APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of A.C. (“Mother”) to her three children, L.A.L.R., K.M.C., and R.S.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3). The Juvenile Court also determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals, claiming DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. Mother also claims DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment.
 

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Bernard M. Wallace, was convicted of possession of cocaine over point five (0.5) grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in the Department of Correction for the Class B felony, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor, to be served concurrently. In this appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of a motel room; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court improperly applied the enhancement factors in determining the length of Defendant’s sentence. After a thorough review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

When read together, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (West 2003) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116(c) (2004) plainly permit the State of Tennessee to recover correctly paid medical assistance benefits from the estate of a recipient’s surviving spouse. However, I concur with the court’s conclusion that the property from which these benefits can be recovered is limited to property owned by the recipient at the time of his or her death that passed to the surviving spouse “through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.” 

Estate appeals probate court’s determination that subject estate was liable to Bureau of Tennessee for Medicaid nursing home benefits correctly provided to a pre-deceased spouse. We reverse.

The appellant, John Wallace, was convicted of four counts of assault. As a result, the trial court sentenced him to four, concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court then placed the appellant on probation for the length of the sentence and imposed a fine of $500 for each conviction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s imposition of the $500 fine for each conviction. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in that regard. However, because the trial court improperly fined the appellant $500 for each conviction when the jury was not instructed to impose a fine and the appellant did not waive his right to a jury-imposed fine, we remand the matter to the trial court for the proper assessment of a fine.

John Green, the defendant, appeals his jury convictions of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery (Class A felony). The defendant was sentenced to life in prison for first degree felony murder with a ten-year concurrent sentence for aggravated robbery. The defendant presents two issues: insufficient evidence to support the convictions, and error by the trial court in failing to suppress the defendant’s statements. We conclude from our review that the evidence was sufficient and that the defendant’s statements were properly admitted. The judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The petitioner, Terry D. Brewer, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his  forty-five-year sentence stemming from his 1989 convictions for aggravated rape with pregnancy  occurring, aggravated sexual battery, and incest. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner appeals the trial court’s dismissal and refusal to appoint counsel. The petitioner contends that his sentences are void because he was improperly sentenced under the 1982 Sentencing Reform Act instead of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act. We conclude that the petition states no cognizable claim for relief, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, S.L.B. (“Mother”) contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to four of her five children.  Mother does not challenge the propriety of the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as to the fifth child. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of her children.  Therefore, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Joseph W. Wilson, was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated rape, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and misdemeanor vandalism. He was sentenced to seventy-one years confinement. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. The Petitioner petitioned for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the post-conviction petition as untimely, and we affirm that judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss
this claim based on the statute of limitations. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree and
reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Maurice Shaw, the defendant, appeals his jury convictions for delivery and possession with intent to deliver over .5 grams of a Schedule II drug (cocaine), both offenses being Class B felonies. The defendant was sentenced as a standard offender to eleven years on each offense. The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Specifically, he contends that no drugs were found on him; that the only eyewitness lacked credibility; and that no foundation was made for identification of the defendant’s voice during the drug transaction. Our review indicates that sufficient evidence existed that the defendant did have cocaine in his possession and that the other issues were matters of credibility determination which were resolved by the jury. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children. The mother of both children and the father of one of the children appeal separately from the Order of the Juvenile Court of Hardin County terminating their respective parental rights. Both Appellants assert that the grounds for termination of their parental rights are not met by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination of their parental rights is not in the best interest of the minor children. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The trial court awarded Plaintiff 100 percent permanent disability. On appeal,
Defendants contend the trial court erred in (1) finding Plaintiff’s stroke was work-related, (2) in
awarding Plaintiff 100 percent disability, and (3) in allowing medical expenses for treatment at the
VA Hospital. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jimmie Lee Hart, was convicted of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment as a career offender. He appeals his conviction, contending (1) that the convicting evidence was insufficient and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the meaning of the use of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to
the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Chancellor determined that the
plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his work-related injury. The defendant
appeals, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination of disability. After careful review of the record and applicable authorities, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Clifford Wayne Morris, pled guilty to attempted dissemination of a cordless telephone transmission, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days with a thirty day period of incarceration to be served prior to release on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

With great reluctance, I must part ways with the court regarding the dismissal of this will contest. Based on the facts of this case, I have concluded that the trial court erred by dismissing the will contest without first disposing of Don Brown’s motion to implead additional parties and Alton Brown’s petition to intervene.

Four years after the contest of his uncle’s will was filed, Alton Brown filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24 Motion to Intervene in the contest of his uncle’s will. The motion, however, was not accompanied by a proposed pleading setting forth the claim for which intervention was sought as required by Rule 24.03. Subsequent to the filing of the motion, an order of dismissal of the will contest was entered.  Thereafter, the movant filed his proposed pleading following which the trial court denied the Motion to Intervene based upon a finding the movant had slept on his rights. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Theressa Joanne Booker (“Wife”) a divorce from Ricardo Baytonia Booker, Jr. (“Husband”), divided the parties’ property, and decreed an award of alimony in solido and alimony in futuro. Husband appeals, asserting that the division of marital
property was not equitable.  He also challenges the propriety of each of the alimony awards.  We modify the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro so as to make it an award of rehabilitative alimony.  As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The defendant, Corrections Corporation of America, has appealed the trial
court’s award of 60% whole body impairment to the plaintiff, Mr. Craven. Corrections Corporation
of America contends that the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Craven sustained a compensable
psychological workers’ compensation injury, in permitting Dr. Randall Moskovitz and Dr. David
Strauser to testify as experts, and in finding that Mr. Craven gave proper notice of the work-related
injury. Corrections Corporation of America also contends that the award of temporary total  disability benefits was in error and that the award of 60% permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole was excessive. After carefully considering the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We remand the case for a determination of the personal representation of Mr. Craven and a determination as to the effect of his death on the award.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of appointed counsel seeking permission to withdraw from further representation of the Appellant in the above-captioned appeal pursuant to Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel claims that there are no meritorious issues available for appellate review. Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Mack T. Transou, has filed a responsive brief pursuant to Rule 22(E), Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review of the motion, the accompanying Anders brief, and the appellate record, we agree with counsel’s assertion that the appeal has no merit and is, accordingly, frivolous within the meaning of Rule 22, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Petitioner, Shinny Leverette, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the accompanying pleadings, this Court concludes that the trial court properly dismissed the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the trial court’s dismissal is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The Petitioner has appealed the habeas corpus court’s order dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court was correct in dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.