APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Leslie Carl Clark, pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, violation of the implied consent law and driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense, said sentences to be served concurrently in the local workhouse. It is from this order that the Defendant appeals. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father to their children. After a hearing, the Lauderdale County Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s parental rights over W.N. and C.N. on the grounds of abandonment for failure to support and severe child abuse. Further, the trial court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. Mother now seeks review by this Court, and we affirm.
 

The Petitioner, Miko T. Burl, was convicted of aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the Petitioner’s aggravated assault conviction, but affirmed all of the Petitioner’s other convictions. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because the Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective.  Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Harry Jamieson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the  ial court. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the appellant’s sentence for aggravated robbery to eight years and the sentences for aggravated assault to three years each, for an effective sentence of eight years incarceration. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a child custody case. Father/Appellant appeals from the trial court's Order, which denied Father/Appellant's Petition to change custody from the minor children’s Mother to Father. Finding that there is not a material change in circumstances to warrant a change of custody, we affirm.
 

The Defendant, Romelus Caraway, was indicted for felony Escape. A Shelby County Jury convicted the Defendant of the indicted offense, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years, after it determined the Defendant was a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied him a new trial because: (1) the indictment against the Defendant was fatally defective and the trial court allowed the State to use this defective indictment to prove essential elements of the offense for which he was charged; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Steven Frederick Brinkley ¹, was convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant ("DUI"), second offense, and violation of the implied consent law. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI because: (1) he was not in "physical control" of his vehicle; and (2) the parking lot where his vehicle was located was not a premises frequented by the public at large. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lisa Karen Stowers Hoffer, formerly Smith ("Mother"), filed a petition against her former husband, Mark Edward Smith ("Father"), seeking to modify the provisions of the parties' judgment of divorce, which judgment required Father to pay $1,200 per month in child support. The trial court, finding that, in the most recent three years, Father had had an average annual income of $117,238, held that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying an order requiring Father to pay child support of $2,803 per month. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its calculation of his income. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

This appeal involves the court's authority to order a parent to pay support for an adult disabled child. The parties were married with two severely disabled adult sons. In 1995, while the parties were still married, the probate court established them as co-conservators for their sons. In June 2001, the mother filed a petition for divorce in circuit court. Neither party informed the divorce court of the conservatorships that had been established for their sons. The circuit court entered a final decree of divorce which incorporated a parenting plan, submitted by the father, which provided for joint custody of the sons. The divorce decree required the mother to pay child support to the father. The divorce decree was not appealed. The mother later filed a motion requesting that the decree requiring her to pay child support be vacated pursuant to Rule 60.02(3), asserting that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to require her to pay support for the adult sons. Rather than rule on the mother's motion, the divorce court transferred the case to the probate court, which had before it the conservatorship actions. The father then filed a motion in the probate court asking it to confirm the divorce decree entered by the divorce court. The probate court, in the same order, denied the mother's motion to vacate and granted the father's motion to confirm the decree adopting the parenting plan, determining that the divorce decree entered by the divorce court was valid. The mother now appeals that order. We reverse, concluding that the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order the parent to pay support for the adult disabled children, but finding that the probate court is permitted to consider requiring the parents to pay support in the context of the conservatorship proceedings.

This is a zoning case. The appellant landowner owns a tract of land that it sought to resume using as a sanitary landfill. The appellees are the newly-incorporated town in which the landfill is located and the town’s zoning board. In 1996, the landowner and the county in which the town and landfill are located resolved a dispute in which the landfill was deemed a legally permitted nonconforming use under the county zoning ordinance. In 2002, the landowner sought a building permit from the town planning commission. The town planning commission refused to grant the permit until the landowner obtained a determination from the town zoning board that the landfill was a legally permitted non-conforming use under the town’s newly-enacted zoning ordinances. The town zoning board determined that the landfill was not a legally permitted nonconforming use under the town zoning ordinances because the landowner had discontinued its nonconforming use of the landfill for longer than one year. Consequently, no permit was issued. The landowner unsuccessfully appealed the ruling to the town zoning appeals board. The landowner then appealed the decision of the zoning appeals board to the trial court. The trial court affirmed the ruling of the zoning appeals board. We affirm, finding that the use of the property as a landfill had been discontinued for more than one year and thus the landfill did not fall within the nonconforming use exception to the town’s zoning ordinance.

This case involves the construction of a will. The will established a trust for the benefit of the decedent's children that provided income for eleven years. At the end of the eleven year term, the trust was to be terminated and the trust assets distributed to the beneficiaries. During the eleven-year term, one of the decedent's children died, leaving no spouse, children or surviving parent. The beneficiary under the deceased child's will sued, seeking that child's share of the trust assets. At issue was whether the trust assets vested in the beneficiaries when the testator died or when the trust terminated. The probate court held that the decedent intended for the trust corpus not to vest in the beneficiaries until the trust terminated, and that the beneficiary under the child's will would not receive her share of the trust assets. We affirm, finding that the language of the will indicates that the testator intended for the corpus of the trust to vest when the trust terminated.

Plaintiff sued for breach of employment contract. The Trial Court found a breach and awarded damages. On appeal we hold the employer had just cause to terminate, and reverse Judgment.

The appellant, John Whatley, was convicted by a jury in the Maury County Circuit Court of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's actions as thirteenth juror, the specificity of the indictment, the trial court's instructions regarding lesser-included offenses, the trial court's evidentiary rulings, sentencing, and the denial of his motion for new trial. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, in light of Blakely v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), we modify the appellant's sentence to eleven years.

This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm.

This appeal stems from an action filed by the State of Tennessee, in its own behalf and for the use and benefit of Hamilton County and certain municipalities ("the state"), against property owners (collectively "the defendants") who had not paid their 1998 real estate taxes. Following the entry of a default judgment as to certain property, a delinquent tax sale was conducted at which Carlton Ditto and Positive Impact, Inc. ("the purchasers") bought a parcel of land. The purchase, however, was subsequently voided because the Hamilton County Property Assessor ("the Property Assessor") inadvertently reflected someone other than the true owner on its property rolls. As a consequence of this mistake, the true owner of the property was never made a party to the delinquent tax suit. The purchasers sought compensation for interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree of sale. The purchasers also sought damages for the state's negligence. The trial court awarded interest on the bid amount and the cost of recording the decree, but refused to award damages for negligence. The state appeals. We affirm.

Forty-six year old female employee who had worked for company for seventeen years filed this action against her employer after her position and employment were terminated. She claims her termination constituted a breach of contract and violated the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The trial court dismissed the THRA claim on summary judgment as time barred, holding that the savings statute did not apply to THRA claims. The remaining contract claims were tried and resulted in judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We find that the trial court erred by holding the savings statute inapplicable to THRA claims against private employers. We also find that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the THRA. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

This is a personal injury case arising from an automobile accident. Defendant/Appellee was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and attempted to pass Plaintiffs/Appellants’ vehicle in a no pass zone as Plaintiffs/Appellants were making a left-hand turn into their driveway. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Plaintiff/Appellant driver 40% at a fault for the accident and Defendant/Appellee 60% at fault. Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal on issues of fault and damages. We affirm as modified herein.
 

The petitioner, Donald Branch, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated vehicular homicide convictions, arguing that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to cite reported criminal law cases when arguing for a jury instruction on proximate causation and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to supplement his appellate brief with State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188 (Tenn. 2001), and for failing to raise as an issue on direct appeal the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself. While the post-conviction appeal was pending, the petitioner sought and received permission to raise as an additional issue the impact of the United States Supreme Court’s Blakely v. Washington opinion on the sentencing in his case. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of demonstrating either a deficiency in counsel’s representation or resulting prejudice to his case. We further conclude that Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The appellee, Freddie William Lewis, was indicted for custodial interference after allegations arose that he moved his child to another state in violation of a juvenile court order. The appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that a default judgment taken against him in juvenile court on the paternity petition, which later formed the basis for the indictment, was void. The trial court dismissed the indictment after a hearing. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment. We determine that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment because the default judgment was not void, but merely voidable. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the indictment and remand the case for trial

This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment. We Affirm.

This is an appeal from a decree of legal separation, involving issues of division of  marital property and debt, alimony, and attorney fees. Wife appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
 

The petitioner, Byron Edwards, appeals the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish either a void judgment or an expired sentence. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in 1) awarding temporary total benefits, 2) apportioning liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, and 3) awarding 180 weeks of lump-sum benefits. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding temporary total benefits to the employee who continued to work for the employer following his injury and then later operated his own unprofitable business. We also hold that the trial court erred in limiting the employer's liability for permanent total disability benefits to 60% of 400 weeks and in awarding 180 weeks of lump sum benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.