APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court denied Father's petition to decrease child support upon finding Father was voluntarily underemployed. It also determined Father's previous payments of child support in excess of the court ordered amount were a gift and refused to credit them to Father's subsequent arrearage. Father appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Roy Wilson, pled guilty to four (4) counts of aggravated rape, eleven (11) counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, seven (7) counts of aggravated robbery, and two (2) counts of aggravated burglary, for convictions stemming from multiple indictments. As a result of the guilty
pleas, the petitioner received a fifteen (15) year sentence for one (1) of the aggravated rape convictions that was ordered to run consecutive to all of the other convictions, which ran concurrent to each other for a total of fifteen (15) years, for a total effective sentence of thirty (30) years. The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to his guilty plea on one (1) of the aggravated rape convictions. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of the petition. Because the petitioner failed to prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that his guilty plea was involuntary, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Travis Young, was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and criminal attempt to commit second degree murder. As a result, the appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty (20) years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant appealed. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury verdict; (2) whether the trial court improperly refused to dismiss the especially aggravated kidnapping charge; and (3) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury with regard to especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authority, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Jared C. Brown, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to possession of over ten pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and he received a sentence of two years. As a condition of his plea, the appellant reserved a certified question of law regarding the validity of a search warrant. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the question is not dispositive of the appellant's case and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Aleta Renee Souder, appeals her Sullivan County effective incarcerative sentence of 18 months on her guilty-pleaded convictions for possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana for resale, a Class E felony, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and unlawful possession of a switchblade knife, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant had sought a probationary sentence or some form of alternative sentencing, which the trial court rejected. Our review of the record discloses no basis to disturb the trial court's sentencing decision, and we affirm the judgments.

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging breach of contract and tortious conduct on the part of defendants resulting in damages to plaintiff. The Trial Court granted defendants summary judgment and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a will contest. In May 2002, the decedent had a stroke at age ninety-five. She had no children, and the plaintiff nephew and the defendant niece and defendant nephew took over her care.  The three parties established a conservatorship, became co-conservators, and placed the decedent in a local nursing home. Later, the parties agreed to move the decedent to a nursing home closer to the defendants. Soon after the move, without informing the plaintiff, the defendants brought a lawyer to the decedent so that she could draft a last will and testament. In October 2003, the decedent died. The decedent’s will left her $550,000 residuary estate to the defendants, and left only two pieces of furniture to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed the instant petition to contest the will, alleging that the decedent was unduly influenced by the defendants. After a bench trial, the trial court upheld the will, concluding that the burden of proving undue influence had not been met. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the decedent received independent advice in the drafting of her will.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employee slipped and fell at work injuring her right arm. The employee’s medical expert testified she had developed reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) in her right arm as a result of her on-the-job injury.  The trial court found that she was “permanently disabled to the extent of 100% to the body as a whole.” The employer contends that the trial court erred: 1) in finding that the employee developed RSD from the fall; and 2) in awarding benefits to the body as a whole instead of to the arm, a scheduled member. The employee contends that the judgment should be modified to find that the she sustained permanent and total disability as a result of her injuries. For the reasons as set out herein, we modify the trial court’s judgment to find that the employee is entitled to a permanent partial disability award for total loss of her right arm as a scheduled member.

The defendant, Mandel Benton, who was originally charged with statutory rape, was convicted of attempted statutory rape. The trial court imposed a sentence of one hundred and eighty days to be served in the county jail. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. The judgment is affirmed.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the dismissal of a legal malpractice complaint because it was untimely and for lack of standing constituted a "favorable termination," which is a required element of a malicious prosecution cause of action. The Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim was based on a favorable termination of the legal malpractice action but granted summary judgment to one defendant after determining there was no genuine issue of material fact as to his involvement in the legal malpractice claim. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the plaintiffs' cause of action for malicious prosecution was not based on a favorable termination because the underlying legal malpractice complaint was dismissed on procedural grounds that did not reflect on the merits. Since both defendants were entitled to summary judgment, the Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part for the reasons stated in this opinion.

The Defendant, Gary Lee Silcox, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued over $1000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for criminally negligent homicide; and (2) the trial court improperly ordered that the Defendant's sentences run consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case is about subject matter jurisdiction. A professor employed by the University of Memphis filed a lawsuit in chancery court against the University, alleging claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and failure to execute a settlement agreement on his discrimination claims. The University filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear contract claims against an agency of the State of Tennessee. The trial court granted the motion, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint. We affirm in part and reverse and remand, finding that the chancery court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims for discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act.

The Appellant, James O. Martin, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Knox County Criminal Court. Martin is currently serving a twenty-two year sentence as a result of his jury conviction for aggravated arson. On appeal, Martin argues that the trial court erred "by failing to grant post-conviction relief." Specifically, he argues that his conviction was unlawfully obtained as a result of juror misconduct and bias of the juror at his trial. After review of the record, the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The petitioner, Shannon Wade Jacobs, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his 2000 jury conviction of second degree murder in the Giles County Circuit Court, for which he received a sentence of 23 years in the Department of Correction. After the post-conviction court appointed counsel for the petitioner and conducted an evidentiary hearing, the court dismissed the petition. The petitioner appeals. Upon our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Kevin Smith, was convicted of two counts of spousal rape and one count of aggravated assault, both Class C felonies. After merging the aggravated assault conviction with one of the spousal rape convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to six years for each rape conviction, to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twelve years. The issues on appeal are whether the trial court properly concluded that the defense would open the door for the victim to testify about the defendant’s prior bad acts if asked why she did not resist the assault and whether the trial court properly sentenced the defendant. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

We accepted review of this cause under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11, in order to address a question properly preserved and certified pursuant to the provisions of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 37(b)(2)(i). The question, as certified, is: Whether the consent given to search the defendant's motel room is consistent with the requirements of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Tennessee? Because we hold that during the course of a lawful traffic stop the defendant voluntarily consented to a search of her motel room, we find the trial court was correct in denying the motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of that search. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would hold that the trial court erred in not setting aside the entry of the default judgment against Mr. Orten. In my judgment the evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Orten did not intentionally fail to appear at the second Trial Management Conference, but simply forgot to appear. Entry of a default judgment against Mr. Orten is too drastic a measure in this case.

The petitioner, James Rimmer, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the issues and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Mold-Tech USA, LLC ("the Supplier") brought this action against Holley Performance Products, Inc. ("the Manufacturer") for breach of contract, seeking to recover the cost of component parts purchased by the Supplier in connection with its contract with the Manufacturer. Following a bench trial, the court found that the Manufacturer had breached the contract, and the court awarded the Supplier $79,436.87 in damages. In addition, the court awarded the Supplier prejudgment interest at the rate of 4% per annum. The Manufacturer appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding for the Supplier because the Supplier failed to comply with the pertinent provisions of the Tennessee version of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Manufacturer also contends that the Supplier is not entitled to prejudgment interest. We affirm.

This is a divorce case. The parties were declared divorced in February 2003. The divorce decree reserved issues regarding their minor child, property valuation and distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees. After a hearing on the reserved issues, the trial court granted the wife alimony and designated her the primary residential parent of their child, set child support, and distributed the marital property. The husband appealed the trial court’s decision on all of the reserved issues. We affirm the trial court’s decision, with modification on the issue of the husband’s residential parenting time.

This case involves the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff telephone customer paid a fee to the defendant telephone company to block calls to 900 numbers from being made from her phone.  Despite this, charges for 900 calls continued to appear on the customer’s bill. The customer disputed this, and the telephone company cut off her telephone service. The customer filed a claim against the telephone company in general sessions court for breach of contract and the telephone company filed a counterclaim for the unpaid charges for the 900 number calls. The general sessions court ruled in favor of the telephone company, and the customer appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court ruled in favor of the customer. The customer then filed a separate lawsuit against the telephone company in chancery court, seeking injunctive relief to require the telephone company to reinstate her telephone service. The telephone company answered, and later sought to amend its answer to plead the defense of res judicata. The chancery court refused to allow amendment of the answer to assert the defense. The chancery court then ruled in favor of the telephone customer. The telephone company appeals, asserting that the chancery court erred in not allowing amendment of its answer to assert the defense of res judicata. We affirm, finding that the principle of res judicata did not apply and the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit amendment of the answer.

Michael E. Ingle and his wife, Melissa R. Ingle ("the plaintiffs"), purchased a house from Aaron Lilly Construction, LLC ("the defendant"). The defendant had constructed the residence and the plaintiffs were the initial purchasers. The plaintiffs began to experience problems with their home and filed suit against the defendant on several theories, including a violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"). The trial court, following a bench trial, found that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, but not under the TCPA. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of one of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. They also claim that the evidence preponderates against the amount of damages found by the trial court. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, challenge the trial court's ruling with respect to their claim under the TCPA. We affirm.

John and Christina Dolle ("Plaintiffs") entered into a contract with Fisher Builders, Inc., for the construction of a single family residence. Plaintiffs eventually obtained a judgment against Fisher Builders, Inc., for breach of contract and breach of warranty. Plaintiffs' judgment against Fishers Builders, Inc. was for $61,102, plus interest and costs. After the judgment against Fisher Builders, Inc., became final, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Marvin Fisher, the president, secretary, sole director, and sole stockholder of Fisher Builders, Inc. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that Fisher Builders, Inc., was a sham corporation, the corporate veil should be pierced, and Fisher should be held personally liable for the judgment against his corporation. The Trial Court agreed and entered a judgment against Fisher personally. We affirm.

The defendant, Thomas Allen Franks, II, was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, evading arrest, and resisting arrest. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of ten years for aggravated burglary and six years for aggravated assault. There were concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days each for misdemeanor evading arrest and resisting arrest. The effective sentence is, therefore, sixteen years. In this appeal as of right, the single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by declining to grant a continuance or other relief when the state filed notice of its intent to use impeaching convictions just before the beginning of the trial. The judgments are affirmed.

Rabia Kafozi and Audry C. Kafozi ("Plaintiffs") signed an installment sales contract to purchase real property from Windward Cove, LLC ("Defendant"). Plaintiffs made some, but not all of the payments as scheduled. Defendant declared a default and then sold the real property to another party. Plaintiffs sued Defendant seeking, among other things, either specific performance or the return of payments made by them. The case was tried and the Trial Court held, inter alia, that the installment sales contract did not set a due date and, therefore, Plaintiffs never were in default. Defendant appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in interpreting the installment sales contract. We reverse, and dismiss Plaintiffs' claims.