APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Scotty Wayne Henry, pled guilty to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and one count of felony reckless endangerment. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the Defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the search and seizure of evidence that led to his indictment and guilty plea were unconstitutional. We conclude that the search and seizure were constitutional, and the judgments of the trial court are therefore affirmed.

The appellant, Patty Grissom, was convicted of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-425, and she was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days to be served in confinement. She appealed, arguing that she was improperly sentenced and that trial counsel was ineffective. We conclude that the record on appeal is insufficient for our review, and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Dennis Jarrett, was indicted on the following charges: count one, driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender; count two, driving under the influence of an intoxicant and/or drug; count three, driving under the influence, seventh offense; count four, felony reckless endangerment; count five, felony evading arrest; count six, possession of drug paraphernalia; count seven, violation of implied consent law; and count eight, failure to appear. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on counts one, four, five, six, seven, and eight. In a separate proceeding, Defendant entered pleas of guilty on counts two and three. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of six years for his convictions, the length and manner of service of which Defendant does not challenge on appeal. Defendant argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of felony reckless endangerment. After a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Antonio Hoyle, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Pauline Lacey, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. The Defendant was indicted for four counts of aggravated assault, and she subsequently pled guilty as charged. Pursuant to the terms of the negotiated plea agreement, the Defendant received an effective four-year and six-month sentence, and the trial court was to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve sixty days in jail, followed by probation for the remainder of her sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for full probation. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Teresa D. Sherlin (“Plaintiff”) sued Sandra G. Hall in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“Trial Court”) seeking compensation for personal injuries and property damage sustained when a vehicle driven by Ms. Hall collided head-on with a vehicle being driven by Plaintiff while Plaintiff was acting in the course and scope of her employment. At the time of the accident, Ms. Hall did not have a driver’s license and was an uninsured motorist. Plaintiff’s uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier, Farmers Insurance Exchange (“Farmers”), answered Plaintiff’s complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Farmers summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff was receiving workers’ compensation benefits, these workers’ compensation benefits exceeded the limits of liability of Plaintiff’s uninsured motorist policy, and because the limits of liability of the uninsured motorist policy are reduced by the amount of the workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to the insurance policy, Farmers had no liability to Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We affirm.

This case involves the interpretation of a lease agreement as it pertains to ownership of an advertising sign structure. The trial court found that Defendant/Appellee, the Lessor under the lease, is the owner of the sign structure pursuant to the terms of the lease. Plaintiff/Appellant contends that the plain language of the lease indicates that it is the owner of the disputed sign. We affirm and remand.

Lessor/Appellee sued Lessee/Appellant for breach of contract due to Lessee/Appellant’s alleged failure to maintain the leased building as required under the lease. The trial court entered Judgment in favor of Lessor/Appellee, which Judgment included damages for repairs to the building, lost rent, and attorney fees. Lessee/Appellant appeals. On appeal, Lessor/Appellee asks for attorney fees in defending this appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for a determination of appropriate appellate attorney fees.

The defendant, Wadie Michael Holifield, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a violent offender to serve eighteen years in the Department of Correction.  He appeals two issues: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; and (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial because the jury allegedly was tainted by overhearing courtroom conversations between the victim and her family. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect the date of the offense as January 16, 2005, rather than February 4, 2005.

The plaintiff was a Nashville man who bought a bottle of mail order vitamins from a California company and directed the company to send the order to one of his relatives. The plaintiff was unsatisfied with the product and mailed it back to the company and asked for a refund. When no refund was immediately forthcoming, he filed suit in General Sessions Court. The company sent the plaintiff a full refund after it was served with the lawsuit. The plaintiff continued to pursue his suit through an appeal to the Circuit Court, which dismissed the case. We affirm the Circuit Court.

Plaintiff City of Covington Education Association filed a petition for writ of mandamus and complaint for damages against Defendants City of Covington and the Covington Board of Education, alleging its members were entitled to a pay increase in addition to that paid by Defendants and to a bonus that was approved and subsequently disapproved by the Board of Education. The trial court denied the writ and entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. We affirm.

A Carroll County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2006), possession of a handgun while under the influence of an intoxicant, see id. § 39-17-1321(a) (2006), and possession of marijuana, see id. § 39-17-418(a), all Class A misdemeanors. The jury acquitted the defendant of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, rolling papers, see id. § 39-17-425(a)(1) (2006), and unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon, a throwing star, see id. § 39-17-1302(a)(8) (2006). The court sentenced the defendant for the DUI conviction to 11 months and 29 days suspended after serving 120 days. For the possession of a handgun charge he received 11 months and 29 days suspended after serving 30 days. Likewise, he received 11 months and 29 days suspended after 30 days for the possession of marijuana conviction. All sentences were to run concurrently. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and complains, only in regards to his DUI conviction, that (1) the trial “was fundamentally unfair due to the State’s failure to preserve the video tape of the field sobriety tests . . ., which . . . would have been exculpatory in nature,” and (2) “the verdict . . . was unreliable based upon [the deputy’s] erroneous testimony . . . concerning the Breathalyzer Machine and the test he gave and the manner in which he gave it.” After review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This administrative appeal arises out of the termination of Officers Mauricio Hearns’s (Officer Hearns), Henry Gray, Jr.’s (Officer Gray), Dorian Branch’s (Officer Branch), and Derick Jones’s (Officer Jones) (collectively “the officers”) employment with the City of Memphis Police Department (the Department) following their purchases of stolen Samsung televisions and digital video disc (DVD) players for their personal use. The Department terminated the officers’ employment after finding a violation of DR-104 Personal Conduct. The Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis (the Commission) ruled that the termination was unreasonable disciplinary action and reversed the City’s decision. The City appealed to Shelby County Chancery Court, where the chancellor reversed the Commission’s decision, finding it to be arbitrary and capricious. We hold that the Commission’s decision was unsupported by substantial and material evidence and therefore arbitrary. We affirm.

This is a breach of contract action for the recovery of a real estate brokerage commission. The trial court found that the parties did not enter into a binding buyer’s representation agreement because there was no meeting of the minds. Instead, the court awarded the plaintiff real estate broker damages in quantum meruit. On appeal, we find that the parties mutually assented to the terms of the buyer’s representation agreement and that the broker was entitled to its commission as stated in the contract. We vacate the award of damages in quantum meruit, affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of judgment in accordance with the contract.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Linda Batts, was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. She was sentenced to serve eight years in the Department of Correction for the intent to deliver conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail for the paraphernalia conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of eight years. Defendant now appeals the judgments of the trial court arguing (1) the trial judge failed to exercise his duty to act as thirteenth juror and overturn the jury’s verdict, (2) the jury selection process was tainted in violation of her constitutional rights; and (3) the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress evidence. After a thorough review of the record, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This worker's compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee, James Bradley, alleges that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit because his employer, Plus Mark, Inc., had actual notice of his injury or, in the alternative, the employee's failure to provide timely notice of his injury was excused. In addition, the employee asserts that the trial court erred when it found that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of his employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Robinson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee benefits based on 54.75 percent of the scheduled member loss of hearing in both ears. On appeal, the employer contends that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and that the trial court erred when it failed to allow counsel to read portions of the plaintiff’s deposition. The employer also appeals the award being based on a scheduled member as opposed to the body as a whole and contends that the award is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Finally, the employer contends that the trial court erred in its determination of the compensation rate. After a careful review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that the claim met the statute of limitations. We do find that the trial court erred in its ruling on the use of deposition testimony but find that error harmless. We find that the trial court erred in its determination of disability attributable to a scheduled member and we have modified that award. Finally, we find no error in the trial court’s determination of the compensation rate. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, modified in part and remanded.

This is a medical malpractice action in which the jury found in favor of Defendant hospital. Plaintiff
asserts Defendant’s expert was not qualified under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-115(a)(1), and that the matter accordingly should be remanded for a new trial. We reverse the trial court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for new trial, vacate the judgment on jury verdict, and remand for a new trial.

The appellant, Maron Donta Brown, pled guilty in the Bradley County Criminal Court to one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of speeding.1 The appellant received a total sentence of fifteen years as a Range II multiple offender. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant properly reserved a certified question of law, challenging the stop and subsequent search of his vehicle during which the cocaine was discovered. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I believe Appellant in this case gave a valid consent for Trooper Hoppe to conduct a general search of Appellant’s car. I am also in agreement that in doing so Appellant consented for Hoppe to “at least touch items, including locked or sealed packages, contained within the vehicle.” However, the majority notes and rightfully so that this consent did not extend to tearing open a sealed package within the car. The majority sanctions Hoppe’s having done so on the basis of his testimony that he was trained in drug interdiction and that upon feeling a closed, heavily-taped cardboard or pasteboard box he was able to immediately recognize the contents as a “brick” of cocaine. With this last crucial bit of information along with the other circumstances of the stop, the majority concludes Hoppe had probable cause to open the package and discover the cocaine within.

The defendant, Jacob Allen Reynolds, pled guilty to one count of vandalism (Class C felony) and, after a sentencing hearing, was ordered to serve four years of confinement in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. Additionally, he was ordered to pay restitution to the victims in the amount of $11,407.75. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to four years of confinement. After careful review, we hold that no error exists and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the authority of the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners to review the medical records of a physician’s patients. After the Board requested access to his patients’  records in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-117 (2004), the physician filed a declaratory judgment action in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The physician asserted that the statutory procedure for gaining access to medical records amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure because it failed to provide him with pre-enforcement judicial review of the reasonableness of the Board’s request. He also claimed that the statute’s notice provisions violated due process. Both the physician and the Board filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the physician received adequate notice of the purpose of the request for medical records. It also determined that Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-117(a)(3), the portion of the statute authorizing disciplinary sanctions against physicians who willfully fail to produce requested records, was unconstitutional and awarded the physician $20,916 in attorney’s fees. The Board perfected this appeal. We concur with the trial court’s conclusion that the physician received adequate notice of the reasons for the request for medical records. However, we have determined that physicians in Tennessee have no reasonable expectation that they can shield their patients’ records from the Board’s regulatory oversight and that the Board may discipline physicians who willfully refuse to comply with lawful requests for patient records that comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-117.

Trial court dismissed action by worker’s compensation lienholder against employee’s attorney seeking to hold employee’s Tennessee attorney liable for disbursement of proceeds from third party settlement made by another out-of-state attorney.  We affirm.

The petitioner, Jeffery Yates, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, and attempted aggravated robbery. He contends that his sentences are illegal and, therefore, that his judgments of conviction are void. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief.