APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that the employee retained a 28% permanent disability to both arms. The employer asserts that the evidence presented at trial shows that the employee suffered no injury to his left arm in 2001. Additionally, the employee asserts that the amount of vocational disability awarded is inadequate. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Robert Lewis Carpenter, Jr., filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court dismissed the Defendant’s petition as barred by the statute of limitations. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Kelsey Darwin Treece, was convicted of one count of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (hydromorphone) and was sentenced to serve fifty months as a Range I offender in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2003) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court determined that the plaintiff-employee suffered a 60% vocational disability to her right upper extremity and a 30% vocational disability to her left. From these determinations, the trial court awarded a 45% disability to both hands. The defendant-employer asserts that the trial court award was excessive under the facts and applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

The Defendant, Earl David Crawford, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, James Kenneth Carroll, was convicted in the Roane County Criminal Court of driving under the influence (DUI), child endangerment, and a violation of the implied consent law. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Roane County Jail for the DUI and child endangerment convictions. For his violation of the implied consent law, the appellant's license was suspended for one year. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's actions as thirteenth juror. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Cecil Moss, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing and that it erred when it dismissed his petition. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court, we affirm its dismissal of the Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief.

Tenured elementary school teacher appeals her termination for alleged incompetence, inefficiency, insubordination, neglect of duty, and compromising the integrity of the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program (TCAP) test. The Chancery Court reversed the termination, finding that the school board’s decision to terminate teacher was arbitrary and capricious and based on no material evidence. Concluding that the Chancery Court did not err in reversing the termination, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

In this post-divorce action, the father appeals from the Trial Court's Order requiring the father to reimburse one-half of the college expenses paid by the mother, pursuant to an agreement in MDA signed by the parties. The Trial Court also ordered the father to pay the mother's attorney's fees, and held the father in contempt. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment against the father for one-half of the college expenses, but reverse the finding of contempt and the Order for attorney's fees.

On November 19, 1998, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree murder. He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. The petitioner appealed to this Court, and we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Jerry D. Carney, M1999-01139-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1335770, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Sept. 15, 2000) perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 2001). The petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied this petition. The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s decision. We affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant physician and dismissed Plaintiff’s action upon finding it was one for medical malpractice and that Plaintiff had failed to offer competent expert proof of negligence as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-115. Plaintiff appeals, asserting the trial court erred in determining the action was not one for ordinary negligence and that the alleged negligence of Defendant was not within the common knowledge exception. We affirm.

Preston Williams pleaded guilty to six crimes, for which he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and received an effective eight-year sentence. Aggrieved of the trial court’s refusal to suspend his sentence, the defendant now appeals his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the decision of the lower court.

This appeal involves a dispute over a periodic long-term spousal support award. Following a twelve-year marriage, both parties requested a divorce from the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The trial court conducted a bench trial and declared the parties divorced. The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife $350 per month in spousal support until her death or remarriage. The husband takes issue on this appeal with the spousal support award. We have determined that the wife is not entitled to long-term spousal support but is entitled to $350 per month in transitional support for three years.

In 1992, the petitioner, William T. Yelton, was found guilty by a jury of theft of property, two counts of coercion of a witness, fabricating evidence and harassment. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective twenty-one-year sentence. After his convictions in Tennessee, the petitioner was sent to Alabama presumably to serve time on a life sentence from which he had previously been paroled in that state. Six years later, the petitioner was returned to prison in Tennessee. In 2001, he filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief alleging that he was unlawfully detained on an expired/pardoned sentence. The petitioner filed a second petition in January of 2004. The trial court denied the second petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the trial court's denial of the petition for habeas corpus relief.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Sanford Barnes, of reckless endangerment, attempted rape, robbery, aggravated burglary, and assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a career offender, to an effective sentence of forty-five years for the felony convictions, plus consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the two misdemeanor convictions. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain any of his five convictions; (2) the trial court improperly classified the Defendant as a career offender; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered that the Defendant’s sentences run consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Willie Claybrook, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has not responded to the State’s motion. It appears from the record before us that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and this Court cannot conclude that justice requires that this Court waive the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Darvell S. Owens, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of the habeas corpus statutes, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant, James Gary Turner, was indicted for reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury, and driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. The State subsequently dismissed the reckless endangerment charge, and the defendant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury, a Class D felony. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of eight years for the felony evading arrest conviction and one year for the driving on a revoked license conviction, to be served consecutively to his federal sentence for a prior conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his Class D felony evading arrest conviction; the trial court erred in sentencing him to one year for the misdemeanor conviction; and the trial court imposed an excessive sentence for the felony evading arrest conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Lemar J. White, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. On appeal, White raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, he challenges the proof with regard to the element of premeditation. After review of the record, we find the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and affirm the judgment of conviction.

The Petitioner, Michael K. Kennedy, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. It appears from the record before us that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and this Court cannot conclude that justice requires that this Court waive the timely filing requirement. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the above-captioned appeal is dismissed.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). On appeal, he asserts the trial court should have given him pretrial jail credit for time served in federal prison on an unrelated federal conviction. Following our review, we affirm the sentence but remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

Wife appeals from trial court’s division of marital property and award of alimony in divorce proceeding. Wife contends the trial court made numerous errors in the classification and division of various assets and in the alimony award. Husband contends that the trial court did not err in its
division of marital property, contends that Wife can be rehabilitated, and seeks an award of rehabilitative alimony to terminate at a specific date. Husband further contends that trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Wife, and Husband seeks attorney’s fees and costs related to defending
this appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, modify in part and remand.

The appellants, Jessica Trotter-Lawson and Andrew Sheriff, pled guilty to theft of property over sixty thousand dollars. As a result of the plea agreement, each appellant received an eight-year sentence. Both appellants applied to the trial court for alternative sentencing. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the appellants to serve the entire sentence in incarceration. Both appellants filed timely notices of appeal, challenging the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. After a review, we determine that a sentence of split confinement would best serve the interests of the public and the appellants. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are reversed and remanded for entry of sentences of split confinement reflecting a period of twelve months of incarceration in the Shelby County Correctional Facility with the remainder of the eight-year sentence to be served on supervised probation.

The Appellant, Darrell Jones, Jr., appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Jones was indicted for first degree murder; however, the plea agreement permitted Jones to enter a guilty plea to the reduced charge of second degree murder. As part of the agreement, he accepted a forty-five year sentence as a Range III offender despite only meeting the statutory criteria for a Range I offender. On appeal, Jones raises the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Jones of the ramifications of pleading outside his range. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The attorney for the petitioner was held in contempt for failing to appear as ordered and failing to advise the Juvenile Court of a Chancery action. We hold the evidence does not support a finding of criminal contempt.