APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following their divorce in 1995, Wife filed a petition for contempt against Husband in 1997, alleging Husband failed to comply with certain provisions of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Husband filed an answer and submitted his counter-petition for modification of his child support obligation based on changed circumstances. Wife, in turn, filed a motion asking the court to determine Husband’s child support obligation following his receipt of a large severance payment from his previous employer. After holding a hearing on the parties’ respective petitions, the trial court entered one order addressing the visitation of the parties’ minor daughter and another order addressing the financial issues. In the order addressing the financial issues, the trial court increased Husband’s base child support obligation, ordered Husband to pay additional child support in various amounts pursuant to the marital dissolution agreement, ordered Husband to pay additional amounts from improperly withheld taxes on the exercise of certain stock appreciation rights, and ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jeffrey Martin Reaves, of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, attempted reckless homicide, a Class E felony, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors, and that it erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Because attempted reckless homicide is not a crime in Tennessee, we vacate the defendant's conviction for that count under plain error review. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Christopher Franklin Waddell, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sumner County Criminal Court which resulted in the imposition of an effective thirty-year sentence. Under the terms of a plea agreement, Waddell pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and three counts of coercion of a witness. On appeal, Waddell argues that the trial court erred: (1) in its application of enhancing factors with respect to his aggravated assault convictions; (2) in imposing consecutive sentences; and (3) in denying an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm.

The defendant, Joseph Barajar, originally charged with premeditated first degree murder, was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court ordered a twenty-five-year sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, cites error in the admission of the evidence, and asserts that his sentence is excessive. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The sentence must be modified to twenty-two years; otherwise, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Hardeman County jury convicted the Defendant, Joe Calvin Boyce, of one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 and one count of attempted theft of property valued between $500 and $1,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a career offender, to twelve years in prison for the theft conviction and six years for the attempted theft conviction, to be served concurrently. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. On appeal, we vacate the Defendant’s six year sentence for attempted theft, and impose a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for that conviction. The Defendant’s convictions and his sentence for theft are affirmed.

This case involves judicial review of a zoning administrator's refusal to issue a certificate of compliance with all zoning laws to a newly-constructed hotel. We reverse the trial court's denial of the local government's motion to dismiss because such review is appropriate under the common law writ of certiorari, not a direct action for declaratory judgment, and the hotel owners failed to meet the exhaustion requirements prerequisite to certiorari review.

This involves the termination of parental rights. The child at issue was taken into protective custody after police raided the parents’ home and found an active methamphetamine lab. Drug charges were filed against the child’s mother and father. The father was on parole from a prior murder conviction in Illinois, and his drug-related activities were a violation of his parole. As a result, the father was returned to Illinois to serve further time in prison on the prior murder conviction. The mother’s parental rights were terminated by default judgment. The father’s parental rights were terminated based on having the child in the home with a meth lab, and the father’s resulting incarceration in Illinois. The father appealed, arguing that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services did not make reasonable efforts to reunite him with his child. We affirm, finding that under the circumstances of this case, the Department of Children’s Services was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunite the father with the child.

The issues presented in this appeal are: whether the trial court properly ruled that the employer had good cause to terminate the employee; whether the trial court properly ruled that the employer was not bound by a written employment agreement with the employee through the year 2003; and whether the trial court properly ruled that the employee was not entitled to a bonus for the year 2002. We hold that the trial court's rulings were proper and so affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The threshold issue presented in this appeal is whether the Plaintiff timely filed her notice of appeal so as to give this Court jurisdiction to hear this case. The trial court entered its order granting the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on January 15, 2004. This order adjudicated all the
claims of the parties. On February 25, 2004, the Defendant filed a motion for contempt alleging nonperformance of the order by the Plaintiff. On March 19, 2004, an agreed order awarding the Defendant pre-judgment interest was entered. The Defendant had not sought pre-judgment interest
in her counter-complaint or in any subsequent pleadings. The Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on April 19, 2004. We find that the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days of entry of the judgment appealed from pursuant to Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Therefore, we dismiss this appeal because this court does not have jurisdiction to hear the issues in this appeal.

I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. In my view, the defendant was not seized when the officer directed him to "hold up." Further, the defendant's flight, coupled with his presence in an area known for drug trafficking, provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to pursue and detain him for further inquiry. That he was not a resident of the housing project, refused to provide his name or identification, and refused to provide the name of the individual he claimed to be visiting established probable cause to arrest him for trespassing.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he should have been appointed post-conviction counsel and given an evidentiary hearing. We conclude that the petitioner presents a colorable claim for relief under the more lenient standards afforded a pro se petition. Accordingly, we reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand the case to the post-conviction court for the appointment of counsel.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case was previously before the Panel in Foster v. Morrow Trucking, et al, No. W2002-0041-WC-R3-CV (Foster I). In that appeal, the Panel remanded the case to the trial court for specific findings of fact regarding the percentage of disability that would have resulted from employee’s November, 1999 injury without consideration of his pre-existing diabetic neuropathy. Upon remand the trial court fixed the permanent partial disability resulting from the November, 1999 work related injury at 50% to the body as a whole without any consideration of his pre-existing disease. As discussed below, the Panel concludes that the evidence does not preponderate against that finding and, accordingly, affirms the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant challenges his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and felony unlawful possession of a weapon. Specifically, he contends that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support the element of premeditation; 2) the trial court improperly admitted the statement made by the victim identifying the defendant as the shooter; and 3) the trial court improperly denied his request for judicial use immunity for a prospective defense witness. After careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the convictions.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to this panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The employer insists the award of 15% whole body disability is against the preponderance of the evidence since the treating physician found no impairment. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the award and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert Faulkner, was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife, Shirley Faulkner. The jury imposed a sentence of death based upon the aggravating circumstance that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more violent felonies. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (1997). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1) (2003), we designated the following issues for oral argument:¹ 1) whether the trial court improperly excluded testimony at the guilt phase regarding Faulkner’s “diminished capacity”; 2) whether the trial court committed harmful error in its instructions defining “intentionally” and “knowingly”; 3) whether the failure of the verdict form to recite that the jury found the aggravating circumstance “beyond a reasonable doubt” rendered the verdict invalid; and 4) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) (2003). Having carefully reviewed these issues and the issue of photographic evidence raised by Faulkner, we find no merit to his arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Carl Johnson, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of especially aggravated robbery, and he received a sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging numerous instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without conducting a full evidentiary hearing. The petitioner now appeals the dismissal of his petition. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. After careful review, we conclude that, under the facts presented, the defendant was seized when the officers instructed the defendant to “hold up,” pursued him on foot, and eventually apprehended him.  Moreover, we hold that the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to effectuate the stop. Therefore, we reverse the findings of the trial court, the evidence flowing from the illegal seizure is suppressed, the defendant’s conviction is vacated, and the charges are dismissed.

TThis workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to this panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee appeals the trial court’s finding of no permanent disability as being against the preponderance of the evidence and asserts error in the admission of medical evidence due to leading questions. We find the trial court did not commit harmful error in overruling objections to leading questions propounded to the medical expert. We further find that the finding of no permanent disability is against the preponderance of the evidence and fix the employee’s permanent disability at 30% to the left leg.

In this case, the Appellant, Anthony Jackson, has appealed from the trial court's order summarily dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion for the trial court's judgment to be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

HCA, Inc. appeals the action of the trial court in granting summary judgment to the insurer/
defendants based upon an “inventory exclusion” provision in the policies of insurance. We reverse
the action of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

 

The Trial Court entered Judgment for plaintiff on loan to defendant and set off the amounts of certain forged checks on defendant's accounts with bank against plaintiff's recovery. We affirm.

The Petitioner, William David Farrar, pled guilty to one count of burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to five years in prison, to be served consecutively to another sentence in Marshall County. The Petitioner did not perfect a direct appeal, but later filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred because his trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I concur with the outcome of the Court’s opinion. However, I am writing separately to focus on HCA. Inc.’s burden of production in response to the insurers’ motion for summary judgment and on the effect of our construction of the “inventory exclusion” clauses in HCA’s all risk insurance contracts on this burden of production.

The petitioner, Michael Dwayne Carter, pled guilty in May of 2002 to two counts of forgery, one count of felony theft, two counts of misdemeanor theft, one count of misdemeanor evading arrest and one count of burglary of a vehicle in exchange for an effective sentence of six years and acceptance into a "Drug Court" program. The trial court set a sentencing date. Prior to sentencing, the petitioner was charged with several other offenses. In October of 2002, the petitioner appeared for sentencing on the previous guilty pleas and entered guilty pleas on four additional counts of forgery. By agreement, the petitioner's sentences on the subsequent offenses were considered with the prior offenses, resulting in an effective ten-year sentence for all of the charged offenses. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.