APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a counterclaim asserting defamation filed by the original defendant, a construction company, concerning statements that the original plaintiffs/homeowners made online and to third parties that were allegedly damaging to the construction company’s reputation. The homeowners sought dismissal of the defamation claims pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-101, et seq., known as the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the homeowners’ motion to dismiss and ultimately entered judgment against them. The homeowners have appealed solely the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss. Determining that the trial court should have analyzed the motion to dismiss pursuant to the provisions of the TPPA rather than applying a traditional Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 analysis, we vacate the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings. We also vacate the trial court’s monetary award to the defendant construction company and remand that issue for further consideration once the motion to dismiss has been properly adjudicated.

This appeal involves a long-running dispute between two groups of property owners in the real estate community development of Renegade Mountain over composition of the board of directors and resultant control of the community organization. Plaintiffs, members of the Renegade Mountain Community Club, Inc. (“RMCC”), a homeowner’s association, brought this action in 2011, seeking a declaratory judgment affirming their status as directors and officers of RMCC. The Defendants contested the validity of the election at which Plaintiffs were allegedly elected. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration of whether the purported developer possessed developer’s rights. After two prior appeals and a subsequent retrial, the trial court held that Defendant Moy Toy, Inc., a property owner, does not have developer’s rights. The trial court further ruled that Plaintiffs were properly elected as members of RMCC’s board and enforced an easement of enjoyment to use certain property in the development that was designated as “common areas,” in favor of Plaintiffs and all other members of RMCC. Defendants appeal. We vacate the trial court’s findings that the parties stipulated that the old golf course property was not “common property,” and that Plaintiffs “have no interest” in it because the parties agreed and stipulated only that the old golf course property was “not an issue” in this case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children.  Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to the children on multiple bases.  Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The petitioner, Richard Cleophus Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and due process. Because the petitioner’s post-conviction counsel also represented the petitioner on direct appeal, we remand to the post-conviction court to determine whether the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily agrees to waive post-conviction counsel’s conflict of interests.

This is an appeal following a four-day divorce trial. The husband raises nine issues on appeal regarding the grounds for divorce, the role and testimony of an expert witness, the valuation and division of marital property, judgments for attorney fees and accountant fees, and a finding of criminal contempt. For the following reasons, we affirm as modified and remand for further proceedings.

Following a trial, a Davidson County jury convicted Defendant, James Lee Simpson, of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault resulting in death, and felon in possession of a firearm, for which he received a total effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by providing incomplete and erroneous jury instructions on the issue of self-defense; (2) the trial court erred by preventing Defendant from cross-examining a witness regarding alleged prior acts of violence by the victims in violation of both Tennessee Rule of Evidence 405 and Defendant’s right to confrontation; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant; (5) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault resulting in death; and (6) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to cross-examine a witness regarding Defendant’s prior conviction for possessing a firearm after concluding that Defendant had “opened the door” to the cross-examination. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse Defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

Patient, by next of kin, sued hospital alleging negligence during his treatment. Trial court granted hospital’s motion to dismiss based on patient’s failure to file the complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Patient appealed the dismissal. Because the trial court correctly determined that the statute of limitations commenced running when the patient was discharged, we affirm.

Defendant, Jeffrey L. Crowe, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for reckless aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, second offense DUI by impairment, second offense DUI per se, and resisting arrest. Following a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of the charged offenses and sentenced to an effective sentence of two years to be suspended on probation after serving 32 days incarcerated. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred when it restricted Defendant’s cross-examination of the victim; and that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed hearsay testimony. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs and arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a contract dispute. The trial court dismissed Appellant's action for failure to state a claim based on the statutes of limitations prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-725 and/or Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-109(a)(3). We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

In a previous appeal from a divorce, this Court vacated the trial court’s award of alimony to the wife.  We remanded for reconsideration of the amount of alimony after determining the husband’s ability to pay.  On remand, the parties stipulated that the husband’s gross income was less than the amount the trial court originally relied upon in setting alimony.  But the court made no change in its alimony award.  The husband appeals.  We affirm.

George Green Taylor, III (“Father”) filed a petition to modify his permanent parenting plan in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”). Father’s ex-wife, Jenny Sue Taylor (“Mother”), responded to the petition contending, inter alia, that Father’s proposed plan was not in the children’s best interests. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that a slight change in the parties’ children’s summer schedule was warranted and ordered an upward deviation in Father’s child support for extraordinary educational expenses. Father appeals. The trial court’s ruling on Father’s child support is modified to reflect that Father’s base child support obligation is $731.00 per month, and we affirm as modified. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that an upward deviation in Father’s child support is warranted and in the children’s best interests, but we remand for entry of an order and child support worksheet reflecting the monthly amount owed for said upward deviation. Finally, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Mother is entitled to her attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).

This appeal involves a contractual dispute related to the plaintiff’s employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude her proffered expert for failing to comply with the locality rule expressed in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011). Plaintiff also appeals the trial court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the trial court to exclude the expert. Additionally, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants.

This appeal arises from a common-law writ of certiorari filed in the circuit court; however, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court, which was presiding over a dependency and neglect action, retained jurisdiction to enter a custodial order after a petition to adopt the children at issue had been filed in the chancery court. The adoption petition was filed after a contested evidentiary hearing for the change of custody had concluded but prior to the juvenile court announcing its decision or entering an order. After the adoption petition was filed, the juvenile court entered an order removing the children from their grandmother’s custody and awarding custody to the mother. The grandmother challenged the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to enter the order by filing a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari. The circuit court granted the writ but held “that the Juvenile Court had the authority to enter the [post-petition custodial order] owing to the fact that proof had been heard on [the petition to change custody].” We respectfully disagree. Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-103(c) unambiguously states, “when jurisdiction has been acquired [by dependency and neglect proceedings] under this part, such jurisdiction shall continue until . . . a petition for adoption is filed regarding the child in question as set out in § 36-1-116(f).” (emphasis added). Furthermore, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1- 116(f)(2) directs that “any proceedings that may be pending seeking the custody . . . of the child . . . who is in the physical custody of the [adoption] petitioners on the date the petition is filed . . . shall be suspended pending the court’s orders in the adoption proceeding, and jurisdiction of all other pending matters concerning the child . . . shall be transferred to and assumed by the adoption court.” Here, the grandmother had legal and physical custody of the children when the adoption petition was filed. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was automatically transferred to the chancery court upon the filing of the adoption petition. For these reasons, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction to enter an order removing custody from the petitioner in the adoption case, the grandmother. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions for the circuit court to enter judgment holding that the juvenile court’s order changing custody is void for want of jurisdiction. 

Following the denial of a motion to suppress, the defendant, Ernest Seard, pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail with all but five days suspended to probation. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(D), challenging the denial of his motion to suppress his “search, seizure and arrest.” Upon our review, we conclude the trial court erred in its application of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(D). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court, reinstate count 2 of the indictment, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Asata D. Lowe, appeals the Morgan County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. On appeal, the Petitioner argues he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was deprived of his right to be present at his initial appearance, deprived of his right to counsel at his initial appearance, and deprived of his right to present a defense at his initial appearance. He additionally contends that the habeas corpus court denied his right of access to the courts when it summarily dismissed his habeas corpus petition before ruling on two of his pending motions. After review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Defendant, Michael Lee Arthur Moreno, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of eight years in the Department of Correction. He raises the following three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-125 by restricting cross-examination of one of the victims about text messages the victim sent the night before the shooting expressing the victim’s desire to commit a robbery; and (3) whether the trial court erred under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 613 by allowing the State to introduce rebuttal evidence of a defense witness’s recorded statement to police. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions, that the trial court did not err in restricting cross-examination of the victim, and that the Defendant, who failed to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial, cannot show plain error in the introduction of the defense witness’s statement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Daniel Hickman, appeals his convictions for criminally negligent homicide and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective 27-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence supporting the defense theory that a third party committed the offenses in violation of Defendant’s right to present a defense; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the entire audio recording of Defendant’s interview with police and photographs taken of Defendant during the interview; (4) the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding a prior suspect’s willingness to take a polygraph examination; (5) the jury improperly considered a lesser included offense for especially aggravated robbery in violation of the trial court’s sequential jury instructions; and (6) the cumulative effect of the errors deprived Defendant of his right to a fair trial. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, oral arguments and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Employee Dianne Moore experienced bilateral numbness, weakness, and tingling from her mid-chest down after performing a work-related task as a truck driver for Employer Beacon Transport, LLC. Following initial treatment in a local emergency room in Ardmore, Oklahoma, Employee was seen by Oklahoma City neurosurgeon Dr. Joseph Cox. Dr. Cox diagnosed Employee with an incomplete spinal cord injury in the form of a spinal cord contusion or lesion, which he opined resulted from her work-related activity. Employee was subsequently seen by panel physician, Nashville, Tennessee neurologist Dr. W. Garrison Strickland. Dr. Strickland diagnosed Employee with a thoracic spinal cord lesion caused by transverse myelitis, a condition which was not work-related. Employee additionally was seen by Nashville, Tennessee neurologist Dr. Darian Reddick, who similarly diagnosed Employee with idiopathic transverse myelitis syndrome-myelitis of unknown origin—a condition which was not work-related. Employee self-referred to Goodlettsville, Tennessee neurologist Dr. James Anderson, who indicated that Employee suffered a work-related back injury with effect on the spinal cord caused by back strain with transient give-way of structural elements traumatizing the spinal cord. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims denied Employee's claim for benefits, and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. Employee has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in accrediting the causation opinions of Dr. Strickland and Dr. Reddick, over the opinions of Dr. Cox and Dr. Anderson and concluding that she had failed to establish her condition was work-related. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a dispute between three neighbors over the nature and permissible use of an easement created through a 1983 judgment of the chancery court.  The plaintiffs own the property that is burdened by the easement and argue that the trial court correctly found that the 1983 judgment created an easement in gross in favor of the landowner directly north of their property.  We find that the trial court erred in finding an easement in gross and hold that the 1983 judgment created an express easement appurtenant creating a dominant and servient tenement; however, the easement appurtenant was not capable of being conveyed to landowners who were not purchasing the dominant estate.  Likewise, we find that there was no prescriptive or implied easement allowing the easement to be deeded from one neighbor to another.  Because the trial court’s judgment lacked findings of fact relevant to the slander of title cause of action, we remand this issue to the trial court for the entry of specific findings of fact on the elements of slander of title.  We affirm the trial court’s holding that defendants are responsible for the cost of re-installing a gate that they damaged.  The chancery court’s order is reversed in part, vacated in part, and affirmed in part.

Tyler Keith Parrish, Defendant, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court affirmed the jury verdict, merged the two convictions, and sentenced Defendant to a within-range sentence of 12 years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence as excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a healthcare liability action. The plaintiff sued a physician who had interpreted the results of her fetal ultrasound. The physician was employed by a Tennessee state university as a professor. Her job duties included both educational responsibilities and clinical care to patients in the residency clinics. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that she had received no personal gain by her act of interpreting the ultrasound. Therefore, the physician possessed absolute immunity under the Tennessee Claims Commission Act for her actions within the scope of her state employment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This post-divorce appeal arises from the trial court’s designation of the primary residential parent of two minor children. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must affirm.