APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. However, I would affirm the trial court because of the Defendant’s failure to include the guilty plea hearing transcript in the record and the attendant presumption that the trial court’s determinations were correct. See State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (holding trial court’s ruling presumed correct in the absence of an adequate record on appeal).

Appellant filed a notice of appeal for a non-final judgment entered by the trial court. We therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner, James Edward Bostic, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The record reflects that on February 7, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Davidson County to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and received a sentence of seven years and six months as a Range II offender pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served in community corrections, and judgment was entered June 26, 2007. On August 7, 2009, the trial court entered an order which revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered the original sentence of seven years and six months to be served by incarceration. Petitioner filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 30, 2009. The petition alleged as grounds for relief that the conviction was based on an unlawfully induced guilty plea and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The factual allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel pertained to representation atthe communitycorrections revocationproceedings. On January 5, 2010, the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing or appointing counsel, on the basis that the petition was barred by the one year statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a). In light of, and based upon the court’s holding in Carpenter v. State, 136 S.W.3d 608 (Tenn. 2004)and AnthonyL.Grant,Jr.v.State,No.M2007-00052-CCA-R3-PC,2008 WL 4169985 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 8, 2008), no perm. app. filed, we affirm the trial court’s order insofar as it dismissed the post-conviction petition as to the original conviction. However, as to the petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the communitycorrections revocation proceedings, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The pro se petitioner, Donald R. Jett, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his 2006 guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated sexual battery for which he received a sentence of 12 years’ incarceration to be served at 100 percent. On appeal, the petitioner argues that due process concerns require the tolling of the statute of limitations and that the post-conviction court denied him a full and fair hearing to address his claims. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court

Plaintiffs sued defendants on a sale of real estate contract wherein defendants agreed to purchase certain real estate located in Polk County from plaintiffs for a stated price. Defendants joined issue on the pleadings in the trial before the Trial Judge. The Trial Court held that the purchase and sales agreement was enforceable, and refused to find Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC liable for breach of the purchase and sales agreement, but held Glen Fetzner personally liable. Defendants and plaintiffs have appealed. On appeal, we hold that the purchase and sales agreement was an enforceable contract, but the Court erred when it held Glen Fetzner personally liable for the breach of the purchase and sales agreement, and the Trial Court also erred when it did not find Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC liable for the breach of the contract. We enter Judgment against Ocoee Land Holdings, LLC.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Karen E. Carpenter, was convicted of facilitation of the anufacture of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and facilitation of felony possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See §§ 39-11-403, -17417, -17-425. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by failing to, sua sponte, declare a mistrial after a witness mentioned the Defendant’s prior criminal charges; (2) that the jury instruction given by the trial court regarding the witness’ testimony was not “adequate;” and (3) that prosecutorial misconduct during the opening and closing statements denied her a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issue presented in this case is whether the employee’s complaint states a cause of action for relief under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The employee, hired as a university professor and department head, filed suit against the university after he was removed as department head. On motion of the university, the trial court concluded that the complaint failed to allege that the employee was discharged or terminated or that he was discharged or terminated for refusing to participate in or for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities and dismissed the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03. A cause of action arises under the Act when an employer discharges or terminates the employee for refusing to participate in or for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities. We determine that because the employee was neither terminated nor discharged from his employment, only removed as department head, the complaint does not allege facts from which we can reasonably infer a claim under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03 dismissal of the employee’s complaint.

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of a majorityof this Court that the plaintiff’s pleadings are insufficient to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the element of termination.

Plaintiff was involved in a previous lawsuit in North Carolina in which he sued several police officers. Plaintiff then instituted the present case against two North Carolina attorneys who represented the police officers in the North Carolina litigation. The trial court granted the attorneys’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It also denied Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of an attorney and an interpreter. We affirm.

This is an action to establish a conservatorship. The trial court assigned one-half of Petitioner’s attorney’s fees and fees of the guardian ad litem to Respondent, although Respondent died before the matter was fully adjudicated and no fiduciary was appointed. We reverse.

This case involves post-divorce petitions for contempt and recusal. During the divorce, the trial judge issued an injunction preventing the parties from filing any actions against the other party without the judge’s prior approval. Appellee filed the present action for contempt against Appellant or violation of that injunction. Prior to the hearing on the contempt petition, Appellant filed a motion for the trial judge to recuse himself based on threats allegedly made by Appellant on the judge’s life. The trial judge denied the motion to disqualify and found Appellant in contempt. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

We granted review in this divorce case to determine whether alimony in futuro should be awarded to a spouse who has a college degree, good health, a stable work history in a relatively high paying job, and a lack of demonstrated need for such long-term alimony. The trial court divided the parties’ real and personal property, declined to award spousal support of any type to either party, and denied a request made by both parties that they be awarded their attorney’s fees and expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s division of the marital estate, but reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding spousal support and ordered the husband to pay the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,250 per month until her death or remarriage. The Court of Appeals also awarded the wife, in the form of alimony in solido, her attorney’s fees and expenses, both at trial and on appeal. We conclude that the award of alimony in futuro and the award of attorney’s fees and expenses is inappropriate in this case. Additionally, the wife has failed to demonstrate that transitional alimony is appropriate. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Susan Renee Bise, was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property in an amount greater than $1000 but less than $10,000, all Class D felonies, and was sentenced to an effective term of three years as a Range I offender. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of her theft convictions and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions, but we conclude that the trial court inappropriately enhanced the defendant’s sentences. Therefore, we modify the defendant’s sentences to the minimum in the range of two years.

I concur with the majority opinion in affirming the convictions. I respectfully dissent  from the majority opinion’s conclusion that the effective sentence must be modified to the minimum sentence of two years, based upon the majority’s conclusion that the one enhancement factor found by the trial court was inappropriately applied. I do agree that the enhancement factor was inappropriately applied. I conclude, however, that in order for our sentencing scheme to be in full compliance with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 1245 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and that case’s progeny, we cannot reduce an enhanced sentence imposed by a trial court which is within the appropriate range, for the sole reason that no statutory enhancement factors are applicable.

Plaintiffs' action was dismissed by the Trial Court by summary judgment. Plaintiffs then appealed to this Court and defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Judgment entered by the Trial Court was not a final judgment. Plaintiffs responded to that Motion, acknowledging that the final judgment had not been entered in the case below, but sought a stay of the appeal. We grant the Motion to Dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the Judgment below is not final and this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the appeal.

Judge Glenn, Judge Woodall, and I all agree that the trial court inappropriately applied a single enhancement factor when considering the defendant’s sentence. I write separately because each of us has different opinions as to what process should be used in determining the end result in circumstances in which the trial court inappropriately applied a single enhancing factor. Because I believe the trial judge is “closer to the case,” I would prefer to remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. I do not have that option as a result of my other two colleagues’ decisions. Therefore, with the trial court not having a presumption of correctness, I have reviewed the case de novo and, after giving consideration to the principles of sentencing, have concluded that the defendant’s appropriate sentence is two years. The result that I reached is the same reached by Judge Glenn’s opinion announcing the decision of the court. However, I think Judge Woodall has expressed appropriate concerns about the language contained in that opinion.

In this divorce case, the husband appeals the trial court’s division and valuation of the marital estate. On appeal, the husband raises several issues and essentially argues that the trial court should have restored the parties to their respective premarital situations due to the short duration of the marriage. The wife also challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate. After an extensive review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s division and valuation of the marital estate in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). Therefore, we affirm.

In this case petitioner wife obtained an order of protection against her husband. The husband, following trial, filed a Motion to reopen the proof, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59, and attached numerous affidavits contradicting some of petitioner's evidence presented at trial. The Trial Court overruled the Motion and the husband has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Plaintiff sought access to a plethora of public records from several state prison officials. Access was granted, but the name(s) of the supplier(s) of the substances necessary to carry out lethal injection executions and the employees who procured those substances were redacted based on the defendants’ interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(h)(1). Plaintiff filed suit under the Public Records Act and the trial court determined that the names were not to be redacted. Defendants filed a notice of appeal and sought a stay under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(e), but the trial court ruled it did not have jurisdiction. Defendants moved this court for a stay, which this court granted. We affirm the trial court’s decision as to the redaction of the names but reverse the trial court’s decision as to its jurisdiction to provide the certification under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(e).

Defendant, Christopher Anthony Holman, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s sentencing of him on multiple felonies following entry of “open” guilty pleas. Defendant does not challenge the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court, and does not contest the trial court’s order of partial consecutive sentencing. The sole issue on appeal is Defendant’s assertion that the order of service by incarceration of the effective sentence of twenty-two years is error. He argues that he “should be resentenced with the opportunity to enter a drug rehab [sic] program that accepts sex offenders.” After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In an indictment returned by the Davidson County Grand Jury, Defendant Wayne Lamar Donaldson, Jr., was charged with possession of, with intent to sell or deliver, twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine within a drug-free school zone. The drugs were seized after a traffic violation stop of Defendant by an officer of the Metropolitan Davidson County Police Department. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the stop. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order which granted the motion,and subsequently entered an order dismissing the indictment based upon the State’s acknowledgment that it could not proceed to trial without the evidence. The State has appealed. Based upon the finding of facts made by the trial court and the application of the law to those facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Larry Wayne Webb, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and to possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (2010); 39-17-418 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years for the possession with intent to sell conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor possession conviction, to be served concurrently. He was order to serve fifteen weekends in the Blount County Jail with the balance of his sentences on community corrections. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Dickson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Michael Anthony Saunders, of one count of aggravated assault, see T.C.A. § 39-13-104(a)(1)(B) (2006), and one count of vandalism of propertyvalued at $1,000 or more butless than $10,000,see id.§ 39-14-408. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of three years and two years, suspended to probation following the service of six months’ incarceration in the county jail. In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a mistrial based upon inflammatory statements made by the victim, (2) denying his request for judicial diversion, and (3) denying him full probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging his conviction of the prison disciplinary offense of conspiracy to violate state law. The chancery court considered the merits of the inmate’s petition and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm.
 

The trial court reformed a lease agreement, finding certain terms had been erroneously transposed.  Appellants contend the reformation was error. We affirm.