APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this appeal, Husband seeks to be relieved from his obligation to pay alimony in futuro to his former wife. In support of his request, Husband asserts that his former wife’s cohabitation with another man terminated his obligation since Wife was being supported by that third person and was in no need of alimony. The trial court denied Husband’s petition finding Wife was not living with a third person, had rebutted presumption that she does not need the alimony, and that no material change in circumstances had occurred to warrant modification of the initial award of alimony. We affirm those holdings. However, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Wife.
 

The Appellant, Anthony Antonio Anderson, was convicted by a Madison County jury of rape and was sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction as a violent offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Robert Walsh, appeals as of right from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Walsh was convicted in 1999 of aggravated sexual battery of a foster child who was in his care. On appeal, Walsh contends that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s cross-examination of the victim and (2) his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated by a deputy sheriff’s comments to the jury during deliberations. After review of the issues presented, the judgment is affirmed.

I concur with the results of the court’s opinion. However, I have elected to file this separate
opinion because I cannot concur with several parts of the court’s analysis.
 

The Trial Court dismissed the Complaint on a Motion filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). We vacate and remand because the Motion to Dismiss did not comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
 

The majority opinion concludes that the defendants’ motion to dismiss is deficient. I agree.
In Willis v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706 (Tenn. 2003), the Supreme Court opined that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.06(6), construed in light of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 7.02(1), requires that a motion filed pursuant to 12.06(6) must state “why the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.” Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 709 n.2 (emphasis added). For example, in the instant case, the motion should have recited, on its face, that (1) the motion was filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.06(6), and (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “in that the claim is for breach of contract but fails to reflect a promise by any of the defendants,” or words to this effect. Having said all of this, I would hasten to add that I do not believe Willis requires that we vacate the trial court’s judgment in the case at bar.

This is a divorce case. The parties were married for three years prior to their separation, and two children were born during the marriage. The mother filed a petition for divorce, and the father filed a counterclaim for divorce. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce and a parenting plan. In the plan, the father was permitted supervised visitation with the children, but was required to undergo a psychological evaluation in order to continue that visitation. The plan also provided that the children’s guardian ad litem would be the “binding arbitrator” on all matters involving the father’s visitation. The father now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in requiring him to undergo a psychological evaluation and in appointing the guardian ad litem as the arbitrator on matters involving his visitation schedule. Because the father did not properly object to the issues raised on appeal, they are deemed to be waived. Therefore, we affirm.

This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell their home and
farm to the defendant. On the scheduled closing date, the defendant refused to purchase the property. The plaintiffs sold the property to a third party for substantially less than the amount the defendant had agreed to pay. In April 2002, the plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant for breach of contract. The defendant argued that he was fraudulently induced into signing the contract, because the parties had a verbal understanding that the contract would not be enforced. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant now appeals. We affirm, finding that the defendant alleges promissory fraud, that evidence of the parties’ verbal agreement is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, and that the evidence submitted by the defendant does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding fraudulent inducement.

A jury convicted the defendant, Gdongalay P. Berry, of two counts of premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, for the murders, kidnappings and robberies of DeAngelo Lee and Gregory Ewing.¹ Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury found three aggravating circumstances in each murder: (1) that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies other than the present charge, the statutory elements of which involve the use of violence to the person;² (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit robbery or kidnapping. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (6), (7) (1996). The jury also found that these aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the jury imposed sentences of death for each of the murder convictions. As to the remaining felony convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender, and imposed an effective fifty-year sentence, to run consecutively to the death penalty.³ The defendant appealed, challenging both his convictions and the sentences of death. After fully considering the issues raised by the defendant, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences.

This case involves the breach of an employment compensation contract. Under the sales employee’s compensation plan with his employer, he was to earn extra commission for any sales that exceeded his annual quota. In the compensation plan, the employer reserved the right to pay only the standard commission on “windfall” sales. For the fiscal year at issue, the sales employee exceeded his quota. The employer invoked the windfall provision of his compensation plan and paid him only the standard commission on the sales over his quota. The sales employee sued his employer, arguing that he was entitled to the extra commission on the sales over his quota. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff sales employee. On appeal, the defendant employer argues that the “windfall provision” applies to all sales that were unbudgeted or unforecast and that the plaintiff sales employee’s excess sales fall in that category. We hold that the defendant employer’s interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the contract, and affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves a former wife’s efforts to recover damages from her former husband for misdeeds during their marriage and following their divorce. Approximately ten years after the parties’ divorce in Louisiana, the former wife filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking to recover $10,000,000 from her former husband for “eight years of trauma and distress, abuse and torture.” The former husband filed a pro se “exception” to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the former wife has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
 

In this workers' compensation case, the employer, McKee Foods Corporation, has appealed the trial court's award of 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole to the employee, Eva Mae Jefferies. The trial court's award of benefits was based on a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fifth Edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ("AMA Guidelines"), which was in effect at the time of trial. The employer's appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to a decision by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel. The employer contends in this Court that the trial court should have applied a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guidelines because the Fourth Edition was the edition in effect when the employee reached maximum medical improvement. Thus, the sole question for this Court is whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits using a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fifth Edition of the AMA Guidelines. After carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we find that in determining the extent of the employee's vocational disability, the trial court should have used a medical impairment rating calculated under the Fourth Edition of the AMA Guidelines. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Earl E. Haynes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relating to his felony murder conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Preston Young, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of probation and imposition of a two-year sentence for his jury conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Because the record is insufficient for our statutorily mandated de novo review of the sentence, we affirm.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This is an arbitration case. The plaintiff borrower executed a note in favor of the defendant bank. The note included an arbitration clause, requiring all disputes between the "Borrower(s)" and "Note Holder" to be arbitrated. The term "Note Holder" is defined in the note as the "Lender or anyone who takes [the] Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under [the] Note." The bank transferred the note and the borrower began making payments to a third party. The borrower then filed this lawsuit against the bank and others, alleging fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm, holding that under the note, the bank is no longer a "Note Holder" and therefore does not have standing to invoke the arbitration clause.

This is a sales tax case. The plaintiff owns an aluminum sheet and foil manufacturing plant. Located in the plant are two multi-ton roll grinders. In 1987, the defendant commissioner of revenue took the position that the roll grinders and roll grinder supplies were exempt from sales tax, because the roll grinders constituted "industrial machinery," which were exempt. In 1995, however, the department of revenue conducted an audit of the plaintiff and changed its position, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance," which is an exception to the industrial machinery exemption. Accordingly, the plaintiff was assessed for sales tax on roll grinder supplies purchased between 1995 and 1998. The plaintiff paid the assessment under protest and filed the instant lawsuit, seeking to recover the sales tax paid on roll grinder supplies for the audit period. The trial court upheld the decision of the department of revenue, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance." From that order, the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the roll grinders fit within the "equipment used for maintenance" exception and that, consequently, roll grinder supplies are subject to sales tax.

The issue in this case is whether the defendant’s notice of appeal was timely filed. The Court of Appeals held that it was not. We disagree. Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal was tolled until the trial court issued its decision on the defendant’s post-trial motion to alter or amend. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the merits of the defendant’s appeal.

A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, James Franklin Redden, of theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to eight years incarceration as a multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We dismiss the appeal due to the untimely filing of a notice of appeal.

The defendant, Roger C. McAnally, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Henry County Circuit Court for especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; kidnapping, a Class C felony; three counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; theft of property over $500, a Class E felony; and sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, eight years for each aggravated robbery conviction, three years for the kidnapping conviction, and three years for each aggravated burglary conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to a one-year sentence for the sexual battery conviction, for an effective twenty-one-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and kidnapping violate his due process rights because his confinement of the victims was incidental to the robberies. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a default judgment. The plaintiffs filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the defendant for intentional infliction of physical injuries. The defendant did not appear, and the plaintiffs obtained a judgment by default. The defendant appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. The circuit court set the case for trial. On the trial date, however, neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared, and the default judgment was reinstated. The defendant filed a Rule 60.02 motion to have the default judgment set aside, based on excusable neglect. The defendant's lawyer attached his own affidavit, which explained that the lawyer was in the midst of closing his law office after thirty-eight years of practice and, in the confusion, failed to put the hearing date on his calendar. The motion to set aside was denied. The defendant now appeals. We vacate and remand to the trial court to consider whether the defendant has a colorable defense to the plaintiffs' claims and to reweigh the pertinent factors in light of that finding.

The petitioner, Eddie DePriest, seeks appellate review of the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of habeas corpus relief. We discern no habeas corpus cause of action in the petition
and affirm.

This case arises from the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on interpretation of T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a). Finding that T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a) requires couples to obtain a marriage license for a valid marriage in Tennessee and that Marriage by Estoppel does not apply, we affirm.