APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Michael Dwayne Carter, pled guilty in May of 2002 to two counts of forgery, one count of felony theft, two counts of misdemeanor theft, one count of misdemeanor evading arrest and one count of burglary of a vehicle in exchange for an effective sentence of six years and acceptance into a "Drug Court" program. The trial court set a sentencing date. Prior to sentencing, the petitioner was charged with several other offenses. In October of 2002, the petitioner appeared for sentencing on the previous guilty pleas and entered guilty pleas on four additional counts of forgery. By agreement, the petitioner's sentences on the subsequent offenses were considered with the prior offenses, resulting in an effective ten-year sentence for all of the charged offenses. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the plaintiff/employee insists the trial court erred in disregarding the testimony of Dr. Jay Segarra, the plaintiff’s medical expert and in making a conditional award of only 10 percent to the body as a whole. The employers contend the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the opinion testimony of Dr. Segarra because Dr. Segarra is not licensed in Tennessee and because the doctor committed a crime by providing medical service to the plaintiff in Tennessee. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the trial court committed no reversible error and that the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court.

Following the death of their premature daughter, the mother and father filed a medical malpractice
lawsuit against several defendants, including the mother’s treating physician. The trial court granted the doctor’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm since our supreme court has expressly stated that Tennessee does not recognize a cause of action for loss of chance.
 

The appellant, Ralph E. Scates, pled guilty to two counts of theft, attempted misdemeanor theft, and simple possession of marijuana. He was placed on unsupervised probation for eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days. In January of 2004, the appellant filed a petition to expunge and seal records in both the cases in which he pled guilty and in previous cases, including several that had been dismissed or in which the grand jury had not returned a true bill. The trial court dismissed the petition. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s dismissal of the petition. Because the trial court properly denied the petition for expungement as to the cases which resulted in convictions, we affirm that portion of the trial court’s judgment. Because the trial court improperly denied expungement of the records relating to cases which were dismissed or where a no true bill was returned by the grand jury, we remand the case to the trial court for expungement of those records. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the trial court.

Convicted of five counts of selling marijuana, the defendant, Linda H. Overholt, appeals and challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the prosecutor's trial conduct, various evidentiary rulings of the trial court, the denial of judicial diversion, and the trial court's sentencing determinations. Because the record supports the judgments of the trial court, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

Appellant, Stacy Dewayne Ramsey, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for first degree murder and sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The petition was timely filed. Approximately two months after the petition was filed, the post-conviction court entered an order summarily dismissing the petition without a hearing. Appellant has appealed from this order, and the State concedes that the matter should be reversed and remanded for proceedings in accordance with Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We agree and accordingly, reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for proceedings in accordance with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

Plaintiffs' action for damages against defendant was dismissed by summary judgment on grounds that "fringe benefits" provided by defendant was plaintiff's exclusive remedy. We vacate the summary judgment.

The Trial Court’s classification, evaluation and division of marital property was appealed by the
husband. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This is a divorce case involving an invalid marriage resulting from the existence of a subsisting previous marriage at the time of the parties' marriage ceremony in 1995. At the time of the parties' marriage ceremony, the purported wife's divorce from a previous marriage was still pending. The wife's divorce from her prior marriage did not become final until three and one-half months following the parties' marriage ceremony. The parties lived together as husband and wife until the wife filed for divorce in 2003. The trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to section 36-4-101(2) of the Tennessee Code. The trial court then classified the parties' "marital" and separate property, making an equitable division of the "marital" property. The husband appeals the trial court's order granting a divorce and awarding certain property to the wife. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of probation. The defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of possession of marijuana for resale and agreed to a six-year sentence as a Range I offender. Following a hearing to determine the manner of service, the trial court denied probation and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Upon careful review, we affirm the trial court's denial of probation; however, we remand the matter for the limited purpose of entry of a corrected judgment.

This is a divorce action. The trial court designated Wife as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarded Husband visitation. It also awarded wife alimony of $415 per month for 16 years. Husband appeals. We affirm designation of Wife as the primary residential
parent and the award of visitation to Husband. We modify the alimony award to an award of rehabilitative alimony of $415 per month for a period of five years.

The petitioner, Ronnie Weddle, appeals the dismissal by the Madison County Circuit Court of his petitions for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in connection with a previously negotiated plea agreement that disposed of two narcotics-related offenses. Upon review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Kenny Lynn Evans, appeals the dismissal by the Dyer County Circuit Court of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant filed an ex parte petition for name change, but failed to pay a portion of the filing fee (20%). The petition was dismissed. We affirm.

The Appellant, Shamain Johnson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Johnson collaterally challenges his convictions for class B felony possession of cocaine and two counts of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, class E felonies. In support of his arguments, Johnson contends that: (1) his community corrections sentences, resulting from these convictions, were not statutorily authorized; (2) his plea agreement, with regard to his convictions for sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, "constitutes a plea to a non-existent offense and is therefore void;" and (3) his guilty pleas to the offenses were not knowingly or voluntarily entered. After review, we affirm the dismissal.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the trial court imposed a sentence which was illegal and void because it was ex post facto; that trial counsel was ineffective; and that his pleas of guilty were not voluntary and knowing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking review of the department’s disciplinary proceedings. The
petitioner, a prisoner, was disciplined for abuse of his telephone privileges. He appealed the
disciplinary charges against him through the administrative process, with no success. He then filed the petition for certiorari in the trial court below, seeking review of the adverse administrative
decisions against him. The trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari, because it was not verified and it did not allege that it was the first application for the writ as required under T.C.A. § 27-8-106. The petitioner now appeals that decision. We affirm.
 

This appeal arises out of a claim filed against Decedent’s estate by the Bureau of TennCare.
Decedent’s estate filed an exception to the claim arguing that such claim was barred because
Decedent was not provided with notice of the State of Tennessee’s recovery provisions as required by section 71-5-118(l) of the Tennessee Code. The trial court found that the Bureau of TennCare’s claim was barred on the basis that no written notice of the State’s recovery provisions was provided to Decedent or his family members. The Bureau of TennCare brought the instant appeal to this Court, and, for the following reasons, we reverse.
 

The defendant, Detrick Cole, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. The jury imposed a sentence of death upon finding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been previously convicted of “one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person,” and that this aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant appealed, challenging his conviction and sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The case was docketed in this Court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1). After considering the briefs and the record, this Court entered an order requesting that the parties address at oral argument the following four issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial court required the defendant to submit to fingerprinting in the presence of the jury; (3) whether, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the jury rather than the judge must determine whether the statutory elements of prior convictions used to support the (i)(2)aggravating circumstance involve the use of violence to the person; and (4) whether the factors for mandatory review in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206 (c)(1) require reversal of the sentence of death. After carefully and thoroughly considering the issues in light of the record and the relevant authority, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

This case involves the timeliness of an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff utility company sued the defendant building owner in General Sessions Court for past due utility payments. On July 28, 2003, the General Sessions Court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On August 1, 2003, the defendant filed a petition to rehear, seeking to have the judgment set aside. On August 6, 2003, the General Sessions Court denied the petition to rehear. On August 18, 2003, the defendant filed a notice of appeal for a de novo review in Circuit Court. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal on the basis that it was not filed within ten days of the final General Sessions judgment entered on July 28, 2003. The defendant now appeals that decision, arguing that the ten-day time limitation was tolled by his General Sessions petition to rehear. We affirm, concluding that the time limitation for filing an appeal to Circuit Court is not tolled by a petition to rehear filed in General Sessions, because no statute grants the General Sessions Court authority to hear such a petition to rehear.
 

The Petitioner, Darron Clayton, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to show either that his sentence has expired or that the trial court was without jurisdiction, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Plaintiff appeals the denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(3) motion by which he sought to be relieved from a final judgment that dismissed his complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff argues that the order dismissing his action was "void" because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss his action. We affirm.

The trial court found that Defendant, Frank D. Grundy, violated the terms of his eight-year community corrections sentence. It ordered him to serve one year "day for day" in the county jail before serving the remainder of his community corrections sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court's imposition of "day for day" sentencing was improper. We conclude the trial court imposed an illegal sentence and remand for entry of an appropriate amended order.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the doctrine of parental immunity bars recovery when a son is injured at his father’s place of employment. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in creating a bright-line rule prohibiting the application of the doctrine of parental immunity when the injury resulted from employment-related activities. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we hold that the motion for summary judgment was improperly granted by the trial court. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this respect and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.