APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiff/Appellant, a student of McNairy County School District, filed a complaint for negligence against the Defendant/Appellee School District for injuries arising from an accident that occurred while the student was engaged in a work-based learning program. Finding that the actions of the School District did not cause the accident, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the School District. The student appeals. We affirm and remand.

We granted the application for permission to appeal in this divorce case to address two issues presented by Husband: (1) whether the increase, if any, in value of his separately-owned stock interest in the family-owned company for which he worked qualifies a marital property; and if so, (2) whether the chancellor correctly assessed the increase in value. Because we find that Husband’s employment with the company  in which he owned stock did not substantially contribute to the preservation and appreciation of the stock, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a motorcycle rider and his passenger who were injured in an accident when they hit a large pothole on a state route highway. The rider and the passenger each filed claims with the Tennessee Claims Commission asserting that the State of Tennessee had failed to maintain the highway in a safe and proper condition. A Claims Commissioner determined that the pothole did constitute a dangerous condition on a state maintained highway pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), but she determined that the State was not liable under that subsection because there was no proof that it had notice of existence of the pothole. The Commissioner then found that the State was negligent in maintaining the highway under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(I), and therefore it was liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries. The State appeals. We reverse.

This is appeal involves a habeas corpus petition filed by a prisoner. The appellant prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in chancery court. The chancery court denied the prisoner’s habeas petition. The prisoner appealed. We vacate the judgment and dismiss the petition, finding that the chancery court did not have jurisdiction.

This is an appeal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a prisoner. The appellant prisoner filed a petition for writ of a habeas corpus in the chancery court. The chancery court denied the prisoner’s habeas petition. The prisoner appealed. We vacate the judgment and dismiss the petition, finding that the chancery court did not have jurisdiction.

The Appellant, Verico Dewayne Jackson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Jackson, who was convicted of first degree murder, is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to adequately communicate with Jackson and the investigator assigned to the case, resulting in a lack of preparation for trial; (2) failing to seek a severance in the case; and (3) failing to request and argue for certain lesser-included offense instructions. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Shelby County Sheriff’s Department terminated the employment of deputy Derek Davis based on a random drug screening. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed the Department’s decision. Mr. Davis appealed to the Chancery Court for Shelby County, which affirmed. Mr. Davis filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, asserting the Board’s decision is not supported by substantial material evidence. We reverse.

This appeal involves the lower court’s dismissal of a case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The Department of Children’s Services fired the petitioner, and she requested an administrative hearing. The Administrative Law Judge upheld the termination, and the petitioner appealed to the chancery court in Shelby County. Pursuant to statute, the case was transferred to Davidson County. After one year, the chancellor entered an order that the petitioner schedule the case for a final hearing. The parties set a hearing date, but in violation of local rules the petitioner failed to submit a trial brief. The petitioner’s counsel twice requested a continuance, which was denied each time. The petitioner’s counsel withdrew, and the petitioner decided to proceed pro se. The petitioner was not on time for the hearing at 9:00 a.m. on October 5, 2006. She called the court, notifying all parties that she would be twenty minutes late. The judge waited until 9:40 and called the case, but the petitioner was not present. The judge then sua sponte dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The petitioner submitted a hand-written letter to the court with an explanation for her tardiness. The court treated the letter as a motion to alter or amend, and denied the motion. The petitioner appeals. We reverse and remand.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the liability for the structural defects in a four-year-old house in a Mt. Juliet subdivision. Shortly after purchasing the house from its original owners, the property owners discovered that the house had been constructed on improperly compacted fill and other debris. When additional structural problems manifested themselves, the property owners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Wilson County seeking compensatory and punitive damages against the contractor who built the house and his wife, the original owners, the original owners’ real estate agent and broker, their own real estate agent and broker, and their home inspector. Following an eight-day trial, the jury determined that the contractor and the original owners had engaged in intentional and reckless misrepresentation by concealing the house’s structural problems. The jury also determined that both real estate agents and the developer of the subdivision were at fault. The jury awarded the property owners $58,720.80 in compensatory damages to be apportioned among the parties at fault. The jury also awarded the property owners $20,000 in punitive damages against one of the original owners and $50,000 in punitive damages against the contractor. The trial court reduced the punitive damage award against the original property owner to $14,000, and granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the two real estate agents with regard to the property owners’ Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claims. On this appeal, the property owners take issue with the dismissal of their claims against the real estate agents and their brokers based on their use of an outdated and incomplete real property disclosure form. The contractor also takes issue with the judgments awarded against him for compensatory and punitive damages. We have determined that the trial court did not err by dismissing the property owners’ claims against the real estate agents and their brokers based on the use of the incomplete and outdated disclosure form. We have also concluded that the property owners presented insufficient evidence to establish their common-law fraud claim against the contractor who built the house. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment requiring the contractor to pay compensatory and punitive damages.

This is an age and sex discrimination case. The fifty-nine-year old male plaintiff worked for the defendant bank as a loan officer. In April 2003, he attempted to process a loan for a customer and did not disclose to the bank underwriting department documents he had received from the customer. When this was discovered, the plaintiff was placed under investigation. His employment was ultimately terminated for violating bank policy. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging age and sex discrimination. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination, or that the bank’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating him was pretextual. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the plaintiff submitted insufficient evidence to establish the fourth element of his prima facie case, that he was either replaced by an employee outside the protected class, or that he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class.

Both parents appeal the termination of their parental rights on the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and failure to remedy persistent conditions. The dispositive issue is whether the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family. The reasonableness of the Department’s efforts to reunite a family is dependent upon whether the services rendered were adequate to meet the needs of the family. In this case, the Department knew both parents needed significant psychological services to afford them the reasonable opportunity to meet the goals of the permanency plans and to remedy persistent conditions. The Department knew this because the psychologist who performed the mental health assessment of each parent at the direction of the Department issued a report recommending that both parents receive specific and significant mental health counseling. The record fails to establish that the Department provided the essential psychological services, without which the other services provided by the Department could not meet the needs of either parent or the family. Accordingly, we vacate the order terminating the mother’s and father’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3). The trial court held that (1) Employee's job caused her injuries, (2) Employee’s delayed notice did not prejudice Employer, (3) Employee sustained a 60% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, and (4) Employer should pay Employee’s discretionary costs pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Employee appeals the award of permanent partial disability benefits, contending she is permanently and totally disabled. Employer contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning causation and notice, and that sovereign immunity bars the award of discretionary costs. We reverse the trial court’s ruling on the assignment of discretionary costs and affirm all of the trial court’s other rulings.

This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal from the Order of the trial court striking medical bills attached to Plaintiffs/Appellants’ complaint pursuant to T.C.A. § 24-5-113. The trial court specifically held that, because Plaintiffs/Appellants incurred total medical expenses in excess
of the statutory maximum of $4,000.00, the Plaintiffs/Appellants were not entitled to the statutory
presumption of reasonableness and necessity. Finding no errors of law, we affirm and remand.

Appellant, Reginald Anthony Laye, pled guilty to evading arrest and criminal impersonation prior to a jury trial, during which he was convicted of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver. The trial court merged the two convictions for possession into one conviction for possession of a Schedule II drug for resale. As a result of the convictions, Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years and six months. After the denial of a motion for new trial and the filing of a timely notice of appeal, Appellant argues in this Court that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A private ambulance service provider challenged the fees established in the Warren County ambulance regulations created pursuant to state law. The trial court found the fees were constitutionally permissible. We affirm, finding that the fees were true fees, not taxes, and that the fees were reasonable.

I concur fully with the result reached by the majority in this case. Respectfully, I file this separate concurrence in order to state my disagreement with dicta in the majority opinion.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. The Appellant has presented a new claim on appeal. The Court concludes that the claim is waived due to Appellant's failure to raise it in his petition below. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Tony Carruthers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In April 1996, a Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner of the first degree murders of Marcellos Anderson, Delois Anderson, and Frederick Tucker and imposed a sentence of death for each conviction. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516 (Tenn. 2000). In December 2001, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. By order entered April 16, 2002, the supreme court appointed a Davidson County post-conviction court to preside over the case. Post-conviction counsel was appointed and an evidentiary hearing was subsequently conducted on various dates between August 29, 2005, and November 3, 2005. On February 2, 2006, the post-conviction court entered an order denying the petition. On appeal to this court, the petitioner raises issues of ineffective assistance of pretrial and appellate counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Timothy Ray Azbill, was found guilty by a Decatur County jury of aggravated burglary, rape of a child, and especially aggravated kidnapping, and received an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the trial court’s application of sentencing enhancement factors. After review, we conclude that the defendant’s claims are without merit and affirm the judgments. However, we additionally conclude that, as to the convictions for rape of a child and especially aggravated kidnapping, the court began at the midpoint of the range, rather than the minimum as required, and, therefore, remand for resentencing as to those two offenses.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the liability of a municipality. Pursuant to the municipality’s ordinances, a municipal inspector inspected a church building. The inspector sent a letter to the owners of the building notifying them that, due to the dilapidated condition of the building, they were in violation of a city ordinance. Over a year later, the building collapsed, killing four people, including three children, and injuring a fifth. The plaintiffs filed suit against the municipality for negligence based on the initial inspection and the municipality’s failure to take appropriate action after the initial inspection. Three separate lawsuits were consolidated into this action. The municipality filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability. The motion was denied. The municipality was then granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s denial of summary judgment,  holding that the defendant municipality may not be immune from liability for some claims under the facts presented in this case.

The defendant, John Britt, appeals as of right his jury convictions in Shelby County Criminal Court for two counts of solicitation of first degree murder. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of ten years as a Range I, standard offender for each count, resulting in a total effective sentence  of twenty years. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court committed plain error in its admission of allegedly improper testimony, in failing to declare a mistrial due to improper behavior by the prosecutors during the trial, and in failing to adequately instruct the jury after the defendant was improperly impeached regarding a prior bad act. He also asserts that the trial court improperly overruled the defendant’s objection to testimony and commented on the evidence in the presence  of the jury. Finally, he urges this court to find plain error in the trial court’s sentencing for multiple reasons, including allegations that the imposition of the enhanced length and consecutive manner of service violates Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions for solicitation of first degree murder but conclude that the trial court’s imposition of sentences beyond the presumptive minimum violated Blakely. Therefore, upon remand, the trial court shall enter judgments to reflect sentences of eight years, for each count, to be served consecutively.

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker's Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he had sustained a compensable aggravation of a pre-existing condition as a result of his employment. The trial court found that he failed to sustain his burden of proof on causation and dismissed his claim. Employee has appealed; he contends that the trial court erred in holding that he had not sustained a compensable injury. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Sherman Boddie, was convicted in the Tipton County Circuit Court of driving under the influence (DUI) and DUI per se. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on unsupervised probation after fortyeight hours incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication, because the sobriety roadblock where he was stopped violated the Tennessee Constitution. We hold that the roadblock was constitutional and affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

A Grundy County jury convicted the Defendant, Sammy Morrison, of driving under the influence and resisting arrest. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with all but forty hours suspended for the DUI and to five days, suspended, for the resisting arrest conviction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that there was not sufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the evidence and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.