APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of the mother’s petition to relocate with her minor child.  We affirm the trial court’s decision.

This is a consolidated appeal from the trial court’s attorney fee award pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c), which concerns awards of the costs and reasonable and necessary attorney fees to parties who prevail on a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging various claims against the defendants. Upon the defendants’ motion, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal on December 3, 2018. The plaintiff took a timely appeal, and we affirmed the judgment of dismissal in full. We remanded the case for collection of the costs below. After the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review, the defendants, for the first time, moved for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c) in the trial court. The trial court granted that motion and awarded the statutory maximum amount of fees to the defendants. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs. 

The appellant challenges the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for order of protection against her husband. Following a hearing where both parties testified, the trial court did not find appellant’s testimony credible and dismissed her petition. We affirm.

In this appeal, we clarify the appropriate standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument when a defendant fails to contemporaneously object but later raises the claim in a motion for a new trial.  Tyler Ward Enix was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and especially aggravated robbery for the 2015 killing of Kimberly Enix.  Mr. Enix filed a motion for a new trial challenging his convictions.  As relevant to this appeal, he alleged that four instances of improper prosecutorial closing argument, which were not contemporaneously objected to at trial, constitute reversible error.  The trial court denied his motion for new trial.  The Court of Criminal Appeals, reviewing the claims under the plain error doctrine, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  Mr. Enix sought permission to appeal, arguing that this Court should employ plenary review to address his claims because they were included in his motion for a new trial.  We granted permission to appeal and now hold that plain error review is the appropriate standard, and, furthermore, that Mr. Enix is not entitled to relief.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals for the separate reasons stated herein.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce petition to modify a parenting plan, specifically the parenting schedule, and a counter-petition to modify child support. The parties were divorced in Kentucky shortly after the father was diagnosed with a mental illness in 2012. The separation agreement gave the father visitation “as agreed upon by the parties to be supervised at all times by [the father]’s parents.” Over the next four years, the father enjoyed frequent and liberal visitation with the child. This arrangement continued until the grandparents took the father to the child’s school performance. The mother believed the father’s presence was “wildly inappropriate” due to his mental health issues. She subsequently refused the grandparents’ requests to see the child, effectively depriving the father of any parenting time with the child. The father then commenced this action by petitioning to modify the parenting plan so that he would have regularly scheduled parenting time that was not subject to the mother’s unilateral approval. The mother opposed the father’s petition and filed a counter-petition to modify his child support obligation and to award an arrearage judgment for unpaid child support. After a trial, the court found that the mother’s unilateral termination of the father’s visitation was a material change in circumstance and that scheduled, supervised visitation with the father was in the child’s best interest. The trial court also retroactively modified the father’s child support obligation and awarded an arrearage judgment of $7,000 in favor of the mother for unpaid child support. The court denied the mother’s request for pre- and postjudgment interest because the mother’s “own actions . . . caused a lengthy delay to the conclusion of the[] proceedings.” The mother raises several issues on appeal. She contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there was no evidence that the mother, the child, and the father lived in Tennessee for six months before the father’s petition. She also contends that her refusal to allow the grandparents to see the child was not a material change in circumstance. Further, she contends the trial court erred in its calculation of the father’s child support obligation and in failing to award pre- and post-judgment interest under Kentucky law. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court in all regards except its denial of interest and the effective date of the modified support order. Therefore, the judgment of the trial is affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child.  The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Wilson County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Christina C. (“Mother”) to her minor child Rufus C. (“the Child”).  After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights.  Mother appeals.  We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that the grounds of severe child abuse and persistent conditions were proven against Mother by clear and convincing evidence.  However, due to ambiguity in the Juvenile Court’s order, we vacate the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home.  We further find, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest.  We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment, as modified, terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated mother’s parental rights to her child on multiple grounds. Specifically, the trial court determined that mother had abandoned her child and failed to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the child or assume physical or legal custody of the child. In addition to finding that grounds existed for termination, the trial court concluded termination was in the child’s best interests. The mother now appeals the trial court’s termination. Although we vacate one ground for termination relied upon by the trial court, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s order terminating mother’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Zachary Rye Adams, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and three counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury after a change of venue. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder); 39-13-305 (2018) (especially aggravated kidnapping); 39- 13-502 (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated rape). The State sought the death penalty. However, after the jury returned guilty verdicts, the parties agreed to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first degree murder, twenty-five years for especially aggravated kidnapping, and twenty-five years for aggravated rape, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus fifty years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by denying a motion to recuse, (3) the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to disqualify an attorney from the defense team, (4) the trial court erred by admitting evidence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), (5) the trial court erred by excluding a prior inconsistent statement, (6) the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence, (7) the trial court erred by excluding impeachment evidence, (8) the trial court erred by excluding “witness reactive conduct evidence,” (9) the trial court erred by failing to strike testimony from an undisclosed witness, and (10) the cumulative error doctrine entitles him to relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Marico Vales, of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Marico Vales, No. W2018-00424-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 328436 at *1, (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 23, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 20, 2019). The Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and, following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that Counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to inadmissible evidence and evidence admitted without the proper foundation. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgement.

A McNairy County jury convicted the Petitioner, Terry Wayne Henson, of two counts of rape of a child, one count of incest, and one count of violating the sex offender registry requirements. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-five years of incarceration. This court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. State v. Terry Wayne Henson, No. W2019-00462-SC-R11-CD, 2020 WL 6317113 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 28, 2020), Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application denied (Tenn. Mar. 23, 2021). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in several regards. The post-conviction court held a hearing, after which it denied the petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

After being convicted of first degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated assault, Johnny Lorenzo Wade, Petitioner, was sentenced to an effective sentence of life plus 40 years. State v. Johnny Lorenzo Wade, No. W2017-00933-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3414471, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 15, 2018). Petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, and Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief. He now appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, among other issues. Because Petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal and the interests of justice do not merit waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal.

This is a multi-party premises liability and general negligence action among a roofer who fell from the homeowner’s roof, the homeowner who erected the scaffolding at issue, and the scaffolding company that rented the scaffolding to the homeowner, but did not erect the scaffolding. The complaint alleged that the roofer slipped and fell on the roof and then bounced over to the scaffolding before falling to the ground. The complaint also alleged that had a safety rail been installed on the scaffolding it could have prevented the roofer’s fall. The homeowner filed an answer denying liability and alleging comparative fault against the scaffolding company. Consequently, the roofer filed an amended complaint adding the scaffolding company as a codefendant. After discovery, the scaffolding company filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it owed no duty to the roofer or the homeowner because it had no control over the premises nor actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the premises. The roofer and homeowner opposed the motion contending, inter alia, that this is a case of general negligence against the scaffolding company because the homeowner relied on the scaffolding company for guidance during the installation process and the scaffolding company assumed the duty of care to ensure the scaffold was installed safely. They also contend that summary judgment was not appropriate because material facts are in dispute. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims against the scaffolding company, and this appeal followed. We find that the material facts are not in dispute and that the scaffolding company was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on claims sounding in premises liability and general negligence. Thus, we affirm the summary dismissal of all claims against the scaffolding company.

The general contractor on a park and marina project brought a professional negligence action against the engineering firm that designed the project and administered the construction contract.  The jury returned a verdict for the general contractor.  And the trial court approved the verdict.  On appeal, the engineering firm argues that it is entitled to a new trial.  It contends that: (1) the jury verdict must be set aside because it is irreconcilably inconsistent; (2) the general contractor’s expert witness was not qualified to testify on the engineering standard of care; (3) and there is no material evidence to support the jury’s findings as to liability or delay damages.  Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Dominique Jamal Nichols, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, one count of evading arrest, and two counts of driving on a suspended license. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); 39-16-603 (evading arrest); 55-50-504 (driving on a suspended license). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 12 years for each of the firearm convictions, 11 months and 29 days for the evading arrest conviction, and 6 months for each driving on a suspended license conviction, for a total effective sentence of 12 years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress “the stop and subsequent seizure of [the Defendant]’s vehicle[,]” and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Andre Anthony (“Petitioner”) appeals the ruling of the Chancery Court for Davidson County (the “trial court”), dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). We conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal. 

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Appellant personal representative appeals two forms of attorney’s fees awarded against her: (1) attorney’s fees incurred by the appellees in opposing the appellant’s motion for sanctions; and (2) attorney’s fees incurred by appellees in enforcing a confidential settlement agreement. We affirm the attorney’s fees awarded relative to the motion for sanctions and vacate the award of attorney’s fees relative to enforcement of the settlement.

The Defendant, Randall Lee Pruitt, pleaded guilty in the Monroe County Criminal Court to three counts of rape, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-503 (2018). After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed nine and one-half years for each conviction and ordered consecutive service, for an effective twenty-eight-and-one-half-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the court erred by ordering consecutive service. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ebony Robinson, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, aggravated assault, resisting arrest, and driving without a license.  The trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence to be served on probation with periodic confinement each year near Christmas and each victim’s birthday.  On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by granting probation because Defendant was not statutorily eligible.  Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and briefs of the parties, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of probation and remand for execution of Defendant’s sentence and entry of amended judgments of conviction. 

This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children upon the juvenile court’s finding of the statutory grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The juvenile court further found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We vacate the statutory ground of persistent conditions due to insufficient findings of fact. However, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

This appeal concerns a father’s petition to modify the permanent parenting plan for his five-year-old daughter. The father filed his petition after the child’s mother decided to move from Wilson County—where the father lived and the child attended preschool—to Williamson County, where the mother’s fiancé lived. The mother was the primary residential parent and wanted the child to attend school in Williamson County, but the permanent parenting plan gave the parties joint authority over educational decisions, and the father wanted the child to attend school in Wilson County. In his petition, the father contended that the mother’s move constituted a material change in circumstance, and he asked the court to name him as the primary residential parent, implement a 50/50 residential parenting schedule, and give him authority over where the child would attend school. After a three-day trial, the court ordered the parties to send the child to school in Williamson County. The court also found the mother’s move was a material change in circumstance for the purpose of modifying the residential parenting schedule but not for the purpose of changing the primary residential parent or reallocating decision-making authority. The court concluded that a 50/50 residential schedule was in the child’s best interests. This appeal followed.We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all regards.

The Defendant, Billy Wayne Locke, was convicted in two McMinn County Criminal Court bench trials of two counts of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; driving while his license was revoked, a Class B misdemeanor; and reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor. T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603(b) (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest); 55-50-504 (2020) (driving while license revoked), 39-13-103 (2018) (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment). The Defendant, a career offender, is serving an effective twelve-year sentence, consisting of six years in the Department of Correction and six years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his evading arrest convictions. Because the Defendant waived his right to an appeal of his convictions, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Dustin Russell, appeals the trial court’s imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The pro se Petitioner, Patrick Lamar Moore, appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, David Allen Donton, Jr., was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for one count of observation without consent, involving an eight-year-old female victim. Defendant pleaded guilty as charged and agreed to serve one year as a Range I offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s request for probation and imposed a sentence of confinement. Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal, and this Court granted his motion to waive the timely filing. Defendant contends that the trial court departed from the principles and purposes of sentencing in several ways. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.