APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following her Davidson County General Sessions Court conviction of criminal contempt based upon the violation of an order of protection, the defendant, Karen Ann Matthews, was charged via an indictment returned by the Davidson County grand jury with violating an order of protection, see T.C.A. § 39-13-113 (2006). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment as violative of double jeopardy principles. In this State appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment because convictions for criminal contempt and violating an order of protection do not violate double jeopardy principles. Discerning no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm.

The petitioner, Shaun Alexander Hodge, was convicted of first degree murder in 2001 and sentenced to life in prison. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. The petitioner appeals, claiming constitutional violations arising from the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and the State’s failure to disclose certain exculpatory evidence. The petitioner also seeks relief based on newly discovered evidence. After careful review of the record and the arguments of both parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Ezra Taylor Shelton, was charged with first degree premeditated murder and felony murder. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The trial court merged the offenses and imposed a sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction for the resulting conviction of second degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; and (2) the trial court failed to “properly address an improper statement made by the prosecution during closing arguments.” After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a contested divorce case involving two minor children. K.B.J. (“Husband”) was the first to file a complaint for divorce. T.J. (“Wife”) answered his complaint and coupled a counterclaim with her answer. The trial court found that Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded Wife a divorce, but made Husband the primary residential parent of the minor children with final authority on certain parental decisions. The court ordered equal parenting time on an alternating week basis. It also denied Wife’s request for spousal support and allocated to her approximately $32,350 of the marital debt. Wife appeals. We reverse that part of the judgment making Husband the primary residential parent with final decision-making authority and modify the parenting schedule. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Donna Dotson, pled guilty to violating her probation and now appeals the trial court’s order requiring her to serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

In a three-count indictment returned by the Hamilton County Grand Jury, Defendant, Emory Leslie Letson, was charged in Count 1 with attempted first degree murder of Jason Kellogg, and in Counts 2 and 3, with reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, with each count involving a different named victim. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Count 1 was amended to a charge of aggravated assault to which Defendant pled guilty. He also pled guilty to Count 2 as charged (which involved a minor as the victim), and Count 3 was dismissed. Pursuant to the agreement, the length and manner of service of sentences for the convictions was determined by the trial court. Defendant was sentenced to serve six years as a Range I standard offender for the aggravated assault conviction, and to serve two years as a Range I standard offender for the reckless endangerment conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other, and all forms of alternative sentencing were denied. On appeal, Defendant argues that the sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred by denying full probation or some other form of alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lyndsey S. (“Mother”) and Trey S. (“Father”) are the biological parents (“Parents”) of Maddox B.S. and Rylie M.S. (“Children”). Veronda S. and James S. (“Grandparents”) are the paternal grandparents of Children. Mother, acknowledging that her consent would result in the termination of her parental rights, sought to consent to the adoption of Children by Grandparents. Grandparents and Mother petitioned the trial court to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights and allow Grandparents to adopt Children. The court accepted Mother’s consent and terminated her parental rights. The court terminated Father’s parental rights in a default judgment, citing abandonment as the ground for the termination of Father’s rights. Shortly thereafter, Mother moved the court to set aside the final order of adoption, citing fraud and duress as grounds. Father also moved the court to set aside the termination of his parental rights and the order of adoption, citing fraud and misrepresentation as grounds. Mother and Father subsequently alleged that the court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Children. The trial court found that it had failed to enter sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law and set aside the final order of adoption. Mother then sought to revoke her consent. The trial court allowed the revocation, finding that the final order of adoption that had been set aside was the only document in which Mother had consented to the termination of her parental rights and subsequent adoption. Grandparents appeal the court’s action of setting aside the order, the allowance of Mother’s revocation of consent, and the dismissal of the case. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In an action for divorce and custody, Father appeals the trial court’s decision to declare Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. Because Father failed to file a transcript or statement of the evidence pertaining to a portion of the trial, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

This is a nursing home negligence case involving an arbitration agreement. The son of the decedent signed documents admitting his mother to the defendant nursing home. The admission documents included an arbitration agreement. After his mother’s death, the son filed a lawsuit on behalf of her estate against the defendant nursing home and others connected to its administration. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the agreement signed by the son. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the son was not the decedent’s agent and did not have authority to sign on her behalf. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Barron Lamar Currie, entered a guilty plea to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property of property over $500, a Class E felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant received an effective sentence of eight years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court ordered the Defendant-Appellant to serve the eight-year term in confinement. The Defendant-Appellant’s sole issue for our review is whether the trial court erred in denying any form of alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In June of 2008, William Mansell (the “Employee”) suffered a compensable injury to his right shoulder while working for Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC (the “Employer”). Dr. Sean Kaminsky, an orthopaedic surgeon, served as the authorized treating physician and assigned an impairment rating of 3% to the body as a whole. The Employee obtained an Independent Medical Evaluation from another orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Robert Landsberg, who assigned a 10% impairment rating. When the Benefit Review Conference at the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“DOL”) ended in an impasse, the Employee filed suit.

A social worker employed by an agency of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County was discharged from her job following an allegation that she had pinched a child attending a Head Start program. She then filed a discrimination and wrongful termination claim with the Metro Civil Service Commission. After the allegations against her proved to be baseless, she settled her claim with Metro for $45,000 and agreed not to be reinstated in her former job. She subsequently filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Davidson County for retaliatory discharge and for employment discrimination. The discrimination claim was eventually dismissed by agreed order. Metro filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim for wrongful discharge. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning among other things that because of the settlement of her claim and her agreement not to be reinstated, she could not prove, as a matter of law, that she was “adversely affected” in any material way by the termination of her employment. We affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Wilkins, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting 1 that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court granted both parties an absolute divorce after a marriage of twenty-four years, divided the marital property equally between them, and declared that neither party was to be awarded alimony. The husband appeals, arguing that the property division was inequitable because he came into the marriage with $500,000 worth of separate property while the wife only owned a negligible amount of separate propertyat the time of the parties’ marriage, and also because he was also the primary wage earner during the marriage. He also argues that the trial court should have awarded him alimony. The wife asserts that the husband’s separate assets became maritalpropertyover the years through the processesof commingling of assets or transmutation, and that the equal division of that property was equitable. She also denies that the husband is entitled to alimony. We affirm.
 

The defendant pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to six years of enhanced probation. At the time, the trial court did not warn the defendant that, upon the expiration of his sentence, he would be subjected to lifetime community supervision,which is mandated by statute upon a conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery and other sex offenses. Just before the sentence expired, the State filed a petition to amend the judgment to include lifetime community supervision. On the same day that the trial court corrected the judgment, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant had been adequately informed of the lifetime community supervision requirement by his trial counsel. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal to determine the effect of our decision in Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), which was filed after the release of the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the trial court failed to warn the defendant of the mandatory nature of lifetime community supervision, as is required by our ruling in Ward, and the State was unable to establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilt.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Damien Neely, of facilitation of second degree murder, and the trial court ordered him to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to exclude recorded telephone calls he made from jail; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred in applying to his sentence enhancement factor (9), pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-114, that the Defendant possessed or employed a firearm during the commission of the offense. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that our review should include all three pages of the insurance application appended to the summary judgment motion. I, however, would construe Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201 (2008) to require more than merely the insured’s signature at the end of an application for insurance in order for the insured to effectively reject “in writing” the amount of uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage otherwise mandated by the statute.

The petitioner, Marlow Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated robbery conviction, arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), challenge to the trial court’s use of enhancement factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

A Hamblen County Jury convicted Petitioner, Shannon Lee Jarnigan, and her co-defendants of one count each of first degree premeditated murder. They were each sentenced to life in prison. State v. George Arthur Lee Smith, et. al., No. E2009-00984- CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4117603, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 19, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008). Petitioner was unsuccessful on direct appeal to this Court. Id. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that she was afforded the ineffective assistance of counsel and her constitutional rights were violated by various means. The post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals this decision. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not proven her allegations. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

This is a post-divorce action. Appellant/Father, who is incarcerated for sexually abusing his step-daughter, appeals the trial court’s: (1) grant of Appellee/Mother’s petition to change the surnames of the two minor children that were born to the marriage; (2) denial of Appellant/Father’s petition to grant him visitation with the minor children; and (3) entry of an order requiring Appellant/Father to execute a qualified domestic relations order to effectuate the trial court’s award of assets as child support. Finding no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action to have the Court declare that she was entitled to the proceeds of a trust fund, as she was the legitimate child of her father. The Trial Court granted partial summary judgment on the grounds that all the records of her birth, baptismal records, and the parents divorce, and the father never questioning her legitimacy, established her legitimacy, and the defendant's son who challenged her right to the proceeds had no standing to question her legitimacy. On appeal, we affirm.

Appellant, Danthony Michael Pender, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery in August of 2008. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in incarceration. Appellant seeks a review of his conviction after the denial of a motion for new trial. On appeal, the following  ssues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the jury verdict was contrary to the law and evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal; and (4) whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for new trial.  after a review, we determine that all of appellant’s issues involve the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 against the owner of a bus line alleging security guards assaulted him while he was waiting for a bus in 2003. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff’s action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-104(a)(1) requires a plaintiff suing for personal injuries to file his complaint within one year of the date of the alleged assault resulting in injuries.

Plaintiff injured in automobile accident died while his negligence action was pending. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a suggestion of death but neglected to move to substitute a party for the deceased plaintiff within 90 days, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01(1). Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which led plaintiff’s estate to file a motion to enlarge time within which to move to substitute pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.02. The trial court determined plaintiff’s counsel’s neglect in moving to substitute within 90 days was not excusable and granted defendants’ motions, dismissing the action. On appeal we affirm the trial court’s judgment because we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the neglect was not excusable.
 

The plaintiff, an employee of the insured, was injured while driving the insured’s tow truck. He filed suit against the defendant and later sought to invoke the insured’s uninsured motorist policy in an amount equal to the liability coverage for bodily injury. The insurer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit uninsured motorist coverage to the amount listed on the first page of the policy rather than the amount otherwise fixed by statute. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the insured was entitled to a partial summary judgment. When the insured signs an application indicating the selection of uninsured motorist coverage lower than the liability limits, but neglects to initial a provision designed to confirm the selection of coverage less than the standard provided by statute, the “in writing” requirement under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201(a)(2) (2008) has been satisfied. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the entry of partial summary judgment and such other proceedings, as may be necessary.