APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights with respect to his son. The father was incarcerated for sexually abusing his stepdaughters, the son’s half sisters, while all resided in the same home. The trial court also found that the father had physically abused the son. The trial court found that all of this conduct constituted severe abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(23)(C). It found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the son’s best interest. The trial court entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights; the order was entered over thirty days after the termination hearing. The father appeals the tardiness of the termination order and the best interest finding. We affirm.

The Defendant, Leonard Miller, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000 and ordering the remainder of his ten-year sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of rape, a Class B felony, and incest, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the defendant raises numerous challenges to his convictions and sentences. The defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. However, his argument is based on alleged inconsistencies in the evidence, and conflicts in the evidence provide no basis for reversing a defendant’s convictions. The defendant claims that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of a police officer concerning statements that the defendant made to his wife in the officer’s presence because these statements were protected by the martial privilege. However, we conclude that the statements were not privileged because the defendant had no reasonable expectation that they would remain confidential. The defendant claims that these same statements should also have been excluded because the officer did not give the defendant his Miranda warnings. However, this claim must fail because the defendant was neither in custody nor being interrogated by the police at the time the statements were made. The defendant claims that the trial court erred by admitting an exhibit containing a nurse’s handwritten notes repeating certain statements made by the victim concerning the cause of her injuries,because these statements were inadmissible under the hearsay rule. However, the trial court properly admitted the statements under the excited utterance exception to that rule. The defendant claims that the trial court erred by giving a pattern rape instruction that included references to “fellatio” and “cunnilingus” because there was no evidence presented at trial establishing that the defendant had committed either act. However, we conclude that the instruction at issue fully and accurately stated the law. The defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted certain exhibits because no chain of custody had been established, but this argument has been waived. The defendant challenges his ten-year effective sentence as excessive, but after thorough review we can discern no error in the defendant’s sentencing. Finally, the defendant claims that the 2005 Sentencing Act is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 302 (2005), but we conclude that binding precedent firmly establishes that the 2005 Sentencing Act complies with Blakely. Consequently, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Appellant, Joshua A. Randolph, was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury in March of 2010 for aggravated assault and domestic assault after an altercation took place at the home occupied by his estranged wife and children. Appellant was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of assault. He was acquitted of domestic assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal he insists that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. After a review of the record, we conclude, as the State concedes, that the trial court did err in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense where the evidence fairly raised a contested issue of fact, i.e., whether Appellant was in the home with consent of the lawful resident when the altercation took place, and therefore entitled to raise self-defense because he claimed he was attacked. As a result, the jury instructions failed to inform the jury of the applicable law. Consequently, Appellant’s conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

A prisoner filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari, which the trial court dismissed sua sponte for failure to prosecute due to the prisoner’s failure to file the necessary summonses. The prisoner appeals. We affirm.
 

The petitioner, Willie Perry, Jr., pled guilty to two counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, each a Class D felony, and was sentenced to serve, in prison, two twelve-year sentences to run concurrently with each other. The petitioner brought this post-conviction petition, seeking relief on the basis that his trial counsel failed to investigate and advise him regarding the possibility that the property was valued at less than $1,000. The post-conviction trial court denied the claim, and the petitioner appeals the denial of relief and the trial court’s refusal to admit certain evidence regarding the property’s value. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. Indeed, I join in the majority opinion on all but one issue. I write separately to address the issue of the appropriate standard of review by this Court on hearsay evidentiary issues. The majority applies an abuse of discretion standard of review to the hearsay issue in this case.

This appeal arises out of a custody dispute over Amber D. Brewster and Nicholas Galloway’s minor child. When presented with a petition to establish paternity and set child support, Nicholas Galloway acknowledged paternity but filed a petition to be named the primary residential parent. The trial court denied Nicholas Galloway’s petition, designated Amber D. Brewster as the primary residential parent, and granted Nicholas Galloway co-parenting time. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached by the majority and, with one caveat, its rationale in reaching that result. While I agree with the majority that “[t]he record before this [C]ourt does not reflect that Father ever raised an issue regarding Mother’s ability to recover attorney fees because she was never his spouse,” I disagree with the majority’s holding, in dicta, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c)(2010) supports such an award.

This appeal focuses on State Farm’s ability to claim an offset of uninsured motorist coverage for workers’ compensation benefits paid to its insured. The trial court construed the case of State Farm Insurance Company v. Schubert, et al., No. E2000-02054-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 584206 (Tenn. Ct. App. May, 31, 2001) so as to preclude offset. We reverse and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Following a Shelby County jury trial, the Defendant, DeWayne Collier, was convicted of aggravated statutory rape. At the time of the crime, the Defendant was forty-two years old and the victim was fourteen years old. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the fourteen-year-old victim was an accomplice and there was not sufficient corroborating evidence. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we conclude that the victim is legally an accomplice regardless of the fact that she cannot be indicted for her own statutory rape. However, we also determine that there is additional evidence to adequately corroborate her testimony. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a contempt finding against a closely-held corporation. The defendant closely-held corporation owned real property located on a highway. The trial court held that the corporation had violated zoning ordinances by maintaining and operating a trucking terminal and salvage yard in an unauthorized area. The trial court enjoined the corporation from maintaining a trucking terminal at this location and directed the corporation to remove junk from the property. The corporation then leased the property to a business associate who continued to operate a trucking terminal on the property and failed to remove the junk. A contemptpetition wasfiled againstthe defendantcorporation. The trialcourtdetermined that the defendant corporation had violated the injunction and was in contempt of court. The defendant corporation now appeals, arguing that the corporation cannot be held in contempt for the actions of the tenant on the property. We affirm.
 

The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding, among other things, that Defendants were entitled to GTLA immunity. Because we find a question of fact exists as to whether Defendants acted within the scope of their employment in communicating with Plaintiff’s teaching supervisor, in communicating with the named individuals, and in ordering destruction of the surveillance video tapes, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ slander, false light, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium claims with regard to such conduct. The decision of the trial court is affirmed in all other respects. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The pro se petitioner, Terry Lewis, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis attacking his convictions for first degree murder and attempted robbery. Petitioner claims that a report indicating that authorities performed a fingerprint analysis on a shell casing found near petitioner’s apartment is new evidence. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.
 

The Petitioner, Quinton Albert Cage, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his convictions and sentences were illegal because the United States Constitution did not authorize the Tennessee Legislature to create criminal statutes. Upon motion by the State, the habeas court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his judgments were facially void and noting that nothing on the face of the judgments indicated that the underlying sentences were invalid. Following our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the summary dismissal by the habeas court.

A neighborhood association president, fearing that members conspired to improperly oust him at an upcoming meeting, filed suit, requesting declaratory relief regarding the proper procedure for removal of a president. Prior to a hearing, the members voted to remove him from office and filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court dismissed the complaint and denied a subsequent motion to alter or amend its judgment. The president appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Devonte Black, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year of incarceration followed by three years on probation after release from confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence of split confinement, specifically when it: (1) denied full probation; and (2) denied judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, Demp Douglas, of one count of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial based upon the victim’s testimony that he met the Defendant shortly after the Defendant was released from prison. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Timothy L. Dulworth, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his convictions are void. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the habeas court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Glover P. Smith, of fabricating evidence in counts 1 and 2 and filing a false report in counts 3 through 8. During a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the appellant’s convictions of filing a false report in counts 3, 4, and 5 and ordered that he serve an effective sentence of one year in jail followed by six years of probation. Subsequently, the trial court granted the appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the fabricating evidence convictions based upon insufficient evidence. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. In a counter-appeal, the appellant maintains that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on “knowingly”; that newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial; that the State committed a Brady violation; that his multiple convictions in counts 3, 4, and 5 and in counts 6, 7, and 8 violate double jeopardy; that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences and improperly denied his request for full probation; and that the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a new trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting the appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and reinstate his convictions of fabricating evidence in counts 1 and 2, the merger of the convictions, and the sentence. We also conclude that the trial court should have dismissed the charges of filing a false report in counts 4 and 5 because they were mutliplicitous with the charge in count 3. The appellant’s remaining convictions and sentences for filing a false report in counts 6, 7, and 8 are affirmed.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Terrance Antonio Cecil, of assault and false imprisonment, both Class A misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of six months incarceration, with all but sixty days on each suspended, followed by ten months on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it considered his prior arrest record in sentencing; and (3) the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of attempted false imprisonment and attempted assault. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Seeking relief from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 conviction of attempted aggravated robbery, Timothy L. Rose appeals and claims that his plea of guilty to the conviction offense is invalid because it was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel and was unknowingly and involuntarily made. The record, however, supports the post-conviction court’s findings and its denial of post-conviction relief. For that reason, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Weakley County Grand Jury indicted the petitioner, Bruce Alexander Tuck, in three separate cases. In each case, the petitioner was indicted for aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and various other related offenses. The petitioner pled guilty in each case, agreeing to serve three, consecutive twenty-year sentences at 100 percent, resulting in an effective sentence of sixty years. No direct appeal was filed. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. He claims that when he entered his pleas, he was mentally ill and subject to mistreatment and threats in an attempt to induce him to plead guilty. He also alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to discuss the facts and circumstances underlying each of the indictments charging the petitioner; (2) failing to review the audio and visual recordings of the petitioner’s first statement to police; (3) failing to file a motion to suppress the petitioner’s confession; and (4) failing to discuss with the petitioner the possibility of withdrawing his pleas. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court concluded that the petitioner did not prove his assertions. Based upon our review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petitioner’s petition for postconviction relief.

Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of Petitioner’s fifth petition for habeas corpus relief. After a thorough review of the briefs and the appellate record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Petitioner, Shundell Lynn Dickerson, was charged with first degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation to commit first degree murder. Petitioner was sentenced as a Range III persistent offender to 60 years incarceration. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. Shundell L.Dickerson, No.M2006-02021-CCA-R3-CD,2008 WL 2780591 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed July 18, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Jan. 20, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel to represent him. Petitioner alleged several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying relief. Petitioner now appeals. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.