APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Marlon Hayes, appeals the Tipton County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Hayes collaterally challenges his guilty pleas for first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery upon grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant filed a claim for unemployment benefits which was denied. Appellant petitioned for judicial review in the chancery court and that court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review.  Appellant next appealed to this Court and we affirm the court below.

This is a direct appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict for aggravated robbery. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant raises four issues: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his car, (2) the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of a police officer who was deceased at the time of trial, (3) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of aggravated robbery, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Saturn Corporation appeals the Chancery Court’s entry of summary judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. Saturn filed its action in Chancery Court seeking a refund of a percentage of franchise and excise taxes paid in fiscal year 1999-2000. In this de novo review of the trial court’s judgment, we hold that the exemption claimed does not apply to the taxpayer, that the exemption as applied does not violate the equal protection provisions of state and federal constitutions, and affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

Petitioner/Appellee Cross filed a complaint in federal court against Shelby County and Shelby County Deputy Sheriff Bishoff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The federal court awarded Shelby County partial summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law. The action against Deputy Bishoff was heard by a jury, which awarded Mr. Cross damages and legal fees. Mr. Cross then filed a complaint in Shelby County Circuit Court alleging that, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-8-302, Shelby County was liable for the amount of damages awarded him in the federal court action.  The trial court awarded Mr. Cross summary judgment, and Shelby County appeals. We reverse and award summary judgment to Shelby County on the grounds of res judicata.

The appellant, Charles Edward Wilkerson, was charged in a three count indictment with possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, evading arrest, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial, the appellant pled guilty to evading arrest and possession of drug paraphernalia. After a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty of criminal responsibility for the facilitation of the possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, a Class C felony. The appellant received a total effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his facilitation conviction. After a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Seven members of the Tennessee Trucking Association Self-Insurance Group Trust appeal the post-liquidation assessment against members of the self-insured group to fund a $2.8 million deficit. The self-insured group trust was declared insolvent in 2004 by the Chancery Court, following which the Commissioner of Commerce and Insurance was appointed Liquidator of the Trust. In the capacity of Liquidator, the Commissioner was responsible for administering the Trust, which included making assessments of the members of the Trust to satisfy its financial obligations. The appellants contend the assessment methodology employed by the Liquidator, which modified the proportionate financial obligations of the members, constituted an impermissible modification of the premium structure the members agreed upon. The trial court determined the only proscription upon making assessments was a requirement the methodology be equitable. Finding the methodology utilized by the Liquidator was equitable, the trial court approved the assessments. We affirm.

This appeal involves a dispute between two telecommunications services providers in the Chattanooga market. A privately owned provider filed a complaint with the Tennessee Regulatory Authority asserting that a competing provider owned by a municipal electric utility was receiving an illegal cross-subsidy because the electric utility was permitting the provider to use its name without compensation. One of the Authority’s hearing officers conducted a hearing and then filed an initial order concluding that the provider owned by the electric utility was not receiving a crosssubsidy in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-52-402 (2005). After the initial order became final, the private provider filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 12 petition for review with this court. We have concluded that the provider’s uncompensated use of the electric utility’s name is not a cross-subsidy prohibited by Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-52-402.

We granted review to address the following certified question that was reserved by Defendant, James D. Nicholson, following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine for resale: “whether the evidence seized from the defendant in this case should have been suppressed because it was seized pursuant to the warrantless arrest of the defendant for which the police had no probable cause in violation of the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article One, Section Seven of the Tennessee Constitution as well as the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State of Tennessee v. Perry Thomas Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330 (Tenn. 2002).” After being instructed to “hold up” by a detective, Defendant turned and ran. A majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Defendant was seized when he was thereafter pursued and apprehended by officers. The intermediate court concluded that, because the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to effectuate such a seizure, the evidence flowing therefrom must be suppressed. After careful review of the record and applicable authority, we concur with the judgment rendered by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, reverse and vacate Defendant’s conviction and dismiss the charges. We also emphasize the importance of creating an adequate record for review in cases such as this one.

In this divorce case, the appellant (wife) has appealed from the final divorce decree and division of marital assets by the Circuit Court for McMinn County.

Following a search of his residence, Defendant, Raymond Griggs, was indicted on two counts.  Count one charged possession of a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver .5 grams or more, and count two charged Defendant with being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. The trial court denied the motion. A jury trial was held and Defendant was convicted of count two, convicted felon in possession of a handgun. A mistrial was declared as to count one, presumably because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which the trial court subsequently denied. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the conviction of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, and (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Joseph Granderson, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Joseph Granderson, No. 02C01-9712-CR-00466, 1998 WL 506658 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Aug. 20, 1998), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Mar. 8, 1999). Subsequently, the supreme court denied permission to appeal. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on numerous grounds. Counsel was appointed and several amended petitions were filed. After hearing evidence on the petition over the course of several months, the post-conviction court entered an order granting post-conviction relief on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to properly inform the petitioner of his potential sentence if convicted of first degree murder. The State appeals the post-conviction court’s decision. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Isaac Jones, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner Derrick L. Brown appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish his entitlement to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This workers’ compensation action arose out of an automobile accident occurring while the plaintiff was on her way to an orientation session held at a location separate from the nursing home facility at which she had been hired to work. The chancery court awarded the plaintiff 95% permanent partial disability and also ordered the defendant employer to reimburse State Farm, the insurer of the driver of the automobile, for medical payments made under the driver’s policy. The court did not order reimbursement for amounts paid by State Farm under the liability portion of the policy. On appeal, the defendant argues: 1) the plaintiff was not an employee at the time of the accident; 2) if she was an employee, the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the plaintiff’s employment; 3) the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to reimburse State Farm for medical payments made; and 4) the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant a credit for those amounts already paid by State Farm. The plaintiff appeals the finding of 95% permanent partial disability, arguing that the evidence supports a finding of permanent total disability. State Farm appeals the court’s denial of reimbursement for the amount State Farm paid under the liability provision of the policy. We accepted review before the case was heard or considered by the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. Upon due consideration, we affirm the decision of the chancery court that the plaintiff was an employee, that she was injured in the course and scope of her employment, and that she suffered 95% permanent partial disability. We also hold that the trial court correctly ordered the defendant to reimburse State Farm for the medical benefits paid while denying reimbursement for the amounts paid under the liability provision. Finally, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to a credit for the amount paid by State Farm.

On May 15, 2004, the victim, Charles Lawuary, was shot and killed in Humboldt, Tennessee in an area known as “the crossing.” A bystander was grazed by a bullet. The defendant, James L. Miller, and a co-defendant, Charles Lewis, were later arrested for the shootings. The Gibson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for criminal responsibility for first degree murder and criminal responsibility for aggravated assault. Following a jury trial held on March 21, 2005, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction and six years for the aggravated assault conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence. The defendant appeals, arguing that, the State failed to prove the venue of the crime, the trial judge failed to charge the natural and probable consequences rule to the jury, there was juror misconduct when one juror felt she was coerced into voting for a guilty verdict, and there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction. We have reviewed the record in this case and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court our findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the
employee asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the employee failed to prove a work-related injury and in dismissing her claim for workers' compensation benefits. We conclude that the evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court our findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred in failing to order the Employee to submit to a medical examination requested by the Employer, in admitting improper evidence concerning a Form C-32, Standard Form Medical Report for Industrial Injuries (C-32) submitted by the Employer, in failing to consider that C-32, and in awarding to the Employee 75% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole as a result of an injury sustained during the course of his employment with Norrod Builders, Inc. We conclude that the trial court committed no error and the evidence presented does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge. In accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(2), the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Frank Peake, III, was convicted of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to prison for six years as a Range II offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to testify about a prior threat made by the Defendant; (2) the trial court erred by failing to provide a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence and failing to provide a limiting jury instruction as to the prior threat made by the Defendant; and (3) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of attempted first degree murder. The Petitioner was sentenced to life plus an additional fifty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that, because his trial counsel was ineffective, the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court our findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the
employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding the employee had sustained a compensable injury during the course of her employment with Calsonic Yorozu Corporation and in awarding the
employee 44% permanent partial disability. We conclude that the evidence presented does not
preponderate against the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Tenn.

The issues presented in this appeal are whether the trial court erred in dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint based on the doctrine of prior suit pending, and its determination that the Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim for unliquidated damages for personal injuries. We hold that the doctrine of prior suit pending is not applicable in this case, because Plaintiff’s claims in this case involve neither the same parties nor subject matter identical to that in the prior lawsuit filed in Probate Court, and because the Probate Court would not have had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims filed in Chancery Court, had they been raised there. We further hold that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Flowers v. Dyer County, 830 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1992) and its progeny, the Chancery Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for unliquidated damages for personal injuries, and we instruct the Chancery Court to transfer this claim to Circuit Court.

The petitioner, Courtney Catrell Goss, appeals t 1 he Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to rape and the resulting twelve-year sentence.  He contends that he did not plead guilty voluntarily and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Allan Joseph Robles, was convicted by a Henry County jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a 100% violent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction and fined $10,000. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in not granting his motion for acquittal; and (3) the trial court erred in not charging a lesser-included offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.