APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Roy Nelson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Denise Wiggins, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect of her five-year-old daughter. The trial court subsequently merged the two Class A felonies into a single conviction for aggravated child abuse. Following a sentencing hearing, Wiggins was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment as a violent offender. On appeal, Wiggins raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; and (2) whether the sentence imposed is excessive. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Wiggins’ conviction for aggravated child abuse. We conclude, however, that the evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction for aggravated child neglect. With regard to sentencing, we remand for resentencing based upon the misapplication of enhancing factors and for adherence with the holding of Blakely v. Washington.

The appellant, Willie Paul Watson, was convicted by a jury in the Dyer County Circuit Court of two counts of assault, and he received a total effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended after service of ninety days. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court should not have required him to serve ninety days of his sentence. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Based on a Special Master’s report, the Circuit Court of Shelby County entered judgment against the appellant for damages for breach of a contract to install cabinets in the appellee’s home. The appellant contends that the trial judge did not independently review the evidence in the record and that the damage award was not supported by the evidence. We affirm.

I find nothing in the factual allegations of the complaint that, even if true, would warrant the voiding of this election. As with everything else in life, elections are not perfect. Voters — I suppose for various and sundry reasons, e.g., a long ballot, inexperience in voting, lack of familiarity with the voting machine — stay too long in the voting booth. Furthermore, I am sure that there have been instances in the past when voters reflected their choices on paper ballots even though functioning voting machines were available. The statutes instruct that these things should not happen; but there is nothing in any of the subject statutes to indicate the legislature intended that these violations would warrant the voiding of an election. Furthermore, there is nothing in the complaint even remotely suggesting that, had the various votes in question been cast in strict compliance with the statutes, the election result in this case would have been different. To the extent that Stuart supports the majority opinion in the instant case, I disagree with Stuart — a decision inwhich I  was not involved.

The Trial Court dismissed this election contest on Motion. On appeal we hold the allegation that enough illegal votes were cast to change the outcome of the election when taken as true stated a cause of action.

This case involves a dispute over the division of proceeds from the sale of a failed business venture. The trial court referred certain matters to a special master for determination. The special master made several specific findings, but left issues open to be decided by the trial court. The trial court adopted the findings of the special master and made no additional determinations. Appellants appeal. We must dismiss this appeal because there is no final order resolving all the claims between the parties and remand the matter back to the trial court for further determinations.

In 2005, Petitioner, Richard M. Stephens, was indicted on ten counts of rape, ten counts of incest and seven counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of rape, one count of incest and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure. As a result, Petitioner was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-two years. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition without a hearing.On appeal, Petitioner alleges that the trial court improperly dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. We reverse and remand the dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eight years in prison as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict, and he also contends that the trial court committed plain error in admitting evidence of the robbery victim’s identification of the defendant as the perpetrator. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, and that the identification issue is waived on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a post-divorce proceeding in which James W. Meier (“Husband”) filed a motion to amend the final decree pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60. The trial court denied the motion. Husband appeals, contending, in part, that the trial court “committed reversible error” when it signed a judgment by consent when it knew that he did not agree to the terms of the proposed judgment. We affirm.

The defendant, Antonio Oliver, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree murder. He was sentenced as a violent offender to life in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he claims that insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction and that he is entitled to a new trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Antonio Lamar Osborn, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify his probation order because more than thirty days had elapsed since the entry of the order. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer, Delta Faucet, argues that the trial court erred in finding that the date of injury was prior to July 1, 2004, and that the award was therefore not subject to the "cap" of 1.5 times the anatomical impairment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-241(d)(1)(a) (Supp. 2004). The employee argues that the award of 25% permanent partial disability to both arms is inadequate. We conclude that the injury occurred after July 1, 2004, and modify the award to 15% permanent partial disability to both arms.

Appellant, Alberto Camacho, was indicted on six counts of theft and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of four counts of theft over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony, two counts of theft over five hundred dollars, a Class E felony, and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Appellant to four years for each Class D felony and two years for each Class E felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, for a total effective sentence of four years. The trial court further ordered Appellant to serve 200 days of the sentence day-for-day, with the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. Appellant was also ordered to pay $750 per month toward restitution. Appellant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the charge of impersonation of a licensed professional and that his sentence is improper. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, the trial court properly instructed the jury and the trial court properly applied enhancement factors (2) and (16), we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the trial court erred in imposing a sentence ordering Appellant to serve 200 days of the sentence day-for-day, we reverse that portion of the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an order deleting the requirement that the sentence be served day-for-day.

The defendant, Szumanski Stroud, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury trial convictions of two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, for which he received seven-year and six-month sentences, to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. In this appeal, he claims (1) that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the definition of “intentionally” and “knowingly” mental states, and (3) that he was excessively sentenced. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court found the Employee's bilateral shoulder injury to be compensable and awarded benefits for 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer asserts that the trial court erred by accepting the evaluating physician's opinion that Employee suffered an 11% impairment and by awarding Employee 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer also contends that the permanent partial disability award should be limited to one and one-half times Employee's medical impairment rating because there was a meaningful return to work. We find the trial court did not err in accrediting Employee's medical proof, but we conclude that the evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court's finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work. Thus, the trial court erred in awarding benefits in excess of the one and one-half statutory cap. We modify the trial court's judgment and award one and one-half of the medical impairment rating of 11% or 16.5% to the body as a whole.

The petitioner, Bobby Joe McCauley, pled guilty to first degree felony murder and received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. In this post-conviction appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel relative to his mental health condition and whether his plea was knowingly entered. The trial court denied relief, and we affirm that judgment.

Defendant, Gregory Lee Smith, was indicted for aggravated rape. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. A complaint was filed by Francois Dextra in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging both a claim based in tort and one appearing to seek workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court dismissed the tort claim and directed the case proceed as a workers’ compensation claim. After more than two years, the case was dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute due to the failure of Mr. Dextra to have his case set for trial. On appeal, Mr. Dextra has not asserted that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the workers’ compensation claim but alleges the trial court erred by dismissing his tort claim and converting it to one for workers’ compensation benefits. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s dismissal of the case and affirm that judgment. Appellate jurisdiction with regard to the dismissal of Mr. Dextra’s tort claim lies with the Court of Appeals and, pursuant to Rule 17 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the cause is transferred to that court for appropriate review.

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3). The trial court awarded eighty percent permanent partial disability to each arm, arising from employee's carpal tunnel syndrome. The employer, Convergys Corp., contends that the trial court erred in determining the date of injury, failed to apply the last-injurious-injury rule, and erroneously found that notice was timely. We affirm, as modified, the trial court's judgment.

I concur in the result and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I cannot agree, though, that the defendant committed the offense “to gratify the defendant’s desire for pleasure or excitement.” T.C.A. § 40-35-114(7).

The decedent executed a will in 2001 and a second will in 2004. The decedent made handwritten alterations to the 2001 will at some time subsequent to its execution. After the decedent died, the 2004 will could not be located, and the 2001 will was presented for probate. The trial court ruled that the 2001 will was revoked by the 2004 will and that the decedent died intestate. We reverse the judgment of the trial court because there was no proof that the terms of the two wills were inconsistent or that the 2004 will contained a clause revoking the earlier will. Further, we remand for a determination as to whether the decedent intended to revive the 2001 will and if so, the effect of the decedent’s markings on such will.

The Defendant, Katia Lenee Harris a/k/a Fuzzy, pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced her to ten years confinement based on the application of three enhancement factors. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when sentencing her. We conclude the trial court erred in enhancing the Defendant’s sentence based on enhancement  factors (1) and (10). Thus, we modify the Defendant’s sentence to nine years.

I respectfully dissent from the decision reached in the majority opinion. I believe the petitioner should be granted relief because he did not get the benefit of pretrial jail credits in this case as provided in his plea agreement.

In this appeal, the trial court determined that a deed to the involved property created a resulting trust in favor of the family of the deceased grantor property owner. Grantee appeals. We affirm.