA-RM-CD, 2009 WL 2633026, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 26, 2009) (not for citation), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied relief. After a review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief because Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that she is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Donald Ragland, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that the post-conviction court erred by not forcing the Petitioner to testify at the post-conviction hearing; and (2) that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because trial counsel withdrew a motion to suppress a photographic identification of the Petitioner. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Telly Romeras Robertson, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in October of 2008 for one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. In January of 2009, Appellant was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of ecstacy with the intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to prepare a controlled substance, one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and casual exchange of marijuana. Appellant pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to sell ecstacy and possession with intent to deliver between .5 ounce and ten pounds of marijuana in exchange for sentences of ten years and two years, respectively. The sentences were to run consecutively to each other and to an eight-year sentence Appellant was already serving for conspiracy to commit money laundering, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record and authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence where: (1) Appellant was sentenced to a Class B felony, rendering him ineligible for probation; (2) probation was denied in order to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense; and (3) Appellant was incarcerated at the time of sentencing, rendering him ineligible for a sentence of Community Corrections. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant, Charles L. Williams, was indicted in October of 2003 for one count of rape of a child and two counts of rape. In November of 2005, the case proceeded to trial. Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-two years in incarceration. Appellant appealed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Charles L. Williams, No. M2005-00836-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3431920 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 29, 2006) ("Williams I"). On appeal, this Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. Id. at *1. On remand, Appellant was again found guilty of rape of a child and two counts of rape. This time, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of seventeen years, merging the two convictions for rape with the conviction for rape of a child. Appellant appeals his convictions after retrial, arguing: (1) that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment with prejudice because the State committed violations of Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide audible videotapes of interviews with Appellant and the victim until three days into the second trial; (2) that the trial court failed to follow the mandate of this Court with respect to expert testimony; (3) that the trial court permitted improper testimony of experts; and (4) that the remedy for the trial court’s errors is a dismissal of the indictment. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the State did not commit a Brady violation where the information in the videotapes was not material; Agent Johnson’s testimony was not in contravention of this Court’s opinion on direct appeal; and the expert testimony elicited at trial was based on information actually perceived by the expert in his examination of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Petitioner, Craig L. Beene, appeals Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the failure of Petitioner to file a complete copy of the petition for habeas corpus relief or the judgments from which he is appealing violate the requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In this worker’s compensation case, the employee alleged that his job caused a compensable aggravation of arthritis in his knees. The trial court found that his employment had caused only an increase of symptoms, and, therefore, he did not sustain a compensable injury. The employee has appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Zacheriah Holden, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for over thirty offenses as a result of a drunk driving accident in which two people were killed. He pled guilty to several offenses before trial and was found guilty of the remaining charges. After the proper merger of offenses, Appellant’s convictions were two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, one count of reckless endangerment, driving on a revoked license, evading arrest, resisting arrest, leaving the scene of the accident, five counts of failure to render aid, failure to obey a traffic device and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of thirty years and eight months. Appellant appeals his convictions and his sentences. Appellant raises several issues on appeal. He argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for change of venue; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for sequestration of the jury; (3) the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s various motions to suppress his statements to law enforcement and his seizure in a car; (4)the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s accident reconstructionist as an expert witness; (5) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present a photograph of the victims’ car; (6) the trial court erred in failing to sever DUI, fourth offense from aggravated vehicular homicide; (7) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Travis Battles who was going to testify to updates to the traffic light since the accident; (8) the State did not sufficiently prove the chain of custody of Appellant’s blood sample submitted for blood alcohol testing; (9) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (10) the sentencing scheme for aggravated vehicular homicide is unconstitutional; (11) the trial court erred in imposing the length of his sentences, as well as imposing consecutive sentences; and (12) the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings on various pieces of evidence. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the issues raised do not warrant reversal of the judgments below. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Oscar Torres, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective twenty-year sentence in the Department of Correction following his conviction for two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to object during jury-out hearings to recalling the victim as a rebuttal witness; and (2) failing to call an expert witness pertaining to the faultiness of the memory of a child witness. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant, Frances Kaylanicole Grech, pled guilty to one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery and one count of robbery. As a result of these convictions she was sentenced to ten years and ordered to serve 180 days with the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant was charged with assault while in jail and felony escape shortly after her release. A probation violation warrant was filed based on the two charges. She subsequently pled guilty to assault and an amended charge of resisting arrest. The trial court held a probation revocation hearing and at the conclusion determined that she had violated the rules of her probation and imposed her original sentence. On appeal, she argues that the trial court did not use conscientious judgment. We conclude that Appellant clearly violated the rules of her probation and we find no abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order transferring the action below from the Circuit Court for Roane County to the Chancery Court for Roane County. Because the order appealed from does not resolve any issues raised in the proceedings but merely transfers those claims to another court, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Appellant, Charles Edward Wilbourn, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine for sale in a drug-free zone. On February 19, 2010, Appellant pled guilty in a negotiated plea to the charge and an eight-year sentence to be served at 100 percent. Appellant subsequently filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. After appointment of counsel, an amended petition was filed. One of the issues raised was that trial counsel afforded Petitioner ineffective assistance of counsel because she did not adequately investigate whether the incident actually occurred in a drug-free non-school zone. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred with respect to the above issue. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in denying the petition. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

This is an appeal by Elvira N. M. from an order terminating her parental rights to her two minor children, Estefani Y. M. and Vanessa N. M. The order terminating the appellant’s parental rights was entered on October 15, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until November 15, 2012, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the October 15, 2012 order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Mother’s parental rights to two children were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, substantial non-compliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. The court also concluded that termination of Mother’s rights was in the best interests of the children. Mother appeals, contending that the evidence does not support the statutory grounds or that termination is in the children’s best interest and asserting that the Departmentof Children’s Services did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. We affirm the judgment terminating her rights.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee alleged that he injured his back as a result of a fall from his tractor trailer during the course and scope of his employment. The employer contended that the employee’s workers’ compensation claim was barred by the affirmative defense of misrepresentation of his physical condition, that a compensable injury had not been sustained and that his permanent partial disability award was excessive. The trial court found that the employee did not intentionally misrepresent his physical condition, that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and that the award should be 70% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against each of the trial court’s findings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Ray McKee, contends that his right to a speedy trial regarding his probation revocation hearing was violated and, as a result, the trial court erred in revoking his probation. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and that there was sufficient evidence presented to support the trial court’s revocation; we affirm the judgment of the trial court.