APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In Maury County on June 17, 2002, Appellant pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. He was sentenced to two six-year sentences to be served consecutively. He was placed on probation. After violating probation, he was placed on Community Corrections. On July 10, 2008, Appellant's Community Corrections officer filed a violation report. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellants Community Corrections sentence and ordered him to serve his full twelve year sentence. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court abused it discretion in revoking his Community Corrections sentence and that the trial court did not have authority to impose the full twelve year sentence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the Community Corrections sentence. However, we agree with Appellant that he had previously served the first six-year consecutive sentence, and the trial court can only impose the remaining six-year sentence. Therefore, we affirm the revocation of the Community Corrections sentence, and modify Appellant's sentence to six years.

Petitioner, Michelle Shoemaker, was unsuccessful in her direct appeal to this Court from her convictions in Jackson County for first degree murder, conspiracy and tampering with evidence. These convictions resulted in an effective life sentence. See State v. Michelle Shoemaker, No. M2005-02652-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3095446 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 2, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. March 12, 2007). Following her unsuccessful direct appeal, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that she was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel by both her trial and appellate counsel. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court's denial of her petition. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has been unable to prove that either trial or appellate counsel were ineffective. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

A Davidson County jury found the defendant, Antonio Vaughn, guilty of possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver within one thousand feet of a school, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced him, as a Range III career offender, to serve 12 years, at 100 percent, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the denial of his motion for a mistrial. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Marquentis Johnson, pleaded guilty on June 20, 2005 to two counts of theft over $1,000, Class D felonies, and one count of theft over $500, a Class E felony, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The trial court sentenced him as a standard offender to four years for each count of theft over $1,000 and two years for theft over $500, to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of four years in Community Corrections. The Circuit Court of Madison County revoked the defendant's community corrections sentence and resentenced him as a standard offender to serve each sentence consecutively, for an effective sentence of ten years, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the circuit court's imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The Petitioner, Jeffery T. Siler, Jr., appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that due process considerations toll the one-year statute of limitations for postconviction relief and entitle him to a delayed appeal. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, George Hardin, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's order summarily dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner seeks to re-litigate a previously litigated claim. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Erodito D. Lopez-Carranza, was charged with one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-504(b). On May 2, 2005, he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, accepting an out-of-range sentence of seven years in the Department of Correction, to be served as a multiple offender at thirty-five percent. On July 6, 2009, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Hickman County. On July 24, 2009, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The habeas corpus court granted the motion. The Petitioner now appeals that grant. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Brian David Black, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's order revoking his probation for theft of property over $500, a Class E felony, and ordering him to serve his three-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He argues that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence to be served, rather than imposing some less severe sanction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Darrell Anderson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life. In this appeal, he presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in giving a description of photographs that were not in evidence in response to a jury question; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to make an offer of proof regarding the truthfulness of an officer's testimony; (4) whether the trial court erred in making comments in the presence of the jury which were unfairly prejudicial; (5) whether the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence; (6) whether he was unfairly prejudiced by the conduct of the State; (7) whether the trial court erred in qualifying an expert and admitting his conclusions; and (8) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the State's duty to preserve evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Corterrius Worthy, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court. The defendant entered an open guilty plea to one count of robbery, a Class C felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s application for judicial diversion and sentenced the defendant to a term of three years. The court also denied the defendant’s request for probation and ordered that the sentence be served in the Shelby County Workhouse. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and failing to grant probation. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Decedent was struck and killed by an on-duty City of Memphis police officer while attempting to cross the street. The trial court awarded $7,500.00 in a wrongful death award. Decedent’s personal representative appeals, seeking an increased award. We affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Bruce Elliot, of conspiracy to possess 300 grams or more of cocaine, see T.C.A. _ 39-17-417(j)(5) (2006); possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine, see id. _ 39-17-417(j)(5); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, see id. _ 39-17-1307(b)(1)(a); possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana, see id. _ 39-17-417(g)(1); conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, see id. _ 39-17-417(j)(5), -432; and money laundering, see id. _ 39-14-903. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 66 years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, argues that the trial court should not have permitted a State's witness to testify regarding "drug jargon," contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of the defendant's apartment, and claims various errors in his sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Petitioner, Dedrick Lamont Patton, was convicted of one count of possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-417(i)(5). On January 5, 2009, he filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging a number of grounds. A hearing was held on this petition on June 15, 2009. The post-conviction court denied the Petitioner relief in an order dated June 18, 2009. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because: (1) the post-conviction court, which also served as the Petitioner's trial court, and the post-conviction Assistant District Attorney, who also served as Assistant District Attorney at the Petitioner's trial, failed to recuse themselves; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (3) the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense; (4) the trial court committed judicial misconduct; (5) the trial court, Assistant District Attorney, and trial counsel colluded against the Petitioner in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and (6) the cumulative effect of these errors denied the Petitioner his right to a fair trial. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Rodney Nelson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, in three separate cases, pled guilty to eight counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and two counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and received an effective sentence of 21.6 years as a mitigated offender. On appeal, the petitioner raises the single issue of whether his guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial.

The defendant, Corterrius Worthy, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court. The defendant entered an open guilty plea to one count of robbery, a Class C felony. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's application for judicial diversion and sentenced the defendant to a term of three years. The court also denied the defendant's request for probation and ordered that the sentence be served in the Shelby County Workhouse. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion and failing to grant probation. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rodney Nelson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, in three separate cases, pled guilty to eight counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and two counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and received an effective sentence of 21.6 years as a mitigated offender. On appeal, the petitioner raises the single issue of whether his guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial.

The petitioner, Derrick D. Futch, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him to 8 years, at 100 percent, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the postconviction court summarily dismissed. The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of

The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Ray Pinson, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony. He was sentenced as a child rapist to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pinson claims on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Giles County jury convicted the Defendant, Steve Carl King, of attempted first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted statements the Defendant gave to Illinois police; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed two witnesses to testify although the State had failed to disclose their existence in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's petition for a writ of error coram nobis based on the victim's recanted testimony. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Plaintiff subcontractor, sued contractor, who constructed a hotel for co-defendant owner of hotel for breach of contract. Construction company cross-filed against defendant hotel owner. The Trial Court, after hearing proof, entered a joint settlement judgment against both defendants on behalf of the plaintiff and based the judgment on the terms of the settlement agreement which had been entered in a prior action in a suit between the defendants. The owner of the hotel appealed. We hold the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the settlement agreement between the defendants, and set aside the judgment against appellant and direct that the contractor is liable for all the damages awarded, based on appellants' cross-action against the contractor.

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff offered evidence of the standard of care required of defendant by an expert witness, and defendant offered evidence that it complied with the standard of care by an expert witness, who was accepted as an expert by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge ruled in favor of defendant, essentially accepting the defendant's evidence that it had met the standard of care for the deceased. Plaintiff appealed, insisting that the Trial Court did not "correctly weigh the conflicting expert testimony" in its ruling for the defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff offered evidence of the standard of care required of defendant by an expert witness, and defendant offered evidence that it complied with the standard of care by an expert witness, who was accepted as an expert by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge ruled in favor of defendant, essentially accepting the defendant's evidence that it had met the standard of care for the deceased. Plaintiff appealed, insisting that the Trial Court did not "correctly weigh the conflicting expert testimony" in its ruling for the defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Plaintiff subcontractor, sued contractor, who constructed a hotel for co-defendant owner of hotel for breach of contract. Construction company cross-filed against defendant hotel owner. The Trial Court, after hearing proof, entered a joint settlement judgment against both defendants on behalf of the plaintiff and based the judgment on the terms of the settlement agreement which had been entered in a prior action in a suit between the defendants. The owner of the hotel appealed. We hold the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the settlement agreement between the defendants, and set aside the judgment against appellant and direct that the contractor is liable for all the damages awarded, based on appellants' cross-action against the contractor.