APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Cedric Antonio Conner, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and received a six-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the trial court's refusal to grant him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Yolanda D. Barefield, appeals the summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, she alleges that she entered an involuntary guilty plea due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we remand to the trial court for appointment of counsel and a hearing regarding the issue of whether the petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to her guilty plea to felony escape.

A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Lee Barnett, of attempted aggravated cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, ordering him to serve seventy-five days in jail and the balance of his sentence on probation. The defendant appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court improperly sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Following a bench trial, Defendant, William C. Howse, was convicted of violating the Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004 (the "2004 Act"), a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to one year to be served as ninety days in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in finding that he knowingly violated the provisions of the 2004 Act, and (2) the 2004 Act violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This lawsuit began as a collection claim filed by Discover Bank ("Discover") against Joy A. Morgan ("Morgan") for $16,341.52. Discover claimed Morgan owed this amount on a credit card originally issued to Morgan's husband, now deceased. Morgan filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting a claim for libel as well as claims pursuant to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. _ 1681, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-18-101, et seq. Morgan's attorney gave Discover's original attorney an extension of time in which to file an answer to the counterclaim. After this extension of time had run, Morgan's attorney warned Discover's attorney that a motion for default judgment would be filed if an answer was not filed within fourteen days. When Discover failed to file an answer within the fourteen days, Morgan filed a motion for default judgment. Discover's attorney failed to show up for the hearing and a default judgment was awarded to Morgan. Discover filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment "pursuant to Rule 60.02. . . ." This motion was denied. Following a later hearing on damages, Morgan was awarded compensatory damages totaling $125,200, which the trial court then trebled under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After obtaining new counsel, Discover filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. Discover now appeals. We affirm the trial court's Order denying Discover's motion to alter or amend the judgment and set aside the default judgment. We, however, vacate the award of damages and remand for a new hearing on the amount of damages and also to determine reasonable attorney fees incurred by Morgan on appeal.

Purchasers of pre-construction condominium units sued the developer seeking rescission of their contracts to purchase the units. The developer filed a motion to compel mediation and/or arbitration pursuant to the contract. The trial court denied the motion and the developer appeals. Finding error, we reverse and remand.

The defendant, Lisa Wiggins, pled guilty to facilitation of burglary, a Class E felony, and facilitation of theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of one year of probation and ordered her to pay $4,874 in restitution. On appeal, the defendant argues that the state presented insufficient proof at the restitution hearing of the amount of restitution, and the trial court did not consider the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay. Following our review, we reverse the trial court's order and remand the matter for consideration of the amount of restitution, the defendant's financial resources, and her ability to pay.

A Williamson County jury convicted the petitioner, Mark A. Shiefelbein, of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced him to ninety-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions but modified his sentence to thirty-two years. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that  received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he (1) did not object when the trial court ordered the spectators to move so they could not see the presentation of video evidence; (2) did not object when the trial court ordered that part of the defendant’s testimony be stricken from the record; (3) did not obtain a copy of the audio-taped conversation between the petitioner and the victim, object to the recording’s  admission as evidence, or properly prepare the petitioner for cross-examination about the recording; (4) did not properly object or move for a mistrial during the state’s cross-examination of the petitioner; (5) did not lay a proper foundation for the admission of expert testimony; (6) did not object to the trial court’s questioning of state witnesses; (7) did not seek an extraordinary appeal when the trial court refused to compel the state to provide copies of videotape evidence; and (8) did not object to the state’s use of the term “vaginal shots.” Additionally, the petitioner avers that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficient performance post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

After entering “best interest” guilty pleas in order to avoid a potential death penalty conviction, Petitioner, Stephen Wlodarz, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Hawkins County Criminal Court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in finding there was no newly discovered evidence and that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm.

Father and Mother divorced in 1989 with the marital dissolution agreement obligating Father to pay all expenses for four years of college and graduate school for both son and daughter. Father refused to pay the entire cost of college for both but did pay $20,000 a year for each, deeming that reasonable. Mother sued. The trial court found that the children's choices of college were reasonable and that Father could afford the college costs. The trial court awarded Mother the costs she incurred in sending the children to college, interest and attorney's fees. Father appealed. We affirm and, based on the attorney fee provision of the MDA, remand for a determination of attorney's fees for Mother on appeal.

The petitioner, Earnest Banks, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to burglarizing a motor vehicle and was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to a term of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel placed him in “an untenable position of mounting no defense . . . or waiving his privilege against self-incrimination,” based upon trial counsel’s refusal to cross-examine witnesses regarding an unidentified third party. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Pierre Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, two counts of leaving the scene of an accident, and one count of driving on a revoked license, third offense, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of fifty-two years, five months, and twenty-nine days. State v. Pierre Jackson, No. W2006-02127-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2053652, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2008), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). In the first direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions and the trial court's order of consecutive sentencing, but remanded for resentencing of the aggravated vehicular homicide convictions because the trial court erroneously applied an enhancement factor that was not found by the jury. Id. Upon resentencing, the trial court imposed the same sentence. The defendant now appeals, arguing that his sentence is "neither fair nor consistent" with those received by other defendants with similar records and equal moral culpability whose drunk driving by chance does not result in anyone's death. Following our review, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, Travis A. Bledsoe, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed against the attorneys and insurance company involved in the settlement of a personal injury claim. The trial court dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs/appellants, Mattie and Edmond Lindsey, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Lindseys did not appeal the original dismissal of their claims but instead moved to set aside the court's judgment nearly one year later. The trial court declined to set aside its judgment and granted a motion for sanctions against the Lindseys. We affirm the trial court's denial of the Lindseys' motion to set aside, vacate its award of sanctions, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a custody dispute between a father and maternal grandparents. The father and grandparents initially filed a joint petition to remove custody from the children’s mother. When the father later filed a separate amended petition for custody on his own, the grandparents argued that he should be precluded from seeking custody due to a previous mediation agreement. The father argued that he was entitled to assert his superior parental right to custody against the grandparents. The trial court found the mediation agreement enforceable and did not consider the father’s petition for custody. The father appeals. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Husband appeals the trial court's award of transitional alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido to Wife. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Uvautai Brooks, of one count of aggravated robbery and three counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the petitioner, as a Standard Range I Offender, to serve an effective ten-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petitioner’s claim, and the petitioner appeals the decision of the court. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

This case involves the question of whether Appellee entities are partnerships under Tennessee law. Appellant appeals the trial court’s order, which found that Appellee entities were not  partnerships. Finding no error, we affirm.

In June 2005, a Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Timothy Hutson, of first degree murder, and he received a life sentence. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to provide timely information about a plea agreement, failed to develop a working relationship with the petitioner, and advised the petitioner to wear jail clothes rather than civilian clothes during the trial. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the defendant, Joey Lee Goins, of facilitation of second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in excluding statements of certain witnesses. The defendant also appeals the court's failure to sequester the jury in light of the media coverage of the trial. Lastly, the defendant argues that the court erred in imposing the defendant's sentences consecutively to each other and to his unrelated federal sentence of life without parole. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

.A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Rashad G. Robinson, of possession of contraband in a penal institution, a Class C felony, two counts of misdemeanor assault, Class A misdemeanors, and vandalism under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail for each of the misdemeanor convictions. The court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively to each other and to case number 07-372. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Cumberland County jury convicted the petitioner, Dorman O'Neal Elmore, Jr., of five counts of rape, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner pursued a delayed appeal pursuant to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and this court affirmed his convictions and sentences. In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, the petitioner argues that trial counsel's failure to file various pre-trial motions, to properly prepare and investigate the case, and to investigate the victim's background constituted deficient performance and prejudiced the defense. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Charles Mandel Moss, alias Charles Mandell, alias Pookie Doo, was convicted of violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, a Class E felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seatbelt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced to serve four years for violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, eleven months and twenty-nine days each for possession of marijuana and evading arrest, and thirty days each for violation of the open container law and violation of the seatbelt law. The court imposed partially consecutive sentences that resulted in an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the convicting evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, and (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to the Defendant's previous arrests. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Ricky Frith, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal in a divorce action. Husband appeals the division of marital property and the award of alimony in solido to Wife. In the 2005 Final Decree of Divorce, the trial court determined that the husband's shares of stock in the family business, which his parents gifted to him, were his separate property; however, the appreciation of that stock during the marriage, $1.7 million, was held to be marital property. The court awarded the wife 37.5 percent of the marital estate and alimony in futuro of $1,500 per month for the first year and $2,500 per month thereafter. This court affirmed the division of marital property but modified the award of alimony, holding that she was entitled to eight years of rehabilitative alimony but not alimony in futuro. The Supreme Court held that the appreciation of the husband's stock was his separate property, not marital property, and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the division of the marital estate and to reconsider the award of alimony due to the substantial reduction of the marital estate. On remand, the trial court awarded the wife 64 percent of the substantially reduced marital estate and granted her alimony in solido in the amount of $478,000. In this second appeal by the husband, we affirm the division of marital property, finding it is not inequitable under the circumstances, and we affirm the award of alimony in solido to Wife, finding that the award was based on the relevant factors in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-121(i).