APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff loaned the defendant $50,000 which was to be repaid in 15 monthly installments of $800 each with a final balloon payment of $46,600. The parties agreed that the total amount to be repaid was $58,600, but did not specify an interest rate or make any provision for interest on the balance in the event the balloon payment was not timely made. The defendant paid the initial 15 monthly installments, but failed to pay the balloon payment, and instead continued to make monthly payments for approximately 44 more months paying a total of $59,416. The issue  presented is what amount of interest, if any, is owed on the balloon payment that the defendant failed to timely pay when the contract failed to make a provision for interest in the event of default. The trial court held that the parties had agreed that the defendant would pay interest at the rate of 14.1 percent per annum, based upon the $8,600 he agreed to pay in excess of principal, and that the plaintiff was entitled to have the balance of the loan outstanding at the time of default paid at such rate. Upon review, we conclude that the parties failed to agree on an interest rate to be paid in the event of default of the balloon payment, and accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is vacated to the extent that it awards the plaintiff interest at the rate of 14.1 percent, and the case is remanded with instructions that the trial court grant the plaintiff an award of prejudgment interest in accord with Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-102. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Plaintiff's Declaratory Judgment asks the Court to declare the contract he signed with defendant void because it was not sufficiently definite to be enforced, and it was a contract of adhesion. The Trial Court held that the contract was enforceable and not a contract of adhesion. On appeal, we hold the contract was enforceable, but whether the contract was one of adhesion is not appropriate for declaratory judgment.

Co-defendants, Henry Cooper and Lawrence M. Walker, were indicted on one count of attempted first degree premeditated murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a jury trial, co-defendants were convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and were found not guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant Cooper as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years, and  Defendant Walker, as a Range I, standard offender, to eleven years. On appeal, each Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and Defendant Cooper challenges the length of his sentence. Defendant Walker does not challenge his sentence on appeal. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Phillip Doyle, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, and violating the implied consent law. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, with all but 45 days suspended to probation. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Mark Grimes, appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because we find merit to the petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus relief, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Tommy Brown, Jr., was indicted on one count of aggravated rape with a weapon, a Class A felony, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, also a Class A felony. The alleged victim in the case failed to appear on two separate dates for trial. The state was unable to proceed and the trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the state argues that the trial court erred by failing to declare the witness unavailable and admitting the victim’s prior preliminary hearing testimony at trial. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jackie R. Russell, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner alleges that his sentence was unconstitutionally imposed based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. The judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissing the petition is affirmed.

The Defendant, Vincent D. Steele, was convicted of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he presents a single issue for our consideration: whether the evidence presented at his trial was sufficient to establish that he had the intent to sell the cocaine that he possessed. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Roderick Chapman, pleaded guilty to counts of burglary and aggravated assault and was sentenced as a Range II offender in Shelby County Criminal Court to an effective five-year term to be served in a community corrections program, with the first year to be served in the Synergy drug treatment program. On January 5, 2007, the court revoked the community corrections sentence and resentenced the defendant as a career offender to serve twelve years in the Department of Correction.  From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment below as modified.

The petitioner, Carl Ronald Dykes, appeals from the denial by the Marion County Circuit Court of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that he should be granted a delayed direct appeal of his convictions. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is the second appeal by the appellant who again has asked this court to review the Probate Court of Perry County’s denial of his petition. In that petition, the appellant contested the manner in which the Executrix of his late father’s estate administered the estate. We have determined the issue is res judicata and thereby affirm the trial court. We have also determined the appeal is devoid of merit and, therefore, the Executrix is entitled to recover her reasonable expenses incurred on appeal.

An Obion County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, James Bradley Warner, of facilitation of theft of property valued between $1000 and $10,000, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him to four years to be served consecutively to an earlier sentence stemming from a parole violation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State did not prove that he knew the items were stolen at the time he helped sell them. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the jury’s guilty verdict.

The petitioner, Martino Wright, pled guilty to two counts of especially aggravated robbery and received a total effective sentence of thirteen and  one-half years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel were ineffective and that as a result of a multitude of errors his guilty plea was not a knowing and voluntary choice. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, William Douglas Zukowski, was convicted of five counts of rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years on each count, to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of 125 years. He later pled guilty to three additional counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated rape and accepted a sentence of twenty-five years, to be served concurrently with his prior sentence. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions. In his petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

I concur in the results reached by the majority as I would also remand this case for a new trial. I write separately to note the manner in which I believe that the proposed testimony of nurse Teresa Hudgens—namely, that the defendant contacted Hudgens via telephone and told Hudgens that the victim threatened to kill the defendant—was admissible.

A Hamblen County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of second degree murder, and the
trial court sentenced her to twenty years. On appeal, she contends that: (1) the evidence is
insufficient to sustain her conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admonished her counsel in
front of the jury; (3) the trial court denied her constitutional right to present a defense; and (4)
the trial court should have ordered a new trial because a juror made false statements during voir
dire. We conclude that, because the Defendant claimed self-defense at trial, the trial court erred
when it refused to admit testimony about a prior incident in which the victim threatened the
Defendant’s life. Further, we conclude that this error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial on the charge
of second degree murder.

Petitioner, Anthony Woods, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief in which he alleged the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when he was convicted of aggravated assault. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

On appeal, Petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. In his petition, Petitioner alleged that the trial court improperly determined that Petitioner was a Range II, multiple offender, for the purpose of determining the length of his sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping and sexual battery. After review, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to state a ground for which habeas corpus relief is available. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus relief.

A Sevier County jury convicted the defendant, Mark Dewayne Culbertson, of possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, a class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant, a Range II offender, to eight years and six months in prison. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress his statement; (2) denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) denied his motion for a new trial because he was not notified pretrial that the controlled substance was destroyed during testing; (4) denied his motion for new trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct; (5) failed to order a new trial because of newly discovered evidence; and (6) improperly sentenced the defendant. Finding that there exists no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment dismissing Appellant’s counterclaim for statutory retaliatory discharge against his employer, the Appellee herein. Finding that the material facts of this case are undisputed and that Appellant failed to show that he refused to participate in or to remain silent about any alleged illegal activity, and/or to prove an exclusive causal link between his alleged refusal to participate in or to remain silent about alleged illegal activities and his termination, we affirm.

I concur in the results reached and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree with the court’s statement that the standard of prejudice for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is whether, absent counsel’s deficiency, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the appeal would have been different. I believe that the proper standard is the same for trial counsel, that is, whether a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

The petitioners, Darryl Lee Elkins and Rhonda Grills, were jointly tried and convicted of offenses against the minor child of Rhonda Grills by the Criminal Court for Sullivan County. Petitioner Elkins was convicted of rape of a child (Class A felony) and attempted rape of a child (Class B
felony). He was sentenced to twenty-five years with a fine of $50,000 for the Class A felony and to twelve years for the Class B felony, to be served consecutively. Petitioner Grills was convicted of facilitation of rape of a child (Class B felony) and sentenced to ten years with a fine of $25,000.  Each petitioner appealed, and their sentences were affirmed. See State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Grills, 114 S.W.3d 548 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). Both petitioners subsequently filed petitions for post-conviction relief, which are the subject of this appeal. The postconviction court granted Petitioner Elkins a new trial on his conviction for attempted rape of a child
but denied relief on the conviction for rape of a child. Petitioner Grills was denied any postconviction relief. The State, Petitioner Elkins, and Petitioner Grills have all appealed from the order of the post-conviction court. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court granting relief to Petitioner Elkins, and we affirm the denial of the remaining issues on appeal for both Petitioner Elkins and Petitioner Grills.

The petitioner, Mathis T. Vaughn, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, he asserts that the habeas corpus court erred by dismissing his petition prior to the appointment of counsel and that his conviction for first degree felony murder is void because (1) the trial court failed to charge any lesser included offenses of felony murder and (2) the indictment did not charge an underlying felony to support the felony murder charge. The judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Montez Dickerson, pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance under .5 grams, and the trial court sentenced him as a persistent offender to ten years in prison. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. In the petition, the petitioner alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. The petitioner appeals that dismissal, and we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

In this action to quiet title in ancestral land held as a tenancy in common, the plaintiff co-tenants challenged two deeds conveying a portion of the land to a grantee outside the family. The defendant grantee procured two deeds to an undivided fractional interest in this property for the sum of $3,500. The first deed was executed by some of the heirs of a record co-tenant, and the second deed originated from two sons of a record co-tenant’s non-marital child. At that time, both the co-tenant of record and his non-marital child were deceased. Five days later, the grantee conveyed his interest in the subject property to a subsequent grantee for $21,000. The trial court set aside all deeds to the grantee, in part, on the ground of fraudulent procurement. It also set aside the deed to the subsequent grantee because the grantee had no title to convey. The court quieted title to the subject property in the plaintiff family members according to a series of quit claim deeds they had executed and recorded so as to partition the property among themselves. Further, the trial court ordered, sua sponte, the grantee to return the purchase price of the subject property, plus pre-judgment interest, to the subsequent grantee. Finding support in the record for setting aside the conveyances from only two of the original six grantors, we affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for a calculation of the respective interests in the property and for a determination regarding the subsequent grantee’s counterclaim for a partition in kind.