APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Marlon Williams, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for possession of marijuana, a Class E felony, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, a Class D felony. He is serving one year for possession of marijuana consecutively to three years for possession of a firearm. The Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea to the possession of a firearm charge and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he did not understand that the firearm conviction required 100 percent service of the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Steven Q. Stanford, was convicted by a Campbell County jury of one count of initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the defendant was sentenced, as a Range III offender, to serve thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we find that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the convictions, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had borrowed money from the Bank and executed a trust deed to secure the loan and the property was properly foreclosed by the Bank as the successful bidder. Further, that defendants then filed numerous documents in the Register of Deeds office to slander plaintiffs' title. Defendants never answered the Complaint and after several months plaintiffs moved for a default judgment which was granted at a hearing before the Trial Court. The Trial Court ruled that the various documents filed by the defendants in the Register of Deeds office were null and void and assessed costs to the defendants. Defendants appealed pro se, and we dismiss the appeal on the grounds that they failed to comply with any of the applicable rules of appellate procedure governing appeals.

The defendant, Raymond Bradley, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s revocation of probation for failure to pay restitution. The defendant pleaded guilty in 2009 to facilitating aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, in exchange for a four-year suspended sentence, and the trial court ordered him to pay $15,500 in restitution. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. On August 11, 2010, the trial court found that the defendant violated the terms of his suspended sentence and revoked his probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation without finding that the defendant had the ability to pay, that he willfully failed to pay, and that no alternative measure to incarceration was available. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Demario Thomas, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we modify the trial court’s judgment to a sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Terrell Westbrooks suffered serious bodily injury as that term is contemplated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(34). I believe the majority’s holding upends the statutory definition of “serious bodily injury” by essentially declaring that any injury inflicted by a deadly weapon results in serious bodily injury. I do not believe the statutory definitions support such an interpretation.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bryant Guartos, of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life plus forty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed an appeal, and this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. State v. Bryant Guartos, M2003-03073-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 163633, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 24, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 28, 2006). Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the Petitioner’s case for further consideration in light of new sentencing case law. Guartos v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 1197 (2007). Upon review, this Court reversed the Petitioner’s judgments for especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and remanded the case for resentencing. State v. Bryant Guartos, No. M2003-03073-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4245084 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 4, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 7, 2008). The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to find that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this divorce case, the husband challenges the trial court’s distribution of the marital property, valuation of the marital residence, and award of alimony to the wife. Without a transcript or statement of the evidence, this court cannot adequately review the issues raised by the husband. Finding that the trial court did not err as a matter of law, we affirm.

The defendant, Calvin Oliver, appeals his effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentences as imposed.

On March 8, 2009, the defendant was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and sentenced to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence; (3) his due process rights were violated by prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After careful review of the record, we reject each of these claims and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Lakeisha Margaret Watkins, of attempted child neglect, four counts of aggravated child abuse, and two counts of aggravated child neglect. The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect; and (2) the trial court erred when it ordered her sentences to run consecutively. Because the Defendant’s delay in seeking medical treatment for the victim, as proven in Count 5, did not cause serious bodily injury separate and apart from the serious bodily injury caused by the Defendant and proven in Count 4, we are constrained to reverse the conviction for aggravated child neglect in Count 5. The trial court’s judgments are affirmed in all other respects.

Defendant Anton Mayhew was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a pair of concurrent twelve-year terms. Defendant Travis Brown was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent twelve-year terms for the aggravated robberies and to a concurrent twenty-five-year term as a violent offender for the aggravated rape, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, Defendant Mayhew claims that the trial court erred in admitting a portion of one witness’s testimony and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Defendant Brown claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction relating to missing evidence, by requiring him to stand next to an enlarged photograph in open court, and by sentencing him to the maximum sentence. After careful review of the record and the arguments raised by both defendants and the State, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects.

The defendants, Michael Farmer and Anthony Clark, were convicted of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. They were each sentenced to fifteen years for the especially aggravated robbery and to a concurrent eight years for aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, both defendants claim that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions, asserting that no evidence put forth at their trial established that they actually took money from either victim. Defendant Clark further claims that the straight, pass-through bullet wound inflicted on one victim’s left thigh failed to pose a substantial enough risk of death to qualify as a serious bodily injury of the type necessary to sustain a conviction for especially aggravated robbery. Defendant Farmer further claims that the trial court erred by failing to sentence him as an especially mitigated offender. After carefully reviewing the defendants’ arguments and the record evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Dustin Lee Owens, was indicted for two counts of solicitation of a minor and one count of attempted aggravated statutory rape. Defendant entered an open guilty plea to all counts and was sentenced by the trial court to serve two years concurrently for Counts 1 and 2 and two years for Count 3, to be served consecutively to Counts 1 and 2, for a total effective sentence of four years as a Range I standard offender. In this appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing, the length of the sentences, and the requirement that the sentences be served by incarceration. We find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following his conviction by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of one count of aggravated assault for which he received a sentence of eight years’ incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender, the petitioner, Atavis Cortez Cunningham, filed a timely petition for postconviction relief based upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and an unconstitutional jury composition. The Dyer County Circuit Court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

The defendant, William Randall Crawford, pled guilty to three counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of simple assault. He received an aggregate sentence of forty-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sentencing determinations made by the trial court, specifically arguing that he should have received the minimum sentence for each individual offense and that the sentences should not have been ordered to run consecutively. After careful review, we conclude that the trial court imposed a lawful sentence and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rita White, was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and pled guilty to failure to obey a required traffic control device, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010), 55-8-109 (2010). She was sentenced to eleven months and twentynine days for the DUI conviction, with ten days to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. She was sentenced to thirty days’ probation for the traffic device conviction, to be served concurrently with the DUI sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following an indictment by the Cheatham County Grand Jury, Petitioner, Michael Charles King, entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of felony murder in Dickson County. He was subsequently sentenced to life in prison. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his plea of nolo contendere was not sufficient to waive venue because the district attorney did not authorize the waiver in writing. We have concluded that venue was properly waived, and Petitioner’s judgment is valid. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the habeas corpus court.

This is a termination of parental rights case with an unusual procedural history. Following an incident with one of her children, Appellant Mother was charged with one count of aggravated child neglect or endangerment and one count of aggravated child abuse of a child under eight years of age. She pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to six years’ incarceration. In a separate proceeding, the children were adjudicated to be dependent and neglected and victims of severe child abuse. At the termination of parental rights hearing, which is the subject of this appeal, the trial court determined that the previous finding of severe child abuse was res judicata and did not permit the parties to relitigate the issue. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding the issue of severe child abuse to be res judicata because the order finding the children to be dependent and neglected and victims of severe child abuse is not a final judgment. Consequently, Appellant should have been permitted to present evidence and argument at the termination proceeding as to whether she committed severe child abuse. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and remanded.

A Rutherford County jury convicted Appellant, Wanda F. Russell, of three counts of theft over $1,000. Prior to trial, the State filed a notice that it was intending to introduce Appellant’s prior convictions to impeach her testimony. At the conclusion of a jury-out hearing during trial, the trial court concluded that the State could use Appellant’s prior convictions for passing worthless checks pursuant to Rule 609(a)(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence to impeach Appellant. Appellant elected not to testify. She now appeals to this Court arguing that the trial court erred in determining that her prior convictions were admissible for impeachment. We have reviewed the record on appeal. We have concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling that the prior convictions were appropriate for impeachment of Appellant. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jerome Lionel Price, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, without appointment of counsel, finding that the petitioner had failed to present a claim upon which a petition for post-conviction relief may be founded. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the decision was in error because he asserts that he did, in fact, state a colorable claim for relief. We agree. As such, we reverse the order summarily dismissing the petition and remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

This case stems from a lawsuit over an alleged implied partnership. Rebecca Gribble Waddell (“Waddell”) and Gregory C. Rustin (“Rustin”) were involved romantically for a number of years. After the couple separated, Waddell sued Rustin in the Chancery Court for Jefferson County (“the Trial Court”), alleging, among other things, that a partnership existed between Waddell and Rustin. The Trial Court held, inter alia, that there was no partnership between Waddell and Rustin and ordered divestiture of certain property from Waddell to Rustin. Waddell appeals to this Court, and both parties raise multiple issues. Rustin also argues that this appeal is frivolous. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court on all issues except for that concerning divestiture of certain property from Waddell, which we reverse. We decline to hold this appeal frivolous. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part.

The petitioner, Lester Arnold Clouse, requests that this court grant him a new post-conviction hearing, asserting that the post-conviction court below did not address all of the issues raised in his petition for post-conviction relief nor did it memorialize its findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing as required by statute. After reviewing the entire record, including the transcript of the original post-conviction hearing, we conclude that the order filed by Judge Wallace is sufficient for appellate review as it adopted the earlier oral findings of fact made by Judge Sells. All other issues are waived for failing to file an adequate record for review and for failing to provide appropriate citations to the record. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petitioner post-conviction relief.

On December 10, 2010 the Trial Court entered an Agreed Order on Parenting Time. Ann Laure Chamberlain (“Appellant”) filed a motion to set aside the December 10, 2010 order. On February 28, 2011 the Trial Court entered its order, inter alia, denying the motion to set aside, reserving child support matters, and stating that the parties may mediate any remaining issues regarding parenting time. Appellant appeals to this Court. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Petitioner, Rodney Corley, was convicted in 1985 of first degree murder, armed robbery, and employing a firearm in the commission of a felony, and he was sentenced to life plus five years. In 2010, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence, and the trial court dismissed the petition without a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred when it denied his petition without a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.