APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The Plaintiff asserted gradually occurring back problems coupled with arm
injuries, long subsisting. Her treating physician diagnosed degenerative disc disease, aggravated by the duties of her job. An independent medical examiner, and another physician, disagreed, finding no organic basis for her complaints, which implicated malingering.

The petitioner, Paul Wilson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that prior judgments used to enhance his 2005 aggravated robbery sentence were illegal and void. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioner, Eddie Wayne Gordon, appeals the Gibson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to first degree murder and resulting life sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment that the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel. However, because the post-conviction court failed to address the issue of whether the petitioner pled guilty voluntarily, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The State appeals the suppression of evidence by the Hardin County Circuit Court. Following his arrest for driving while intoxicated, the Defendant, Randy C. White, stated to the arresting officer that he was the driver of the vehicle. The trial court found that the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. After review we conclude that, although the statement was made while White was in custody, it was not made in response to police interrogation. Thus, Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s suppression of the statement and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We granted these appeals to determine whether a post-conviction trial court has the authority to consider petitions that are filed by the Post-Conviction Defender but are not verified under oath or signed by the petitioners. In Holton v. State, the post-conviction trial court entered an order staying Holton’s execution, appointing counsel, and requiring Holton to meet with counsel and a court appointed mental health expert. In Reid v. State, the post-conviction trial court entered an order staying Reid’s execution, appointing counsel, and staying the post-conviction proceedings. In both cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied the State’s application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. After reviewing the records and applicable authority, however, we conclude that the post-conviction trial courts did not have the authority to consider the petitions because they had not been signed or verified under oath and because the Post-Conviction Defender did not establish a proper basis to initiate the proceedings as “next friend.” Accordingly, the post-conviction trial courts’ orders are vacated, and the petitions are dismissed.

My colleagues conclude that, under the facts of this case, the appellant’s act of urinating in the patrol car constitutes vandalism. I respectfully disagree.

The appellant, Shane M. McAnally, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of misdemeanor vandalism and was sentenced to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with sixty days to be served in confinement. On appeal, McAnally raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) whether the sixty-day period of confinement is excessive. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support McAnally’s conviction for vandalism, and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of his complaint for malicious prosecution against three officials at Tennessee State University. A former student of Plaintiff, a professor at Tennessee State University, filed a complaint with the Affirmative Action Officer at TSU, alleging sexual harassment by Plaintiff in the fall of 1990. Following a series of administrative proceedings within the university, Plaintiff was found to have violated its policy on sexual harassment and its standards of professional conduct and responsibility for which his employment was terminated. Plaintiff then filed a Petition for Review with the Chancery Court and successfully appealed his termination. As a consequence, his employment was reinstated. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action against three university officials who participated in the proceedings that led to his termination, asserting they lacked probable cause. We have determined the defendants never brought a lawsuit or judicial proceeding against Plaintiff, an essential element to a cause of action for malicious prosecution, and thus affirm the summary dismissal of the complaint.

The issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice, on its own motion, a lawsuit alleging legal malpractice in which a summons was issued but never served on the defendant, and not reissued within one year. After careful review, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, John W. Casey, pled guilty in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court to possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received a total effective sentence of eight years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employee has appealed the findings of the trial court, which determined that the Employee's claim was not compensable because she failed to establish a causal connection between her cervical injury and her employment. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish causation. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, James C. Johnson, was convicted of rape of a child, and he received a twenty-year sentence. Subsequently, he filed for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the Tennessee Department of Correction impermissibly changed his release eligibility from thirty percent to one hundred percent, his sentence is void because of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and his sentence is void because the State failed to file a notice of enhancement prior to trial.  The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The community corrections sentence of the defendant, Kathy E. Cooper, was revoked after a new law violation of driving under the influence, and the trial court resentenced her to serve twelve years, the maximum in the range, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court inappropriately enhanced her sentence and revoked her community corrections sentence. Upon review, we conclude that facts which develop between the time a defendant is sentenced to community corrections and the time the sentence is revoked may be considered in applying enhancement factors and increasing a sentence.

The defendant in this case was indicted on a single count of felony murder committed during the perpetration of arson. Under the felony murder rule, criminal liability for the murder is imposed based on the culpability required for the underlying felony without separate proof of any culpability with regard to the death. As our supreme court stated in Farmer v. State, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn. 1956), “it is not necessary that the State prove an intention to kill, or that it was committed willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and with malice aforethought.”

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employer has appealed the findings of the trial court, which determined that the Employee is entitled to recover permanent partial disability of 55% apportioned to the body as a whole. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Employer the right to obtain an independent medical evaluation, and, under the facts of this case, that decision was so prejudicial that it constitutes reversible error. We remand the case to allow the Employer to obtain an independent medical evaluation and for retrial.

The petitioner, Rickie Boyd, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Thomas Richardson, Jr., appeals his conviction for first degree felony murder. In support of his appeal, the defendant presents three issues: (a) The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (b) Two photographs of the victim were improperly admitted; and (c) Hearsay statements were improperly admitted.

This appeal involves a default judgment in a paternity action. The trial court granted a default judgment against the defendant even though the defendant had not received his five days’ notice as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55. Citing other grounds, the defendant moved to set aside the judgment, but the trial court denied the motion. Upon review of the record, it is our determination that the default judgment must be vacated and this case remanded for further proceedings.

Broderick Autry (“Plaintiff”) sued Charles Boston, Jr. and Corrine Boston (“Defendants”) claiming that Defendants had contracted to sell Plaintiff real property located at 2512 Ocoee Street in Chattanooga, Tennessee (“the Property”) and had breached the contract. Defendants raised, among other things, a statute of frauds defense under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101. After a bench trial, the Trial Court held, inter alia, that Plaintiff had a valid contract for the purchase of the Property, and ordered Defendants to execute and deliver a warranty deed for the Property to Plaintiff within thirty days of the payment of the balance due by Plaintiff. Defendants appeal to this Court. We affirm by holding that although the writing produced as evidence of the contract does not satisfy the statute of frauds, Defendants are estopped from denying the existence and enforceability of the contract.

The Appellant, David Jones Milton, was convicted by a Carroll County jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to a term of fifteen years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Milton raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

These appeals find their genesis in a collision between a Georgia school bus and a CSX freight train in Polk County, Tennessee, just north of the Georgia state line. As a result of the collision, three children were killed and four others on the bus were injured. All of the children were minors. Three wrongful death actions and three personal injury actions – as well as other actions not involved in this appeal – were filed in the trial court. The cases before us named as defendants, Rhonda Cloer, the driver of the bus; the Murray County [Georgia] School District (“the School District”); and other entities. Regarding two of the wrongful death claims against the School District, the trial court held that the claims were barred by the personal injury one-year statute of limitations. As to all of the claims arising out of the collision, the trial court held that the School District’s liability could not exceed $300,000, the total amount of the coverage for one incident under the School District’s vehicle liability policy. We affirm.

The parties were divorced in October of 1999. The final decree of divorce incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement which provided a formula for establishing the father’s child support obligation. The father subsequently filed a petition to modify his child support obligation, which culminated in the entry of a consent order incorporating a permanent parenting plan utilizing essentially the same formula for establishing the father’s child support obligation found in the marital dissolution agreement. Shortly thereafter, father retained new counsel and filed another petition to modify his child support obligation seeking to have it set at $2,100 a month pursuant to the child support guidelines. In response, the mother filed a motion to dismiss the petition for, among other reasons, failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At a hearing on the mother’s motion, the father presented several exhibits which were considered by the trial court, thereby converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed the father’s petition for, among other reasons, failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.  The father timely filed an appeal to this Court. On appeal, the mother requests her attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal. We affirm the trial court’s decision, and we remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an order awarding the mother her reasonable attorney’s fees.

James Torrence and J.T. Lemons (“the plaintiffs”) were lessees of a four-acre tract of land in Polk County. During the original term of the lease, their lessor transferred acreage, which includes the
four acres under lease, to a family partnership, The Higgins Family Limited Partnership (“the Higgins Family”). During an extended term of the plaintiffs’ lease, the Higgins Family, without the consent or knowledge of the plaintiffs, granted Hunter Properties Inc., an option to purchase a 370-acre tract – which includes the four acres – for $1,350,000. Upon subsequent written notice of the option to the plaintiffs by the Higgins Family, the lessees attempted to exercise a right of first refusal set forth in their lease. The right of first refusal provides that “[s]hould the Landlord, during the lease term, or any extended term, elect to sell all or any portion of the Leased Property, the Tenant shall have the right of first refusal to meet any bona fide offer of sale on the same terms and conditions of such offer.” The plaintiffs assert that the right of first refusal extends to the entire 370-acre tract. The Higgins Family refused to sell the lessees the property and this suit followed. The trial court held that the lessees had properly exercised their right of first refusal and were entitled to purchase the property for $1,350,000. Hunter Properties filed a notice of appeal and all parties raise issues. We affirm.

Plaintiffs applied to rezone their 1.74 acre tract of land located at 6815 Ringgold Road from R-1 Residential District to C-2 General Commercial District. The Chattanooga-Hamilton County Regional Planning Commission recommended that the Mayor and City Council of East Ridge deny the petition for rezoning. After a hearing, the City Council voted to deny the application. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, asserting that the City Council erred by declining to grant the rezoning request. Following a hearing, the trial court upheld the decision of the City Council, finding that the City Council had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting the rezoning application. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur with the results of the court’s opinion in this case. However, I write separately to emphasize a point regarding the valuation of marital property that is only briefly addressed in the court’s opinion.