APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Brian Lee Cable, was convicted by a Blount County jury of two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; two counts of theft over $10,000, a Class C felony; two counts of burglary, a Class D felony; and four counts of theft over $1000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to three years for each of the Class C felonies and two years for each of the Class D felonies, imposed fines totaling $22,000, and ordered restitution totaling almost $18,000. Finding the defendant to be an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive, the trial court ordered that all his sentences be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the aggregate length and manner of service of his sentences, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing, in ordering consecutive sentences, and in imposing excessive fines without regard to his ability to pay. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Count 8 to reflect that the sentence is to be run consecutively to the sentence in Count 7, instead of Count 6, and in Count 2 to reflect that no fine was imposed for that count.

We accepted Defendant’s interlocutory appeal in this personal injury action to determine whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, a plaintiff is required to obtain the permission of the trial court to file an amended complaint naming an additional defendant after an original defendant alleges possible fault by that nonparty. We conclude that permission to file is necessary under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. We also conclude that, under the facts of this case, Plaintiff has substantially complied with the applicable rules. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this divorce case, Appellant/Husband appeals from the trial court’s classification of certain real property as marital property. The property at issue was Husband’s separate property prior to the marriage. The property was sold to a third party during the marriage, and a deed of trust secured the balance of the purchase price. The third party defaulted in the installment payments, and Husband purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and received a trustee’s deed in his name only.  Husband asserts that the property is separate property under either T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(2)(A) or T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(2)(B). The trial court concluded that the property was marital property under T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(1)(A). We affirm.

The Defendant, Robert A. Wiley, aka Jabo, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of identity theft, violation of a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) order, and driving while license cancelled, suspended, or revoked. For these convictions, the Defendant received an effective three-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court made several errors in instructing the jury, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for identity theft, and (3) the trial court committed sentencing errors. Finding plain error, double jeopardy principles require us to vacate the Defendant’s conviction for driving while license cancelled, suspended, or revoked. The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all respects.

The petitioner, Christopher Hodge, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The juvenile court dismissed Mother’s dependency and neglect petition. Mother appealed to circuit court, which dismissed her appeal without a hearing or presentation of evidence. Mother appeals.  We vacate the order of dismissal and remand.

The Appellant, Brandon Goods, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery, resulting in concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and twenty years. On appeal, Goods raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence certain photographs of the deceased; and (2) whether the trial court’s response to a jury question during deliberations constituted reversible error.  After a review of the record, the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Bronson Wayne Coker, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to adequately investigate the case or explain the ramifications of the plea agreement and that his guilty pleas were consequently unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Alex D. Wells, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty plea was voluntarily entered and that he received the effective assistance of counsel.  Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Donna Marie Tait (“Wife”) filed for divorce from William Frank Tait (“Husband”) citing grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. The parties entered into a Permanent Parenting Plan and a Property Settlement Agreement, but reserved the issue of alimony for trial. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that Wife was not in need of additional alimony support from Husband, despite Husband’s ability to pay. Wife appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Rita Kay Vines, pled guilty to accessory after the fact, aggravated burglary, theft over $500, theft under $500, vandalism under $500, and three counts of forgery in exchange for a total effective sentence of eight years as a Range I, standard offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, we must determine whether the trial court had the authority to enforce the marital dissolution agreement signed by the parties when one of the parties repudiated its terms prior to court approval. The parties entered into and signed, in the presence of a notary public, a marital dissolution agreement. Shortly thereafter, the husband filed a complaint for divorce in which he expressed his repudiation of the agreement. The wife filed a motion to enforce the agreement as a validly executed contract. The trial court granted the husband a divorce, but enforced the terms of the marital dissolution agreement as a valid contract between the parties. The Court of Appeals overruled the trial court’s enforcement of the agreement, holding that the trial court did not have authority to enter a consent judgment because one of the parties had withdrawn his consent prior to the entry of judgment. We granted the wife’s application for permission to appeal and hold that the marital dissolution agreement was an enforceable agreement, and reinstate the opinion of the trial court.

The appellant, Donald Williams, Jr., was indicted on one count of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary and arson. After a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty of second degree murder, two counts of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed life sentences for the two felony murder convictions, a twenty-five year sentence for the second degree murder conviction, a twenty-five year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and a twelve-year sentence for the especially aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred: (1) by refusing to grant a continuance; (2) by refusing to allow the appellant to question Officer Robert Shemwell about a potentially exculpatory witness; and (3) by admitting an excessively graphic photograph of the victim. The appellant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.  Because the judgment forms do not reflect whether the sentences were imposed concurrently or merged for an effective life sentence, we remand the matter to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that the convictions for felony murder and second degree murder are merged into one count of felony murder for an effective life sentence. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s appeal of the Collierville Municipal Planning Commission’s denial of Appellant’s subdivision application as barred by the statute of limitations. We reverse, vacate the order of dismissal, and remand.

A Marshall County Circuit Court jury found the defendant, Timmy Lee Hill, guilty of possession with intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, possession with intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court merged the possession with intent to deliver conviction into the possession with intent to sell conviction and imposed an eighteen-year sentence for the possession conviction and a sixty-day sentence for the evading arrest conviction to be served consecutively as a Range II, multiple offender in confinement. The defendant appeals, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession with intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court found that the defendant, Jamie L. Bailey, was competent to stand trial and he pled guilty to three counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences, reserving as a certified question of law whether the trial court was correct in its competency determination. He then filed a pro se motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty, and defense counsel filed a notice of appeal as to the certified question. Pending the outcome of his appeal, the trial court held in abeyance the pro se motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty. Before considering the  appeal as to the certified question, this court remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination as to the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty. Following the remand, the defendant withdrew his motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty, and this court then considered his appeal as to the certified question. Following our review, we conclude that this appeal does not properly present a certified question because, even if resolved in favor of the defendant, it would result only in remand to the trial court for further determinations. Accordingly, this court does not have jurisdiction as to the matter and the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Albert Evans, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court merged the first degree felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction, for which the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, and sentenced the defendant to twenty-four years as a Range I, standard offender for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to be served consecutively to the life sentence without parole. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in (a) admitting an exhibit, (b) in allowing the defendant’s spouse to testify in violation of the marital privilege, and (c) in allowing the State to “proffer the contents of a prior statement” of a witness “as substantive evidence under the guise of impeaching” the witness with a prior inconsistent statement; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Stephen E. Miles, appeals the Weakley County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to six counts of aggravated robbery, one count of theft of property greater than ten thousand dollars but less than sixty thousand dollars, and the resulting effective sentence of eighteen years in confinement. He contends (1) that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) that his guilty pleas were involuntary; (3) that the State failed to turn over evidence to the defense as required by Rule 16, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (4) that his confession to police was involuntary. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “Stanfort had sufficient actual knowledge of its injury no later than January 13, 2000.” I also agree that the second amended counterclaim cannot be saved by the relation-back doctrine found at Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03. I write separately to state my opinion that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which, if resolved in Stanfort’s favor, would support a determination that Richard Phillips and/or Robert G. Campbell & Associates, LP, are equitably estopped from relying upon the defense of the statute of limitations.

The majority has accurately stated that portion of the broad doctrine of equitable estoppel applicable to the facts of this case: 

Statements or conduct that support an estoppel claim include representations, made prior to the expiration of the limitations period, that the defendant either would not assert a statute of limitations defense or that the dispute would be amicably resolved without filing suit. 

Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 633 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). I agree that the affidavit of Terry Fortner, Stanfort’s principal, along with the July 27, 1999, letter signed by Campbell and the letter of October 7, 1999, signed by Phillips, establish, for the purpose of this summary judgment analysis, certain things: first, that Fortner had been assured, in the words of the majority opinion, “that the general contractor was pursuing [Stanfort’s] claim for extra compensation” (emphasis mine); second, that Campbell recognized, in the words of the July 27, 1999, letter, that “[Stanfort] reserve[d] the right to file a claim for additional rock excavation, as provided by the contract documents;” and third, that the letter of October 7, 1999, indicated that Stanfort’s claim for compensation for extra rock excavation was “being evaluated” and that there was no contract requirement that the claim be resolved, one way or the other, “prior to the work being executed.”  My problem with the majority’s conclusion that these three documents create a genuine issue of material fact is that I find nothing in them that brings this case within the rubric of Ingram. Neither of the letters, expressly or by implication, states that a statute of limitations will not be asserted in the event a lawsuit is filed at a later date. Furthermore, there is nothing in either which could lead one to reasonably believe “that the dispute would be amicably resolved without filing suit.”  Certainly, Stanfort had reason to believe that its claim for extra compensation was being considered and might be resolved short of litigation; but this is a “far cry” from the necessary factual predicate for a reasonable belief that the claim was going to be paid without the necessity of suit being filed. 

In my judgment, the facts before the trial court, construed, as required by applicable law, in Stanfort’s favor, simply do not make out a case of equitable estoppel. I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment on the grounds the statute of limitations had run on plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, we vacate and remand.

The defendant, James David Creasy, was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell a schedule II drug (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed an eight-year sentence for the possession of methamphetamine conviction and an eleven-month and twenty-nine day sentence for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. The Range II sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell methamphetamine and (2) that the sentence is excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, Michael Keith Kennedy, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

I concur fully in the majority opinion, except for its conclusion that summary judgment was inappropriate on House’s separate claim of breach of contract against Edmondson, based on breach of the Pre-Incorporation Agreement. From this conclusion, I must dissent.

This is an appeal from a post-divorce criminal contempt proceeding. The parties were divorced by final decree in July 1999. The divorce decree incorporated the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, in which the husband agreed to pay the wife spousal support over a period of time. The husband did not make the support payments, and consequently the wife filed several motions for criminal contempt against the husband. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order reserving judgment on the issue of the husband’s criminal contempt, but requiring a non-party corporation in which the husband was a shareholder to pay to the wife a portion of the monies received by the corporation in satisfaction of the husband’s support obligation. The husband now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in holding the corporation liable for his personal debt. We dismiss the appeal, finding that it is not an appeal from a final order, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

In 1997, the Appellant, a shareholder in a Tennessee corporation, reviewed the corporation’s records and discovered that the corporation’s majority shareholder, who also served as the corporation’s president and chairman of the board of directors, had been misappropriating corporate funds for his personal use. In 1999, the Appellant filed a shareholder’s derivative action against the majority shareholder of the corporation alleging breach of fiduciary duty. In addition to his derivative claim, the Appellant also filed a direct claim against the majority shareholder for breach of a Pre-Incorporation Agreement signed by the shareholders at the corporation’s inception. The corporation appointed a one person special litigation committee to investigate the Appellant’s derivative action.  The committee determined that the majority shareholder had indeed misappropriated corporate funds. In its report to the board of directors, the committee recommended that the corporation either attempt to settle the lawsuit with the majority shareholder pursuant to terms suggested by the committee or, in the event the majority shareholder declined such terms, proceed with the litigation.  The trial court subsequently approved the report, and the corporation settled the derivative litigation.  Regarding the direct claim for breach of the Pre-Incorporation Agreement, the majority shareholder moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. The Appellant filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s decision to approve the special litigation committee’s report. We reverse the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the majority shareholder on the Appellant’s direct claim, as a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Appellant’s claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.