APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

While working for a law firm in which he was a shareholder, an attorney performed legal services for clients and failed to remit fees owed to the law firm. Members of the law firm confronted the attorney about the misappropriated legal fees shortly after the attorney resigned his position at the law firm to assume elected public office. As a result of his conduct, the attorney pleaded guilty to theft and to willful failure to file income tax returns. During a subsequent investigation, the Board of Professional Responsibility discovered that the attorney had accepted loans from the law firm’s clients while he was employed at the law firm. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility found that the attorney should be suspended for four years. The attorney appealed, and the chancery court applied additional mitigating factors to reduce the suspension to two years. We hold that the chancery court erred in modifying the judgment without finding that any of the circumstances in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 1.3 applied. We also hold that the hearing panel erred in imputing a conflict of interest to the attorney with respect to the loan from the law firm’s client and in misapplying aggravating and mitigating factors. Despite these errors, we conclude that the length of suspension imposed by the hearing panel is consistent with the sanctions imposed on attorneys for similar conduct. We therefore reverse the chancery court’s reduction of the suspension to two years and affirm the hearing panel’s imposition of a four-year suspension.

Peggy Giffin d/b/a Re/Max Realty Center and Racia Futrell (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Anthony Sawyer and Hope Sawyer alleging, among other things, that the Sawyers had breached a real estate sales agency contract. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Sawyers did not breach the sales agency contract and that Plaintiffs were not entitled to collect a commission under the sales agency contract. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

Petitioner, Milburn L. Edwards, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of Petitioner’s fifth petition for habeas corpus relief. After a thorough review of the briefs and the appellate record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Petitioner, Shundell Lynn Dickerson, was charged with first degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation to commit first degree murder. Petitioner was sentenced as a Range III persistent offender to 60 years incarceration. This Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State v. Shundell L.Dickerson, No.M2006-02021-CCA-R3-CD,2008 WL 2780591 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed July 18, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Jan. 20, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed counsel to represent him. Petitioner alleged several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying relief. Petitioner now appeals. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We accepted this appeal of a personal injury action to determine whether the dismissal of a defendant pursuant to a written order not made final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 renders that defendant “not a party to the suit” for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. We answer this question in the affirmative. Because the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appellees from the Manns’ second amended complaint as time-barred, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

This is an estate case in which Bobbie Bryant appeals the trial court’s affirmation of the fifth and final accounting of the deceased’s estate. Having concluded that the issues raised on appeal do not pertain to the fifth and final accounting of the estate, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Curtis Beechem, pled guilty to first degree murder and attempted aggravated robbery. He received sentences of life for first degree murder and four years for attempted aggravated robbery to be served concurrently. In this appeal from the denial of the postconviction relief, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court and trial counsel misinformed him as to the length of his sentence. He also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel misinformed him as to the length of his sentence, and trial counsel failed to object to a statement made by the post-conviction court concerning the sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary or that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Vincent D. Hadley, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the habeas corpus petition filed by Petitioner. Petitioner asserts on appeal that the indictment, which resulted in his guilty plea to felony murder in 1994, is defective and that the judgment is void. After reviewing the briefs of the parties and the entire record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Petitioner, Larry C. Pitman, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief which the trial court summarily dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. The petition seeks to set aside Petitioner’s 2006 convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. As pertinent to this appeal, Petitioner alleged that the indictment for each offense which led to his jury convictions is defective because each count of the indictment failed to allege at least one essential element of the criminal charge. After a thorough review of the briefs and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Father and Mother filed a joint motion to modify a parenting plan entered by the trial court in 2010. In their motion, Father and Mother asked the court to reduce Father’s child support obligation, to modify the parenting time schedule, and to amend the plan to permit a known registered sexual offender to be in the presence of their children. The trial court denied the motion with respect to allowing a sexual offender to be in the presence of the children, and otherwise granted the motion. Mother appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Patrick Wayne Carter, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation and order that he serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the revocation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Delivetrick Dewon Blocker, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The married parents of two minor children are involved in custody/visitation litigation in the trial court. The most recent decision by the trial court was prompted by a petition filed by he children’s father. The trial court denied the father’s attempt to obtain custody and suspended his visitation rights pending his completion of anger management and parenting classes. The father appeals. Because the trial court’s judgment is not a final judgment, we dismiss the father’s appeal.

The defendant, Christopher S. Robinson, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the court erred: (1) in finding that his due process and speedy trial rights were not violated by the long delay between the filing of the probation violation warrant and the revocation hearing; (2) in finding that he violated the terms of his probation; and (3) in ordering him to serve six months in confinement. Following our review, we conclude that the twelve-year delay between the filing of the warrant and the revocation hearing, under the facts of this case, violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and dismiss the revocation warrant.

This case concerns the application of the medical malpractice notice requirement to a lawsuit that was previously nonsuited and then re-filed pursuant to the saving statute. The children of a woman who died due to alleged medical negligence filed suit against the defendant medical providers. The children subsequently nonsuited the lawsuit. Within one-year of the nonsuit, the children sent notice of a potential claim to the medical providers. Within one year and 120 days from the nonsuit, the children re-filed their claim. The medical providers moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim was not filed within the one-year period provided by the saving statute and, as such, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the action and the children appealed. Concluding that the saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-105(a) is not an “applicable statute[] of limitations or repose,” we hold that the saving statute is not extended by compliance with the medical malpractice notice requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(c). Affirmed and remanded.

The executor of the estate of Dana Ruth Johnson Gregory waited approximately 14 months after her death before seeking to open her estate. The Bureau of TennCare filed a claim approximately four months later, shortly after receiving the executor’s notice of the death and the opening of the estate. The executor objected to the claim as untimely under the statute of limitations applicable to claims by the state. The trial court rejected the objection and held that the claim was valid. The executor appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Corry Tyrone Owens, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, pursuant to a plea agreement, to ten years of incarceration, to be served at 45%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition.

Covered Bridge Resort on Waldens Creek, LLC (“Seller”) sold its interest in an ongoing resort development to Tennessee Covered Bridge, LLC (“Purchaser”). Seller agreed to finance the sale and Purchaser agreed to secure the debt with a mortgage on the property. Mountain National Bank (“the Bank”) agreed to loan Purchaser money to continue development of the property but required that its mortgage be in a first position. Seller agreed to subordinate its mortgage with the understanding that the members of Purchaser would personally guarantee the debt to Seller. Attorneys Charlie R. Johnson and Sherri E. Case of the firm of Johnson, Murrell & Associates, P.C. (collectively “the Lawyers”) prepared the documents and handled the closing. Purchaser soon defaulted and Seller learned that Purchaser’s members had refused to execute the guaranties. Seller filed this action against the Bank, the Lawyers and Purchaser . When Seller took the deposition of the Bank’s loan officer, the Bank, through counsel, instructed him not to answer several categories of questions on the ground of privilege. Seller filed a motion to compel which the trial court granted upon finding that the information at issue was not privileged. The trial court granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. This Court agreed to hear the appeal. We now affirm the order of the trial court (1) granting the motion to compel and (2) holding the Bank’s motion for summary judgment in abeyance pending completion of discovery.

This case involves an alleged breach of a construction contract. The plaintiff contractor entered into a fixed priced contract to build a custom home for the defendant homeowners. During the construction, the contractor told the homeowners that the project was under budget, and that they could apply the cushion in the budget toward upgrades. Many upgrades and additions outside the scope of the original contract were made. The project ended up over budget, and the homeowners refused to pay more than the fixed price of the contract. The contractor filed this lawsuit, alleging breach of contract. The homeowners counterclaimed for breach of contract, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the contractor some of the upgrade costs and dismissed the homeowners’ counterclaims. The homeowners now appeal. We reverse the award for the cost of the upgrades and remand for specific findings as to each upgrade or addition. In all other respects, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

Davidson Taylor (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for evading arrest in a motor vehicle and driving under the influence. In his petition, he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. The Petitioner appeals, arguing that the postconviction court erred in denying his petition. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel: (1) failed to advise the Petitioner properly regarding his right to testify; and (2) failed to request a continuance once trial counsel learned of a death in his family. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an adoption case involving Shyann B. (“the Child”) (DOB: April 11, 2005). We are asked to decide a jurisdictional question. At an earlier time, a juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected. She was placed in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed by it in the foster care of Teresa S. (“Foster Mother”). Louis F. B. (“Uncle”), the Child’s maternal great uncle, had also sought custody, but his petition was ultimately denied. After the parental rights of the Child’s biological parents were terminated, Foster Mother filed a petition to adopt in the 1 trial court. Uncle responded with a counterclaim seeking to intervene and adopt, or, in the alternative, to obtain custody of the Child. At trial, Foster Mother took a voluntary nonsuit of her adoption petition and, on the same day, refiled a petition for adoption in the Chancery Court for Greene County. In the trial court, Uncle contended that the trial court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate his counterclaim for custody. The trial court found that, by virtue of Foster Mother’s filing in chancery court, jurisdiction over the Child was then in chancery court. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment reciting “this cause is hereby dismissed.” Uncle appeals. We affirm.

This parental termination case concerns the child’s surname. The appellant biological father consented to the termination of his parental rights so that the child could be adopted by the appellee adoptive parents. At the conclusion of the telephonic hearing in which the biological father confirmed that he consented to the termination of his parental rights, the adoptive parents requested that the child’s surname be changed. This request was granted. The biological father now appeals the trial court’s decision on the child’s surname. We affirm.

This appeal arises from the cancellation of a homeowner’s insurance policy. The plaintiff homeowner asked the defendant insurance agent to obtain a homeowner’s insurance policy for a home that was not her residence. The agent contacted the defendant intermediary insurance agency, and an insurance policy was issued. The homeowner paid the insurance premiums to the insurance agent, who failed to pay them to the intermediary insurance agency. The policy was cancelled for nonpayment. The cancellation notice was sent to the insurance agent and to the insured address, but not to the residential address of the homeowner. A fire occurred and the homeowner’s claim was not paid. The homeowner sued the intermediary insurance agency. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant intermediary insurance agency. The homeowner appeals. We reverse in part, holding that the intermediary insurance agency did not negate the homeowner’s claim based on the apparent authority of the insurance agent.

This appeal involves the release of ballots for a condominium association election. The plaintiff condominium owner was a candidate for a position on the board of directors for the defendant condominium association. After losing the election, the plaintiff condominium owner requested to audit the vote and see the other members’ written ballots. The condominium association provided a tally sheet reflecting the number of ballots cast for each candidate but declined to release the actual ballots. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit, contending that the condominium association had a statutory obligation to release the ballots to him. The plaintiff later filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the summary judgment motion and dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff condominium owner now appeals. We affirm, finding that the plaintiff condominium owner does not have a statutory right to see the association members’ written ballots.

The Petitioner, Michael Panzini, pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, to be served at 100%. The record contains two judgments of conviction, one provided by the State and one provided by the Petitioner. The judgment form in the official court file indicates the box on the judgment form showing the Petitioner was sentenced to community supervision for life as checked. The judgment submitted by the Petitioner does not contain that check mark. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his sentence was illegal because he was not sentenced to community supervision for life. The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his original judgment of conviction did not include community supervision for life as required by statute and that his judgment was modified without notice, a hearing, or an order. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.