APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Romalis Gray, pled nolo contendere to attempted second degree murder and received a sentence of 8 years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.1977) and Rule 11 (c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. He argues the trial court failed to: (1) advise him that if he pled guilty, the court could question him under oath, and those answers could be used against him in a prosecution for perjury if the statements were false; and (2) advise him of the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Daryl J. Carter, was convicted after a trial by jury of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a statement made to police and by prohibiting his defense counsel from cross-examining the defendant’s ex-wife concerning her love life. In addition, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the prosecution engaged in misconduct during its closing argument. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that: (1) the trial court did not err by declining to suppress the defendant’s pretrial statement; (2)the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the defendant’s cross-examination of his ex-wife; and (3) the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. While we agree with the defendant that the prosecutor made an inappropriate statement in his closing argument, we do not believe that this inappropriate statement prejudiced the defendant to the degree necessary to warrant the reversal of his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.

The Trial Judge held that venue for the cause of action was not in Knox County. Plaintiff, on appeal, contends that defendant either waived the issue of venue, or the record establishes that Knox County was the proper venue for the cause of action. On appeal, we hold that venue is properly in Knox County and reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This is an election contest case brought pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 2-17-101, et seq. Appellants, unsuccessful candidates for various offices in the August 5, 2010 Shelby County general election, filed suit against the Appellee Shelby County Election Commission. Appellants aver that the election process was incurably flawed to the extent that Appellants and the citizens of Shelby County were denied a free and equal election as required by Article I, Section V of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court granted an involuntary dismissal, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2), finding that Appellants’ proof was insufficient to prove that the election was incurably uncertain. We affirm.

A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Jon Logsdon, of two counts of solicitation of a minor to commit especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, two counts of solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape, a Class E felony, and four counts of solicitation of the sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony. He received an effective sentence of four years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for review on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of Logsdon’s reasonable belief that undercover officers posing as minors were under eighteen years of age. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The two billboards at issue in the case were erected in 1979, prior to Collierville’s prohibition of billboards. Plaintiff sought to re-construct the billboards, and he received assurances from the Town that he could do so. However, the Town subsequently questioned whether the billboards were legal, non-conforming uses protected by the “grandfather clause” set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208, and it issued stop work orders on the billboards’ reconstruction and it refused to issue the building permits necessary for reconstruction. Plaintiff appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which affirmed the Town’s actions. Plaintiff then filed a writ of certiorari in the chancery court, which, prior to trial, remanded to the BZA. On remand, the BZA affirmed its prior decision, and Plaintiff subsequently filed a second writ of certiorari in the chancery court. The chancery court found that the BZA acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capriciously, and it invalidated the stop work orders and it declared that Plaintiff could re-construct the billboards. Based on Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that the billboards were legal uses prior to the 1982 amendment, we find that the BZA was justified in upholding the Town’s stop work orders and in upholding the Town’s denial of Plaintiff’s requested building permits. Accordingly, we find that the BZA’s decisions were not illegal, arbitrary, or capricious.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Brandon Newby, of carjacking and evading arrest, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of eight years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Bernardo Acuna Rodriguez, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for second offense driving on a revoked license. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the arresting officer’s stop and seizure of Defendant. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion, and as a result, dismissed the indictment. The State now appeals. After a review of the record, we conclude that the officer’s stop of Defendant was constitutionally valid, and therefore, the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed, the order dismissing the indictment is reversed, and this case is remanded.
 

Michael San Miguel (“Claimant”) filed a claim against his brother’s estate, Marshal San Miguel (“Decedent”), alleging that Decedent was responsible for expenses and mortgage payments relating to their jointly-owned Louisiana property. Decedent’s son, Nicholas Brandon San Miguel (“Beneficiary”), filed an exception to the claim. The clerk and master disallowed the claim. Claimant objected to the clerk and master’s report, and the trial court precluded recovery. Claimant appeals. We reverse the court’s preclusion of recovery of the mortgage payments and expenses and conclude that Claimant is entitled to reimbursement for the mortgage payments submitted on behalf of Decedent and a portion of the expenses incurred on behalf of the property. We affirm the court’s decision in all other respects.

The defendant, Marquette Woods, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerome Williams, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief on the basis that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter his 1986 conviction of aggravated rape because the indictment failed to allege an offense. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after undergoing laser corrective eye surgery. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging medical negligence. Subsequently, Defendant filed an amended answer alleging, inter alia, the affirmative defense of comparative fault. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of Defendant’s amended answer, and following a hearing on the motion, Defendant agreed to the entry of a consent order waiving the defense of comparative fault. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed motions in limine to preclude the testimony of two of Defendant’s experts. Plaintiff argued that, because Defendant waived comparative fault, he could not use the causation testimony of the two experts to shift blame away from himself unless he first plead comparative fault under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied both motions. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The employee sought reconsideration of her workers’ compensation settlement. The trial court found that she had voluntarily resigned and was therefore not eligible to receive reconsideration. The employee has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

In this case, the plaintiff, a taxi driver injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought workers’ compensation benefits from the taxi company that he alleged employed him. The trial court held that he was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves a divorce action that includes a claim against third parties. The wife filed a divorce complaint against the husband, and the husband counterclaimed for divorce. Later, the husband amended his divorce counterclaim to add claims against third parties as defendants, alleging that they took personal property from the marital home with the wife’s acquiescence. Later, the divorce claims were dismissed, but the claims against the third parties remained. After a hearing, the trial court awarded the husband compensatory and punitive damages as to the property taken. As to one item, however, the third parties were ordered to deliver the item to the court to be donated to a local charity. The third parties now appeal. We affirm the trial court’s finding as to the value of the property taken, remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52.01 as to the monetary judgment, and vacate the order requiring the donation of an item of property.
 

The defendant, Jerry W. Elliott, was convicted by a Henderson County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”), a Class A misdemeanor, and violations of the open container, financial responsibility, and registration laws, all Class C misdemeanors. He was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction and thirty days for violations of the open container and registration laws. He also received fines for each conviction as well as for violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court separately found the defendant guilty of violation of the implied consent law, for which his driver’s license was revoked for one year. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of DUI and also argues that his conviction for violation of the implied consent law is improper because the charging instrument is not in the record. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained compensable injuries to his neck and lower back as a result of a March 29, 2007 automobile accident. His employer denied that the employee had any permanent impairment or disability due to the accident. The employer sought an evaluation through the Medical Impairment Registry, but the doctor selected for the evaluation declined to assess impairment because he did not find the employee to be at maximum medical improvement. The employer sought a continuance of the previously-scheduled trial. The trial court denied that motion. The trial court ruled for the employee and awarded disability benefits. On appeal, the employer argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion to continue and by awarding permanent disability benefits. We affirm the judgment.

Petitioner, Calvin Landers, was convicted by a jury of rape of a child and sentenced to twenty years. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Calvin Landers, No. W2007-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2901603 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jul. 25, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also asserted that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) , that his conviction was based on evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest, that his conviction was based on evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search, and that there was a “fatal variance” between the indictment and the proof. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a thorough review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief where the proof showed that trial counsel made a tactical decision to forego a motion to suppress; met with Petitioner at least ten times prior to trial; and was given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Moreover, Petitioner did not raise his issue with regard to exhibits in the petition for post-conviction relief so it cannot be raised on appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The appellant, Steven Larry Kilgore, Jr., pled nolo contendere in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to misdemeanor theft of property and received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on probation. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant reserved a certified question of law as to whether the police had reasonable suspicion to seize and detain him and whether the subsequent, non-consensual search of his car and seizure of evidence was illegal. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Demario Rawlings, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but five days suspended. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner,Michael Smythe,appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief filed 14 years after the entry of his guilty pleaded convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault for which he received sentences of 17 years’ and 6 years’ incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case arises from juvenile proceedings concerning the then minor child A.W. The Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) found A.W. to be an unruly child. A.W. filed a Petition to Vacate Orders and to Dismiss (“Petition to Vacate”) regarding the order finding A.W. to be an unruly child. The Juvenile Court denied the Petition to Vacate. A.W. appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The State of Tennessee (“the State”) moved to dismiss the appeal arguing the appeal was untimely. The Circuit Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. A.W. appeals to this Court, arguing that the Circuit Court should have heard A.W.’s appeal from Juvenile Court. We hold that the Circuit Court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss A.W.’s appeal of the Juvenile Court’s order denying A.W.’s Petition to Vacate. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.

The Defendant, Hanes Cooper, appeals as of right from the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. The Defendant pled guilty to attempted theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, official misconduct, and conspiracy to commit forgery of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. After the plea agreement was entered, the Defendant filed an application for judicial diversion which the trial court denied. Following the denial of his application for judicial diversion, the Defendant was sentenced, pursuant to the plea agreement, to a six-year term of probation. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his application for judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court, but we remand the case for correction of the judgments.

Appellant, Christopher Vigil, appeals from his conviction for criminally negligent homicide. As a result of the conviction, Appellant was sentenced to two years in incarceration. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for criminally negligent homicide where the proof showed Appellant was engaged in conduct that he knew, or should have known, created a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the victim and constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care of an ordinary person under those circumstances and that Appellant’s actions proximately caused the victim’s death. Further, the trial court properly sentenced Appellant to two years where the record indicated Appellant had a “significant” prior criminal history. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case involves the sufficiency of service of process. After an automobile accident, Plaintiff sued Defendant for personal injuries. Private process server served Defendant’s father with the complaint rather than Defendant. The Defendant answered the complaint, raising the defense that there was insufficient service of process as to him. Over a year after the summons had been issued, Defendant moved for summary judgment based on insufficient service of process. The trial court denied summary judgment, finding that the Defendant was evading service. Because we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to find that the Defendant was evading service of process, we reverse and remand.