APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner argues that his indictments were void because the applicable statute under which he was indicted did not "define the use of a deadly weapon as an element of first degree murder." Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Ryan Sandson, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a standard offender to eleven years, six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and (2) whether his sentence was excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from a custody dispute between a mother and father over their minor daughter.  In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the circuit court erred when it dismissed the appeal of two juvenile court orders denying the mother’s petition for permanent custody and the mother’s amended petition to reconsider. The mother argues that both orders were related to an original dependency and neglect proceeding that transferred custody of her minor daughter from her to the daughter’s father. The circuit court found that both orders were not related to the dependency and neglect proceedings and dismissed the mother’s appeal. Also on appeal, the mother asserts that the circuit court erred when it dismissed her appeal of the order regarding the original dependency and neglect proceedings as not being timely filed. The mother has also requested that this Court vacate the original order regarding the dependency and neglect proceedings because of several due process violations that occurred during the hearing. We dismiss the appeal of the issue requesting that we vacate the original order from the dependency and neglect proceedings and affirm the portion of the circuit court’s order dismissing the appeal of the order stemming from the original dependency and neglect proceedings. We vacate portion of the order dismissing the appeal of the two juvenile court orders filed September 24, 2004 and remand to the trial court for the entry of an order transferring the appeal of the two orders to the Court of Appeals for processing and disposition.

Connie J. Ottinger ("Plaintiff") sued Patricia E. Stooksbury ("Defendant") seeking, among other things, to quiet title to a thirty foot easement. Defendant answered the complaint and filed a counter-claim asserting, in part, that her right to use the easement is exclusive and that Plaintiff has no right to use the easement. The case was tried without a jury and the Trial Court entered a final order holding, inter alia, that Defendant is permanently enjoined from interfering with Plaintiff's right to use the easement located on Plaintiff's property. Defendant appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred by considering parol evidence and by requiring Defendant to prove her case by clear evidence. Defendant also argues that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court's finding that the original grantors did not intend to create an exclusive easement in favor of Defendant. We affirm.

The petitioner, Jeremy D. Shivers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective and that, as a result of counsel's deficient performance, his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Robert Fluellen, was convicted of one count of burglary of a building, a Class D felony. The Defendant was sentenced as a multiple offender to six years in the workhouse. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at his bench trial is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case is before us after remand by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The defendant, who was indicted on three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, pled guilty to one count of incest, a Class C felony, in exchange for a negotiated eight-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender.  On direct appeal, this court originally vacated the judgment of conviction on the grounds that incest is not a lesser-included offense of rape, without reaching the merits of the defendant’s sentencing issues.  Thomas Poston Studdard v. State, No. W2003-01210-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 370259 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2004), perm. to appeal granted (Tenn. Sept. 7, 2004). Our supreme court, however, concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to accept the defendant’s guilty plea and remanded the case to this court for consideration of the defendant’s sentencing issues. Studdard v. State, __ S.W.3d __, 2005 WL 3192279 (Tenn. 2005). Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Travis Ray Wilkins, was convicted by a Cocke County jury of aggravated burglary and theft of property over $500. As a result of these convictions, Wilkins received an effective sentence of five years. On appeal, Wilkins argues that the evidence is insufficient to support either of his convictions. After review of the record, we conclude that the evidence supports the convictions.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Letonio Swader, of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of an offense. The trial court merged the murder convictions and sentenced the appellant to life. The trial court also sentenced the appellant to ten years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and two years for the possession of a weapon conviction. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve the life and ten-year sentences concurrently and ordered that the two-year sentence be served consecutively to the other two sentences. On appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the State committed reversible error by telling potential jurors during voir dire that the punishment for first degree murder in this case was life with the possibility of parole, (2) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police, and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because there is no evidence to corroborate his statement to police that he intended to rob someone. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the State's comments during voir dire were improper but harmless error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Terry L. Tabor, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of driving under the influence ("DUI"), speeding, and failure to use headlights. As a result of Tabor's conviction for DUI, he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months service in confinement. On appeal, Tabor raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for DUI; and (2) whether the court erred in ordering him to serve six months in jail. After review, the judgment of conviction and resulting sentence are affirmed.

Vernon Frye, a defendant, appeals the grant of a post-trial motion to alter or amend the judgment for the defendant, resulting in a judgment against him of $65,000. Plaintiffs, Tom and Hazel Albert, sued Vernon Frye on a check he signed and delivered to them but stopped payment on before it was presented to the bank. Following a bench trial, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim against Vernon Frye upon the finding Plaintiffs had not proven fraud. In a post-trial motion to alter or amend, Plaintiffs contended they were entitled to relief pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-414(b) because Frye, the drawer, was obliged to pay the draft according to its terms without proof of fraud. The trial court agreed and entered a new judgment awarding damages in the amount of the check against Vernon Frye. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to amend the judgment, we affirm.

This appeal involves a legal malpractice action. When the client discovered that her attorney had failed to file a personal injury complaint before the statute of limitations ran, she filed identical legal malpractice complaints in both the Circuit Court of Dickson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. After the Montgomery County complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute, the client's former attorney moved to dismiss the Dickson County complaint on the ground of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion, and the attorney filed an application for an extraordinary appeal in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 10. We granted the application and have now determined that the trial court properly denied the attorney's motion to dismiss.

This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner, Shawn Donzell Anglin, pled guilty to and was convicted of facilitation of possession for resale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner was sentenced to ten years to be served in Community Corrections and was fined $2,000. The Petitioner filed for and was denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Tennessee Department of Correction regarding the Department’s confirmation of the prisoner as a member of a Security Threat Group.  The prisoner filed a petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225 (2005) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaratory judgment that the Department’s Security Threat Group policies and their application to him were invalid. The trial court granted the Department’s Tenn.  R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, and the prisoner has appealed. We have determined that the prisoner failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225 petitions cannot be used to challenge the Department’s internal management policies.

A repairer sold equipment at auction to enforce its lien and collect its charges for repairs. It also attempted to collect storage charges that had not been agreed to. The trial court found the repairer was not entitled to storage charges, and we agree under the facts of this case. The trial court also awarded the owner of the equipment damages for the difference in the fair market value of the equipment and the amount received at auction. We modify that award to the measure authorized by statute in the absence of a challenge to the auction procedures. The trial court found the repairer violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and we reverse that holding.

This is a claim filed against the State by a minor-decedent’s father for the wrongful death of the minor-decedent based on T.C.A. 9-8-307 (a)(1)(E) (Negligent Care, Custody and Control of Person). Claims Commissioner found that the State did not have care, custody and control of the minor child and, therefore, the Claims Commission is without jurisdiction to consider the claim.  Father appeals. We affirm.

Taxpayer insurance companies brought suit in consolidated cases for refund of franchise and excise taxes which taxpayers had paid under protest. The taxes were assessed as a result of an audit conducted by the Tennessee Department of Revenue's field audit division and covering tax years 1995 through 1998. The taxpayers assert that they are allowed to take credit against the franchise and excise taxes for the amount they actually paid in gross premiums tax plus the credit they were granted against said tax by virtue of Tennessee investments. The Commissioner asserts that they are only entitled to credit on the franchise and excise taxes for the amount of gross premiums tax actually paid. The Chancery Court of Maury County entered judgment granting taxpayers motion for summary judgment holding that the commissioner's interpretation of the statutes defeated the incentives for investment in Tennessee securities provided under the gross premiums tax statutes. The revenue commissioner appealed. Finding that Commissioner of the Department of Revenue is not estopped from assessing franchise and excise taxes against the Appellee, either by statute or by equity, and that the credit against franchise and excise taxes includes only the amount of gross premiums taxes paid and collected by the Department of Commerce and Insurance, we vacate the summary judgment granted to the Appellees and grant summary judgment for Appellant.

This appeal involves a dispute between the developers of the site of a former commercial laundry and dry cleaning plant located in a residential neighborhood and a group of neighboring residents and property owners. Following two public hearings, the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals approved a mixed-use development that included renovating two of the existing structures and constructing a new structure containing underground parking and additional retail and residential space. The neighboring property owners filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari and a writ of supersedeas in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the Board’s decision. Following a review of the record of the Board’s proceedings, the trial court upheld the Board’s decision, and the property owners appealed. We have determined that the Board followed the proper procedures and did not act arbitrarily, and that its decision is supported by material evidence.

The Petitioner, Charles Dewayne Moore, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal arises from the last of many petitions and counter-petitions by both parties to change custody of the parties' only child, to modify child support, to acquire arrearage judgments for non-paid child support, and for contempt of court. The order from which this appeal arose awarded custody of the child to the mother and dismissed the father's petition for contempt. Prior to this order, custody had been awarded to the father; however, he had not provided financial support for the child, and the child had not lived with him since the entry of the order awarding him custody. The dismissal of the father's petition was based upon the trial court's finding the father had failed to comply with the previous order he was seeking to enforce. Finding no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Tim Flood, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of four counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of 40 years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the convictions are unsupported by the evidence and that the trial court erred in refusing to allow a proposed defense witness to testify. Because the refusal to permit the defendant to call a witness was error, we reverse the convictions and remand the case.

This is a consolidation of three appeals involving three tariffs filed by BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. with the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. All three tariffs contained bundled offerings of telecommunications services and non-telecommunications services. The Consumer Advocate Division of the Office of the Attorney General was allowed to intervene in these proceedings in order to address the question of BellSouth’s obligation, under the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, to offer for resale the telecommunications services contained in the bundled offerings. The Tennessee Regulatory Authority entered orders allowing the tariffs to go into effect without the telecommunications service portions thereof being offered for resale. The Consumer Advocate appealed and the cases were consolidated for that purpose. In 2005, during the pendency of this appeal, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted T.C.A.§65-37-103 (Supp. 2005).  This statute specifically exempts retail offerings of combinations or bundles of products or services from the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. In addition, all three of the tariffs at issue in this case expired, by their own terms, during the pendency of this appeal, rendering the appeal moot. Because we do not find that these appeals fall within any of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

This is a direct appeal as of right from convictions entered on a jury verdict of guilty of two first degree premeditated murders. The jury sentenced the Defendant to life without the possibility of parole for one conviction, and he received a life sentence for the other. On appeal, the Defendant advances five arguments: (1) the state violated his equal protection rights by striking three African Americans during jury selection; (2) the court erred by admitting into evidence a photograph of one of the victims; (3) the court erred by admitting into evidence a threatening statement made by the Defendant three years prior to the date of the crimes at issue in this case; (4) the court erred by failing to declare a mistrial when the State made a statement during closing argument which was unsupported by the evidence; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdicts. We affirm the judgments of the court.

The defendant was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide and one count of driving under the influence. He pled nolo contendere to one count of vehicular homicide. The defendant was on probation for prior convictions at the time of his plea and sentencing. A subsequent warrant for violation of probation was issued for his probationary sentence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years on his vehicular homicide plea to run consecutively to his probationary terms. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court should not have ordered the vehicular homicide sentence to be served consecutively to his probationary sentence. We conclude that the trial court did not err, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The majority concludes that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to grant a mistrial. I respectfully dissent. The majority opines that trial counsel’s overreaching remarks made during his opening statement, informing the jury that it was the victim who first struck the defendant, so tilted the scales of justice as to require the granting of a mistrial for reasons of manifest necessity.  See generally Millbrooks, 819 S.W.2d at 443; Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d at 226.