APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Lesa Annette White McCulloch, appeals her convictions for one count of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, three counts of simple possession of a controlled substance, one count of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, and one count of possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, and her resulting sixteen-year sentence. The Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search of the Defendant’s home; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for the State’s failure to preserve material evidence and by declining to issue a special jury instruction; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell; (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the Defendant’s prior bad acts; (5) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments by commenting on the Defendant’s intelligence; (6) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; and (7) the trial court erred in determining her sentencing range and by ordering partial consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm; however, we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 1 due to a clerical error.

The defendant, Jamar Laquan Braden, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of theft of property and unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon for which he received an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of venue.  Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

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The defendant, Byron Cole Tucker, pled guilty to aggravated assault for which he received a sentence of five years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended to five years of supervised probation.  The trial court also ordered the defendant pay $39,028.49 in restitution through monthly payments of no less than $350.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s restitution order.  After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Christopher Desmond Simpson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.  After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Nikos Burgins, was convicted by a jury of five counts of aggravated rape, four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of ninety-six years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, contending that the State failed to establish removal or confinement that exceeded the accompanying felonies and that the evidence only established one count of especially aggravated kidnapping per victim; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach the Defendant with a prior aggravated assault conviction; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the two victims to be present in the courtroom prior to their testimony; and (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the Defendant’s letters, averring that they were not properly authenticated. Following our review, we remand the case for the entry of corrected judgments reflecting one conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping per victim.

The plaintiff appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. Having determined that the plaintiff has waived arguments related to his breach of contract claim, we review solely the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful foreclosure. We conclude that the defendants did not strictly comply with the notice requirements of the deed of trust, vacate the portion of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants with respect to the plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim, and set aside the foreclosure sale. We affirm the trial court’s order with respect to the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. We decline to award the defendants damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1- 122.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Mark Christopher Beasley, was convicted in Case Number 20CR4 of two counts of violation of the conditions of community supervision for life; two counts of failure to appear; and one count of violation of the sexual offender registry and, in Case Number 21CR4, of two counts of violation of the conditions of community supervision for life; one count of tampering with, removing, or vandalizing a tracking device; and one count of tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed effective sentences of one year and four years, respectively, to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of five years. On appeal, the defendant asserts the proof is insufficient to sustain his conviction for tampering with evidence in Case Number 21CR4 and, in the alternative, his convictions for tampering with evidence and tampering with, removing, or vandalizing a tracking device violate principles of double jeopardy. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rashaud Deavon Watson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel and entered a voluntary and intelligent plea.  Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

I respectfully dissent with the portion of the majority opinion concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for tampering with evidence. It bears repeating at the outset that while the focus of this appeal is on the tampering with evidence conviction, Tenn. Code Ann. Section 39-16-503, a Class C felony, the Defendant was also charged with and does not dispute his conviction of tampering with evidence pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. Section 40-39-304, a Class A misdemeanor (requiring minimum of 180 service).2 In my view, the evidence adduced at trial failed to show that the Defendant had the requisite action and intent to conceal the GPS device by placing it in the trash can at a convenience store.

A Loudon County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Deborah Morton, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced the Appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her conviction. The Appellant also contends that the trial court erroneously excluded and erroneously admitted certain lay and expert testimony, that the trial court erroneously denied her request for a jury instruction concerning the State’s failure to preserve evidence, that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, and that these cumulative errors deprived her of her right to a fair trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a Final Order of Dismissal and Order Approving Minor’s Settlement. Because the appellant did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

This case involves a church property dispute.  The plaintiffs are trustees of a local church congregation who were attempting to establish their congregation as separate from the church’s national governing body and from a local congregation, with which the plaintiffs had previously been joined, that desired to remain affiliated with the national church body.  Naming as defendants the national body and trustees of the congregation desiring to remain with the national body, the plaintiffs sought, inter alia, declaratory judgment that real property upon which the local church building was located belonged to their congregation and was not held in trust for the national body as the national body’s written policy dictated.  The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, asserting in part that pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc. 531 S.W.3d 146 (Tenn. 2017), the national body’s written policy governed ownership of the property, which had therefore been held in trust for the national body.  Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine precluded the court’s hearing any claims except the property dispute and that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment declaring the national body as the owner of the property and associated personalty and the congregation aligned with the national body as entitled to use and possession of the property and associated personalty.  Upon the plaintiffs’ appeal to this Court and motion to the trial court for a stay, the trial court granted a stay of the judgment pending appeal and entered an order, inter alia, directing the plaintiffs to pay expenses related to the property while the stay remained in effect.  The defendants filed a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 7(a) motion seeking review of the trial court’s stay order, which this Court denied.  The plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to supplement the record with their response to the Rule 7(a) motion, which, upon limited remand, was granted by the trial court.  The defendants then filed a motion requesting that this Court strike the references to the supplemented materials in the plaintiffs’ principal brief and disregard post-judgment facts in the supplemented materials.  Discerning no reversible error in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment order in its entirety.  However, because the supplemented materials included documents not reviewed by the trial court at the summary judgment stage, we grant the defendants’ motion to disregard the supplemental materials and strike the plaintiffs’ references to them.  We deny the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. 

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The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Elizabeth R.1 (“Mother”) and David C. (“Father”) to their child Lily C. (“Child”). DCS alleged that Father was guilty of severe child abuse by, among other things, raping her. As grounds against Mother, DCS alleged (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home for the Child in the first four months following removal; (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the Child’s removal; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the Child. The trial court found that DCS established the alleged grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, and that termination of parental rights was in Child’s best interest. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Gutierrez, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his convictions of first degree premeditated murder and four counts of aggravated assault and resulting effective sentence of life plus sixteen years.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress statements he made in response to a custodial interrogation after he had invoked his right to remain silent and because trial counsel failed to intervene when he made incriminating statements during an interview for a television show.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to consider awards of attorney fees and costs after dismissal of a claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c).  The plaintiff homeowner entered into a contract with the defendant contractor.  The homeowner sued the contractor, and the contractor filed a countercomplaint alleging breach of contract.  After his motion to amend was granted, the contractor filed an amended countercomplaint asserting the same breach of contract claim with revised damages.  The trial court later granted the homeowner’s motion to dismiss the countercomplaint for failure to state a claim.  The homeowner then sought attorney fees and costs pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c).  The trial court granted the motion but excluded fees and costs incurred prior to the date the amended countercomplaint was filed.  After the homeowner appealed the amount of attorney fees awarded, a split panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed.  On appeal, we hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the homeowner’s award of attorney fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c) was limited to those incurred after the date the amended countercomplaint was filed.  We reverse the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s award, and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the award of reasonable attorney fees and costs.

This appeal arises from Appellant/Mother’s January 2020 petition to modify the visitation provisions in an agreed parenting plan entered by the juvenile court in December 2017.  Following proceedings before a juvenile court magistrate, Mother filed a timely request for a de novo hearing by the judge pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107(d).  In lieu of an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court considered the matter on the parties’ briefs and argument of counsel.  The court determined it could not make factual findings without conducting a de novo trial and advised the parties that, in lieu of a hearing, a direct appeal to this Court was “a remedy for either party.”  Mother did not set a hearing, and the juvenile court affirmed the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Mother appeals.  We vacate the juvenile court’s order and remand this matter for a de novo hearing before the juvenile court judge.  

The defendant, Capone Carroll Strange, appeals his Scott County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated child abuse, arguing that the jury venire was improperly influenced by the victim, that the trial court erred by failing to strike a juror for cause, that a State witness gave improper expert testimony, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B.  We affirm the trial court’s denial of the Appellant’s recusal motion.

Plaintiff, a Tennessee limited liability company headquartered in Blount County, sued defendants, a former employee and a limited liability company both residents of the U.S. territory of Guam, alleging breach of a non-compete agreement. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to enforce the non-compete agreement’s forum selection clause and its express waiver of the inconvenient forum defense. We reverse, holding that the forum selection clause dictates the proper forum.

The Defendant, Guy A. Cobb, was convicted of one count of possession with intent to sell more than one-half gram of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years’ probation. See T.C.A. § 39-17-434 (2018). Subsequently, the trial court found the Defendant violated conditions of his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se defendant, Brandon Cardell Coman, Jr., appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, excluding certain evidence, denying a motion to suppress certain evidence, denying the defendant’s request for new counsel, denying a motion to dismiss the charges; that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and that his trial was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Edward Earl Killgo, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to statutory rape, a Class E felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a six-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence, including his request for judicial diversion, and whether he would be placed on the sex offender registry. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Appellant be given credit for time served in jail, that he serve the balance of his six-year sentence on supervised probation, and that he be placed on the sex offender registry. On appeal, the Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying diversion and by ordering that he register as a sex offender. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denying judicial diversion and ordering that the Appellant be placed on the sex offender registry and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights.  The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that four grounds for termination as to the mother were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) persistent conditions; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility.  The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child.  The mother appeals.  We affirm.

The petitioner, Anthony E. Barnett, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely.  Because the record establishes that the incarcerated petitioner did not submit his petition to the appropriate prison official for mailing within one year of the final action of the supreme court on his direct appeal, we affirm the ruling of the post-conviction court.

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