APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a State appeal from an order dismissing the indictment against the Defendant, Cedric Ruron Saine. The Defendant was indicted for possession with the intent to sell more than 300 grams of cocaine. The issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress evidence seized from the Defendant’s residence and vehicle or, more specifically, whether the search warrant affidavit contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause that drugs were located inside the Defendant’s home and, if not, whether the warrantless search of the Defendant’s car was supported by exigent circumstances. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the order of the trial court granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his residence, but we reverse the decision to suppress the drugs found during the search of the Defendant’s car. We vacate the order dismissing the indictment, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2005 & Supp. 2007).  Employee alleged that she had sustained a permanent disability as a result of exposure to mold at her place of work. The trial court found in her favor and awarded benefits for 35% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that Employee had sustained a permanent injury or contracted an occupational disease, by finding that her condition was permanent, and by awarding an impairment rating in conflict with the AMA Guidelines. Because the evidence preponderates against the finding that Employee sustained a compensable injury or contracted an occupational disease, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties stipulated that appellee Susan Randolph (“Employee”) suffered bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome as a workplace injury during her employment with appellant Fleetguard, Inc. (“Employer”). The parties also stipulated as to her rate of compensation, impairment, and vocational disability. At trial, the only disputed issue was whether Employee gave Employer actual notice of her injury prior to July 1, 2004. The trial court held that Employee did and Employer has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Lee Nora Hunter, alleged that she sustained a compensable neck injury resulting in permanent disability. The employer, Williams-Sonoma Direct, Inc., admitted that an injury occurred, but denied that it caused permanent disability. Ms. Hunter represented herself at trial. She introduced no medical evidence.  The trial court granted Williams-Sonoma’s motion for involuntary dismissal. Ms. Hunter has appealed. We affirm the judgment.

A Putnam County jury convicted Appellant, William Floyd Cartwright, of first degree premeditated murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because the State did not prove that he acted with premeditation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court because the evidence sufficiently supports the conviction.

The defendant, Steven Ray Tallent, pleaded guilty to a charge of domestic assault and was sentenced in the Blount County Circuit Court to a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, which was suspended to supervised probation. On May 30, 2007, the court revoked the probation and ordered the defendant to serve 11 months and 29 days in confinement. From that order, the defendant appeals and claims a lack of evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment below.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee slipped and fell in the course of her employment as a cafeteria worker. She was subsequently diagnosed with fibromyalgia. The trial court found that condition was caused by the work injury, and awarded benefits for permanent total disability. Employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings as to causation and also as to the extent of Employee's permanent disability. Employer further contends that the trial court erred in ordering accrued benefits to be paid in a lump sum. Employee contends that the trial court incorrectly based her average weekly wage upon a calendar year rather than a school year. We affirm the judgment in all respects.

The Defendant, Terrell Antron Greer, was convicted upon a jury verdict of one count of the sale or delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and he was sentenced to five years or that conviction. He was likewise convicted of two counts of the sale or delivery of more than .5 grams of cocaine, Class B felonies, and he was sentenced to eleven years for each of those convictions. All of his sentences were ordered to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. In this appeal, he asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions and that his sentences are excessive. Following our review of the appellate record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is an action for workers’ compensation benefits brought by the Appellant, Ronald L. Stief. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, Madaris Exteriors, Inc. and Builders Mutual Insurance Company, on the ground Mr. Stief was an independent contractor, and dismissed the case. Mr. Stief has appealed. We find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings.

The defendant, Charles Edward Stanley, was convicted by a Cumberland County criminal court jury of rape, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained an injury to her lower back in the course of her employment as a pilot. Her treating physician placed permanent restrictions upon her activities which prevented her from returning to that job. While recovering from her injury, she obtained three licenses concerning sale and appraisal of real estate in California. She testified that she was unable to work in that field because the physical demands conflicted with her restrictions. The trial court awarded permanent total disability benefits. The trial court also declined to grant Employer a set-off pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-114(b) for payments made pursuant to its long-term disability plan.  Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in awarding permanent total disability and also in declining to grant a set-off. We agree and modify the judgment accordingly.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appellant suffered a stroke while performing his job as a package car driver for his Employer. The stroke occurred while he was being trained to take over a new delivery route. The Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that the stroke was precipitated by stress associated with his job, particularly with the adjustment to the new route. In preparation for trial, the Employer took discovery depositions of two medical experts identified as potential witnesses by its Employee. The Employee did not take evidentiary depositions of those witnesses, but sought to introduce their discovery depositions as evidence at trial. The trial court admitted the depositions into evidence over the objection of the Employer. The trial court found that the Employee’s stroke was the result of an occupational disease, precipitated by work-related stress, and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The Employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by admitting the discovery depositions into evidence, and finding that the Employee’s stroke was a compensable event. We find that the depositions should not have been admitted into evidence, in accordance with Rule 32.01(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. After a review of the record without consideration of the depositions, we reverse the judgment of the trial court awarding permanent disability benefits for the stroke and dismiss the portion of the complaint relating to the stroke. The award for an injury to the Employee’s shoulder is not questioned and that portion of the judgment is affirmed.

The November 7, 2006 Hendersonville election for alderman in Ward 3 is the subject of this litigation. The margin of victory was a mere 18 votes. The losing candidate, Mr. Skidmore, challenged the election results. The chancellor held against him. Mr. Skidmore appeals, maintaining that a sufficient number of illegal votes were cast to require that the election be voided. We affirm the chancellor.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Paul Dykas, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-four years. This Court affirmed those judgments on direct appeal. ¹ He filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming he failed to receive the effective assistance of counsel because counsel allegedly failed to properly strike a juror, failed to prepare him for trial, and failed to prepare a witness for examination. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and we affirmed that decision. ² The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, again claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly strike a juror and for failing to object to a jury instruction. The habeas court dismissed the petition, and, after a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

Plaintiff and defendants entered into a verbal agreement wherein plaintiff would purchase two lots from the defendants at an agreed price. Plaintiff made payments as agreed over a period of time, but before the lots were completely paid for defendants sold one of the lots to a third party. Plaintiff brought this action for specific performance and the Trial Court ruled that the verbal agreement violated the Statute of Frauds. However, the Trial Court invoked the theory of equitable estoppel against defendants, ordered specific performance, and awarded damages for the lot sold, which was part of the purchase agreement. On appeal, we affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, M-Tek, Inc. ("Employer") contends that the trial court erred in finding that Ida Cummings ("Employee") sustained a compensable permanent partial right shoulder disability. In the alternative, Employer contends that the trial court erred in relying on the evaluating physician's impairment rating instead of the rating given by the treating physician, and in awarding Employee a 27.5% impairment to the body as a whole. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this legal malpractice action, the trial court denied the former client’s motion to stay proceedings and granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney. The former client asserts on appeal that summary judgment was not proper because the underlying case in which the malpractice allegedly occurred is still pending, and therefore, damages cannot be established. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher James Dodson, pled guilty to facilitation of robbery, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, a Range I offender, to four years to be served at thirty percent. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that the parties and the trial court agreed at sentencing that the Petitioner should receive thirteen months of jail credit, which he was not given by the Tennessee Department of Correction. Because he was not given this jail credit, the Petitioner alleged he was entitled to post-conviction relief because his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered, and he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals that dismissal, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Troy Sepulveda ("Employee") sustained an injury to his lower back while sleeping in the cab of his truck while waiting to make a delivery. The trial court found that he was a "traveling employee," found the injury to be compensable and awarded permanent partial disability benefits. Western Express, Inc. ("Employer") has appealed, contending that the injury did not arise from the employment. We affirm the judgment.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment where Plaintiffs failed to respond to Defendants’ motion prior to the hearing. Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend, asserting that they had received notice of the hearing but did not receive a copy of Defendants’ motion itself. The trial court found the motion had been mailed with the notice of hearing, and that Plaintiffs failed to respond timely. Plaintiffs appeal; we affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendants, Martha Ann Freeman and Rafael DeJesus Rocha-Perez, of the first-degree murder of Martha Freeman’s husband. On appeal, Freeman alleges that the trial court erred by: (1) admitting a nude photograph of Rocha-Perez; (2) refusing to allow Freeman to play a recording of a 911 call; and (3) refusing to grant her motion to sever. Rocha-Perez alleges the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to testify concerning a statement Freeman made in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Both Defendants allege there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff physician sued the defendant hospital for breach of contract after the hospital declined to promote him to a permanent position on its medical staff. He claimed that the hospital’s bylaws were part of his employment contract, and that the manner in which the hospital reached its decision violated those bylaws. The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital. We agree that the bylaws formed part of his contract, but since the record clearly shows that the hospital substantially complied with its bylaws we affirm the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Claudell Watkins Carpenter, was convicted of second degree murder, first degree murder in the perpetration of a burglary, especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. Additionally, the defendant pled guilty to evading arrest. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court subsequently granted as to certain of the convictions, reducing the second degree murder conviction to voluntary manslaughter and dismissing the first degree murder and aggravated assault convictions. The defendant then was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, twelve years for the especially aggravated burglary conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction, with all sentences to be served concurrently. Thereafter, the State appealed the trial court’s ruling on the motion for judgment ofacquittal. Rule 29, pursuant to which the defendant filed the motion for judgment of acquittal, requires that, before a judgment is entered following the granting of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court first should rule on the motion for new trial. Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for disposition of the motion for new trial so that a single appeal will result from the defendant’s trial. Since judgments were entered prematurely following the court’s granting the motion, they are set aside, and the jury verdicts for second degree murder (Count 1), first degree murder in the perpetration of a burglary (Count 2), and aggravated assault (Count 4) are reinstated. Because the State’s appeal is premature, it is dismissed.

The defendant, Christopher Cooper, pleaded guilty to a charge of theft of property worth $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and was sentenced in the Blount County Circuit Court to a sentence of four years, with 30 days to be served incarcerated on consecutive weekends and the balance to be served through supervised probation. On April 16, 2007, the court revoked the probation and ordered the defendant to serve six months in confinement and extended his subsequent probation period by one year. From that order, the defendant appeals and claims a lack of evidence to support revocation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment below.

The petitioner, Glen Cook, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was sentenced improperly. Specifically, he argues that counsel failed to interview witnesses, never discussed trial strategy with the petitioner, and failed to file proper motions. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.