APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur with the majority’s opinion regarding the evidentiary issue. I dissent from the majority’s opinion insofar as it finds insufficient evidence to support the convictions.

The owner of a tract of undeveloped commercial property in the city of Lawrenceburg asked the trial court to enjoin the lessees of that property from subletting it to the city for the purpose of building a retention pond. She claimed that such a use would constitute waste or create a permanent and private nuisance on the land. The trial court declined to issue the injunction and certified its decision as final for purposes of appeal. We reverse.

Following a jury trial, the appellant, Roshad Romanic Siler, was convicted of three counts of the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of one year for each conviction, but suspended the sentences and placed the appellant on community corrections. The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and an evidentiary ruling made by the trial court on appeal. Because we determine that the evidence was insufficient to support the appellant’s convictions, we reverse and dismiss.

The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her breach of contract action against her former employer, Harpeth Valley Utilities District. The plaintiff entered into a Deferred Compensation Agreement with Harpeth Valley at the beginning of her employment in 1998 that afforded her a retirement benefit if she remained employed until the year 2012. The plaintiff voluntarily left the employment of Harpeth Valley in 2003 after only five years of employment. One year later, she filed this action contending that a handwritten modification was made to the Agreement which provided that she was entitled to receive the retirement benefit and death benefit specified in the Agreement. The trial court dismissed her Complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. We affirm.

The defendant, Marques¹ Douglas, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdicts. After review, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

The pro se petitioner, James Brian Stevens, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the statute of limitations should have been tolled during the time that he spent on probation. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as time-barred.

The petitioner, Carlos Angel, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The appellant, Eric Michael Goldman aka Eric Forrest, was convicted of driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender (Class E felony) and sentenced to four years in the Department of Correction as a multiple offender. He was also found guilty of driving on a revoked license, tenth offense (Class A misdemeanor), which was merged with the conviction for driving as a habitual motor vehicle offender. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for the offense of driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender; and (2) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive and contrary to the law. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, John Anthony Gust, was convicted of forgery over $1000, a Class D felony, and theft up to $500, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a trial court’s division of marital property following a divorce.  The wife came into the marriage with substantial assets, but the husband had no assets and owed a large debt to the IRS.  During the marriage, the wife was continuously employed, and the husband was often unemployed.  After the wife found out that her husband had quit one of his jobs, he executed a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in their house to the wife. When they later divorced, the trial court appointed a special master to classify certain assets and debts as marital or separate property. The trial court affirmed the special master’s report with modifications. Both parties now challenge the classification of certain assets and the court’s division of the marital property.  For the following reasons, we affirm.

The Defendant, Tayuana D. Taylor, appeals the trial court’s re-sentencing decision upon the revocation of her community corrections sentence. The Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sentencing her to the maximum allowable sentence and for not giving her credit for time already served. We conclude the trial court did not err in re-sentencing the Defendant and credit was given for time already served. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The appellant, James Otis Butler, pled guilty to one count of delivery of over .5 grams of cocaine.  As a result, the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence, but ordered the appellant to serve the sentence on probation. Subsequently, several probation violation warrants were issued against the appellant. The trial court held a hearing, at which the appellant was not represented by counsel, and revoked the appellant’s probation. The trial court later rescinded that order and held a second hearing after appointment of counsel. After the second hearing, the trial court again revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. The appellant argues on appeal that the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to issue written findings of fact, failing to allow counsel to argue on his behalf at the probation revocation hearing, and failing to consider the appellant’s drug and alcohol treatment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a trial court’s distribution of marital property in a divorce proceeding. The parties owned their own business, and the husband generally ran its operations while the wife handled its financial aspects. After the business caught fire, the husband found $240,000 in the company safe. He took the money to a bank and placed it in a safety deposit box. The company’s head of security accompanied the husband to the bank and testified about these events at trial. The wife also had access to the box, and the bank records revealed that she accessed it over thirty times in the next five years. The husband and the security officer returned to the safety deposit box when he learned that the wife intended to file for divorce, but there was no cash remaining in the box. The trial court determined that the wife had dissipated the marital estate in the amount of $240,000 and subtracted half that amount, $120,000, from her award of the marital property. The wife appealed.  For the following reasons, we affirm.

The Defendant, Issac Scott, was convicted of first degree murder and received a life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Paul Dennis Reid, Jr., was convicted of three counts of premeditated murder, three counts of felony murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged each of the felony murder convictions with the corresponding premeditated murder convictions. The jury sentenced the defendant to death based upon four aggravating circumstances, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), (7), (12) (Supp. 1996), and further found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (Supp. 1996). We hold that (1) the trial court did not err by finding the defendant competent to stand trial; (2) the trial court did not err by admitting the testimony of the defendant’s former employer; (3) the trial court did not err by denying the motion to limit proof regarding the defendant’s financial condition; (4) the trial court did not err by refusing to recuse itself from the case; (5) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the murders at the Captain D’s restaurant to establish the “mass murder” aggravating circumstance; and (6) the defendant’s sentences of death are not invalid under the mandatory review criteria of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). As to the remaining issues, we agree with the conclusions reached by the Court of Criminal Appeals. The relevant portions of its opinion are appended. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.

Invitee fell in gravel driveway of rental property, allegedly due to a partially hidden concrete divider. Invitee ultimately died as result of the fall and invitee, by and through her husband, filed an action against rental property owners. Property owners filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that Plaintiff failed to establish an exception to the general rule of landlord non-liability. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends the trial court erred in (a) holding the employee’s right shoulder injury could not be considered in determining vocational disability resulting from carpal tunnel syndrome, (b) accrediting the testimony of one physician over that of another, (c) finding the employee sustained a 75 percent vocational disability to the arm, and (d) permitting codefendant CNA Insurance to participate in the trial. We affirm.

The plaintiff patient visited the defendant dentist periodically between 1998 and 2003. Between 2001 and 2003, the defendant performed dental work on the plaintiff including root canals, fillings, and crown work. Over this period, the plaintiff’s dental condition became significantly worse. The plaintiff developed abscesses and infection in his mouth and suffered from substantial dental pain.  The plaintiff’s last visit to the defendant was in October of 2003. Over the 2003 holidays, the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to contact the defendant for relief from his increasingly painful condition. The plaintiff ultimately received treatment from another dentist throughout 2004. After receiving the plaintiff’s dental records from the defendant in October of 2004, the treating dentist informed the plaintiff that the defendant’s treatment had been negligent. The plaintiff filed a dental
malpractice action against the defendant on January 12, 2005. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the one-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, finding that the plaintiff should have discovered the injury by the time of the plaintiff’s last visit to the defendant in October of 2003.  The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.  We affirm.

The Appellant, Stephen Lee Noe, proceeding pro se, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court. Noe pled guilty to one count of statutory rape and, following a sentencing hearing, was placed on a two-year period of probation. On appeal, Noe argues that the trial court erred by not granting judicial diversion. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Second Injury Fund contends the trial court erred in (a) finding the employee gave notice of injury to her left arm and shoulder, (b) awarding separate scheduled member and body as a whole awards for one gradually occurring injury, (c) failing to find the employee permanently and totally disabled from the last injury if notice was properly given, and (d) finding that an award on appeal constituted a “prior award” for the purposes of assigning liability to the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). We modify and remand

I agree with the result reached by the majority and the substance of the majority’s reasoning.  I write separately only to note that I disagree with a portion of the majority’s reading of Ramsey v. Beavers, 931 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996), and in particular its reliance on Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). 

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tavarski Childress, was convicted of first degree felony murder, reckless homicide, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged Defendant’s conviction of reckless homicide with his felony murder conviction, and Defendant was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for his felony murder conviction.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-two years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction, and ordered that this sentence be served consecutively to his life sentence. After filing a petition for post-conviction relief, Defendant was granted a delayed appeal. In his appeal, Defendant argues as plain error that the admission of his co-defendant’s statements to the police during the State’s re-direct examination of Sergeant Shemwell violated his constitutional right of confrontation. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to the length of Defendant’s sentences, but remand for a new sentencing hearing to reconsider whether consecutive sentencing is appropriate.

Parents, individually and on behalf of their two minor children, sued various defendants for damages resulting from an automobile accident caused allegedly by the negligence of defendants.  The complaint, in addition to seeking damages for the personal injuries sustained by one of the minor children, seeks damages on behalf of the mother and one minor child for negligent infliction of emotional distress. An uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed an answer in the cause and subsequentlymoved for summary judgment, which ostensibly involved only the claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion but failed to denote that the grant was only a partial summary judgment for that particular claim. We modify the trial court's order by granting only a partial summary judgment and further reverse and remand that grant.

Attorney filed an action against client to collect unpaid installments due under a promissory note. The trial court entered a consent final decree awarding attorney the sum currently due under the note. Attorney filed a second action against client to collect the then unpaid installments due under the same promissory note. Client answered alleging affirmative defenses which attacked the validity of the note and which were not raised in the first proceeding. Attorney filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that client was precluded from asserting the defenses under the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the motion and attorney filed an extraordinary appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent herewith.