APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Jerry Britt, entered Alford pleas in 1996 to three counts of attempted rape of a child and guilty pleas to one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver a Schedule IV controlled substance, and six counts of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, and received an effective sentence as a Range I, standard offender of forty-eight years in the Department of Correction. He appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that the trial court should have granted him relief based on newly discovered evidence, the victim's recantation testimony. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the petition.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of first degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and perjury. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for felony murder; and (2) he was denied a fair trial because an expert witness for the State did not disclose to the jury that the witness was himself the subject of a federal criminal investigation. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The mother of a three year old girl asked the court to deny the girl's father any visitation with the child because she believed that the father had sexually abused the child. The trial court did not find that the evidence conclusively proved abuse, but denied the father any visitation or other contact with his daughter, stating, "I have to side with the protection of the child." Because the trial court did not make the requisite findings to support elimination of all visitation, we must vacate the judgment.

The petitioner, Byron Edwards, appeals the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish either a void judgment or an expired sentence. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an action against an insurance company that is alleged to have breached its duties to an insured by failing to provide a defense in a prior personal injury action, wherein a substantial default judgment was entered against the insured. The former plaintiffs, now judgment creditors, and the purported insured, now judgment debtor, have joined forces as plaintiffs in this action to recover damages, including the amount of the default judgment, the purported insured suffered due to the insurer's refusal to provide a defense. The trial court dismissed the action on a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12 motion for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We affirm. The judgment on which this action is based is void, because the relief granted therein by default judgment exceeded the relief sought. In the alternative, if the previous judgment on which this action is based is valid, the purported insured is not afforded coverage; the policy excluded injury or damage expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured and it was held in the previous judgment that the purported insured intended the collision and the Alcantars' injuries.

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in 1) awarding temporary total benefits, 2) apportioning liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, and 3) awarding 180 weeks of lump-sum benefits. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding temporary total benefits to the employee who continued to work for the employer following his injury and then later operated his own unprofitable business. We also hold that the trial court erred in limiting the employer's liability for permanent total disability benefits to 60% of 400 weeks and in awarding 180 weeks of lump sum benefits. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This case involves a claim for reimbursement against an estate. A trust was established during the decedent's lifetime to pay for her needs. Before the decedent died, her husband paid for her needs, in part to preserve trust property. After her death, the husband filed a claim against the wife's estate seeking reimbursement for his payments for the healthcare and support of the wife. The trial court found that the payments were made to protect the wife's trust property, as well as for the care and support of the wife, and would have been paid by the trustee but for lack of assets, and the wife's estate was the successor-in-interest to the remaining assets of the trust. Consequently, the trial court sustained the husband's claim against the wife's estate. The wife's estate now appeals. We affirm, finding the expenses paid by husband constitute a valid claim against the wife's estate.

This case involves claims of fraud arising out of the sale of a house. The plaintiff purchasers signed a contract to buy a house owned by the defendants. The contract to sell contained an "as is" clause, allowing inspection of the property but requiring the sale to be "as is." The purchasers did not inspect the house further before the closing. After the purchasers took possession, they noticed several defects in the house that were not disclosed by the sellers. The purchasers sued the sellers, alleging that the sellers had made material misrepresentations of fact and had fraudulently concealed or failed to disclose material defects in the house. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the sellers. It concluded that, although the sellers had made material misrepresentations of fact, the purchasers' reliance on those representations was not reasonable because of the "as is" provision in the contract and because the defects were either apparent or readily discoverable. The purchasers now appeal. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion that the purchasers' reliance was not reasonable.

Plaintiffs appeal an adverse judgment from the general sessions court to the circuit  court for a trial de novo pursuant to T.C.A. § 27-5-108 (Supp. 2004). On motion of defendant, the circuit court transferred the case to the chancery court because a previous suit filed in the chancery court on the same cause of action was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff. The chancery court granted defendant’s motion to adopt the findings of the special master filed in the previous chancery court suit and then granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have appealed. We vacate and remand to the circuit court.
 

The issues in this case are whether the trial court's award of alimony to the wife was excessive because the husband's income may be diminished when he retires from his current employment and whether the trial court's award to wife for her attorney's fees and expenses was erroneous. Upon a finding that the time of the husband's retirement is uncertain and a further finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife attorney's fees and expenses, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as rendered and remand.

The issue in this case is whether an award of permanent total disability should commence when the employee reaches maximum medical improvement or on the last day that the employee is able to work due to the injury. The trial judge ordered permanent total benefits to be paid as of the day the employee last worked. The employee appealed, arguing that he was totally disabled from the time that he reached maximum medical improvement, and because he was only able to work in a limited capacity thereafter, he should be able to collect benefits for the period between his reaching maximum medical improvement and the time he ultimately stopped work. Because the employee was working during the three years at issue and because there was no evidence presented that he was unemployable in the general workforce, the evidence supports the trial court’s decision that he did  not meet the statutory definition of permanent total disability until he stopped work.

The petitioner, Orlando Crenshaw, convicted of attempted first degree murder, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for relief. He asserts that (1) the trial court erred by failing to provide jury instructions on the appropriate lesser included offenses and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to comply with the requirements of Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999), and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare him to testify at trial; (3) that the state failed to prove that the offense occurred before the return of the indictment; (4) that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by using false statements to secure the indictment and soliciting false testimony at trial; (5) that the trial court erred by providing a misleading jury instruction on the issue of criminal responsibility and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present the issue as a ground for relief on direct appeal; (6) that the trial court erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction with regard to certain of the evidence; (7) that he was denied the right to a fair trial because the same jury pool used in the trial of his co-defendant was used for his trial and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury pool; (8) that he was denied the right to a fair trial because of a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (9) that the state denied his right to a fair trial by utilizing mutually exclusive theories in his trial and that of his co-defendant. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, the conviction is set aside, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

This case comes before us on petitions for habeas corpus relief. Although several arguments are
raised on appeal, the dispositive issue presented is whether the petitioner is “imprisoned or restrained of liberty” by the challenged judgments and thus eligible to seek habeas corpus relief, when the petitioner’s sentences expired prior to filing for relief. We hold that he is not. The petitioner was convicted of numerous criminal offenses from 1986 to 1993. In 2002, the petitioner filed three pro se habeas corpus petitions challenging the validity of these convictions. The trial court dismissed the petitions. Upon appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the dismissal of the petitions was affirmed. In addition to affirming the trial court’s initial findings, the intermediate court also held that the petitioner was ineligible for habeas corpus relief because he was currently incarcerated on unrelated charges and thus had no standing to claim he was being illegally restrained by the challenged convictions. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Applying the rule recently announced in Hickman v. State, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. 2004), we hold that the petitioner is not currently "imprisoned or restrained of liberty" by the challenged convictions because they expired prior to his filing for relief; therefore, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Alonzo C. Williams, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Appellants appeal (1) a jury determination that a rock quarry, an asphalt plant, and trucking activities did not create a nuisance and (2) the allowance of discretionary costs. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute between the City of Lebanon Planning Commission and real estate developers regarding approval of a proposed subdivision. The planning commission approved the plans for the first phase of this subdivision but then disapproved the plans for the second and third phases. The developers filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Wilson County seeking judicial review of the commission's actions. The trial court granted the writ and determined that the planning commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by denying approval of the final subdivision plans. We affirm the trial court's decision.

Defendant, Amy Jo Taylor Blankenship, appealed the trial court's judgment revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Defendant, Howard Lavelle Tate, was pulled over by a Metropolitan Police Officer in Nashville, Tennessee for violating the noise ordinance. The officer asked the Defendant for consent to search the Defendant's person and the Defendant's vehicle. The Defendant replied "whatever" to both these requests. The officer found scales with a white powder residue in the Defendant's vehicle. The Defendant then fled the officer. The officer and a second officer caught the Defendant who then told the officers that they could find the drugs in his pants leg. The officers retrieved the drugs and placed the Defendant under arrest. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the warrantless searches. The trial court denied this motion. The Defendant pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, but reserved a certified question concerning whether the warrantless searches fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. The Defendant now appeals on the basis of the certified question. We find that the searches fell within an exception to the warrant requirement and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James David Alder, was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault, kidnapping, and unlawful possession of a weapon. As a result, he received an effective sentence of twenty (20) years as a multiple offender. The judgments were affirmed on appeal. See State v. James David Alder, No. M2000-01804-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1285945 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Oct. 25, 2001). In this post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner alleges that for various reasons his trial counsel was ineffective. For the following reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the post-conviction petition.

The defendant, Rose Marie Hernandez, pled guilty to seventy counts of forgery, a Class E felony, which the trial court merged into thirty-five convictions of forgery, and the trial court sentenced her as a Range III, persistent offender to five years and six months for each conviction. The trial court ordered some of the sentences to run concurrently and others to run consecutively for an effective sentence of thirty-three years and six months in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors in violation of the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and in denying alternative sentencing. Although we conclude that the sentencing procedure violated the rule announced in Blakely, we hold it to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case arises out of a petition filed by Appellants to compel the executor of Decedent’s estate to collect certain assets and a petition for declaratory judgment filed by Appellee. The trial court determined that Appellants’ motion in limine to exclude certain evidence based on the parol evidence rule should be denied. Additionally, the trial court denied Appellants’ objection to certain testimony based on the statute of frauds. The trial court further denied Appellants’ objections to exclude testimony based on the Dead Man’s Statute. The trial court determined that Decedent successfully gifted annual $10,000 sums to Appellee in the form of forgiving interest and principal owed by Appellee to Decedent as stated in a promissory note, finding there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that such transfers were advancements. Further, the court determined that such promissory note called for simple, rather than compound, interest, finding that Appellee owed Decedent’s estate the sum of $64,297.78. Appellants seek review by this Court and, for the following reasons, we affirm.
 

The defendant, Jimmy Albert Warren, indicted for second offense driving under the influence and DUI per se, filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence. The trial court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the field sobriety tests and the statements made by the defendant prior to his arrest were admissible, but that the blood alcohol content test results were not.  In this interlocutory appeal initiated by the state, each party claims that the trial court erred. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and misdemeanor theft. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed suit asserting that she was the owner by adverse possession of four acres of farmland in Maury County. Defendants, who purchased adjoining property in 2001, assert that they are by deed the true and rightful owners of the disputed parcel. The trial court ruled that Plaintiff was the owner of the property by adverse possession based on a finding that she and her predecessors in interest had possessed the property visibly, exclusively, actually, continuously, openly, and notoriously for twenty years. We affirm.

Defendant, William Cartwright, pled guilty to one count of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant received a sentence of three years as a Range I standard offender with the manner of service of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.