APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant challenges trial court’s rescission of a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity (“VAP”) and termination of child support. We reverse.

The petitioner, Michael Hooper, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the
petition.

Probation for the defendant, Greg Goff, was revoked after he tested positive for cocaine and admitted he had possessed and sold cocaine while on probation. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and that his sentence is excessive in light of the circumstances surrounding his violation and past criminal history. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation. Further, we conclude that our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation and not the length of the sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of E.S.J. (“Father”) with respect to his minor children, J.C.J. (DOB: April 30, 2003) and J.E.J. (DOB: May 4, 2002) (collectively “the children”), upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for termination existed and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The court awarded the maternal grandparents temporary custody of the children. Father appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Donald Clark, who was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, sought  postconviction relief from the Shelby County Criminal Court, which denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner presents several issues of the ineffective assistance of  counsel. We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Matthew Lee Rogers, appeals the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for habeas corpus relief. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we note that this Petitioner was recently granted a new trial on direct appeal, and his grounds for habeas corpus relief are now moot. Thus, we find no error in the judgment of the habeas court and affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition.

The defendant, Charles E. Harrison, waived his right to a jury and proceeded with a bench trial. The trial court found the defendant guilty of theft of property over $1000 (Class D felony), Driving Under the Influence (D.U.I.) fourth offense (Class E felony), driving on a revoked license (Class A misdemeanor), and violation of the implied consent law (Class A misdemeanor). The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of seven years and six months. The defendant received six years and six months as a Range II offender for the theft conviction; eleven months and twenty-nine days for the D.U.I. conviction; eleven months and twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction; and five days for violation of the implied consent law. The misdemeanor sentences were imposed concurrently with each other but consecutively to the felony conviction. At the sentencing hearing, the D.U.I. fourth offense conviction was amended to D.U.I. third offense (Class A misdemeanor). The defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the theft conviction, contending that the State failed to prove the defendant intended to deprive the owner of his property. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support the theft conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Roger A. Weaver, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the Lauderdale County
Circuit Court. Pursuant to the terms of plea agreements stemming from two separate cases, Weaver pled guilty to the crimes of reckless aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, and aggravated assault and received an effective sentence of nine years in confinement. On appeal, Weaver argues that the trial court erred in denying non-incarcerative sentences for each conviction. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
 

This is a will contest. The decedent was an 89-year-old woman with eight grown children. In May 2004, the decedent was diagnosed with senile dementia. Shortly thereafter, the trial court established a conservatorship for the decedent. On August 2, 2004, the decedent executed a will that divided her estate equally among her children. After the decedent died in 2005, the will was submitted for probate. One of the decedent’s sons contested the August 2004 will, asserting that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity when it was executed, and submitted for probate an earlier will whose terms favored him and disinherited three of the children. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the decedent had the mental capacity to execute the August 2, 2004 will and admitted it for probate. The will contestant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in placing the burden of proving testamentary capacity on him instead of placing it on the will’s proponent, and that the trial court also erred in finding that the decedent had testamentary capacity to execute the August 2, 2004 will. We affirm, finding that the issue turns primarily on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s finding that the decedent had testamentary capacity to execute the August 2, 2004 will.

This appeal involves the termination of a police officer’s employment with the Memphis Police Department. The officer appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission of the City of Memphis (“the Commission”). The Commission found that the City of Memphis (“the City”) had not shown that termination was reasonable, and it ordered that Officer Lindsey be reinstated with full back pay and benefits. The chancery court affirmed the Commission’s decision. For the following reasons, we reverse and uphold the City’s decision to terminate the officer.

This appeal is before this Court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Petitioner, Dwight K. Pritchard, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the guilty pleas he entered were not knowing and voluntary because the sentences imposed by the trial court were illegal. A recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court compels our conclusion that summary dismissal was proper. The judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissing the petition is affirmed.

The Appellant, Roy Gene Russom, was convicted by a Henderson County jury of violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act and was subsequently sentenced, as a Range II offender, to four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Russom raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Inmate filed medical malpractice action against hospital for the allegedly negligent performance of his surgery and the failure to order appropriate post-operative treatment instructions. Hospital filed motion for summary judgment, alleging that it was an improper party to the suit because it was not a legal entity capable of being sued. The trial court granted the motion and inmate appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court, finding that (1) hospital is not a legal entity capable of being sued; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing hospital to reset its motion for summary judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee suffered an injury to his leg when his knee buckled while he walked across the floor of the Employer’s warehouse. The trial court dismissed his cause of action, finding that the injury was idiopathic and not compensable because the Employee had not proven any hazard incident to the employment that caused or exacerbated his injury. The Employee appealed. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court and affirm the decision of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Dennis Jarrett, was convicted of driving after being declared a
habitual motor vehicle offender, a Class E felony, and violation of the open container law, a Class
C misdemeanor. The jury found Defendant not guilty of violation of the seatbelt law. Following
a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III career offender to six years for his felony conviction. Defendant does not appeal the length of his sentence or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his misdemeanor conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his felony conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not granting Defendant’s motion for a mistrial; and (3) the trial court erred in excluding Defendant from the courtroom during his trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

The Defendant, James Albert Pippin, was convicted by a Putnam County jury of seven counts of aggravated assault and one count of resisting arrest. On appeal, he alleges the trial court improperly denied him judicial diversion at sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I regret that I cannot concur with the court’s opinion in this case. Based on the law, I cannot conclude, as the court has done, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Ms.  McManus’s tardy Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside the properly granted default judgment.

The trial court refused to set aside a default judgment based upon the defendant’s delay in filing a motion to set aside. Because the defendant promptly notified the court that she had a meritorious defense, because the only evidence in the record shows the defendant did not willfully ignore the action against her, because the plaintiff has failed to allege or show any prejudice that would result from setting aside the judgment, and because relief should be granted where there is any reasonable doubt that the judgment by default should be set aside, we reverse.

The Defendant, William Andrew Long, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Campbell County Circuit Court. In February of 2006, the Defendant pled guilty to kidnapping and robbery. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received an effective twelve-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender, and the trial court was to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of total confinement rather than a less restrictive alternative. After review, the sentencing decision is affirmed.

The petitioner, Marcus Nixon, was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of rape of a child. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Marcus Vashawn Nixon, No. W2003-01909-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2058927, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2004). The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-304, that was denied by the trial court; the denial was affirmed by this court. Marcus Nixon v. State, No. W2005-02158-CCA-R3-WM, 2006 WL 851764 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 3, 2006). On September 15, 2005, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. After the appointment of counsel, appropriate amendment to the petition, and a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm.

The defendant, Alonzo Ladon Mason, appeals from his Bedford County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. He claims that the trial court erred in admitting a 9-1-1 tape recording into evidence and that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Because we disagree, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Larry Daniel, appeals the sentence imposed after his probation was revoked due to an arrest for driving under the influence. Additionally, the Defendant asserts that the statute which prohibits credit from being given for time spent on probation is unconstitutional. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court and affirm.

The Petitioner, Carl Anthony Watson, was convicted of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his original trial, and that the post-conviction court erred in failing to grant a continuance of the evidentiary hearing. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Klein Adlei Rawlins, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of aggravated child abuse and first degree felony murder. On appeal, he alleges that: (1) his right to counsel was violated during police questioning in jail; (2) the trial court erred when it allowed autopsy photographs of the victim into evidence; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed an unqualified witness to give expert testimony; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Because we conclude that no reversible error exists, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.