APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, David Scott Winfrey, pleaded guilty to twenty-nine Class A misdemeanors consisting of one count of aggravated criminal trespass, one count of stalking, thirteen counts of harassment, and fourteen counts of violation of an order of protection. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense and ordered that ten of his violation of an order of protection sentences run consecutively. In a previous decision, we remanded this matter for re-sentencing, concluding that the trial court erroneously applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13- 113(g). See State v. David Scott Winfrey, No. M2008-01429-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2486180 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug. 14, 2009). The defendant now appeals the consecutive sentences imposed upon re-sentencing and contends that they are not in accordance with our previous opinion in this matter. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a retaliatory discharge claim. Employee claims that she was discharged after reporting her supervisor's unlawful activities. Employer denied that employee was discharged, claimed that she quit, and demonstrated that the State terminated the grant funding the program overseen by employee. A jury trial commenced, and at the close of all proof, employer moved for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict and found that employee failed to prove a causal link between her discharge and her decision to engage in a protected activity. Employee appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Christopher Lovin, appeals the Claiborne County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to object to the State's amendment of his indictment, (2) failing to examine and rebut the State's medical witnesses properly, (3) failing to object to the State's use of demonstrative evidence, and (4) failing to object to the State's presentation of two theories of causation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Vincent Jordan, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's order revoking his probation for robbery, a Class C felony, and ordering the Defendant to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Viola Darlene Stephens, pled guilty to theft of property valued at less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft conviction, to serve six months, and six months for driving on a revoked license, to be fully served in incarceration. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not stating whether it had considered a sentence of community corrections. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Petitioner, Victor L. Dobbins, was found guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17- 1307(b)(2). This Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Victor L. Dobbins, No. M2007-01751-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2648951 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 3, 2008), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2008). The petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because: (1) trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case and (2) the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors entitles him to a new trial. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kelvin Reed, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and aggravated burglary. The trial court merged the offenses of first degree murder and felony murder, and defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for his murder conviction and three years for aggravated burglary. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, including testimony about the music played at defendant's birthday party, testimony that one witness had seen defendant with a gun, and photographs of the victim; and (3) that the judgment for aggravated burglary should be corrected to reflect defendant's actual sentence. Following review, we affirm the convictions and remand to the trial court solely for entry of a corrected amended judgment for aggravated burglary in accordance with this opinion.

After an elevated PSA test in October 2000, Dr. Josovitz referred Decedent to a urologist. After an even higher PSA level on retest, the urologist performed a biopsy, which was benign. Despite being informed of his need for additional PSA testing, decedent did not return to the urologist, and, despite routinely seeing decedent for other health issues, Dr. Josovitz did not again discuss the need for repeat testing with decedent until 2004. In May 2004, decedent was diagnosed with advanced prostate cancer, and he died in September 2005. Plaintiffs' expert testified that decedent's prostate cancer must have been diagnosed by December 2001 in order for decedent to survive. However, it is undisputed that the defendants had no knowledge of his prostate cancer by that time. Plaintiffs filed suit in this case beyond the three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice. Because they are unable to prove defendants had knowledge of decedent's prostate cancer, fraudulent concealment is unavailable to toll the statute of repose. Accordingly, we find that plaintiffs' wrongful death claim is barred by the statute of repose and further that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering. Summary judgment is granted to defendants, and the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim is affirmed.

The trial court should have rejected the guilty plea as being deficient pursuant
to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(g)(1). That subsection provides that when restitution is a component of alternative sentencing and there is “no sentencing hearing or presentence report because the defendant’s sentence is agreed upon and the payment of restitution is a part of the sentence, the plea agreement shall include the amount of restitution and the other performance requirements set out in subsection (c).” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 304(g)(1). In a theft case, payment of restitution must be “a part of the sentence” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-116. See id. § 40-20-116(a) (providing that the trial court “shall . . . order the restitution of the property” in theft cases). In the present case, the plea agreement left no sentencing issues undecided except for the amount and payment method of restitution; no presentence report was entered into evidence. Under the circumstances, the “restitution hearing” was not a “sentencing hearing” as contemplated by section 40-35-304(g)(1); to say otherwise is to render the provisions of subsection (g)(1) meaningless. I cannot fathom why the subsection reads the way it does, but it says what it says.

The Petitioner, Phillip Lowell Bledsoe, appeals from the Gibson County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to pursue potentially exculpatory evidence; failed to impeach a detective's credibility based on his police misconduct in a different case; failed to object to numerous references to the petitioner's gang membership; and failed to file a motion in limine, make an objection, or request a limiting instruction regarding references to a polygraph examination. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Donna Harvey, and a codefendant pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to theft of at least $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. __ 39- 14-103, -105(3) (2006). The defendant received a four-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender, suspended to time served with the balance on supervised probation. The trial court ordered the defendant and codefendant to pay $64,852 in restitution with joint and several liability. At issue in this appeal is the amount of restitution for damages caused by the crime. We reverse the order setting the restitution amount and remand for a restitution hearing, at which the trial court shall consider the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay and determine the proper amount and schedule of restitution.

Husband filed for divorce after twenty-five years of marriage alleging inappropriate marital conduct as grounds for divorce. Wife filed a counter-claim for divorce also alleging inappropriate marital conduct. After a bench trial, the court found that the parties had lived separately for at least 10 years; awarded a divorce to Husband; and awarded alimony in futuro to Wife. Wife appeals challenging the trial court's award of a divorce to Husband, the division of the marital property, and the award of alimony. Upon review of the record, we affirm.

The trial court entered judgment against the borrowers and guarantors on two promissory notes. On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in striking their jury demand and that they are entitled to relief under an alleged written commitment for permanent financing or under various equitable theories. We find the defendants' arguments to be without merit and affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a judgment summarily holding attorney Herbert S. Moncier in direct, criminal contempt of court. Because the trial court improperly exercised its summary contempt authority several weeks after the cited conduct occurred, we vacate its judgment and remand this case for additional proceedings.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Vershawn McCoy, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to twenty years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court inadequately responded to a jury question raised during deliberation requesting a definition of "state of passion." After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Contractor agreed to build duplex for property owner, with plaintiff providing construction financing. At closing, contractor was paid, but contractor did not pay plaintiff as agreed. Plaintiff sued property owner, contractor, and bank. We previously affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the bank, finding that contractor and plaintiff were in a joint venture, such that payment to contractor was payment to plaintiff. Property owner then moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Because we find no separate agreement between property owner and plaintiff requiring repayment directly to plaintiff, plaintiff's cause of action against property owner is precluded, and the trial court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed.

International Market and Restaurant, Inc. and Patti Myint, owner of the P.M. Café, sued the Belmont University and the Metropolitan Government because representatives of Belmont and the United States Secret Service informed the plaintiffs that the streets and sidewalks around plaintiffs’ establishments would be closed for security purposes the evening of the Presidential debate at Belmont pursuant to a plan developed by the Secret Service. The plaintiffs closed the businesses that evening; however, the sidewalks were not closed. The plaintiffs claim that they lost revenue by closing and seek compensation based on negligent representation, constructive fraud and breach of the indemnity agreement between Belmont and Metro. The trial court granted Belmont’s motion for summary judgment and Metro’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

Plaintiff timely filed a complaint for medical malpractice, but failed to file a certificate of good faith within ninety days as required. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for enlargement pursuant to Rule 6.02 and a proposed certificate of good faith. The trial court granted defendants' motion, finding plaintiff had failed to demonstrate "good cause" for failing to file the required certificate. Because we find that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate either "good cause" or "excusable neglect," we affirm the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

The petitioner, Rick D. Hanebutt, appeals the Carroll County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving concurrent sentences of life and twenty years for his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to continue the postconviction hearing; and (2) denying his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that the court erred in denying relief because he claims he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) investigate the case and present viable witnesses, proof, and argument as to self-defense; (2) obtain a ballistics expert; (3) obtain unadulterated copies of phone records and obtain the phone records of another witness; (4) properly impeach a witness with inconsistent evidence, statements, and testimony; (5) contest the search warrant; (6) renew a motion to change venue; (7) object to statements made by the prosecution during voir dire; and (8) request additional jury instructions on drug usage and witness credibility. He further contends that the cumulative effect of all the alleged errors supports a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a thorough review of the record before us, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Evelyn Cotton Self, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days with defendant's sentence suspended and defendant placed on probation after service of seventy-three days in confinement. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury concerning prescription medicines; (4) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of defendant's psychologist; and (5) the trial court erred in ordering defendant to serve seventy-three days in confinement. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robert Bailey, Lisa Bailey Dishner, and Richard Neal Bailey ("the Baileys") were sued by Arthur B. Roberts and Tia Roberts with regard to a boundary line dispute. The Baileys filed a third party complaint against Dale Littleton, Alice Littleton, Kimber Littleton, Mark Lee Littleton ("the Littletons"), and Charlotte Dutton seeking to quiet title to real property, including the property involved in the boundary line dispute. The Baileys filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the Littletons. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for summary judgment and certifying the judgment as final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. The Baileys appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Petitioner filed this petition for judicial review in 2009 to challenge the propriety of the seizure of $5,518 in cash following the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation executing a search warrant on Petitioner’s residence in May of 2001. A notice of seizure was served on Petitioner; also a forfeiture warrant was issued and mailed to Petitioner at his residence. The Department of Safety subsequently entered a final administrative order forfeiting the money. When Petitioner filed this action almost eight years later, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petition was not timely filed. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed this action to quiet title to a strip of land along a former railroad line. Defendant, an adjacent landowner, asserts that plaintiff has no interest in the disputed property because the deed that purportedly conveyed the property to plaintiff was champertous and void due to the fact defendant was adversely possessing the property under color of title at the time of the deed. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff, finding that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous or that defendant had acquired title by seven years of adverse possession under color of title for thirty years. We have determined the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard by holding that defendant had to prove seven years of adverse possession to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous. Instead, defendant need only prove that he was in adverse possession at the time of the deed to plaintiff. Defendant established he was in adverse possession under color of title of the disputed property at the time of plaintiff's deed; accordingly, the deed is champertous. Champertous deeds are void; therefore, plaintiff never acquired a legal interest in the disputed property. We reverse the judgment of the trial court quieting title in favor of plaintiff. As for defendant's prayer that he be declared the owner of the disputed property, we have determined that an indispensable party is missing, the grantor of the deed to plaintiff; therefore, we make no ruling concerning defendant's claim that he owns the property by adverse possession of at least seven continuous years under color of title pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-105.

The defendant, April Jennifer Warren, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to one count of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant agreed to a sentence of ten years a Range II, multiple offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.