APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the termination of a municipal police officer. The housemate of the petitioner police officer accidentally damaged the police officer’s take-home police vehicle. Although the police officer suspected that her housemate caused the damage, the police officer nevertheless filed accident and insurance loss reports indicating that the damage was caused by an unknown driver. About two months later, the police officer and her housemate had a tumultuous break up. After that, the police officer’s supervisor discovered that the damage to the police vehicle may have been caused by the housemate. After an internal affairs investigation, the police officer was charged with violating police department rules regarding neglect of duty and lack of truthfulness. After a hearing before the municipal board, the police officer was found to have violated these rules and her employment was terminated. The city administrator upheld the termination. The police officer then filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari, challenging the administrative decision. The trial court
granted the petition, holding that the termination of the police officer’s employment was not supported by material evidence and, therefore, was arbitrary and capricious. The city now appeals. We reverse, finding that material evidence supported the administrative decision to terminate the police officer’s employment.

The Petitioner, Keith Dotson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his conviction of aggravated burglary on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief based upon its finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and prepare adequately for the fingerprint evidence presented at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se Petitioner, Dock Walker, appeals as of right from the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court denied the petition for failure to state a cognizable claim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal of the denial of a motion for summary judgment in a
medical malpractice case. The trial court denied Appellants/Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment, finding that the statute of repose, Tenn. Code Ann.§29-26-116(a)(3), was
tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment on the part of Appellants/Defendants. Finding
that there are material issues of fact in dispute, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
Appellants’ motions for summary judgment. We, however, vacate any decision that the
statute of limitations was tolled as a result of fraudulent concealment.

Christenberry Trucking & Farm, Inc., initiated this litigation against F&M Marketing
Services, Inc., with a complaint seeking a declaration that Christenberry had not contracted
to pay F&M a commission on loads Christenberry hauled for UPS/Dell Computer (“the
UPS/Dell account”). F&M filed an answer and counterclaim asking for a determination that
there was a contract with respect to the UPS/Dell account under which Christenberry was
obligated to pay F&M a commission of 6%. F&M’s counterclaim also asked for an
accounting and attorney’s fees. The case was tried without a jury, after which Christenberry
was allowed to amend its pleadings to allege that if there was a contract it was illegal and
unenforceable because F&M is not licensed as a broker by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (“the ICC”). The trial court found that there was a contract between
Christenberry and F&M, but that the contract was rendered illegal and unenforceable because
of F&M’s lack of a broker’s license. F&M hired new counsel who filed a notice of appeal
that did not contain the signature of its trial counsel. Christenberry filed a motion with the
trial court to strike the notice of appeal. Six days later, F&M filed an amended notice of
appeal which bore, in addition to the signature of its new appellate counsel, the signature of
its counsel of record in the trial court. F&M argues on appeal that it was not required to be
licensed and, alternatively, that the contract should not be nullified for its lack of a license,
even if one was required. Christenberry argues that the notice of appeal is ineffective. We
vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

This is a construction case. Appellants/Builders appeal the trial court’s award of damages
to Appellees/Homeowners pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and arising
from Appellants/Builders’ breach of warranty and contract. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Roy Rowe, Jr., pled guilty to seventeen counts of sale of a controlled substance, and, after merging several of the counts, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of six years. The trial court imposed a split sentence, ordering that the Defendant serve 365 days in the county jail, with the remainder of his sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence to the maximum within the range. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The appellant, Johnny L. Sapp, was found guilty of one count of possession of a motor vehicle from which the serial number has been removed in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-5-111 and two counts of altering the serial number on a motor vehicle in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-5-112. He received a total effective sentence of two years. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that his convictions for possession of a motor vehicle from which the serial number had been removed and altering the serial number on a motor vehicle violate double jeopardy; and that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion or probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed this action seeking to review the business records of the defendant, asserting under oath that she is a 25 percent shareholder of the defendant corporation. The defendant moved to dismiss. The trial court found that the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §48-26-104(a) – the corporate records statute – and ordered the defendant to comply with the request to inspect and/or copy corporate records. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s attorney fees. We reverse.

The Defendant, Teddy Ray Mitchell, appeals from his jury conviction in the Criminal Court of Hamblen County for disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, for which he received a sentence of thirty days in jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) that his conviction violates his First Amendment right to free speech, and (3) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an altercation with another police officer that was contemporaneous to the offense. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction of disorderly conduct. Accordingly, the Defendant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is dismissed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie Lewis, of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it imposed an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Regina Day, sustained compensable injuries to both of her shoulders. She returned to her pre-injury job, but the holding company which owned her employer had been sold to another entity. The employer, which had been a corporation, became a limited liability company (LLC). The trial court, applying existing case law, held that she had not returned to work for her pre-injury employer and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the statutory cap contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by failing to apply the cap or, in the alternative, that the award is excessive. We affirm the judgment.

This is a construction case. The defendant landowners entered into an oral contract with the
plaintiff contractor to construct a house. When the house was substantially completed, the
homeowners terminated the builder, citing defective work. At the time of termination, there
were two unpaid invoices. After filing a notice of lien on the landowners’ property, the
contractor filed suit for breach of contract and to enforce the lien. The landowners
counterclaimed for breach of contract and sought damages stemming from the defective
work. After a trial, the trial court entered judgment for the contractor and awarded a portion
of the amount sought. The trial court’s order did not address enforcement of the contractor’s
lien. The landowners appeal. Because the trial court’s order does not address, among other
things, enforcement of the lien, it is not a final judgment, and this Court does not have
jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.

This appeal involves the termination of a sheriff’s department employee. The employee was terminated and appealed the termination to the county civil service commission. The termination was upheld by the commission, based solely on expert testimony. The employee then sought judicial review. The motion for summary judgment filed by the employer sheriff’s department was granted, and the employee’s petition was dismissed. The employee now appeals. We find that the expert testimony on which the commission relied is incongruent with the undisputed facts in the record. Therefore, we conclude that the commission’s decision is not supported by substantial and material evidence and is arbitrary and capricious. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the employee.

Plaintiff brought this action for breach of contract. The issues were referred to a Special Master, and the plaintiff on the hearing date, acting pro se, asked for a continuance which the Master denied. The defendant moved to confirm the Master's report and a hearing was set on the Motion. The plaintiff, again acting pro se, asked for a continuance, which was again denied. The plaintiff, acting pro se, moved to set aside the Judgment because he did not get a full ten days to file objections, and the court set aside the Judgment and set another hearing date. After hearing plaintiff's objections, the Court affirmed the Special Master's report and entered Judgment. Plaintiff, on appeal, raises the issues of whether the Trial Court erred in not sustaining objections to the Master's report, whereby the Master allowed defendant to interview witnesses and exhibits at the hearing without compliance with local rules that require the parties to exchange names of witnesses in advance of trial, and whether the Trial Court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for continuance. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Stanley Harvill, appeals the circuit c 1 ourt’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the court’s order.

The defendant, Arealie Boyd, pled guilty to forgery over $1,000, a Class D felony, on March 30, 2009. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced her to a two-year sentence in the Shelby County Correctional Center, suspended all but thirty days of the sentence, and placed her on probation for six years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and manner of her sentence. Specifically, she contends that the trial court should have sentenced her as an especially mitigated offender to either full probation or judicial diversion. Additionally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony at the sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Preston Rucker, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping and sentenced, respectively, to concurrent sentences of twenty-four years and twenty years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred in concluding that a police report was not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rain Thomas Chesher, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the circuit court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment