APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her two children. Father appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his child with Mother. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s determination, we affirm.

The Defendant, Landy M. Clemmons, appeals his convictions by a jury in the Criminal Court for Knox County for two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the two aggravated burglary convictions and sentenced the Defendant to nine years as a Range II, multiple offender for the aggravated burglary and to eleven years as a Range I, violent offender for each of the aggravated kidnappings, to be served concurrently, for an effective eleven-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his convictions for both aggravated burglary and aggravated kidnapping violate principles of due process. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Allen Jean Stephens, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This appeal involves claims made by a sister against her brother’s estate in addition to a separate dispute between the sister and the brother’s estate regarding how much money the estate was owed from the sale of a house owned by the brother and his siblings. The trial court referred the matters to a special master, who found in favor of the sister on some of the claims. Upon review of the special master’s report, however, the trial court rejected the special master’s findings in favor of the sister and ruled in favor of the brother’s estate. The sister appeals, claiming that the trial court should have deferred to the special master. We affirm.

The petitioner, Clemmie Rhyan, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner, convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, is currently serving a twenty-two-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to: (1) investigate the case and locate witnesses for the defense; and (2) present evidence, including thorough cross-examination of State witnesses supporting the theory of self-defense. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial of the petition and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Snodgrass’s 401(k) account was not transmuted to marital property when he withdrew a portion of its funds for the purchase of a family home, as well as its holding regarding the division of the parties’ pensions. I further agree with the majority’s determination that 401(k) accounts are “retirement . . . benefit rights relating to employment” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(b)(1)(B), and that the contributions made by Mr. Snodgrass and Mrs. Snodgrass prior to the marriage (the “premarital contributions”) should be classified as separate property because they did not, as the statute requires, “accrue[] during the period of the marriage.” I disagree, however, with the rationale by which the majority concludes that the increase in the value of the premarital contributions qualified as marital property. Instead, I would remand for consideration of whether the increases in value could be traced to the premarital contributions of each to their respective 401(k)s and have not been subjected to commingling (inextricably mingled with marital property) or, in the alternative, whether the increases became marital through the concept of substantial contribution (to the preservation and appreciation of the premarital contributions).

In this ejectment action, the plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s finding that they did not prove title to the property at issue by adverse possession in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-105 and that they failed to show the boundaries of the property they claimed. Plaintiffs also contend that they were entitled to the presumption of ownership set forth at Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109. Finding no basis to reverse the judgment of the trial court, we affirm same.

This is an appeal from an order terminating a mother’s parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, among others. The trial court found that termination was in the children’s best interest. The mother appeals, and we affirm.

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit after discovering damage to a Mercedes-Benz that had been represented to them as a new vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim against all defendants and plaintiffs’ breach of contract and warranty claims against defendant Mercedes-Benz USA. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Appellant previously acted as co-conservator of respondent’s estate and person. He was removed from this capacity due to difficulties with his co-conservator cousin. Appellant sought to be renamed conservator of respondent’s estate, but the trial court instead appointed an independent conservator citing Appellant’s previous removal as conservator, the distance Appellant lives from respondent, and the fact that Appellant’s mother is currently acting as conservator of respondent’s person. Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s appointment of Robert T. Condo as conservator of respondent’s estate, we affirm.

I concur with the Court’s conclusion that the nonclaim statutes in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 30-2-
307(a)(1), -310(a) (2007) do not prevent the Bureau of TennCare from recovering correctly paid
medical benefits from the late Martha M. Tanner’s estate. My two-fold purpose in preparing this
separate opinion is to explain my understanding of the basis for the estate’s liability and to address the application of the statutory recovery procedures when a TennCare recipient’s family decides against probating the deceased recipient’s estate.

The defendant, Gayle Thomas Crawford, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; and possession of drug  paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years at thirty-five percent in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he raises essentially five issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) whether the rule of sequestration was violated; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to offer his opinion on the street value of the drugs; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing an officer to testify that an unknown black male listed in the warrant was the defendant; and (5) whether the search warrant was invalid. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana, the rule of sequestration was not violated, the trial court did not err in allowing the officer’s testimony with respect to the street value of drugs and the identity of the unknown black male, and that the defendant has waived the issues with respect to the validity of the search warrant. We further conclude, however, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver and reverse and dismiss the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.

The decedent, Martha M. Tanner, died intestate while a resident of a nursing facility. Nineteen months later, the Bureau of TennCare filed a complaint in the Davidson County Chancery Court seeking the appointment of an administrator of her estate. The case was transferred to the probate court, and the decedent’s son, Thomas Tanner, was appointed administrator. The Bureau of TennCare then filed a claim seeking recovery of “medical assistance correctly paid” on behalf of the decedent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-5-116 (1995 & Supp. 2002) and 42 United States Code section 1396p (2003 & Supp. 2009). The probate court dismissed the claim as untimely, and, upon direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted application for permission to appeal in order to consider whether the claim is procedurally barred. Because section 71-5-116 places an obligation on the representative of an estate to obtain a waiver or release from the Bureau, the claim is not subject to a one-year statute of limitations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded to the probate court. Tenn. R. App. P. 11; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed
 

The petitioner, Le Tonio Swader, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Rutherford County Circuit Court from his convictions for first degree felony murder; second degree murder, a Class A felony; attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of an offense, a Class E felony. The murder convictions were merged. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of life plus two years. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, which is not a proper post-conviction claim, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for which the petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof. He also argues for the first time in this proceeding that his convictions amounted to double jeopardy. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Gregory Allen Cathey, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and  conclusions of law. The Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder during the construction of the Defendant’s auto wash. The trial court held that the Plaintiff was a casual employee of the Defendant, and therefore not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. It further held that the Defendant was not subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act because it did not have the required number of employees and because it was not in the construction business. On appeal, the Plaintiff contends that these findings were erroneous. We disagree, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee complied with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(a) (Supp. 2003). It further found that she had sustained a compensable injury to her lower back and awarded 30% permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the claim is barred by failure to provide timely notice and that the evidence preponderates against the finding of causation. We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Terrence Gardner, was convicted of first degree (felony) murder, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to life for the murder, to ten years for the Class B felony, and to four years for the Class C felony. The convictions for the murder and aggravated robbery were set to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the aggravated assault, for a total effective sentence of life plus four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in not permitting him to present a witness to be impeached. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Petitioner of three counts of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life without parole plus twenty years. The Petitioner then timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this second appeal of this case, the Trial Court had entered an Agreed Order for disbursement of the funds which stated the parties had determined that the purpose of the constructive trust would best be shared out by transferring the funds to a newly created non-profit corporation known as the Lafollette Medical Foundation (the funds had been held by the Clerk of the Court). The Court directed that the trust fund would be placed in the foundation with the monies retained for potential liabilities, and the charter of the LaFollette Medical Foundation, Inc., was filed with the Court, as well as its by-laws. The City of LaFollette filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order pursuant to Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. P., along with affidavits. The Court conducted a hearing and filed a Memorandum Opinion finding that its order was not void because the City had been found to have no interest in the fund and the City had actual knowledge of the Foundation and its rules, and transferring the money to the Foundation best served the interest of the public rather than the money being held by the Court. The City of LaFollette appealed to this Court. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Travis Tierney, was charged with one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210(c), -102(d)(1), -16-503(b). He was found guilty as charged following a jury trial and sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for second degree murder, six years for each aggravated assault, and six years for tampering with evidence, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of second degree murder; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years for second degree murder. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Dennis J. Rountree, Jr., appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition because it found the petition to be barred by the statute of limitations. Following our review, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for a hearing on the merits of the petition.

The defendant, William J. Johnson, appeals his convictions and sentences for violation of habitual motor vehicle offender status, driving under the influence fifth offense, and driving while license revoked fourth offense. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support hisconvictions and that his effective twelve-year sentence was excessive. We affirm the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, Brandon Wallace, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He is presently serving an effective sentence of forty years after being found guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, attempted especially  aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and felony reckless endangerment. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we conclude that the petitioner’s sentencing claim was previously determined and that he failed in carrying his burden of proving that trial counsel was ineffective. The judgment from the post-conviction court denying relief is affirmed.

Commercial real estate broker brought action against seller of property seeking commission following the sale of the property to buyers allegedly introduced to the seller by the broker during the term of the listing agreement. Upon cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the seller finding the listing agreement was unenforceable because there was no meeting of the minds and a lack of mutual assent to the terms of the agreement. Broker appeals and finding error, we reverse and remand.