APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Mitchell Lee Blankenship, was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years, with one year to serve in confinement. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing by improperly weighing enhancement factors, not applying mitigating factors, and not granting him full probation. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient. Although the trial court erred in applying the multiple victims enhancement factor, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial court was justified. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a premises liability case. Plaintiff/Appellant allegedly suffered injuries after slipping in a pool of water that was allowed to stand on the Hospital/Appellee’s floor. The trial court ruled that Hospital/Appellee had no actual or constructive notice of the water and entered judgment in favor of Hospital/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant appeals.  We affirm.

The Appellant, Marcellus Hurt, was convicted by a Madison County jury of three counts of misdemeanor theft, two counts of burglary of a vehicle, one count of felony vandalism over $500, one count of possession of burglary tools, and one count of misdemeanor evading arrest. As a result of these convictions, Hurt received an effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty nine days in confinement. On appeal, Hurt raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the vidence is sufficient to support his convictions for burglary of a vehicle and possession of burglary tools; and (2) whether his sentence is excessive. Following review of the record, we affirm the convictions and sentences as imposed.

The Appellant, Wayne Shelton, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the Bedford County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Shelton pled guilty to aggravated assault and attempted arson and received an effective six-year sentence, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, Shelton argues that the court erred in denying him an alternative sentence, specifically community corrections. After review, we affirm.

I join in the result, but write separately for the following reasons.

The defendant, Russell House, was convicted by a Sumner County Criminal Court jury of aggravated perjury, a Class D felony, for lying about his criminal history during his testimony at his probation revocation hearing. The trial court subsequently sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to two years, with six months to be served in the county jail and the balance of the time on supervised probation. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the probation revocation hearing judge and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Johnny McGowan, appeals the habeas corpus court’s orders dismissing his petitions for writs of habeas corpus and error coram nobis. Following our review, we affirm the orders of dismissal.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The Petitioner has appealed the habeas corpus court’s order dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court was correct in dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.   Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The defendant, Mitchell Lee Blankenship, was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years, with one year to serve in confinement. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing by improperly weighing enhancement factors, not applying mitigating factors, and not granting him full probation. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient. Although the trial court erred in applying the multiple victims enhancement factor, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial court was justified. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Howard Gailand Bruff, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The murder convictions were merged, and the defendant received concurrent sentences of life and twenty-five years in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish his convictions because the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to prove his identity as the assailant, that he committed a theft against the victim, that he had the requisite intent to rob the victim to be convicted of felony murder, or that he killed the victim with premeditation. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 1997, an Arkansas state court adjudged the plaintiff/ward to be incapacitated and appointed a bank to be the conservator of her estate. The conservator bank, acting on the behalf of the incapacitated plaintiff/ward, filed a complaint in 2002 against the defendants. The plaintiff sought to set aside a quit claim deed for property located in Shelby County, Tennessee. The plaintiff/ward had executed the deed in 1996 and transferred title for the property to the defendants. The co-defendant bank, which had obtained an interest in the property through the defendants in 2002 but was not named as a defendant in the complaint, answered the complaint in 2003 and moved for a dismissal. The plaintiff sought to amend the complaint and name the bank as a co-defendant. The co-defendant bank moved to strike the amended complaint.  The originally named defendants filed an answer later in 2003, and in 2004 they moved for dismissal based upon the statute of limitations.  In 2005, the defendants moved for a dismissal based upon their original defenses and for the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the complaint.  The plaintiff set a trial date in the chancery court, and the defendants moved to strike the trial date. The trial court held a hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss and granted the defendants’ motion for dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute.  The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the judgment, and the trial court denied the motion.  The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This case involves a claim for unemployment benefits after an employee was terminated for failing to follow company policy and refusing to follow his supervisor’s instructions. A female co-worker had previously complained about the claimant’s repeated attempts to ask her out on dates and several occasions when he had followed her to her car, all of which had made her uncomfortable. The claimant was suspended for two days at that time. A few months later, another female co-worker complained to her supervisor about the claimant’s behavior after he continued asking her out on dates for over a month, waited for her at her car, and eventually hugged her at work after she rejected another invitation to go out with him. A meeting was held about the claimant’s conduct, and his female co-worker and his supervisors asked that he agree not to communicate with the co-worker in the future. The claimant would not agree to stop contacting his co-worker, and he was terminated from his employment the next day. He filed for unemployment benefits, which were initially approved by the Department of Labor. On appeal, the Appeals Tribunal found that the claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because he had been terminated for work related misconduct.  The finding was affirmed by the Board of Review, and later by the chancery court.  For the following reasons, we affirm.

Appellant appeals the denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from a Final Decree of Divorce as it relates to child custody. Appellant asserts that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA due to the entry of a previous order of protection in the Alabama family court. We affirm.

The issue presented in this case is whether the Wife’s alimony award is modifiable due to her remarriage when the divorce decree does not classify the alimony award, stating only that “the [Husband] shall pay alimony to the [Wife] in the amount of five hundred dollars per month for a
period of two years.” The trial court, presented with Husband’s petition to modify spousal support, held that the alimony award was “periodic/rehabilitative alimony,” and terminated Husband’s spousal support obligation to Wife because of her remarriage. We hold that the award of alimony is properly classified as alimony in solido, because (1) both the alimony award in the divorce decree and the parties’ marital dissolution agreement provided for a sum certain – $500 per month for two
years – with no contingencies that would cause termination of the alimony, such as Wife’s death or remarriage; and (2) the trial court made no finding in the divorce judgment regarding the relative economic status of the parties, nor of the Wife’s need or potential for rehabilitation. Therefore,
because an award of alimony in solido is not subject to modification, we reverse the judgment of the trial court terminating Wife’s alimony payments.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, contending the evidence was not clear and convincing that she abandoned her child and that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the child. The trial court found the mother had abandoned the child by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child, which conduct included ingesting drugs while pregnant and while breast feeding, and the manufacture of methamphetamine in the family home. We affirm.

In this case defendants moved to arbitrate the dispute since plaintiff signed a contract to arbitrate. Plaintiff pled incompetence to contract, but the Trial Court held that issue was subject to arbitration. We vacate and remand and instruct the Trial Court to decide the issue of incompetency.

I concur in the opinion of the Court and write separately in order to re-emphasize and reaffirm the sound rules of law stated in Holt v. Citizen Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn.1984).  Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Holt, an innocent purchaser at a foreclosure sale had constantly to look back over his shoulder for fear that someone would challenge the validity of the foreclosure sale in equity under the “shock the conscience of the court” standard. Holt makes it clear that, in the absence of misconduct or fraud, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale where the property brings less than true value is free from a constant cloud upon his title.

Appellant, who was married to the mother at the birth of the child, claims the Trial Court erred in failing to engage in a comparative fitness test in awarding the child to a person who by DNA testing was shown to be the biological father.  We affirm.

This case involves a creditor’s entitlement to a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale in which the creditor was the only bidder, and in which he paid considerably less for the large tract of mountaintop property than the debtor alleged it was worth. The trial court awarded the creditor’s successor-in-interest a deficiency judgment of over $4 million, holding that in accordance with the rule of Holt v. Citizens Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. 1984), the debtor should not be permitted to challenge the legal presumption that the value of the property at the time of foreclosure was equal to the sale price because there was no evidence of “irregularity, misconduct, fraud or unfairness on the part of the mortgagee.” Since the Holt case did not involve a deficiency judgment, we believe it is inapplicable. After examining both the law of Tennessee and that of other jurisdictions, we conclude that the trial court should have permitted the defendant to challenge the presumption by attempting to prove that the sale price was grossly inadequate. We accordingly reverse.

In this class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, the Knox County Board of Education and its superintendent, were guilty of statutory, regulatory, and constitutional violations in the design and implementation of theBoard’s evening alternative education program for students who are expelled or suspended from their regular schools.  The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenges.  The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

In this premises liability case, the minor plaintiff received a severe foot injury while assisting an independent contractor straighten concrete poles with a forklift on defendant premises owner’s property. The plaintiff’s father sued the independent contractor and the premises owner on his minor
son’s behalf, alleging negligence and workers’ compensation liability. The trial court tried the workers’ compensation claim first and entered a judgment for the plaintiff. The Special Workers’ Compensation Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed as to the premises owner, finding that the premises owner was not the statutory employer of the plaintiff. The case returned to the trial court for trial of the negligence claim. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the independent contractor from the action, leaving the premises owner as the only defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the premises owner, finding that the premises owner owed no duty to prevent the independent contractor from hiring the plaintiff, and finding that the facts of the case did not fall into any exception to the general rule that a premises owner is not liable for the negligence of its independent contractor. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, alleging that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment. We affirm.

The Appellant, Tulinague Thandiwe, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court which resulted in the imposition of an eight-year sentence of incarceration. On appeal, Thandiwe challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.  After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Stephen D. Lamb, was convicted by a Madison County jury of burglary, a Class D felony, and the misdemeanor offenses of possession of burglary tools and evading arrest. Lamb received an eight-year sentence for burglary and an eleven month and twenty-nine day sentence for each misdemeanor conviction. The misdemeanor sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the felony conviction. On appeal, Lamb raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress certain items found in Lamb’s possession at the time of his arrest; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting a police videotape; (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether Lamb’s sentence
for burglary is excessive and whether the imposition of consecutive sentences is warranted. After review, the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences are affirmed.

The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this negligence action.  We affirm.