Denny Lee Rhodes v. Capital City Insurance Company and James Farmer, Director, Department of Labor, Second Injury Fund
The issue in this case is whether an award of permanent total disability should commence when the employee reaches maximum medical improvement or on the last day that the employee is able to work due to the injury. The trial judge ordered permanent total benefits to be paid as of the day the employee last worked. The employee appealed, arguing that he was totally disabled from the time that he reached maximum medical improvement, and because he was only able to work in a limited capacity thereafter, he should be able to collect benefits for the period between his reaching maximum medical improvement and the time he ultimately stopped work. Because the employee was working during the three years at issue and because there was no evidence presented that he was unemployable in the general workforce, the evidence supports the trial court’s decision that he did not meet the statutory definition of permanent total disability until he stopped work. |
Benton | Supreme Court | |
Torian Benson a.k.a. Marcus Terry a.k.a. Marcus Benson v. State of Tennessee
This case comes before us on petitions for habeas corpus relief. Although several arguments are |
Lake | Supreme Court | |
Arvell Ezell, et al. v. Alvin E. Duncan, et al.
This appeal involves a boundary line dispute between neighbors. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs' boundary line description, and defendants appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
Thelma Williams v. Jeff Troyer, et al.
Plaintiff filed suit asserting that she was the owner by adverse possession of four acres of farmland in Maury County. Defendants, who purchased adjoining property in 2001, assert that they are by deed the true and rightful owners of the disputed parcel. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff was the owner of the property by adverse possession based on a finding that she and her predecessors in interest had possessed the property visibly, exclusively, actually, continuously, openly, and notoriously for twenty years. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Marjorie M. Kirkpatrick v. Robert W. O'Neal
Robert W. O'Neal ("Father") and Sandra K. O'Neal ("Mother") were granted a divorce by the Sumner County Circuit Court in 1986. There were two minor children born of the marriage, and Father was ordered to pay $650 per month in child support. After Mother passed away in June of 1990, the children's maternal grandparents, William and Marjorie Kirkpatrick, were awarded full custody of both children by the Sumner County Chancery Court. In 2001, Marjorie Kirkpatrick ("Petitioner") filed a petition in the Hamilton County Circuit Court seeking to have the previous order requiring Father to pay $650 per month in child support enforced. Petitioner also sought a substantial amount of arrearages. The Hamilton County Circuit Court determined that Father was in arrears a total of $55,063 covering from when Petitioner was awarded custody until June of 2002. Petitioner also was awarded her attorney fees. Father appeals, claiming the original order from the Sumner County Circuit Court requiring him to pay $650 per month in child support had no effect once Mother died. We modify the judgment of the Hamilton County Circuit Court, and affirm as modified. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dion A. Russell
On this consolidated appeal, the defendant challenges the manner and consecutive nature of his sentences. After analyzing the issues properly before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err in revoking the defendant's probation on the former sentence or in denying him probation on the latter. Further, we hold the consecutive sentences to be warranted and proper in this instance. Therefore, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cumecus Rodrelle Cates
Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and misdemeanor theft. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Martin Palmer Jones v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal from denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant, Martin Palmer Jones, was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder upon entry of best-interest guilty pleas. He was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment, which were to be served consecutively. The Defendant's sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Martin Palmer Jones, No. 03C01-9803-CR-00084, 1999 WL 93144 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Feb. 25, 1999). On petition for post-conviction relief, the Defendant claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty pleas. The trial court denied the petition, and the Defendant appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Unicoi | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher A. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Defendant, Christopher A. Johnson, seeks to appeal as of right from the trial court's denial of his "Petition to Enforce the Plea Agreement." The State argues that this appeal should be dismissed because an appeal as of right does not lie from a trial court's denial of a petition to enforce a plea agreement. We agree with the State's argument and dismiss this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Cartwright
Defendant, William Cartwright, pled guilty to one count of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received a sentence of three years as a Range I standard offender with the manner of service of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Albert Warren
The defendant, Jimmy Albert Warren, indicted for second offense driving under the influence and DUI per se, filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence. The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the field sobriety tests and the statements made by the defendant prior to his arrest were admissible, but that the blood alcohol content test results were not. In this interlocutory appeal initiated by the state, each party claims that the trial court erred. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffery D. Rhoades
The defendant, Jeffery D. Rhoades, appeals from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s 2004 revocation of his 1996 sentences for burglary and theft. We affirm the revocation of probation and the ordering of confinement for the balance of the original effective sentence, but we modify the provisions for sentence credits and remand. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darius Jones
The defendant, Darius Jones, was convicted of one count of felony murder, four counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder, ten years for each of the aggravated robberies and attempted especially aggravated robberies, and four years for each of the attempted aggravated robberies and the aggravated burglary, for an effective sentence of life plus eighty-one years 1. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the crime scene, that the trial court erred by limiting the defense cross-examination of a homicide detective, that the trial court erred by admitting the videotaped preliminary hearing testimony of one of the victims, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, that the sentence was excessive, and that cumulative error requires reversal. The conviction for felony murder and sentence of life with the possibility of parole are affirmed. The remaining judgments of conviction are affirmed, but the causes are remanded for resentencing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James W. Taylor aka Lutfi S. Talal v. Wayne Brandon, Warden
The Petitioner, James W. Taylor (aka Lutfi S. Talal), filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment, which the trial court dismissed. The Petitioner now appeals contending that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition because: (1) his presentments were fatally defective which deprived the trial court of proper jurisdiction; (2) the trial judge violated his constitutional rights; (3) the trial court erred when it ordered that the Petitioner's sentences run consecutively; (4) the trial court erred when it found that the Petitioner was a Range II offender; (5) the trial court erred when it approved an illegal judgment of conviction; and (6) the habeas corpus court erred when it denied the Petitioner a right to respond to the State. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Jackson, Jr.
Defendant, Charles Jackson, Jr., entered a plea of guilty to possession of cocaine of over 0.5 grams with intent to sell, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed the recommended sentence of eight years as a Range II multiple offender. As a part of the plea agreement, Defendant reserved two certified questions of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure arguing that the trial court erred in not suppressing items found during a search of his vehicle. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry E. Shannon
The defendant, Larry E. Shannon, appeals the trial court's order extending his probation by an additional eighteen months. He contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because his sentence expired before the probation revocation warrant was issued. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lydia Ann Watkins v. William C. Watkins, Jr.
Lydia Ann Bishop Watkins ("Wife") filed for divorce from William C. Watkins, Jr., ("Husband") after thirty-five years of marriage. The Trial Court awarded Wife a divorce and distributed the marital property. The Trial Court also concluded that Wife was not economically disadvantaged and refused to award her any alimony. The Trial Court ordered each party to be responsible for his or her attorney fees. Wife appeals claiming the Trial Court's distribution of the marital property was inequitable, the Trial Court erred by not awarding her alimony in futuro, and the Trial Court erred by not requiring Husband to pay her attorney's fees. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Thomas v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Eric Thomas, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. He seeks relief from his Class C felony conviction for robbery and resulting sentence of eight years and one day in confinement. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Youth Programs, Inc. v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, et al.
The chancery court reversed the Assessment Appeals Commission and held that Youth Programs, a charitable organization, is entitled to a property tax exemption on real property in Shelby County used in conjunction with the FedEx/St. Jude Classic golf tournament. The trial court determined the disputed property is used exclusively for a charitable purpose and that an unusable area is used constructively and is likewise exempt. The Shelby County Assessor of Property and the State appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Grover Aaron
In June of 2001, the appellant, Ricky Grover Aaron, was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and false imprisonment. As a result of his convictions, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven (11) years for the conviction for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and eleven months, twenty-nine days on his conviction for false imprisonment. The trial court further ordered that the appellant’s sentences be served concurrently to each other, but consecutively to a federal sentence he was already serving. On July 8, 2004, this Court affirmed both the appellant’s convictions and the sentence imposed by the trial court. See State v. Ricky Grover Aaron, No. M2002-02288-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1533825 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jul. 8, 2004). On July 14, 2004, the appellant filed a petition to rehear, urging this Court to consider the impact of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), delivered on June 24, 2004, on his sentence. Finding the position well-taken due to the potential impact of the Blakely decision upon the current Tennessee Sentencing Act, this Court granted the petition to rehear on August 2, 2004. The parties filed supplemental briefs fully addressing their view of the impact of Blakely on the appellant’s sentence. After a thorough review, we conclude that in light of Blakely, the trial court impermissibly considered certain enhancement factors to arrive at the appellant’s sentence for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Therefore, we modify the appellant’s sentence for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor from eleven (11) years to nine (9) years. Accordingly, the portion of the previous opinion of this Court affirming the appellant’s sentence is vacated. All other portions of this Court’s previous opinion are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Grover Aaron - Concurring
I concur with Judge Smith’s lead opinion; however, I am writing separately for two reasons. First, I have reconsidered, and upon further reflection, retreat from my earlier position that sentences found to be in violation of Blakely should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing in the trial court. Until such time as there is clear authority for our courts to deal with Blakely issues, whether by case law or by statute, judicial economy and sentencing considerations, including uniformity of application of sentencing factors, dictates that most sentences found to be in violation of Blakely should be modified, if at all, by the appellate courts. Clearly, the appellate courts have been given the authority to do so by the legislature Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(c). |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Grover Aaron - Dissenting
The majority concludes that modification of the appellant’s eleven-year sentence is required in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). I must respectfully dissent. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Laurie Ann Searcy v. Sandy Lee Searcy
Laurie Ann Searcy sought, by post-divorce Petition, a modification of the child custody and visitation privileges provided by the divorce decree. The trial court held that no change of circumstances had occurred “with a negative impact upon the child” and denied modification. We hold that the trial court applied an improper standard for determining the change of circumstances issue. We hold, however, that no change of circumstances has occurred under Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2003) and Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B) and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy W. Neves v. Erica Regan Neves (Arrell)
This case involves a custody dispute between the parents of one daughter. Mother lives in Belgium, and Father, the primary residential custodian, currently lives in Lewis County, Tennessee, although he has also lived with his daughter in Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington State at various times since the parties' separation in 1998. Father has refused to allow most of Mother's visitation since the divorce became final, has interfered with communication between Mother and Daughter, and has convinced Daughter to falsely accuse her maternal grandfather and stepfather of sexual abuse. The trial court found that these occurrences amounted to a material change in circumstances and found that it would be in the best interest of Daughter to make Mother her primary residential custodian and to allow Daughter to move to Belgium with Mother. We affirm the trial court. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Particularly, he avers that the court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing his petition solely on the lack of credibility of the affiant supporting the petition. We remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |