APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant, Darius Montez Edwards, was indicted in April of 2007 by the Davidson County Grand Jury for premeditated first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to facilitation of first degree murder and facilitation of attempted first degree murder in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charge. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty-four years for facilitation of first degree murder and eleven years for facilitation of attempted first degree murder. Appellant appeals his sentence. We determine that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant and, therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

I concur, but on a different basis. “Whether the stop of a vehicle is considered ‘reasonable’  depends on whether the officer had either probable cause or an ‘articulable and reasonable  suspicion’ that the vehicle or its occupants were subject to seizure for a violation of the law . . . . The level of reasonable suspicion required to support an investigatory stop is lower than that required for probable cause.” State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 902 (Tenn. 2008). Reasonable suspicion must be supported “by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Hughes v. State, 588 S.W.2d 296, 305 (Tenn. 1979).

This appeal involves the detention and questioning of the driver of a truck tractor and trailer based upon an anonymous tip of reckless driving from a citizen. A police officer received a dispatch that a caller had reported a black “18-wheeler” bearing a “Smith Brothers” logo was being driven recklessly in a northbound direction on the interstate and had just exited at the Highway 72 ramp. The police officer was in a parking lot very close to the exit ramp at the time he received the call. He responded immediately and observed a black “semi-truck” parked in the emergency lane of the northbound exit ramp. The officer turned his blue lights on, drove down the ramp, and pulled in front of the truck. After observing a Smith Transport logo on the door of the truck tractor, questioning the driver, and administering field sobriety tests, the officer arrested the driver for driving under the influence. The driver entered a conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence and reserved the certified question of whether the warrantless detention and questioning of the driver violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. We hold that in this case the anonymous tip reporting reckless driving indicated a sufficiently high risk of imminent injury or death to members of the public to warrant immediate intervention by law enforcement officials and justified the brief investigatory stop because the offense was reported at or near the time of its occurrence, and the report indicated that the caller was witnessing an ongoing offense; the report provided a detailed description of the truck, its direction of travel and location; and the investigating officer verified these details within moments of the dispatch reporting the tip.

The defendant, Damion Seals, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to five years as a Range I offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Carl Stevenson, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to criminal attempt murder in the first degree and especially aggravated robbery and received a concurrent sentence of 15 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred when it found that the petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Derrick McClure, was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, the petitioner received an effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred in failing to find that due process considerations tolled the statute of limitations to allow him reasonable time to file his petition asserting the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Two of a deceased mother’s six children appeal a jury’s specific findings that their mother’s last will was invalid because they had a confidential relationship with their mother and unduly influenced her to execute the will. Plaintiffs, the decedent’s four other children, commenced this action to contest the will the appellants offered for probate. On appeal, the appellants contend there is no material evidence to support the jury’s findings that they had a confidential relationship with their mother or that they exerted undue influence. Appellants also contend the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a criminal conviction of one of the appellants. Whether to admit the evidence was within the sound discretion of the trial court and we find the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence; moreover, the trial court gave a limiting instruction that evidence of the crime was only relevant as it pertained to motive and intent to influence the testatrix to change her will. As for the jury verdict, we find substantial and material evidence that supports the jury’s findings in the record. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

The Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Vincent Johnson, on charges of unlawful possession of more than seventy pounds of marijuana. The defendant and the District AttorneyGeneral entered into a plea agreement allowing the defendant to plead guilty to one count of the indictment for an eight-year sentence and petition the trial court for placement in a community corrections program. The trial court rejected the plea agreement and the defendant filed an application for an appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the trial court erred in withholding its approval of the plea agreement based on the defendant’s ineligibility for probation and consequent ineligibility for placement in a community corrections program. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Frankie Blankenship sought reconsideration of her workers’ compensation award after her employer, Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., discontinued its operations. The trial court granted a multiplier of 6 times her permanent partial disability rating of 3 percent. In accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008), the appeal by the Employer has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Panel for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the trial court specifically accredited the testimony of the Employer and properly addressed each of the factors pertinent to an award upon reconsideration, our scope of review is limited. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

Defendant, Jackie Lynn Foster, Jr., was indicted for first degree premeditated murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-three years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in its sentencing determinations, and that the trial court erred in its admission of certain evidence. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of second degree murder, and that Defendant waived his issue concerning the admissibility of evidence by not filing a timely motion for new trial. Although the trial court erred in applying one enhancement factor in determining the length of Defendant’s sentence, we further conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial court was justified. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jose Jordan Rodriguez, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the petitioner pled guilty to possession of a weapon with intent to employ it during the commission of an offense, a Class E felony, and possession with intent to sell over 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the petitioner, as agreed, to concurrent sentences of one year and eight years for the respective convictions. The court further ordered that the sentences be served in confinement. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately advise him of the consequences of entering the guilty pleas. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority. In my view, the police officers’ search of Ms. Turner’s residence without reasonable or individualized suspicion violates article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. While the United States Supreme Court has ruled in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), that such a search, without reasonable or individualized suspicion, does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, I would hold the Tennessee Constitution provides a greater degree of protection against suspicionless searches than does the federal Constitution.

This appeal involves a conservatorship. When the respondent was eighty-three years old, her sister
died and left the respondent over $200,000. The bulk of the inheritance was placed in an irrevocable
trust for the respondent’s benefit, and the deceased sister’s former attorney was appointed as the trustee. Soon, the respondent began to spend her inheritance at a rapid rate, with much of the spending benefitting her daughter and her daughter’s boyfriend. The respondent then purchased a $200,000 home to live in with her daughter and her daughter’s boyfriend, with the expectation that the $1,800 monthly mortgage would be paid out of the trust.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the police violated the constitutional rights of the defendant, a parolee, when they searched her residence without a warrant but pursuant to a condition of her parole. We adopt the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and hold that parolees who are subject to a warrantless search condition may be searched without reasonable or individualized suspicion. The officers who searched the defendant’s residence knew about her parole status, were aware of the warrantless search condition of her parole, and did not conduct the search in an unreasonable manner. Accordingly, the trial court erred in suppressing evidence found during the search of the defendant’s residence. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee, Barry R. Moore, was a truck driver. He was employed by a small corporation owned by a senior vice president of a large trucking company, Howard Baer, Inc. The smaller company leased his services to the larger one. He suffered a significant on-the-job injury. Mr. Moore obtained a judgment for workers’ compensation benefits against his employer, Ronald Baker, Inc. That corporation did not have workers’ compensation insurance and immediately discharged the debt in bankruptcy. He sought to receive benefits from Howard Baer, Inc., that he had been leased to, arguing that his employer was the “alter ego” of the larger company. The trial court found that the larger company was not liable for benefits, based upon the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-106(1)(A). We reluctantly affirm the judgment.1
 

Defendants sold materials containing asbestos to the deceased’s employer, where he was exposed to asbestos and contracted mesothelioma from which he died. Plaintiff’s widow brought this action against the supplier, a jury trial resulted and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, which the Trial Court approved. On appeal, we hold that certain jury instructions were error and we reverse and remand for a new trial.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee suffered a compensable injury to his lower back, which resulted in two surgical procedures and a 12% anatomical impairment. Subsequently, his treating physician recommended an additional surgical procedure. Employer declined to pay for the procedure, contending that intervening events caused the need for surgery. The trial court awarded Employee 18% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The trial court also found that the additional procedure was related to the original work injury, and ordered Employer to pay for it. On appeal, Employer contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s ruling. We disagree, and affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, William C. Brothers, pled nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and received an effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County which was dismissed. On appeal, the petitioner argues: (1) the indictment was defective; (2) he was no protected from double jeopardy; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) the State failed to identify any evidence to prove its allegations. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the denial of relief.

The employee, Reginald G. Peck, sought benefits for an alleged work-related injury to his lower back. The trial court found for the employer, Hochman Family Partners, L.P., and dismissed the complaint. Mr. Peck has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by entering judgment for the employer, and by denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment. 1 We affirm the judgment.

Claimant filed this claim for damages seeking return of bond money he had posted. He alleged a violation of his constitutional rights resulted when the State charged him for the same two crimes in two different counties. The State responded with a motion to dismiss contending that the Claims Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The Claims Commissioner granted the motion. Claimant appeals. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Joseph Wayne Graves, was found guilty of aggravated assault,aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property valued at more than $500 butless than $1000. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty-three years. On appeal,Defendant alleges: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence; (2)the evidence presented does not support his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm Graves’convictions; however, we conclude that double jeopardy protections require that the convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and theft be merged. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for purposes of merger and for entry of corrected judgments of conviction.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Randy Joe McNew, of driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, see T.C.A. § 55-10-616 (2004), violating the vehicle registration law, see id. § 55-5-115, and driving under the influence, see id. § 55-10-401. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, argues that a violation of the rule of sequestration rendered a State’s witness incompetent to testify, claims that the trial court erred by refusing to rule prior to trial on the admissibility of evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions, and attacks the sentencing decision of the trial court. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After Plaintiff was injured in a car accident, she filed suit against the minor who was driving the other vehicle and against the minor’s father, alleging that he was vicariously liable for the acts of his son pursuant to the family purpose doctrine. Father moved for summary judgment, claiming that the undisputed facts showed that the family purpose doctrine was inapplicable as a matter of law. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that the family purpose doctrine was applicable as a matter of law. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Father. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting Plaintiff’s motion, as we find the family purpose doctrine applicable to this case.

This appeal involves the enforcement of a marital dissolution agreement, which provided that the parties would jointly own various retirement accounts after their divorce. Several years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition for relief alleging that the husband was using the funds in the retirement accounts for his own benefit and denying her access to the funds. The trial court essentially divided the retirement funds between the parties and ordered the husband to repay the wife one-half of the funds he had withdrawn since the divorce. The husband appeals. We affirm.