APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this extraordinary appeal, the Defendant, Allison Elizabeth McLean, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order affirming the Assistant District Attorney’s (“ADA”) denial of pretrial diversion and the trial court’s refusal to grant an interlocutory appeal of it’s denial of her pretrial diversion request. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari because the Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) abused her discretion by (a) failing to support her decision with “substantial evidence;” (b) failing to consider and give proper weight to the Defendant’s amenability to correction; (c) giving weight to the circumstances of the case and the need for deterrence without supporting it with evidence; (d) considering improperly the victim’s age to “enhance” the circumstances of the offense; and (e) giving “little or no weight” to the Defendant’s lack of criminal record and her eight-year marriage; and (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the ADA’s denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Ian Zraik McClellan, pled guilty to an indictment against him. The State alleged that the indictment charged the Defendant with aggravated vehicular homicide, and the Defendant contended the indictment sufficiently charged him with only vehicular homicide. At the time he entered his plea, the Defendant agreed to allow the trial court to determine whether the indictment sufficiently charged him with aggravated vehicular homicide. After a hearing, the trial court determined the indictment sufficiently charged the Defendant with aggravated vehicular homicide. On appeal,the Defendant contends first that the indictment was not sufficient to charge him with aggravated vehicular homicide and only sufficiently charged him with vehicular homicide and second that his guilty plea was not validly entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide.

A former employee broughta retaliatorydischarge action againstthe employer city,asserting a claim under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in the city’s favor and the employee appealed. Because genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, we reverse.
 

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, a sheriff’s deputy, alleged that he sustained a mental injury as a result of a confrontation that occurred while he was serving an eviction warrant. His employer denied the claim and filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the injury was not compensable because the alleged precipitating event was not unusual or abnormal for a deputy. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred by concluding that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the incident in question was sufficiently extraordinary or unusual to support a mental injury claim. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injury qualified as extraordinary and unusual or was merely the result of stress ordinarily experienced in the line of duty, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.

This is a malicious prosecution case arising out of a dispute between neighbors. A dispute arose when the plaintiff neighbor hired a tree service to trim the branches of a tree near the border between the two neighbors’ properties. After a confrontation, the police were called. After they arrived, the police cited both neighbors on charges of disorderly conduct. After the charges against the plaintiff neighbor were dismissed, he filed this malicious prosecution action against the defendant county and two of the police officers involved. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff neighbor now appeals. We affirm.

The Trial Judge held that venue for the cause of action was not in Knox County. Plaintiff, on appeal, contends that defendant either waived the issue of venue, or the record establishes that Knox County was the proper venue for the cause of action. On appeal, we hold that venue is properly in Knox County and reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This extraordinary appeal involves proceedings to dissolve a nonprofit corporation. After the case had been pending in the trial court for seven years, with a court-appointed receiver in control of the nonprofit corporation’s assets, the trial court dismissed the case in its entirety based upon a motion to dismiss that was filed early in the proceedings but never heard. We conclude that the trial court erred in doing so, and therefore, we reverse and remand for further  proceedings, to include an orderly winding up of the nonprofit corporation’s affairs and a proper termination of the receivership when appropriate.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I would hold that the Shelby County trial court properly found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit  against the Attorney General. Because the lawsuit named the Attorney General as the defendant and sought substantial relief against the Attorney General, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-4-104, I would hold that only the Davidson County court had jurisdiction over the lawsuit. I would hold that the trial court erred only in declining to transfer the case to Davidson County in the interests of justice.

Petitioner, Romalis Gray, pled nolo contendere to attempted second degree murder and received a sentence of 8 years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.1977) and Rule 11 (c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. He argues the trial court failed to: (1) advise him that if he pled guilty, the court could question him under oath, and those answers could be used against him in a prosecution for perjury if the statements were false; and (2) advise him of the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Daryl J. Carter, was convicted after a trial by jury of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a statement made to police and by prohibiting his defense counsel from cross-examining the defendant’s ex-wife concerning her love life. In addition, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the prosecution engaged in misconduct during its closing argument. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that: (1) the trial court did not err by declining to suppress the defendant’s pretrial statement; (2)the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the defendant’s cross-examination of his ex-wife; and (3) the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. While we agree with the defendant that the prosecutor made an inappropriate statement in his closing argument, we do not believe that this inappropriate statement prejudiced the defendant to the degree necessary to warrant the reversal of his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.

Defendant, Bernardo Acuna Rodriguez, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for second offense driving on a revoked license. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the arresting officer’s stop and seizure of Defendant. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion, and as a result, dismissed the indictment. The State now appeals. After a review of the record, we conclude that the officer’s stop of Defendant was constitutionally valid, and therefore, the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress is reversed, the order dismissing the indictment is reversed, and this case is remanded.
 

This is an election contest case brought pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 2-17-101, et seq. Appellants, unsuccessful candidates for various offices in the August 5, 2010 Shelby County general election, filed suit against the Appellee Shelby County Election Commission. Appellants aver that the election process was incurably flawed to the extent that Appellants and the citizens of Shelby County were denied a free and equal election as required by Article I, Section V of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court granted an involuntary dismissal, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2), finding that Appellants’ proof was insufficient to prove that the election was incurably uncertain. We affirm.

A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Jon Logsdon, of two counts of solicitation of a minor to commit especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, two counts of solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape, a Class E felony, and four counts of solicitation of the sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony. He received an effective sentence of four years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for review on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of Logsdon’s reasonable belief that undercover officers posing as minors were under eighteen years of age. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The two billboards at issue in the case were erected in 1979, prior to Collierville’s prohibition of billboards. Plaintiff sought to re-construct the billboards, and he received assurances from the Town that he could do so. However, the Town subsequently questioned whether the billboards were legal, non-conforming uses protected by the “grandfather clause” set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208, and it issued stop work orders on the billboards’ reconstruction and it refused to issue the building permits necessary for reconstruction. Plaintiff appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which affirmed the Town’s actions. Plaintiff then filed a writ of certiorari in the chancery court, which, prior to trial, remanded to the BZA. On remand, the BZA affirmed its prior decision, and Plaintiff subsequently filed a second writ of certiorari in the chancery court. The chancery court found that the BZA acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capriciously, and it invalidated the stop work orders and it declared that Plaintiff could re-construct the billboards. Based on Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that the billboards were legal uses prior to the 1982 amendment, we find that the BZA was justified in upholding the Town’s stop work orders and in upholding the Town’s denial of Plaintiff’s requested building permits. Accordingly, we find that the BZA’s decisions were not illegal, arbitrary, or capricious.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Brandon Newby, of carjacking and evading arrest, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of eight years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Calvin Landers, was convicted by a jury of rape of a child and sentenced to twenty years. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Calvin Landers, No. W2007-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2901603 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jul. 25, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jan. 20, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also asserted that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) , that his conviction was based on evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest, that his conviction was based on evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search, and that there was a “fatal variance” between the indictment and the proof. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a thorough review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief where the proof showed that trial counsel made a tactical decision to forego a motion to suppress; met with Petitioner at least ten times prior to trial; and was given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Moreover, Petitioner did not raise his issue with regard to exhibits in the petition for post-conviction relief so it cannot be raised on appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The appellant, Steven Larry Kilgore, Jr., pled nolo contendere in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to misdemeanor theft of property and received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on probation. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant reserved a certified question of law as to whether the police had reasonable suspicion to seize and detain him and whether the subsequent, non-consensual search of his car and seizure of evidence was illegal. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Demario Rawlings, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but five days suspended. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner,Michael Smythe,appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief filed 14 years after the entry of his guilty pleaded convictions of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault for which he received sentences of 17 years’ and 6 years’ incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Michael San Miguel (“Claimant”) filed a claim against his brother’s estate, Marshal San Miguel (“Decedent”), alleging that Decedent was responsible for expenses and mortgage payments relating to their jointly-owned Louisiana property. Decedent’s son, Nicholas Brandon San Miguel (“Beneficiary”), filed an exception to the claim. The clerk and master disallowed the claim. Claimant objected to the clerk and master’s report, and the trial court precluded recovery. Claimant appeals. We reverse the court’s preclusion of recovery of the mortgage payments and expenses and conclude that Claimant is entitled to reimbursement for the mortgage payments submitted on behalf of Decedent and a portion of the expenses incurred on behalf of the property. We affirm the court’s decision in all other respects.

The defendant, Marquette Woods, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerome Williams, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief on the basis that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter his 1986 conviction of aggravated rape because the indictment failed to allege an offense. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after undergoing laser corrective eye surgery. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging medical negligence. Subsequently, Defendant filed an amended answer alleging, inter alia, the affirmative defense of comparative fault. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of Defendant’s amended answer, and following a hearing on the motion, Defendant agreed to the entry of a consent order waiving the defense of comparative fault. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed motions in limine to preclude the testimony of two of Defendant’s experts. Plaintiff argued that, because Defendant waived comparative fault, he could not use the causation testimony of the two experts to shift blame away from himself unless he first plead comparative fault under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied both motions. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The employee sought reconsideration of her workers’ compensation settlement. The trial court found that she had voluntarily resigned and was therefore not eligible to receive reconsideration. The employee has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

In this case, the plaintiff, a taxi driver injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought workers’ compensation benefits from the taxi company that he alleged employed him. The trial court held that he was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm the judgment.