APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Keusi Yamba Donald, was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and possession with intent to sell or deliver more not less than one-half (½) ounce nor more than ten (10) pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve sixteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender for his conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and six years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, career offender for his conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver marijuana, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and (3) his sentence of sixteen years was excessive. After a thorough review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Commissioner granted defendants summary judgment on a medical malpractice claim. On appeal, we dismiss the case on the failure of plaintiffs to timely file notice of appeal.

The defendant, Marchello Simpson, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and nolo contendere to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to six years for each of the convictions and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences based upon a finding that he was a dangerous offender. We hold that no error occurred, and we affirm the trial court.

In a dispute over death benefits from employer, the trial court held designated beneficiary who later divorced decedent, was entitled to benefits rather than the estate.  We affirm.

We accepted this appeal to clarify whether experts testifying in legal malpractice cases must be familiar with a single, statewide professional standard of care or a standard of care for a particular locality within the state. Because we hold that a single, statewide professional standard of care exists for attorneys practicing in Tennessee, expert witnesses testifying in legal malpractice cases must be familiar with the statewide professional standard. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Timothy Hutson, the defendant, appeals his jury conviction for premeditated first degree murder.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal the defendant presents a single issue, that the evidence does not support the jury’s finding of premeditation. Our review reveals that sufficient evidence was presented, and we affirm the defendant’s judgment of conviction.

Defendant, Cory Campbell, was indicted and charged with aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve one year in the Shelby County Correctional Facility, with ninety days to be served on weekends and the remainder suspended. Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of felony reckless endangerment and that the trial court lessened the State’s burden of proof in response to the jury’s questions during deliberations. After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Robert Smith, the defendant, appeals from a Shelby County jury conviction for second degree murder (Class A felony). The defendant was sentenced to sixty years as a career violent offender.  In his sole issue the defendant maintains that the evidence does not support his conviction in that it was insufficient to prove a knowing killing. After review, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

Following a jury trial, a Shelby County trial court convicted the defendant, Frank Smith, of two counts of rape (Class B felonies). The trial court sentenced the defendant to terms of incarceration of eight years on each offense, to be served concurrently. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to sentence him to a form of alternative sentencing and specifically argues that the trial court failed to state on the record its reasons for denying an alternative sentence. The defendant failed to provide a record of his sentencing hearing and, therefore, we must presume the trial court was correct. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner, David Earl Palmer, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary and aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to five years for the aggravated burglary conviction and 25 years for the aggravated rape conviction with consecutive service for an effective sentence of 30 years. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions and sentences. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and because he was illegally sentenced. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the
employer asserts that the trial court erred in finding the employee’s injury compensable, awarding
the employee workers’ compensation benefits, and finding the employee seventy-five (75%) percent disabled as a result of her employment with National Health Corporation. The employee asserts that the trial court erred in not finding the employee totally disabled and that summary judgment should not have been granted with respect to the tort claim brought against employee’s supervisor. We conclude that the findings of the trial court should be affirmed with regard to issues relating to workers’ compensation benefits. Appellate jurisdiction with regard to the granting of summary judgment on Ms. McCall’s tort claim lies with the Court of Appeals and, pursuant to Rule 17, T. R. App. P., the cause is transferred to that court for appropriate review.

Appellant, Executrix of Decedent’s Estate, filed a request with the Probate Court of Shelby County to authorize the post-mortem transfer of real property to a limited family partnership, which was allegedly established by oral contract entered by and between the Appellant and Decedent prior
to Decedent’s death.  The United States, Appellee, disputed the Appellant’s contention that there was an oral contract to form a partnership. The trial court found that the record did not support an enforceable oral contract by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant appeals. We affirm and remand.

The appellant, X-Cell Bonding Company, appeals the order of final forfeiture declared upon the minutes of the Sullivan County Circuit Court. Because the record fails to contain a Rule 58 final judgment, the appeal is dismissed.

The State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of A.C. (“Mother”) to her three children, L.A.L.R., K.M.C., and R.S.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3). The Juvenile Court also determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Mother appeals, claiming DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. Mother also claims DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. We affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment.
 

Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Trent Starks, was convicted of first degree murder. The State sought to impose the death penalty, but the jury sentenced the Petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Petitioner argues that (1) his trial co-counsel was inadequate under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) his lead trial counsel failed to meet and communicate with him adequately in violation of the Sixth Amendment, (3) his lead trial counsel did not adequately advise him on whether to testify in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and (4) his lead trial counsel did not adequately investigate his alibi witness in violation of the Sixth Amendment. ¹ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Franklin Fitch, guilty of the first degree premeditated murder of Angela Carroll. Following a separate penalty phase, the jury found the presence of two statutory aggravating circumstances and that the aggravators outweighed any mitigating factors. The jury subsequently imposed a sentence of death. The defendant seeks review by this court of both his conviction for first degree murder and his sentence of death. He challenges:  (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, (2) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence of first degree murder, (3) the trial court’s admission of post-mortem photographs of the victim, (4) the trial court’s instruction on premeditation, (5) the prosecutor’s closing argument, (6) the sufficiency of the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance, (7) the trial court’s instruction that reckless endangerment is an offense of violence, (8) the sufficiency of the (i)(3) aggravating circumstance, (9) the trial court’s admission of victim impact testimony, (10) the trial court’s jury instruction regarding victim impact evidence, (11) the failure to charge aggravating circumstances in the indictment, and (12) the constitutionality of Tennessee’s death penalty statutes. Following our extensive review, we affirm the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder. However, we conclude that the evidence does not support application of the (i)(2) statutory aggravating circumstance. As we are unable to conclude that this error is harmless, this matter is remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Bernard M. Wallace, was convicted of possession of cocaine over point five (0.5) grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. Defendant was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in the Department of Correction for the Class B felony, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Class A misdemeanor, to be served concurrently. In this appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of a motel room; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court improperly applied the enhancement factors in determining the length of Defendant’s sentence. After a thorough review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

When read together, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (West 2003) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116(c) (2004) plainly permit the State of Tennessee to recover correctly paid medical assistance benefits from the estate of a recipient’s surviving spouse. However, I concur with the court’s conclusion that the property from which these benefits can be recovered is limited to property owned by the recipient at the time of his or her death that passed to the surviving spouse “through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.” 

Estate appeals probate court’s determination that subject estate was liable to Bureau of Tennessee for Medicaid nursing home benefits correctly provided to a pre-deceased spouse. We reverse.

The petitioner, Terry D. Brewer, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his  forty-five-year sentence stemming from his 1989 convictions for aggravated rape with pregnancy  occurring, aggravated sexual battery, and incest. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner appeals the trial court’s dismissal and refusal to appoint counsel. The petitioner contends that his sentences are void because he was improperly sentenced under the 1982 Sentencing Reform Act instead of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act. We conclude that the petition states no cognizable claim for relief, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss
this claim based on the statute of limitations. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree and
reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joseph W. Wilson, was convicted of one count of attempted second degree murder, three counts of aggravated rape, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and misdemeanor vandalism. He was sentenced to seventy-one years confinement. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. The Petitioner petitioned for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the post-conviction petition as untimely, and we affirm that judgment.

Maurice Shaw, the defendant, appeals his jury convictions for delivery and possession with intent to deliver over .5 grams of a Schedule II drug (cocaine), both offenses being Class B felonies. The defendant was sentenced as a standard offender to eleven years on each offense. The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Specifically, he contends that no drugs were found on him; that the only eyewitness lacked credibility; and that no foundation was made for identification of the defendant’s voice during the drug transaction. Our review indicates that sufficient evidence existed that the defendant did have cocaine in his possession and that the other issues were matters of credibility determination which were resolved by the jury. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.

In this appeal, S.L.B. (“Mother”) contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights to four of her five children.  Mother does not challenge the propriety of the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights as to the fifth child. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of her children.  Therefore, we affirm.

The appellant, John Wallace, was convicted of four counts of assault. As a result, the trial court sentenced him to four, concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court then placed the appellant on probation for the length of the sentence and imposed a fine of $500 for each conviction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s imposition of the $500 fine for each conviction. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in that regard. However, because the trial court improperly fined the appellant $500 for each conviction when the jury was not instructed to impose a fine and the appellant did not waive his right to a jury-imposed fine, we remand the matter to the trial court for the proper assessment of a fine.