APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a child support obligation. The mother and father had three minor children. When the parties divorced, they entered into a marital dissolution agreement and a permanent parenting plan, which were approved by the divorce decree. Relevant to this appeal, the parties owned a newer residence, which was their marital home, and also an older residence, which had been listed for sale. The permanent parenting plan provided that it would not become effective until the older residence was sold. The parties agreed that the mother and the three children would be allowed to continue living with the father in the newer residence after the divorce until the older residence was sold. The father would be paying several marital debts until the older home sold, including the mortgage on the older home. However, the parenting plan provided that the father’s obligation to pay child support would not begin until the older home was sold. The mother and children soon moved out of the marital home and into the older residence. Pursuant to the agreement, the father had no obligation to pay child support because the older residence had not been sold. Six weeks after the final divorce decree was entered, the mother filed a motion to set aside the divorce decree and parenting plan, claiming that the parties were not abiding by the decree and the father was not paying any child support. The mother began receiving public assistance benefits, and the State of Tennessee Department of Human Services filed a petition on her behalf seeking to modify the father’s child support obligation, claiming that the agreement relieving him of his duty to pay child support was void and that a significant variance existed between his current obligation and the Child Support Guidelines. The trial court entered a default order requiring the father to pay child support directly to the mother, but later set it aside, leaving the father with only his obligation, pursuant to the marital dissolution agreement, to pay the marital debts until the older residence sold. The State appeals. We reverse and remand.

At the conclusion of a bench trial, the defendant, Gary Lynn Sykes, was convicted of aggravated assault. The trial court required restitution of $4,421.00 and imposed a Range I, three-year sentence in the Dyer County jail; all but sixty days were suspended. In his appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

The appellant, Devito Polk, pled guilty to second degree murder¹ and was sentenced to 35 years as a Multiple Range II offender. His sentence was to be served concurrently with seven pending aggravated robbery charges. He, thereafter, filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing and involuntary plea. He appeals the denial of the petition. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether he knowingly and intelligently entered his plea of guilty; and (2) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of a post-conviction relief petition. The appellant, Michael South, was convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery and sentenced to serve 60 years and 30 years, respectively.  The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. We affirm the dismissal of the petition.  In his petition seeking post-conviction relief, the sole issue was whether South had been denied effective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge filed an excellent, detailed opinion. The trial judge found that counsel’s performance was not deficient and denied relief. We have reviewed the briefs, transcript of the hearing, opinion and order denying relief and the entire appellate record. The evidence in the record does not preponderate against the findings and conclusions of the trial court.  The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal appeals.

The Appellant, Michael Anthony Pike, appeals as of right his sentences for simple possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He argues on appeal that the trial judge erred by not placing him in community corrections or, in the alternative, by not giving him the minimum statutory sentences. After a careful review of the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff has operated a funeral home on its property since 1997. In this zoning dispute, the City of Mt. Juliet Board of Zoning Appeals (“the Board”) refused to allow plaintiff to establish a crematory as an expansion of plaintiff’s funeral home services. The funeral home had been a legal nonconforming use of plaintiff’s property since the City’s zoning ordinance was amended in 1998. The Board refused to allow plaintiff to operate a crematory on the same property because crematories are not permitted in the zoning district for plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Trial Court for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The Trial Court granted the writ and found that the Board’s decision was arbitrary, illegal, and capricious. The Trial Court reversed the Board’s decision and ordered defendants to allow plaintiff to build and operate the proposed crematory on its funeral home property. The Trial Court also granted plaintiff $10,000 in attorney fees and costs. Defendants appeal. We affirm. We also hold that BMC is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred during this appeal, not to exceed $10,000, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-37-101, et seq. Therefore, we remand to the Trial Court for a determination of the proper amount of attorney fees and costs to be awarded to BMC and for collection of costs below.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 23, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in November 1988, and was convicted of the same in August 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 22, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in October 1988, and the petitioner pled guilty to the same in January 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

Bryan Matthew Willis appeals his convictions in the Circuit Court of Henry County. He was convicted by a jury of three (3) counts of aggravated burglary and three (3) counts of theft of property. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient for the convictions based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Turks, a/k/a Asad E. Mujihadeen, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court which denied him post-conviction, habeas corpus and coram nobis relief from his 1979 first degree murder conviction and resulting life sentence. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's case because the postconviction and coram nobis actions were barred by statutes of limitations and the habeas corpus action failed to state a ground for relief. The following issues are presented for review:

(1) Can evidence tending to show actual innocence of the crime for which the petitioner has been convicted be the basis for post-conviction relief under Tennessee law?

(2) Can evidence tending to show actual innocence of the crime for which the petitioner has been convicted be the basis for habeas corpus relief?

(3) Does the one-year statute of limitations for bringing evidence of actual innocence under Tennessee's coram nobis statute violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

The issue on appeal in this medical malpractice action is whether the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was timely filed. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this medical malpractice action on December 5, 2003, against three healthcare providers for a surgical procedure performed on husband on December 8, 2000. All defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment based on the statute of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding the plaintiffs had knowledge of enough facts more than one year before filing the lawsuit to put a reasonable person on notice that an injury had been suffered as a result of wrongful conduct by the defendants. The trial court also found that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply to toll the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

The biological father of S.A.W. appeals the termination of his parental rights. He maintains that he had no notice of the final hearing. The notice of the hearing was sent in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5.02 to the address supplied by the biological father. Proof of due mailing creates a presumption of receipt and nothing in the record rebuts this presumption. We affirm.

Defendants appeal the trial court’s failure to set aside, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the grant of summary judgment in this intentional tort case. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

Defendant Armstrong appeals as of right from a jury verdict of guilty for the sale of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine). Sentenced as a Range I standard offender, Armstrong received thirty-seven (37) months in the Tennessee Department of Correction and was fined $2,000. The sole issue for review is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Armstrong’s conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court was correct in awarding benefits for 50% permanent partial disability to a scheduled member, i.e. hearing loss, rather than the body as a whole. We hold that the award should have been apportioned to the body as a whole and therefore capped at two and one half times the anatomical impairment. We modify the judgement accordingly.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. There was no evidentiary hearing. While the petitioner submits an extensive brief outlining a number of issues, we have summarized his claims as follows:

(1) whether the trial court erred when it determined that sentence reform legislation adopted in 1979 and 1989 did not apply to petitioner's sentence;

(2) whether the subsequent sentence reform acts deny petitioner equal protection under the law and due process of the law;

(3) whether the petitioner's sentence is cruel and unusual punishment;

(4) whether the trial court erred by not appointing counsel to represent the petitioner during this habeas corpus proceeding;

(5) whether the trial court erred by not allowing the petitioner an evidentiary hearing on this petition; and

(6) whether the trial court erred by determining that it did not have jurisdiction to alter the petitioner's sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal as of right from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Obion County, granting Appellant’s motion to modify her sentence, but denying her full probation. See, Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35. Appellant was convicted upon a plea of guilty of the offense of theft of property in excess of $60,000, a Class B felony.  Her original sentence, imposed April 17, 1995, was to a term of eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. The sentence was suspended except for one year which Appellant was ordered to serve in the Obion County Jail. A probationary period was imposed for the balance of the term and restitution ordered as a condition thereof.

The biological father of F.M.B.P.W. appeals the termination of his parental rights. He maintains that he should have been personally served rather than served by publication and that he had no notice of the final hearing. Because we have determined that the statutory requirements of service by publication were not met, we vacate the order and remand the case to the trial court.

The appellant, Billy Joe Harris, appeals as of right from a judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing his motion for a new trial. The appellant claimed he was entitled to a new trial due to newly discovered evidence. The trial court found the motion was not timely filed pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was tried and convicted on April 27, 1989. His motion for a new trial was denied. This Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court also affirmed the sentence. He subsequently instituted four suits for post-conviction relief. All four suits were denied at every stage of the proceedings. The present motion was filed June 26, 1995 as a separate action.  After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the law governing the issue presented for review, it is the opinion of this Court the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

The Defendant appeals to this court as of right from a judgment entered on a Weakley County jury verdict convicting him of attempt to commit first degree murder and aggravated assault. The defendant presents four issues for review: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict for attempt to commit first degree murder; (2) that principles of double jeopardy prohibit his conviction for both attempt to commit first degree murder and aggravated assault; (3) that the twenty-five year sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is excessive; and (4) that the court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively to four prior sentences of incarceration.   After review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s decision.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 24, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in January 1981, and was convicted of the same in May 1981. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

This appeal involves the classification and division of marital property after a marriage of approximately thirteen years. We have determined that the trial court erred in its classification of various assets and debts, and the resulting distribution of the marital estate was inequitable. Therefore, we modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

This case arises from a contract dispute between the parties. The Appellant herein, Nashville Hockey Club, entered into a “Sponsorship Agreement” with the Appellee herein, Robert J. Young Company. Subsequently, the parties agreed to change their agreement. As a result, the parties entered into a subsequent “Letter of Agreement.” When a players’ strike occurred, Appellee wished to cancel the contract. Appellant claimed that the “Sponsorship Agreement,” and particularly the force majeure clause contained therein, were not superseded by the “Letter of Agreement.” The trial court granted summary judgment against Appellee and, following a hearing on Appellant’s counterclaim, granted judgment in favor of Appellant but did not award damages based upon its finding that Appellant had mitigated all of its damages. Appellant appeals on the issue of damages. Appellee appeals on the issue of what, if any, agreement exists between the parties. Finding that the plain language of the “Letter of Agreement” supports a finding that same supersedes the “Sponsorship Agreement,” we reverse and remand.
 

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 21, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on eight counts of aggravated rape and one count of rape in May 1984, and was convicted of rape in October 1984. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

Appellant Michael Bellew pled guilty in the Henry County Circuit Court to operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act. As a Range I standard offender, Appellant received a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he presents the following issue: whether his sentence is excessive.  After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.