APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Reneshia Kioto Parker, pled guilty to forgery involving $1000 or more and theft of property valued at $60,000 or more. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we dismiss this appeal because the Defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal.

The Appellant, Tyrone Neely, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition to reinstate driving privileges, which were revoked after he was declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO) on October 20, 1994. In December 2006, Neely filed a petition to reinstate his driving privileges, pursuant to an amendment to the reinstatement of license statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-615(c), which permits immediate reinstatement of driving privileges when one of the underlying convictions which qualifies a person for MVHO status is not enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-603(2)(A). In his petition, Neely asserted that his underlying convictions for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, were not qualifying offenses of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-603(2)(A); therefore, he was entitled to reinstatement. At the scheduled hearing, the trial court summarily denied the petition without allowing Neely to present proof regarding the prior convictions. Neely appeals this ruling. On appeal, the State concedes, and we agree, that it is necessary that the case be remanded to the trial court for a full hearing to determine the nature of the qualifying convictions and whether Neely is entitled to immediate restoration of his driving privileges as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-615(c). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated and remanded.

The defendant, Louis E. Whitecotton, was convicted of failure to timely register as a violent sexual offender, a Class E felony, and sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) case was dismissed by the Trial Court after it concluded that it lost subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with this case once a voluntary dismissal was taken in the initiating tribunal in Maryland. The Trial Court concluded that the present case also must be dismissed because there had been at least two previous voluntary dismissals and the dismissal by the Maryland tribunal operated to bar the present case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(2). We hold that the Trial Court retained subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the voluntary dismissal of the petition by the initiating tribunal. We further conclude that the present case is not barred by the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(2). Accordingly, the judgment of the Trial Court is vacated and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

In Tipton County, Petitioner entered an open guilty plea to three counts of vehicular homicide, one count of vehicular assault and two counts of driving while intoxicated, which were later merged into the first vehicular homicide conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to three consecutive ten-year sentences for the vehicular homicides and a consecutive three-year sentence for vehicular assault. This resulted in an effective thirty-three-year sentence. Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal. State v. Barbara Ann Bryant, No. W2004-01245-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 756252 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Apr. 1, 2005), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 3, 2005). Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied and dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision based upon the fact that Petitioner did not present the issue to the post-conviction court that she now presents to this Court on appeal.

Progress Printing Company, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee (“Trial Court”) seeking to domesticate a foreign judgment obtained in Virginia against Reliable Printing & Graphic Design, Inc. (“Defendant”). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming, in part, that the Virginia court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant and, therefore, the Virginia judgment is void. The Trial Court entered an order on June 7, 2007, inter alia, denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the petition, and granting Plaintiff’s petition to domesticate the Virginia judgment. Defendant appeals to this Court. We affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss the petition, vacate that portion of the Trial Court’s order granting Plaintiff’s petition to domesticate the Virginia judgment, and remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her nine-year-old child. Her parental rights were terminated on several grounds, including abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plan, failure to remedy persistent conditions, and mental incompetence. The trial court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights based upon Mother’s failure to remedy persistent conditions and the best interest of the child.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Homer Hooper, Jr., filed a motion to set aside a court-approved settlement of his workers’ compensation claim. The trial court granted the motion, but ordered that Mr. Hooper repay the original settlement amount to his employer, Kathy Freeman Trucking, Inc., within thirty days. Mr. Hooper failed to do so and the trial court reinstated its previous order approving the settlement. On appeal, Mr. Hooper contends that the trial court erred in requiring repayment as a condition of setting the settlement aside. We reverse the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The pro se petitioner, John Willie Partee, appeals as of right the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleges that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the Board of Paroles violated his constitutional rights by  the retroactive use of release eligibility standards. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of  the habeas corpus court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee sustained a compensable injury to his lower back in February 2000. He had surgery to repair the injury in July 2000 and returned to work in September of that year. In April 2001, he completed a temporary day shift assignment. Shortly thereafter, he moved to Florida. The timing and cause of the move are disputed. In July 2002, he consulted a doctor in Florida for low back pain.  He had a second surgery in May 2003. The Employer admitted liability for the February 2000 injury and surgery, but denied that the second surgery was compensable. The trial court found that the Employee had a meaningful return to work after the initial injury, that the second surgery was not compensable and awarded 25% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The Employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that the second surgery was not related to the initial injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Don Sanders, appeals his conviction by a Shelby County jury for the first degree murder of Marilyn Hughes. On appeal, Sanders argues that, because he suffers from a mental illness, the evidence is insufficient to establish that he possessed the mental capacity to premeditate the murder of the victim. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support his conviction. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

In this action for termination of lease and damages due to alleged breaches, the Trial Court terminated the lease and awarded damages. On appeal, we affirm.

The Appellant, Michael D. Mann, appeals his misdemeanor conviction by a Dyer County jury for aggravated criminal trespass. Mann challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying this conviction. The State argues that Mann has waived his right to appeal this issue by failing to file a timely motion for new trial or notice of appeal. We agree, but, in the interest of justice, we waive the timeliness requirement for the notice of appeal. After review, we conclude that the evidence at trial was legally sufficient to support Mann’s conviction for aggravated criminal trespass.  Alternatively, the State appeals the trial court’s grant of Mann’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to a separate charge of simple assault. However, there is no authority which permits the State to appeal, as of right, from a trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal when the grant is entered prior to a verdict of guilty. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects.

The defendant, Floyd Taylor, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Department of Correction. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not offer adequate proof that he intentionally or knowingly robbed the victim. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kevin Wilkins, filed in the Shelby County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief, challenging trial counsel’s failure to appeal the petitioner’s conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping. The post-conviction court granted the petitioner post-conviction relief, and the State appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Lonnie Maclin, was convicted of first degree felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, reckless aggravated assault, and two counts of aggravated assault, and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were erroneous. Finding that the issue was waived because it was not raised on direct appeal, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in those determinations and in dismissing his petition without affording him an opportunity to amend or supplement it. He also argues that we should not find waiver because he is seeking to vindicate a federal constitutional right. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The pro se petitioner, Anthony D. Clement, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the habeas court erred in summarily dismissing the petition without appointing counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court dismissing the petition.

The Trial Court entered Judgment for back child support, but barred the State from enforcing the Judgment though passport denial. We reverse the Trial Court.

After nineteen years of marriage, Paul David Franklin (“Husband”) sued Sherry A.B. Franklin (“Wife”) for divorce. Gary Freeman (“Freeman”) was granted leave to intervene in the suit to establish the paternity of the younger of the two minor children (“J.A.F.”) born during the Franklins’ marriage. After a trial, the Trial court entered a Final Decree of Divorce, inter alia, granting Husband a divorce; holding that Freeman is the biological father of J.A.F., but that Husband is the legal father; distributing the marital property; and awarding primary residential custody of both minor children to Husband with Wife to have co-parenting time. Wife filed a motion to alter or amend. The Trial Court entered an order altering its decision in light of the then just released Tennessee Supreme Court opinion in In Re: T.K.Y., and terminating Freeman’s parental rights to J.A.F. on the grounds found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Wife and Freeman appeal to this Court raising issues regarding the termination of Freeman’s parental rights to J.A.F., the custody of J.A.F., and distribution of the marital property. We reverse the termination of Freeman’s parental rights to J.A.F., reverse the Trial Court’s order granting custody of J.A.F. to Husband, vacate that portion of the Trial Court’s order distributing the marital home, and remand this case to the Trial Court to effectuate the custody transfer of J.A.F. to Wife and for an overall equitable distribution of the marital property in light of our decision in this case.

Plaintiff sued defendants to collect a judgment against a defunct nonprofit corporation, claiming defendants were the alter egos of the defunct corporation. The trial court declined to add a fourth defendant and granted summary judgment against the plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals both decisions of the trial court. We affirm in part and reverse in part the grant of summary judgment and reverse the decision not to add the fourth defendant.

A corporation providing garbage collection services under a contract with Metropolitan Nashville brought suit seeking reimbursement for waste disposal fees allegedly due under the contract. After a trial, the chancellor found in favor of the disposal company and awarded it damages for breach of contract. Metro appeals the court’s interpretation of the contract. We affirm.

The petitioner, William Thompson, filed in the Bledsoe County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner’s sentence was not illegal. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the habeas corpus court’s ruling. In response, the State filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petition was properly denied. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A corporation filed suit against two of its former employees for violating the terms of a non-compete agreement. The defendants argued that the agreement was rendered unenforceable by changes in the structure of the business and their relationship to it after the agreement was executed. The business was originally a sole proprietorship, and the defendants worked for it as independent contractors. Several years later, the business was chartered as a corporation, but with no change in its ownership or in its day-to-day operations. The defendants became employees of the corporation while keeping the same compensation, working conditions and duties as before. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employees, ruling that the corporation had no standing to sue because it was not a party to the original agreement. We reverse, because the non-compete agreement was assigned to the corporation by operation of law.

The petitioner, Reginald Dion Hughes, appeals the circuit ¹ court’s order summarily dismissing his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the court’s order.

The defendant, Koy Owens, pled guilty to simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and to solicitation of aggravated assault, a Class E felony. He received concurrent sentences of seven days for assault and one-and-a-half years for solicitation. The trial court denied in part and granted in part the defendant’s petition to have his sentence suspended. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve forty-five days in confinement, day-for-day, on a non-consecutive basis and imposed two years probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to fully suspend his sentence. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.