APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Anthony L. Harris, was found guilty by a jury of armed robbery by use of a deadly weapon and aggravated kidnapping. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of ninety years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of John William Thomas ("Plaintiff") in the amount of $190,095, of which $53,295 was for relocation expenses and increased rent. Plaintiff was injured when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Norma E. Pino-Rutkowski ("Defendant") while Defendant was backing out of a parking space. Due to his poor eyesight, Plaintiff does not have a driver's license and has to walk to work. Plaintiff claimed he was required to move much closer to work because he could no longer walk as far as he could before being injured. Plaintiff sought as part of his damages his relocation expenses and the $300 in his increased monthly rent. Defendant claims on appeal that Plaintiff was required to specifically plead these damages and because he failed to do so, that portion of the jury's verdict cannot stand. Defendant also claims the Trial Court erred when it allowed Plaintiff's granddaughter to testify and when it told the jury that "although the law in Tennessee may require insurance, you are not to consider the presence of insurance in this case." We agree with Defendant, and we vacate the judgment in its entirety and remand for a new trial.

The Appellant, Antonio Jackson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, Jackson contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that his trial attorneys were ineffective by failing to pursue an alibi defense and by failing to properly investigate and prepare the case for trial.  After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Richard E. Miller, in his capacity as an officer and director of Duncan Electric Company, Inc. ("Duncan Electric"), brought this action against the company's other directors, Bernard Stone and Greta B. Lindsay (collectively "the defendants"), alleging that they had breached certain fiduciary duties owed to him. Stone and Lindsay each moved for summary judgment on the basis that a settlement agreement and release entered into by the parties in a prior and separate lawsuit barred the plaintiff's present action. The trial court granted the defendants' motions and ordered the plaintiff to pay their attorney's fees. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.

This is a divorce proceeding in which the parties accused each other of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted both parties a divorce, and custody of the parties' child was awarded to Husband along with child support. Marital property, mostly debts, was allocated in part to Husband and in part to Wife. The trial court declined to assess attorney fees. Wife appealed claiming that she should have been granted the divorce and custody of the child. Wife also claimed that the marital debts were not allocated equitably and that she should have been awarded her attorney fees. We modify in part and affirm.

The Appellant, Frankie Donald Releford, appeals the judgment of the Sullivan County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Releford argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that the post-conviction court erred in allowing trial counsel to remain in the courtroom during the post-conviction proceeding. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Danny Worthington, appeals the judgment of the Scott County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, Worthington argues that trial counsel was ineffective for providing erroneous advice and, as a result, his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Hamblen County Criminal Court Jury convicted the defendant, Miguel Garcia, of possession of more than three hundred grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the defendant's judgment of conviction, but we modify his sentence under the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), from twenty-two years to twenty years.

In an opinion filed on January 7, 2005, this court affirmed the trial court's denial of probation but modified the defendant's sentence to comply with the requirements of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). On January 18, 2005, the state filed a petition to rehear pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39. The state asserts that this court erred by modifying the sentence because the defendant waived any challenge under Blakely and because the record was incomplete.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Ronnell Jason Leberry, of aggravated assault, extortion, especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of facilitation to commit aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-two years and six months. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on accomplice testimony; (2) he was denied a unanimous jury verdict; (3) the trial court erred by failing to recuse itself; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (5) he was denied his right to an impartial jury because certain jurors considered evidence not admitted at trial; (6) the trial court erred by failing to recuse the Assistant District Attorney General at trial; (7) he was denied the right to a fair trial because he was required to wear leg-shackles during the trial; (8) he was denied a fair trial due to the racial composition of the jury; and (9) the trial court erred by enhancing the Defendant's sentences and ordering consecutive sentencing. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm all of the Defendant's convictions. Further, we hold that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant's sentences in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and we reduce the Defendant's sentences in accordance with this opinion to an effective sentence of twenty-eight years.

The petitioner, Thomas M. McCormick, appeals as of right the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Bedford County Circuit Court. He seeks relief from his conviction for aggravated assault and sentence of twelve years as a Range III, persistent offender. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1986, Petitioner, James William Taylor, a/k/a Lutfi Shafq Talal, was convicted, following a jury trial, of receiving stolen property over the value of $200.00 and concealing stolen property under the value of $200.00. The convictions were in docket number S86300 in the Circuit Court of Williamson County. No appeal was taken from these convictions. In 1987, he was sentenced to three years for receiving stolen property and one year for concealing stolen property, with the sentences ordered to be served concurrently. However, the sentences were suspended and he was immediately placed on supervised probation for five years. In December, 1987, following the filing of a probation violation warrant, he was found to be in violation of his conditions of probation and ordered to serve thirty days in the Williamson County Workhouse, following which he would be released from custody and his probation reinstated. In June of 1991, the Circuit Court of Williamson County entered an order again finding Petitioner in violation of his probation due to convictions for burglary, robbery, and first degree murder, and revoked probation and ordered him to serve the three-year sentence consecutively to the new convictions. On April 15, 2004, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking the convictions for receiving stolen property and concealing stolen property in case number S86300. On September 14, 2004, the Circuit Court of Williamson County dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief because the three-year statute of limitations, which existed at the time of his convictions, had long since expired. Petitioner appealed from this order, and the State has filed a motion for this Court to affirm the dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding merit in the motion, we grant same and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises out of an action for damages by a commercial tenant against a landlord. After a
jury awarded the appellee the sum of $168,000 in damages, the appellee sought pre-judgment
interest, post-judgment interest, and attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded the appellee prejudgment and post-judgment interest calculated on the entire award of damages but denied the appellee’s request for an award of attorney’s fees. The appellant seeks review of the award of prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and the appellee cross appeals, seeking review of the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for any further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

The defendant, Jones Everett Travis, was indicted for Adult Driving While Impaired. On January 15, 2004, the defendant was to enter a nolo contendere plea to that charge when the district attorney’s office served notice of an Implied Consent Law violation. The parties agreed to a continuance on the Implied Consent Law violation and the defendant’s nolo contendere plea was entered. On February 10, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the Implied Consent Law violation. The trial court first denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the proceeding due to insufficient notice at the conclusion of the hearing. The trial court suspended the defendant’s driver’s license. The defendant now appeals this decision arguing that he was given insufficient notice that the district attorney’s office was going to allege an Implied Consent Law violation. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for Davidson County over a dispute regarding custodial accounts established for the benefit of a divorced couple's children. The father moved to dismiss the mother's suit on the ground that the Circuit Court for Williamson County where the divorce had been granted had jurisdiction over the claim. The trial court denied the motion but permitted the father to pursue an interlocutory appeal to this court. The parties have now filed a stipulation for an accelerated civil appeal in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App. R. 13. We granted the interlocutory appeal, and now we vacate the order denying the father's motion to dismiss, and remand the case to the trial court with directions to transfer the case to the Circuit Court for Williamson County.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Charles O. Emesibe, was convicted in count one of first degree felony murder during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the kidnapping of Ibiene A. Emesibe; in count two of first degree felony murder during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the kidnapping of Letitia Abili; in count three of first degree felony murder of Ms. Emesibe during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a burglary; in count four of first degree felony murder of Ms. Abili during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a burglary; in count five of first degree premeditated murder of Ms. Emesibe; and in count six of first degree premeditated murder of Ms. Abili. The trial court merged counts one and five with count three, and counts two and six with count four. The trial court imposed life sentences for each felony murder conviction and ordered Defendant's two life sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs into evidence; (3) that the trial court erred in ruling certain statements admissible; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting court documents pertaining to Defendant's divorce into evidence; (5) that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Ms. Emesibe's attorney concerning Defendant's divorce proceedings; and (6) that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant's two life sentences to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This appeal involves a dispute between the biological father, Brett W. Woodroof, who filed a petition to establish paternity of the nine year old child, Taylor Leigh Fisher, and the stepfather, Nathan E. Fisher, with whom the child has lived since she was two years old. The trial court determined that Mr. Woodroof was the natural father and awarded him visitation rights, but did not award him custody. A review of the record indicates that Mr. Woodroof asked for custody initially in his petition to determine parentage, but subsequently withdrew his request in his amended petition, and repeatedly advised the court throughout the lengthy court proceedings that spanned sixteen months that he sought only visitation with the child, and not custody. Mr. Woodroof requested custody only at the end of the trial process, after the testimony of the medical experts and other persons had been presented, and after numerous assertions in court that he was not presently seeking custody. We hold that his request for custody came too late and therefore we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for further action consistent with this opinion.

This case arises out of a will contest filed by Appellants. At trial, Appellants alleged that Appellee
unduly influenced Decedent and that Decedent’s Last Will and Testament is a product of that undue influence rendering the Will invalid. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Decedent’s Will was not the product of undue influence and dismissed the will contest. Appellants now seek review by this Court, and, for the following reasons, we affirm.
 

The unsuccessful Plaintiff, Kevin Easley, appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Larry G. and Gary H. Baker, d/b/a Legend's Bar and Grill. On appeal, Easley argues that the record presents a genuine issue of fact on the question of whether Defendants provided adequate notice of a dangerous condition. We affirm the trial court.

Monica McPeek and Melinda S. Lockhart ("Defendant") were involved in an automobile accident. Monica McPeek and her husband, Eldridge McPeek, ("Plaintiffs" or "Ms. McPeek" and "Mr. McPeek" respectively) sued Defendant. The case was tried and the jury found Ms. McPeek to be 40% at fault for the accident and Defendant 60% at fault and awarded Ms. McPeek damages of $4,000 and Mr. McPeek zero damages. Plaintiffs appeal claiming the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant an additur or a new trial after the jury refused to award loss of consortium damages to Mr. McPeek and that the Trial Court erred by allowing the introduction of certain of Ms. McPeek's medical records. We affirm.

The petitioner, Robert Ledford, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel incident to his guilty pleas for second degree murder, aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnaping and theft. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Steven Nelorn Hampton, Jr., was found guilty in count one of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and in count two of burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and one year for the burglary conviction. Following a hearing on Defendant's motion for new trial, the trial court, acting in its capacity as thirteenth juror, found that the jury's verdict of guilty on the automobile burglary charge was contrary to the weight of the evidence and set aside Defendant's conviction for this offense. The trial court denied Defendant's motion for a new trial on the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of especially aggravated robbery and the length of his sentence. After a review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellants, Kevin Dewitt Ford and Clifford Sylvester Wright, each pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to multiple counts of aggravated robbery. Appellant Ford received a total effective sentence of fifty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant Wright received a total effective sentence of forty-five years incarceration. As a condition of their pleas, the appellants attempted to reserve certified questions of law concerning the trial court's ruling on their motions to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that Appellant Wright failed to properly reserve a certified question of law. Additionally, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Appellant Ford's motions to suppress. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner, Edward Beard, pled guilty to one count of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in prison, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition
for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s petition because the Petitioner failed to submit any facts in support of his claims for relief. Finding no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court, we affirm the dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner James Beasley appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus ad testificandum. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. An appeal as of right does not exist from a denial of a petition for habeas corpus ad testificandum. Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.