APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On April 15, 1998, the Putnam County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, James Thomas Manning, on one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. The jury acquitted Defendant of attempted aggravated sexual battery and could not reach a verdict on the aggravated robbery charge. Defendant received concurrent twenty-five year sentences for each of the aggravated rape convictions, and a consecutive six year sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction, for an effective thirty-one year sentence. These sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to a prior sentence out of Sumner County being served by Defendant at the time of trial and sentencing. In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to strike expert testimony for failure to lay a proper foundation; (2) excluding evidence that the victim had pending charges for aggravated assault; (3) violating double jeopardy principles in allowing Defendant to be convicted of two counts of aggravated rape; and (4) imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff brought this action against her former employer, alleging that the defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for her pursuit of a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge and that she also failed to rebut the defendant's proffered legitimate reason for termination. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Cedric Davis aka Cedric Booker, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, including the petitioner’s reply brief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jamie Emerson New, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to eight years of incarceration. On appeal, he contends that; (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, and (2) the two child witnesses who testified against him were not competent to testify. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and the denial of alternative sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts and that the denial of alternative sentencing was justified given the defendant's lengthy history of criminal activity and the inability of probation to deter him from such conduct. Therefore, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

In this action arising from a vehicular accident, the issues presented are whether the trial court erred in allowing into evidence deposition testimony of a Defendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 32.01, and whether the amount of the jury verdict was supported by material evidence. We hold the trial court did not err in its discretionary decision to admit the deposition testimony, and that there is material evidence supporting the duly approved jury verdict. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Kristi Dance Oakes, stands charged in the Sevier County Circuit Court with one count of statutory rape. The district attorney general denied her application for pretrial diversion, an action upheld by the trial court upon certiorari review of that decision. The defendant obtained an interlocutory appeal from this court via Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Following our review, we vacate the order upholding the denial of pretrial diversion and remand the case to the trial court.

The defendant, Efrain Murillo Ramirez, who is serving an eight-year Department of Correction sentence for a Greene County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession of one-half or more grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, appeals and challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his automobile. Because the suppression issue has been waived by the failure to file a timely motion for new trial, the judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal as of right from the summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court dismissed the amended post-conviction petition because the court found the petition was not verified under oath and failed to include the factual basis upon which relief was sought. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Barnes & Robinson Co., Inc. filed this action against two related companies claiming breach of contract, failure to negotiate in good faith, and promissory estoppel. The claims arise from negotiations pursuant to two letters of intent and subsequent representations upon which Barnes & Robinson contends it relied to its detriment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending Barnes & Robinson failed to state any claims upon which relief could be granted, which the trial court granted. Barnes & Robinson appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

Pfizer, Inc. challenges the assessment of the additional rate of business tax under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B). It contends the sales in question, which were from one wholesaler to another wholesaler, were not within the definition of “wholesale sales” as the term is defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-702(a)(19), and thus not subject to the additional business tax. The State of Tennessee contends sales, whether a “sale at retail” or a “sale at wholesale,” are taxable pursuant to the percentages set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B). The facts are not disputed. Based upon a statutory interpretation, we find sales from one wholesaler to another wholesaler are not subject to the additional business tax under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-709(b)(2)(B).

A Sevier County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Bruce E. Olson, of rape of a child, a class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty years at one hundred percent in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred in not excluding the defendant's statement to police based upon the state's delay in providing him a redacted copy, and that the state violated his right to due process by withholding exculpatory evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mark Griffin, appeals from the Anderson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, through which he had challenged his conviction of first degree felony murder. On appeal, the petitioner claims that ineffective assistance of trial counsel and certain due process violations invalidate his convictions. We disagree and affirm.

The petitioner, Thomas Alvin Carter, appeals from the Monroe County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to theft over $500 but less than $1000, a Class E felony. He contends that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a custody dispute involving an eleven-year-old boy. After the parties agreed to end their marriage, the father filed a complaint for divorce in November 2001 in the Chancery Court for Cheatham County. In addition to the complaint, the father filed a marital dissolution agreement and a parenting plan designating the mother as the primary residential parent. The child remained in the mother's custody until October 2002 when the trial court awarded the father temporary custody of the child. Following a hearing in July 2003, the trial court entered an order in September 2003 declaring the parties divorced and designating the father as the primary residential parent. The mother has appealed. Despite the father's conduct following the parties' separation, we have concluded that the trial court's decision to designate him as the child's primary residential parent does not fall outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from a correct application of the governing law to the facts established by the evidence in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Three competing parties claim rights to commercially exploit performances of legendary performer Hank Williams that were recorded and broadcast by WSM Radio in the 1950s. Polygram Records, Inc., claims exclusive phonograph exploitation rights, relying on a contract Williams entered into with its predecessor in interest, MGM Records. Legacy Entertainment Group, LLC., claims rights of exploitation to the recordings under a chain of title. Williams' heirs, Hank Williams, Jr. and Jett Williams, contend neither Legacy nor Polygram have contractual rights to exploit Williams' performances embodied in the WSM recordings, and further contend the rights passed to his heirs. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims of Polygram and Legacy, finding neither own rights to exploit the recorded performances, and the rights belong to Williams' heirs. Legacy and Polygram appeal. We affirm the trial court.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mary Katherine W.B. ("Mother") and Christopher M.B. ("Father") with respect to their five minor children: Christian B. (DOB: August, 13, 1993), Nathaniel B. (DOB: August 11, 1996), Stepan B. (DOB: April 22, 1998), REanne B. (DOB: March 3, 1999), and Dolton B. (DOB: January 1, 2001). Mother and Father appeal, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings, stated to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds for termination exist in this case. We affirm the trial court's judgment terminating the parental rights of the parents but vacate one of the bases upon which the trial court relied.

The petitioner, Marshall Tidwell, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to five counts of rape and three counts of sexual battery, and he received a total effective sentence of fifty years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed in the Bledsoe County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, which dismissal the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the habeas corpus court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

This workers compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker’s Compensation
Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and
reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the
employer asserts the trial court erred in finding that the employee suffered permanent, total
disability as a result of an injury, which occurred on April 15, 1993, during the course of his
employment with Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. We conclude that the evidence presented supports the findings of the trial judge and, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated §50-6-225(e)(2), affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Marvin Rainer, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In March 2001, Petitioner was convicted in Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of misdemeanor assault, two felony counts of forgery over five hundred dollars, one count of theft over a thousand dollars, and one count of forgery over a thousand dollars. Petitioner was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor assault conviction, six years for each felony conviction of forgery over five hundred dollars, ten years for the felony conviction of theft over a thousand dollars, and ten years for the felony conviction of forgery over a thousand dollars.  According to the judgment forms, the trial court ordered the felony sentences to be served concurrently for a ten year sentence, with the misdemeanor sentence to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of ten years, eleven (11) months, and twenty-nine (29) days, with all sentences to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On October 15, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Lauderdale County Circuit Court. Petitioner alleged that his convictions were void because, inter alia, he received an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the issues raised by Petitioner were not proper subjects for habeas corpus relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Clifford A. Davis, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Humphreys County Circuit Court. Davis' revocation stems from his violation of Rule 7 of the conditions of probation which provides: "I agree to a search, without a warrant, of my person, vehicle, property, or place of residence by any Probation/Parole officer or law enforcement officer, at any time." Davis does not deny that he refused his probation officer's request to search his residence. Rather, he argues that Rule 7 is unconstitutional in that it infringes upon his Fourth Amendment rights. Finding no constitutional error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant was found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to ten days in jail for violating an Order of Protection. He appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient. We agree.

The defendant, Betty Gouge, pled guilty to one count of sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, one count of possession with intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession with the intent to sell less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. The Unicoi County Criminal Court sentenced her to eight years for each Class B felony and one year for the Class E felony to be served concurrently as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying her probation or alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but we remand case number 5337, Count 3, to the trial court for the judgment to reflect that the defendant pled guilty and was found guilty.

The defendant, Bowman Robert Russell, appeals from his Loudon County Criminal Court jury verdict resulting in a conviction of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense. The single issue on appeal is whether the convicting evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Because it is, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

Defendant, Marlon Orlando Walls, was indicted on one count of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of second degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, and found not guilty of second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and fifteen years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant's sentences to be served concurrently, and Defendant does not challenge the length or manner of service of his sentences. Defendant was granted a delayed appeal. In his appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on facilitation; (3) that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial; (4) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences rule; and (5) that the trial court erred in not allowing into evidence proof that when the victim possessed the handgun, the victim was violating the terms/conditions of his community corrections sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgments.