APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Dewayne Jones, of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. Because the two counts alleged alternative theories of the same offense, the trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, alleging that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, including that the State did not prove venue was in Shelby County; (2) the trial court erred in not requiring the State to elect which of the aggravated rape counts it wished to proceed upon; and (3) the trial court misapplied one enhancement factor. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial Defendant, Steven Allen Jones, was found guilty of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of first degree murder and (2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to the punishment for first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Gary Aldridge, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The Appellant fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Mario Morris, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. After merging the four counts of aggravated robbery into two counts, the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to ten years at 30% for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and as a violent offender to twenty years at 100% for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. Finding the defendant to be a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered that each of the sentences be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of forty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the record reveals that the defendant was improperly sentenced under the 2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act, we remand to the trial court for resentencing.

The Appellant, Jacob Edward Campbell, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. After a jury trial in 2002, Campbell was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery, and he was ordered to serve consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and ten years. On appeal, Campbell argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record on appeal and the arguments of the parties, we affirm.

The petitioner, Arthur Buford, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of first degree murder. See
T.C.A. § 39-13-202. He was sentenced to two life sentences to be served consecutively. The
petitioner contends the trial court erred in denying him post-conviction relief based upon the
ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that no error exists and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

The petitioner, Rodney R. Rye, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of child rape, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and his resulting effective twenty-two-year sentence. He contends that he entered guilty pleas that were unknowing and involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief, and we affirm that judgment.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. The Appellant filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Patient filed a complaint against Doctors, OB/GYN Group, and Hospital (together “Defendants”) alleging medical malpractice for failing to obtain informed consent and failing to properly care for Patient during and after her hospitalization. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds that Patient failed to provide a competent medical expert as required by T.C.A. § 29-25-115 (Supp. 2006). Patient appeals.
We affirm.

The Trial Court terminated the parental rights of the parents of the two minor children. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and sentenced the defendant to life in prison for first degree murder and twenty years for especially aggravated robbery, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of two itnesses, a forensic psychologist and the defendant’s mother, who would have offered testimony regarding the defendant’s ability to form the requisite culpable mental state. The defendant also contends that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of the two witnesses, and that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this action for damages allegedly due to water runoff from construction for a new school, the Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we conclude there are disputed issues of material fact, and remand and vacate the summary judgment.

Appellant, Carlos Bush, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to serve fifteen years in incarceration as a Range II multiple offender.  After the denial of a motion for new trial and a timely notice of appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the photographic lineup was unduly suggestive; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify regarding Appellant’s prior incarceration; (4) whether the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony; (5) whether the trial court improperly refused to grant a recess to allow Appellant to prepare curative measures for alleged evidentiary errors; and (6) whether the trial court improperly enhanced Appellant’s sentence by applying an enhancement factor that was not determined by a jury in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). We determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, that the photographic lineup was proper and that the trial court did not improperly admit hearsay or statements about Appellant’s prior incarceration. With regard to Appellant’s sentence, we determine that review of the issue is not necessary to do substantial justice, and consequently, that no plain error was committed on the part of the trial court. Further, the application of enhancement factors (1) and (16) justified the enhancement of Appellant’s sentence from twelve years to fifteen years. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this medical malpractice action against a treating physician, his medical group, and several hospital entities, the plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by including in the jury instructions the defense of superseding cause requested by the treating physician and his medical group. The plaintiffs argue the evidence was insufficient to justify the instruction. It is proper to charge the law upon an issue of fact within the scope of the pleadings upon which there is material evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict. The record contains material evidence regarding each of the essentialelements of the defense of superseding cause sufficient to sustain a verdict of  superseding cause; therefore, an instruction as to superseding cause was appropriate.

This is an appeal challenging the issuance of several permits to North American Galvanizing Company by the Air Pollution Division of the Metropolitan Department of Health. Appellants base their challenge on the failure of the Department to consider the location of the company as well as noise and exhaust fumes arising from truck traffic traveling through a residential neighborhood to and from the company. They also challenge the representation of both the Department and the  Boardof Health by Metropolitan Department of Law attorneys. The Chancellor ruled against the appellants. We affirm.

An inmate filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari, alleging that the Board of Paroles acted arbitrarily and illegally in denying parole. The chancery court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The inmate appealed. We affirm.

This is a post-divorce case involving disputes over obligations in the Marital Dissolution Agreement and modification of the visitation schedule contained in the permanent parenting plan. Husband filed for divorce from Wife, and on August 25, 1998, the chancery court entered a final decree of divorce that incorporated the Marital Dissolution Agreement. The permanent parenting plan was filed on February 12, 2004. Concerning Husband and Wife’s minor son, born January 7, 1990, the residential schedule in the permanent parenting plan provided that Husband would be the primary residential parent and Wife would be responsible for the child every other weekend and during certain holidays. As to property division, the Marital Dissolution Agreement required Husband to transfer one-half of his pension plan to Wife. Concerning the marital home, Wife agreed to execute a quitclaim deed to Husband conveying her interest to Husband simultaneously with Husband paying her $15,000. After a contempt hearing, the court modified the parenting schedule; found that Wife was entitled to one-half of Husband’s pension, but not one-half of Husband’s annuity; and found that Husband had satisfied the $15,000 obligation. Wife appeals pro se, arguing that the modification of the residential schedule found in the parenting plan is void because the court did not follow Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-405(a). Wife also argues that the parties’ intent was that she was to receive half the annuity along with half the pension. Finally, Wife contends that Husband did not meet his burden of proof to establish the defense of accord and satisfaction. We affirm.

The petitioner, Paul Welcome, appeals the denial of his petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. He asserts he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that he is entitled to relief based upon newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Carl Johnson, appeals the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Johnson, who was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, is currently serving a sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. Following the affirmance of his conviction on direct appeal, Johnson filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied. On appeal, this court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing “solely on the petitioner’s complaint of the ineffective assistance of counsel regarding lesser-included offense instructions and Owens.” Following an evidentiary hearing, during which Johnson challenged only trial counsel’s failure to request that aggravated assault be charged as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated robbery, the post-conviction court again denied relief finding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request the lesser charge. In the instant appeal, Johnson challenges the denial of  relief. Following a review of the record and the law applicable at the time of trial, we find no reversible error and affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This is a case involving the termination of a father’s parental rights. The Department of Children’s Services instituted a dependent and neglect proceeding and the court granted a protective order removing the minor child from the mother’s home. At the time, the father’s whereabouts were unknown. The child, almost seven months old, was placed in the temporary custody of her  greataunt. The father subsequently began serving a 56 month sentence in federal prison. When the child was almost five years old, the great-aunt petitioned the court for the termination of both the mother and the father’s parental rights and for the adoption of the child. The mother joined in the petition. After a termination hearing, the court announced that the father had abandoned the child, that his rights were terminated, and granted the great-aunt’s petition for adoption. The court first entered an order of adoption, but had yet to enter the order terminating the father’s parental rights. The court then issued an order of termination, but failed to include any findings of fact. Next, the court issued an amended order of termination with specific findings of fact, nunc pro tunc to the termination hearing date. Father appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court failed to make findings of fact; (2) that there is not clear and convincing proof of abandonment; (3) that the Department of Children’s Services did not afford him a reasonable opportunity to reunite with the child; and (4) that substantial harm to the child must be proven before a court may constitutionally terminate a parent’s rights. We affirm.

In this dispute over child support owing by the father, the Trial Court ordered child support ended on the grounds the child turned 18 and his high school class had graduated, but ordered payments of back child support arrearage. On appeal, we affirm.

This appeal involves a review of actions taken at a meeting of the Memphis City Council. When the council members voted on a resolution, for unknown reasons, the electronic voting machine did not record an entry for one of the council members. This resulted in six votes being cast in favor of the measure and six votes against it. The omitted council member orally expressed his intention to vote in favor of the resolution before the Chairman announced the result of the vote. The Chairman then called for the electronic voting machine to be cleared so that all members could re-enter their votes. After the second vote, the Chairman declared that the resolution passed by a vote of seven to six. The appellants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the chancery court, alleging that the first vote was final and that the City Council acted illegally by taking a second vote. Upon review of the record of the proceedings, the trial court granted summary judgment to the City of Memphis and the Memphis City Council. We affirm.

This is a case involving a petition for appointment of conservator and a request for attorney’s fees by the non-petitioning spouse of the ward. The husband and wife were married, but lived apart.  The husband lived with his daughter from a previous marriage. Unknown by the husband’s children, he continued to see and financially support his estranged wife. The husband suffered from bipolar disorder requiring several hospitalizations. The husband, during a manic period, emptied his 401K account and purchased several vehicles and properties. The husband’s daughter petitioned the court for appointment of a conservatorship for her father. The court found that the husband was disabled, and appointed the daughter as the conservator over his person and a third-party attorney as the conservator over his finances. The wife was represented by counsel during the proceedings. The court ordered the conservator to pay the wife spousal support in the amount of $2,000 a month out of the husband’s $150,000 estate. The wife then petitioned the court for an award of her attorney’s fees, which the probate court denied. Wife appeals, arguing that the lower court has the statutory authority pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-109 to include in the award of financial support her attorney’s fees. We affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute over the personal property of a wife who was murdered by her husband. Following their appointment as conservators of her property, the wife’s parents filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against their son-in-law and certain members of his family seeking to recover their daughter’s personal property. Following a three-day trial, the jury returned a $222,449.10 verdict for the parents against the husband’s brother, sister, and brother-in-law. On this appeal, the husband’s family members take issue with the denial of their motion for directed verdict based on the statute of limitations, the failure to join the original conservator as a necessary party, the admissibility of certain evidence, and the jury instructions.  We have determined that the trial court did not commit error during the trial and, therefore, affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves the second case filed by the appellants to challenge an annexation ordinance. Previously, the appellants filed a quo warranto action seeking to have the annexation ordinance declared null and void on various grounds. Other landowners had previously filed quo warranto actions that were consolidated and still pending, and the appellants sought to consolidate their action with the others. The trial court held that the appellants’ quo warranto action was not timely filed, and accordingly dismissed it. On appeal, this Court affirmed. The consolidated quo warranto proceedings concluded with a consent order approving the reasonableness of the annexation ordinance, but providing that the annexation would take place in two phases. The appellants then filed the present action seeking a declaration that the annexation accomplished through the consent order was procedurally invalid and unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the appellants’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.