APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Marlon Meacham, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. Defendant was sentenced to serve nine years for the robbery conviction and six years for the burglary conviction, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction, for a total effective sentence of nine years. In this appeal, Defendant argues that 1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, (2) the State improperly refreshed the recollection of Javonta Charles, and (3) the State improperly questioned Defendant about his pre-arrest silence in violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a declaratory judgment action. The plaintiff county filed the instant lawsuit seeking a declaration that the defendant county library board of trustees has no authority under the pertinent Tennessee statute to contract with private entities for the management of the local library. The city intervened, arguing that the library board had the authority under the statute to enter into such contracts. Upon stipulated facts, the trial court held that the statute at issue authorizes the library board to contract with private entities for the management of the county library. The county now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the authority conferred upon the county library board in Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-3-104 includes the authority to enter into private contracts for the management of the local library.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Devonna Barbee, was found guilty of felony reckless endangerment (Class E felony). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to a one-year community corrections sentence with sixty days to be served in jail. She appeals, contending the trial court erred by failing to grant her judicial diversion. After careful review, we conclude the trial court properly denied judicial diversion, and we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The parties to a construction contract dispute the enforceability of its arbitration provision. The trial court refused to enforce the arbitration provision. The construction company appealed. The developer argues that the arbitration provision is unenforceable because it did not assent to arbitration, or alternatively, the arbitration provision was induced by fraud or unconscionable. The developer also claims that the defendants waived their right to arbitrate, and that they lack standing to enforce the right to arbitrate. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration.

This case arises from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant/Appellee on a malicious prosecution complaint filed by Plaintiff/Appellant. Defendant/Appellee certified that it mailed copies of its filings, including its motion for summary judgment, to an incorrect address for Plaintiff/Appellant. Under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5.02, if by mail, service must be made to the last known address of the party. Because Defendant/Appellee mailed its notice to an incorrect address, Plaintiff/Appellant was not properly noticed. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiff sued corporate defendants alleging that defendants failed to make proper distribution to shareholders under the operating agreements of each company. The Trial Court held that plaintiff received cash distributions from one of the companies or from KRS sufficient to pay his income tax liability under the terms of the operating agreement, but no distribution was made by CRS. On appeal, plaintiff argues that CRS, a separate entity from KRS, was required under the operating agreement to distribute to the plaintiff funds sufficient to pay his tax liability, since distributions were made to other members. Under the plain language of the agreement, we agree that plaintiff was due a distribution and we remand for the Trial Court to determine the proper amount.

The plaintiff contractor filed a complaint in Shelby County General Sessions Civil Court against the defendant for a debt owed for various house repairs performed according to a service contract. The case was appealed to the Shelby County Circuit Court. Discovery was conducted, and the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a counter-complaint, which the trial court granted. In her countercomplaint, the defendant alleged that the contractor had not fulfilled the terms of the contract within the specified time period, that the contractor had failed to make repairs in compliance with local building codes as provided by the contract, and that the contractor had failed to perform repairs in a workmanlike manner. A bench trial was held, and the trial court found that the defendant was entitled to offset the original contract price of $14,981 by $5,500, and it entered judgment in favor of the contractor for $9,481 representing the remaining contract price. The trial court denied the contractor any award of attorney’s fees, and it assessed court costs against the defendant. The defendant appealed to this Court. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The Petitioner, Barry Sotherland, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner claims that his concurrent life sentences for aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping are illegal because he was convicted of these charges while on parole for another felony and the sentencing court failed to explicitly order that this new sentence be served consecutively to the sentence for the paroled offense. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the Wayne County Circuit Court summarily dismissing the petition.

After a bench trial, the Shelby County Criminal Court convicted the appellant of burglary of a building, a Class D felony, and sentenced him as a career offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Claimant sought to recover for injuries allegedly caused by an agency of the State. The Claims Commission found claimant to be 65% at fault. Therefore, under the rule of comparative fault adopted in McIntyre v. Ballentine, Claimant was precluded from an award of damages. Claimant asks this Court to affirm in order that he may proceed with the appellate process. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On this appeal, the employer, Saturn Corporation (Saturn), challenges the finding of the trial court that the avascular necrosis (AVN) suffered by the employee, Kenneth Polly, was advanced by his work activities and that the injury sustained by him was compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law. We agree with the trial court’s finding and affirm.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s orders finding Appellant in civil contempt and awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Appellees. We affirm.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s order adopting the Report of the Special Master, dismissing her case, and authorizing foreclosure proceedings. We affirm.

The defendant, Jonathan P. Taylor, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to eight years incarceration. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue presented in this lease dispute is whether the landlord or the tenant is responsible for payment of the costs of ad valorem real estate taxes and premiums for fire and extended coverage insurance. We hold that pursuant to the clear and unambiguous agreement of the parties, the tenant is responsible for the costs at issue. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the protest of a bid made pursuant to an invitation to bid issued by the State for copy machines. Upon protest made by several of the bidders as to the bid made by the selected bidder, the board of standards, after review, awarded the contract to the selected bidder. The next qualified bidder filed suit in chancery court, and the chancery court reversed the decision of the board of standards and awarded the contract to the complaining bidder. The State-defendants and the selected bidder appeal. We reverse and remand.

While an inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility, Anthony Bond was found guilty by the prison disciplinary board of assault on a visitor, placed in punitive segregation for 15 days, and ordered to pay a $5 fine. Mr. Bond challenged the conviction by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Wayne County Chancery Court. The trial court, after granting the petition and reviewing a certified copy of the disciplinary record, found that Mr. Bond was not entitled to any relief and dismissed the case. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Stephen Cox, the defendant, appeals from a denial of his application for alternative sentencing. The defendant entered a best interest guilty plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), to reckless aggravated assault (Class D felony) for a two-year sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial judge. After a hearing, alternative sentencing was denied and the defendant was ordered to serve two years of confinement as a Range I, standard offender. After review, we conclude that the denial of alternative sentencing was proper and affirm the sentence.

This is a workers' compensation appeal referred to and heard by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Prior to trial the parties settled the issue of permanent vocational impairment at 17% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, which was subsequently court-approved. The defendant, Parker Hannifin Corporation, originally contended that the court erred in holding the defendant liable for plaintiff's milage to and from her residence or workplace and that of her medical provider due to the fact that the trips did not involve travel 15 miles or more in radius. The plaintiff having conceded the court's error in doing so, that leaves remaining the defendant's second contention, that being that the court erred in holding defendant responsible for what plaintiff's claim of unauthorized medical expenses in the amount of $39,037.25. We hold the court was correct, and therefore we affirm the trial court's decision.

The defendant, Richard Odom, filed a motion to access closed files in the Shelby County District Attorney’s Office pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act, and the state opposed said motion. After two hearings on the matter, the trial court entered an order granting the defendant’s ex parte motion for the trial court to view the state’s file in camera for specific limited exculpatory material. We granted the state’s Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a) application for extraordinary appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s ex parte motion, requiring the state to relinquish its file for in camera inspection by the trial court. Upon our review of the record and due consideration of the issue, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s order.

This dispute concerns annexation of property known as the Southwind area by the City of  Memphis. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to intervene in Plaintiffs’ quo warranto action challenging Memphis’ annexation ordinance, and entered a consent order agreed to by the parties following settlement negotiations. We affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that the employee suffered a compensable back injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Vivian Larose Johnson, sought workers’ compensation benefits for carpal tunnel injuries to both hands and a separate injury to her back. The trial court found the employee had sustained a work related injury and that she had sustained a sixty percent permzzanent partial disability to the body as a whole without specifying the validity of her separate claims. The employer, Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. (Coca-Cola), has appealed, alleging the trial court erred in finding Ms. Johnson’s claim for benefits for the injury to her back had been filed within the limitations period established by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-203(a), and in awarding Ms. Johnson sixty percent permanent partial disability as a whole. We agree, reverse in part and remand the case to the trial court for determination of the remaining claims.

The appellant, James Michael Hanners, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of misdemeanor assault, a lesser-included offense of abuse of a child under six years of age, in September 2002. In January 2003, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days. In
August 2005, the appellant moved for expungement of any records relating to the charge of child abuse, which the trial court denied relying on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101, as amended May 22, 2003. On appeal, the appellant argues that the denial of his motion for expungement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Tennessee Constitution because he was entitled to expungement at the time of his conviction and sentencing. After our review of the parties’ briefs and the record as a whole, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an expungement order.

This is a workers' compensation appeal referred to and heard by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in finding that she had failed to demonstrate that she had suffered a permanent injury to her back while in the course of employment for the defendant. We conclude the trial court was correct in its finding, however, and therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.