APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Dan E. Durell, acting pro se, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his second petition for habeas corpus relief. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tony Latrell Greer, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of thirty-three years, ten years, and ten years, respectively. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Jovan Crawford, was convicted of aggravated assault, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years’ incarceration to be served consecutively to the defendant’s prior sentences in Shelby County Case Nos. 1308038 and 1501666. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentence is excessive and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Robert Beham, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because (1) counsel failed to request a “mental evaluation” and (2) counsel failed to present mitigating evidence in sentencing, specifically a psychosexual evaluation. Following our review, we affirm.

This appeal involves several consolidated actions that were filed by insurance companies concerning a wildfire that occurred in Sevier County on November 28, 2016. The insurance companies alleged that the fire was sparked by a decaying Northern Red Oak tree that fell on an electrical service conductor and that the fire quickly spread to neighboring properties, including properties owned by their insureds. The insurance companies urged that the vegetation management contractor should be held liable for the losses for failing to prune or remove the diseased tree before it fell on the conductor. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the vegetation management contractor, determining, inter alia, that the contractor owed no duty to prune trees located near service drops or to inspect or remove trees that were outside the right of way that the contractor had agreed to maintain. The insurance companies have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the vegetation management contractor.

Kevin Lee Waggoner (“Petitioner”) filed an action in the Chancery Court for Davidson County on April 30, 2021, pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act (the “Act”). Petitioner sought the audio recordings from his criminal trial held several years earlier in Union County. The trial court held that the clerk of the criminal court in which Petitioner’s trial was held was not required by statute to store the recordings as part of the clerk’s case records. The trial court also held that the audio recordings were exempt from disclosure under the Act pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 34. We reverse the trial court’s decision as to both issues and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Larry Lee Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This appeal involves several consolidated lawsuits that were filed by insurance companies concerning a wildfire that occurred in Sevier County on November 28, 2016. The insurance companies alleged that the fire was sparked by dead or diseased trees falling on or striking electrical lines and that the fire quickly spread to neighboring properties, including properties owned by their insureds. The insurance companies urged that the defendant vegetation management contractor should be held liable for the losses for failing to prune or remove the diseased trees before they contacted the power lines. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the vegetation management contractor, determining, inter alia, that the contractor owed no duty to inspect or remove trees that were located outside the right of way that the contractor had agreed to maintain. The insurance companies have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the vegetation management contractor.

A meeting between siblings about their deceased mother’s estate went awry. As a result of the meeting, one sister, and her spouse, sought a protective order against the sister’s brother. After a hearing, the trial court granted the protective orders. We affirm.

This case involves a custody dispute between a biological father and the maternal grandparents of two children.  The children at issue were placed in the temporary custody of their maternal grandparents while the children’s parents were in the midst of a divorce and were dealing with addiction issues.  Father petitioned the court to regain full custody of the children.  Ultimately, the court named maternal grandparents primary residential parents and provided father with 54 days of parenting time per year. Because the orders granting custody to the maternal grandparents were temporary, the chancery court should have applied the superior parental rights doctrine, rather than a material change in circumstances, when making its custody decision with respect to the father.  Because the chancery court applied an incorrect legal standard when analyzing the case, we reverse the chancery court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The Defendant, Charles Lawson, entered guilty pleas to unlawful possession of a weapon, evading arrest, attempted child abuse or neglect, felony escape, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and theft of property valued $10,000 or more, and he received an effective ten-year sentence, which he was to serve on probation. The Defendant was charged with new criminal offenses, and he entered into an agreement with the prosecution resolving both the new charges and the violation of probation. The trial court rejected the plea agreement. After a hearing, the court determined that the Defendant violated probation and ordered the sentences in the probation violation case to be served in confinement. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erroneously believed that the prosecution had no authority to make a plea offer for a violation of probation, that his due process rights were violated because the court relied on evidence outside the proceedings and interjected itself into the plea process, and that the sentences imposed were illegal. We conclude that the Defendant’s claims regarding the rejection of the plea agreement by the trial court are waived, that his due process rights were not violated during the hearing addressing revocation, and that the judgments, which reflect a thirty-five percent release eligibility date, are not rendered illegal by any error in the mittimus. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The pro se petitioner, Jamie Brock, appeals from the dismissal of his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“the Act”), which petition sought the appointment of counsel to assist him in seeking DNA testing of evidence related to his first degree murder conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, David Paul Beets, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a private school, simple possession of heroin, hydrocodone, and marijuana, and driving on a suspended license, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he sold drugs in a drug-free zone or that his license had been suspended. We affirm the drug conviction but reverse the conviction of driving on a suspended license and dismiss that charge.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for disqualification of the trial judge.  After carefully reviewing the record provided by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion.

This appeal concerns a detainer action. Lee Dodgson (“Dodgson”) sued Cheryl M. Williams (“Williams”) in the Knox County General Sessions Court (“the General Sessions Court”). The General Sessions Court ruled in Dodgson’s favor. Williams appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Circuit Court”). Dodgson, the plaintiff in this matter, filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim. The Circuit Court granted Dodgson’s motion and dismissed Williams’ appeal. Williams appeals to this Court, arguing among other things that, while a motion for summary judgment might have been appropriate, a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was unavailable to Dodgson. We hold that Dodgson, as the plaintiff in this matter, could not use a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion as a means to dismiss Williams’ appeal. We vacate the Circuit Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, William Scott Warwick, of three counts of assault by offensive or provocative touching, a Class B misdemeanor, and three counts of sexual contact with a minor by an authority figure, a Class A misdemeanor. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of 2 years, 11 months, and 27 days at 75 percent, suspended to supervised probation after serving 90 days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing split confinement. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review of a trial judge’s recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B or, alternatively, a common law writ of certiorari. Such review is beyond the scope of Rule 10B. And a judge’s recusal may not be reviewed by a writ of certiorari. So we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal concerns the purchase and sale agreement for a 98,094-square-foot, multi-use commercial development in Nashville, Tennessee, known as Houston Station. Before marketing the property for sale, the defendant-seller discovered that approximately 100 square feet of the building encroached on neighboring property owned by CSX Transportation, Inc. and sought a lease from CSX to cover the encroachment. But before it could reach an agreement with CSX, the seller agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff-buyer. The buyer deposited $3 million as earnest money, and the parties scheduled a closing. Before closing, however, CSX demanded $550,000 per year for the encroachment. The seller then informed the buyer that it could not meet its obligations under their agreement. Meanwhile, the seller breached the agreement by executing two new leases without the buyer’s approval. The buyer extended the closing several times to allow the seller to cure its defaults, but the seller refused to terminate the new leases and could not reach a mutually agreeable arrangement with CSX. The buyer then let the closing deadline lapse and sued for, inter alia, reformation of the purchase agreement, specific performance, and damages. The seller then moved for summary judgment and requested an award of the earnest money on the theory that the buyer waived its objections by allowing the closing deadline to lapse. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that the buyer had constructive notice of the encroachment and then breached the purchase agreement by failing to buy the property. Accordingly, the court found the seller was entitled to the $3 million deposit as liquidated damages and an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses under the agreement as the prevailing party. The buyer appeals. Following a thorough review, we respectfully disagree that the buyer had constructive notice that the seller did not have good and marketable title. We also disagree that the seller had a right to terminate the contract and receive the earnest money. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Rodney Turner, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his postconviction petition, in which he challenged his two convictions of attempted first degree murder and one conviction of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the resulting total effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal and that the post-conviction court erred by denying funds for a fingerprint expert. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiff in this personal injury action was a passenger in a vehicle driven by the defendant when an accident occurred after an animal purportedly ran into the roadway. Upon the defendant’s motion and following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had presented no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal addresses mootness when a law challenged in the trial court is altered or amended after the trial court issued its final judgment and while the appeal is pending.  The plaintiff homeowners operated businesses out of their homes.  They filed a lawsuit against the defendant municipality challenging an ordinance that prohibited them from having clients visit their home-based businesses.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant municipality, and the homeowners appealed.  While the appeal was pending, the municipality repealed the ordinance that was the subject of the complaint and enacted a new ordinance that allowed limited client visits to home-based businesses.  The Court of Appeals held that the repeal of the original ordinance rendered the homeowners’ case moot, and the homeowners were granted permission to appeal to this Court.  While the appeal to this Court was pending, the ordinance was amended again. On appeal, based on the current record, we cannot determine whether the homeowners suffer ongoing harm from the new ordinance, how the change will affect their claims, and whether they retain some residual claim under the new ordinance.  Consequently, we vacate the judgments of the lower courts and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in which the parties may amend their pleadings to address any claims the homeowners may assert under the new ordinance.  

The petitioner, Rodney Deon Porter, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, William Benning, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, and he was sentenced to twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a third promissory note constituted a novation of two earlier promissory notes. Following a bench trial, the court found the defendant “carried her burden of proof to establish that the third note was a novation and cancelation of the previous two notes.” Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Eric Dates, sought post-conviction relief from his conviction of driving under the influence (“DUI”), for which he received a sentence of eleven months, twentynine days on probation with service of forty-eight hours in confinement. Relevant to this appeal, he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in his advice concerning a plea offer the Petitioner rejected prior to his trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.