APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Quantraveous Williams, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his postconviction petition in which Petitioner alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the entry of his pleas of guilty and that his pleas of guilty were not entered into voluntarily or knowingly. After a through review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Shortly after a sixty-one year old woman signed a nursing home admission agreement, she fell and broke her ankle. She sued for negligence, and the defendant nursing home moved the court to compel her to bring her claim to arbitration in accordance with a separate agreement she had signed as a part of the admissions process. The trial court found that the arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion and that it would be unconscionable to enforce it. The nursing home filed a direct appeal to this court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann._ 29-5-319. Because the terms of the agreement favor the nursing home by giving it a judicial forum, we find the arbitration agreement unconscionable. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves a motion to set aside a marital dissolution agreement. After a long marriage, the parties filed cross-petitions for divorce. After mediation, they entered into a marital dissolution agreement settling division of the considerable martial estate. The parties presented the MDA to the trial court, and it was approved and incorporated into the final decree of divorce. Several weeks later, the husband filed this pro se petition to have the MDA set aside, claiming that, at the time it was signed, he was not mentally competent to enter in to such an agreement. The husband's motion was denied, and the wife was awarded attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the MDA. The husband now appeals. We affirm. We hold that the evidence supports the factual finding below that the husband was mentally capable of understanding the consequences of the MDA, and we find no abuse of its discretion in the trial court's denial of the husband's motion to set it aside. We also affirm the award of attorney fees to the wife, and award attorney fees for this appeal.

The trial court granted the wife a divorce after a marriage of almost twenty years, divided the marital property, and awarded the wife temporary alimony. The husband argues on appeal that the court erred in the property division by impermissibly taking his fault into consideration and by dividing his military retirement between the parties without considering the effect of their long separation on the equities of that division. The husband also argues that the court impermissibly awarded the wife alimony in solido out of his future earnings rather than out of his separate property. After thoroughly examining the record, we have found no evidence that the trial court based its property division on the husband’s fault, and we do not find that it abused its discretion in dividing the military retirement as it did. We also find no indication that the trial court intended its monthly alimony award to be considered alimony in solido. We accordingly affirm the trial court, but modify its decree to specify that the award of monthly alimony is in the form of transitional alimony and conversely that the award of attorney fees is alimony in solido .

The trial court granted the wife a divorce after a marriage of almost twenty years, divided the marital property, and awarded the wife temporary alimony. The husband argues on appeal that the court erred in the property division by impermissibly taking his fault into consideration and by dividing his military retirement between the parties without considering the effect of their long separation on the equities of that division. The husband also argues that the court impermissibly awarded the wife alimony in solido out of his future earnings rather than out of his separate property. After thoroughly examining the record, we have found no evidence that the trial court based its property division on the husband's fault, and we do not find that it abused its discretion in dividing the military retirement as it did. We also find no indication that the trial court intended its monthly alimony award to be considered alimony in solido. We accordingly affirm the trial court, but modify its decree to specify that the award of monthly alimony is in the form of transitional alimony and conversely that the award of attorney fees is alimony in solido.

This is a condemnation case in which the Water Authority of Dickson County acquired an easement by eminent domain for the purpose of installing a subsurface water transmission line. The Water Authority's ability to take the land is not in question; this appeal only involves the amount of compensation to which the landowners are entitled. Following a trial without a jury, the court awarded $6,300.00 for the taking of the permanent easement and incidental damages. The Water Authority appeals. Finding error, we vacate the judgment of the court and remand for further proceedings.

This is a dispute between two insurance companies, each of which provided liability insurance for a Captain D’s restaurant in Mississippi. The defendant, Federal Insurance Company, provided the primary coverage for Captain D’s with policy limits of $1,000,000. The plaintiff, Great American Insurance Company of New York, provided excess coverage for the benefit of Captain D’s. When an action was filed against the insured in Mississippi for serious and permanent injuries sustained by a 15 year-old minor at a Captain D’s, Federal provided the defense for Captain D’s. The jury returned a verdict of $20.8 million against Captain D’s. The next day, Federal sent a letter to its insured, Captain D’s, and to the excess carrier, Great American, offering to pay its policy limits of $1,000,000 toward the judgment; however, Federal’s “offer to pay” was not communicated to Foradori, the plaintiff in the Mississippi action. Federal appealed the $20.8 million Mississippi judgment on behalf of Captain D’s, but the judgment was affirmed. Post-judgment interest of $2,269,169 accrued during the appeal. When the judgment became final, Federal paid its policy limits of $1,000,000, but no interest. Great American paid the balance of the judgment plus all of the post-judgment interest.

The juvenile court granted emergency custody of a four-year-old girl to her paternal aunt and uncle and subsequently determined that the child was dependent and neglected. More than two years after obtaining custody, the aunt and uncle petitioned the trial court to terminate the parental rights of the child's mother and father. The court conducted a four-day hearing before terminating their parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions. Only the mother appealed. We affirm the termination of her rights on the ground of persistence of conditions.

The matter at issue is a sliver of land between an old established fence and the centerline of a rural road. The plaintiff and the defendants each contend they own the disputed property.The plaintiff claims his property, which lies west and southwest of the defendants' property, extends beyond an old established fence in a northeasterly fashion to the center line of Old Lincoln Road. The defendants, however, claim their property extends across the road to the old established fence which, the defendants insist, is also where the plaintiff's property ends. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the "old established fence" referenced in the plaintiff's deed is the boundary line, as the defendants claim, not the centerline of Old Lincoln Road, as the plaintiff claims, and therefore, the defendants own the disputed property. We have concluded that the trial court correctly determined the plaintiff's property stopped at the "old established fence." Thus, we affirm that decision. We, however, have determined that the trial court erred by awarding the disputed property to the defendants. This is because the defendants' deed clearly states that their property stops at the center line of Old Lincoln Road and nothing in the deed suggests their property extends beyond that point. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's finding that the defendants' property extends beyond the centerline of Old Lincoln Road. As a consequence, neither party has established that they own the disputed property. Furthermore, we have determined that others who are not parties to this action may have a claim to the disputed property; thus, ownership of the disputed property will need to be determined in a subsequent action in which others who are possibly indispensable parties are joined.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph S. Rittenberry, pled nolo contendere in Sumner County to three counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Rittenberry to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, Rittenberry claims the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a dispute between two insurance companies, each of which provided liability insurance for a Captain D's restaurant in Mississippi. The defendant, Federal Insurance Company, provided the primary coverage for Captain D's with policy limits of $ 1,000,000. The plaintiff, Great American Insurance Company of New York, provided excess coverage for the benefit of Captain D's. When an action was filed against the insured in Mississippi for serious and permanent injuries sustained by a 15 year-old minor at a Captain D's, Federal provided the [*2] defense for Captain D's. The jury returned a verdict of $ 20.8 million against Captain D's. The next day, Federal sent a letter to its insured, Captain D's, and to the excess carrier, Great American, offering to pay its policy limits of $ 1,000,000 toward the judgment; however, Federal's "offer to pay" was not communicated to Foradori, the plaintiff in the Mississippi action. Federal appealed the $ 20.8 million Mississippi judgment on behalf of Captain D's, but the judgment was affirmed. Post-judgment interest of $ 2,269,169 accrued during the appeal. When the judgment became final, Federal paid its policy limits of $ 1,000,000, but no interest. Great American paid the balance of the judgment plus all of the post-judgment interest.

The defendant, Edward Garcia Summers, was indicted for possession with the intent to sell .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia, all charges based upon evidence seized during a search of his residence. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, alleging that there was no probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, and the State now appeals. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Two trade contractors alleged that the City breached its contract with them by failing to take reasonable measures to guard against delays and disruptions by other contractors in the City's coordination, management, and scheduling of the contractors and by failing to pay the retainages they were due. The contractors sought damages for the delays. The City raised three defenses: (1) the "no damages for delays" provision of the contracts; (2) untimely notice of claims by the contractors; and (3) the contractors' acknowledgment and acceptance of time extensions without a reservation for increased compensation in the change orders they executed. The trial court concluded that all three of the City's defenses failed and awarded damages to the contractors. We affirm the trial court's decisions.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Troy Allen Pruitt, of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it found the Defendant waived review of the issue of whether recent case law on expert witness testimony entitled him to a new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This is a condemnation case in which the Water Authority of Dickson County acquired an easement by eminent domain for the purpose of installing a subsurface water transmission line. The Water Authority's ability to take the land is not in question; this appeal only involves the amount of compensation to which the landowners are entitled. Following a trial without a jury, the court awarded $12,526.56 for the taking of the permanent easement and incidental damages. The Water Authority appeals. Finding error, we vacate the judgment of the court and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal involves subject matter jurisdiction with respect to billboard permits. The defendant's application for a State permit to erect a billboard in Shelby County was denied, so he filed an administrative appeal from this decision. Meanwhile, the defendant proceeded to erect the billboard in Shelby County without a State permit. The State filed this petition in Shelby County to enjoin the defendant from erecting the billboard pending resolution of the administrative appeal. The defendant argued that the State was not entitled to injunctive relief because he had unfairly been denied a State permit. The defendant also filed a counterclaim based on alleged improper conduct by State officials, seeking to enjoin the State from improperly enforcing its regulations against him in all cases in which he had been denied a State billboard permit. The trial court entered an order enjoining the State from improper enforcement of the billboard regulations. Later, after lengthy evidentiary hearings, the trial court ordered the State to grant the defendant State permits for various billboard sites and assumed continuing jurisdiction over certain administrative proceedings in which the defendant had appealed the denial of billboard permits. The State now appeals. We find that, by statute, the trial court in Davidson County has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the matters asserted by the defendant in response to the petition for injunctive relief and in his counterclaims. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismiss the counterclaim in its entirety, and remand.

This appeal involves subject matter jurisdiction with respect to billboard permits. The defendant’s application for a State permit to erect a billboard in Shelby County was denied, so he filed an administrative appeal from this decision. Meanwhile, the defendant proceeded to erect the billboard in Shelby County without a State permit. The State filed this petition in Shelby County to enjoin the defendant from erecting the billboard pending resolution of the administrative appeal. The defendant argued that the State was not entitled to injunctive relief because he had unfairly been denied a State permit. The defendant also filed a counterclaim based on alleged improper conduct by State officials, seeking to enjoin the State from improperly enforcing its regulations against him in all cases in which he had been denied a State billboard permit. The trial court entered an order enjoining the State from improper enforcement of the billboard regulations. Later, after lengthy evidentiary hearings, the trial court ordered the State to grant the defendant State permits for various billboard sites and assumed continuing jurisdiction over certain administrative proceedings in which the defendant had appealed the denial of billboard permits. The State now appeals. We find that, by statute, the trial court in Davidson County has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the matters asserted by the defendant in response to the petition for injunctive relief and in his counterclaims. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismiss the counterclaim in its entirety, and remand.

The Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Jones, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Circuit Court of Madison County. Jones pled guilty to three Class A misdemeanors: possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia . For each conviction, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. He was also fined a total of $1,150. The trial court ordered the sentences for possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana to be served concurrently, with the sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia to be served consecutively. All three sentences were suspended, and Jones was placed on probation. On appeal, he claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation and restoring his original sentences. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendants-Appellants, Erica Harrison and Alexis Harrison, each entered an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property valued at more than five hundred dollars ($500) but less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), a Class E felony, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Both requested judicial diversion, which the court denied. The trial court sentenced Erica Harrison as a Range I, standard offender to 180 days in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the balance of her two-year sentence to be served on supervised probation and sentenced Alexis Harrison as a Range I, standard offender to 90 days in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the balance of her sentence to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Erica and Alexis Harrison argue that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) denying judicial diversion and (2) denying full probation. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, Richard Joe Fitten, appeals pro se from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Hamilton County. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Fitten resolved case numbers 255275, 261292, and 261403. In case number 255275, Fitten agreed to the revocation of his probation and the imposition of a six-year sentence. He also agreed to plead guilty to filing a false police report, case number 261292, and retaliation for past action, case number 261403. He received a two-year sentence on the false reporting offense, and one year on the retaliation offense, to be served consecutively. However, the effective three-year sentence was suspended to unsupervised probation, to be served consecutively to the six-year sentence. Although not entirely clear from his handwritten brief, Fitten claims: (1) his conviction for retaliation for past action should be dismissed because it resulted from an illegal arrest under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for retaliation for past action and filing a false police report. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post-divorce modification of child custody and support. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court's order, which increased his child support obligation, modified his parenting time, and ordered him to pay Mother/Appellee's attorney's fees. Finding that the trial court erred in eliminating Father's one-week of uninterrupted summer visitation and not allowing him an additional night per week visitation, we reverse that portion of the order. Further, we find that the trial court erred in providing Father with a "credit" towards his child support in exchange for his payment of Mother's mortgage. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's amount of child support ordered, as well as the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Mother. We affirm the trial court's findings on both Mother's and Father's income. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; vacated in part and remanded.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Johnny Villalobos, of robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to four years in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, a non-resident, brought this action against defendant real estate agent for releasing funds from a sale to defendant Hays, who had been employed by the plaintiff to sell items of personalty for plaintiff and improve plaintiff's real estate properties for sale. Further, that Hays improperly filed a lien against plaintiff's property, resulting in damages to plaintiff. The Trial Court granted the real estate agent summary judgment and, after a trial, entered a monetary judgment against Hays in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals the issue of summary judgment in favor of the real estate agent, and Hays appeals the monetary judgment entered against him in favor of plaintiff. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Defendant-Appellant, John Barlow, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies. The trial court sentenced Barlow as a Range I, violent offender to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for the aggravated child abuse conviction and fifteen years for the aggravated child neglect conviction, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years. In Barlow's appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the convictions for aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect violate his right against double jeopardy, (3) the trial court erred in declaring Dr. Robert Sanford and Dr. Karen Lakin as expert witnesses, (4) the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Lakin to testify that the victim suffered from an "abusive head trauma incident [that was] most probably associated with [a] bed[-]wetting episode," and (5) the State committed several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support Barlow's conviction for aggravated child neglect. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction for aggravated child neglect is vacated. However, the judgment of the trial court in all other respects is affirmed. Because Barlow's fifteen-year sentence for his aggravated child neglect conviction was to be served concurrently with his twenty-five-year sentence for aggravated child abuse, his effective sentence is unchanged.

In 2004, Baird Tree Company, Inc. ("Baird Tree") unsuccessfully bid on a tree trimming and removal project with the City of Oak Ridge ("Oak Ridge"). Baird Tree filed a lawsuit claiming, inter alia, that Oak Ridge's bidding process violated the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-25-101. We affirmed the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants because the contract at issue was a contract for services, not goods, and, therefore, the Tennessee Trade Practices Act did not apply. We also concluded that Baird Tree could not challenge the bidding process because it had failed to submit a valid bid in the first place. See Baird Tree Co., Inc. v. City of Oak Ridge, No. E2007-01933-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2510581 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2008). When the same project came up for bid in 2007, Baird Tree again submitted a fatally defective bid. When it was not awarded the contract, Baird Tree filed the present lawsuit raising various challenges to Oak Ridge's bidding process. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to all defendants. We, again, conclude that Baird Tree does not have standing to challenge the bidding process because it submitted a fatally defective "bid" in the first place. The judgment of the Trial Court is, therefore, affirmed.