APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner pled guilty to one count of burglary and one count of theft of property between $1,000 and $10,000 on August 21, 2001. He was sentenced to twelve years for each offense to run concurrently to be served at sixty percent as a career offender. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 16, 2002. The trial court denied the petition on January 13, 2003.  The petitioner appeals this denial alleging that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and his plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Upon its own motion, the court hereby withdraws the opinion and vacates the judgment
previously filed on April 26, 2004, in this case. A new opinion and judgment will be filed.

The defendant, David Clinton York, an inmate in the Clay County Jail, pled guilty to felony escape and was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in determining that he was a persistent offender, in denying alternative sentencing, and in applying the enhancement and mitigating factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this appeal, in part, to determine whether fault was properly assessed against the patient in this medical malpractice action. We overrule Gray v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1996), and hold that fault may not be assessed against a patient in a medical malpractice action in which a patient’s negligent conduct provides only the occasion for the medical attention, care, or treatment which is the basis for the action. We also hold that the additional issues raised by the defendant are without merit. We therefore affirm the trial court’s post-trial ruling that the defendant is 100% at fault and is responsible for the full amount of damages found by the jury. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; Jury Verdict Reinstated
 

This is a Will construction case. The decedent's Will provided that her estate would be distributed to her husband. However, the husband predeceased the decedent leaving no issue. The only remaining provision in the Will provided that her estate would be distributed to certain orphan's homes if she and her husband died at the same time. The trial court found it unreasonable to construe the Will to require simultaneous death and distributed the estate to the orphan's homes. We hold that the Will contains a failed condition resulting in intestate succession. We reverse and remand.

The petitioner, Damien Lamar Owes, was found guilty by a Davidson County jury and stands convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. He is serving a 30-year sentence. Aggrieved by his convictions, the petitioner pursued a pro se action for post-conviction relief predicated on the alleged ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following the appointment of counsel and a hearing, the petition was denied. The petitioner appeals and urges that he is entitled to relief. We disagree and affirm the dismissal of the petition.

By overruling Gray v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1996), a decision released only eight years ago, the majority disregards the principle of stare decisis and undermines the fairness goal of our prior comparative fault decisions. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s decision in this case. In addition, like the Court of Appeals, I believe the trial court erred by excluding evidence of Larry T. Qualls prior alcohol-related conduct and testimony of two defense witnesses and by commenting upon the credibility of a defense witness. Given the cumulative effect of these errors, Vanderbilt is entitled in my view to a new trial.

The trial court dismissed count two of this indictment charging the violation of the implied consent law and barred the State from arguing in the defendant's trial for DUI that he knew he would suffer a loss of driver's license if he refused the breath test. The State appeals. We conclude that the defendant was sufficiently advised of the possible suspension of his driver's license upon his refusal to submit to testing to satisfy the warning requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(a)(2). The defendant need not be advised of the correct and exact term of the suspension in order to satisfy the statutory warning requirements. The defendant was advised that he would suffer a loss of driver's license if he refused the breath test. We reverse the trial court's dismissal of the violation of implied consent law. Likewise, we reverse the trial court's limiting the State from arguing that the defendant knew he would suffer a loss of driver's license if he refused the breath test. Accordingly, we remand for trial consistent with this opinion.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the defendant, Terry Byington, of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective four-year sentence in confinement as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his DUI conviction; (2) the arresting officer improperly presented expert testimony regarding field sobriety tests; (3) the trial court erred in ruling that the state could question the defendant regarding a prior perjury conviction more than ten years old; (4) the trial judge erred in refusing to recuse herself; and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Anthony Crowe, appeals as of right the McNairy County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to facilitation of first degree murder, for which he is serving a sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. He also complains that the length of his sentence is excessive and should be modified. We conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Additionally, we find no error in the sentence imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Richard Lafayette Sumner, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Cocke County Circuit Court for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of aggravated arson. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for each murder and twenty-five years for the aggravated arson, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his insanity defense. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant of first degree murder. We also hold, though, that the convictions for the premeditated and felony murders in counts one and three should be merged pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause. We affirm the convictions, but vacate the judgments as to counts one and three and remand the case for the trial court to enter a judgment reflecting a merger of those two counts.

On March 11, 1998, the petitioner, John T. Heflin, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal this Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and the sentence. See, State v. Heflin, 15 S.W.3d 519 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to object to the testimony of a state witness. The trial court concluded that the failure to object to this witness' testimony did not amount to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities we conclude that the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and therefore the judgment of the post-conviction court is AFFIRMED.

We granted permission to appeal in this divorce proceeding to determine whether postnuptial agreements are contrary to public policy and if not, whether the postnuptial agreement entered into by the parties in this case is valid and enforceable. We hold that postnuptial agreements are not contrary to public policy so long as there is consideration for the agreement, it is knowledgeably entered into, and there is no evidence of fraud, coercion or duress. However, the agreement between the parties in this case is invalid because it lacks adequate consideration. We also granted the husband’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony in futuro instead of rehabilitative alimony. We hold that the trial court properly considered all of the relevant statutory factors and that its award of alimony does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea was properly denied. I believe that a sufficient factual basis for the defendant’s plea is lacking and that the plea was the result of a mistaken belief regarding criminal liability, such that manifest injustice permits the plea to be withdrawn.

JANICE M. HOLDER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that postnuptial agreements are not contrary to public policy. I respectfully dissent, however, from that portion of the majority’s opinion concluding that the agreement at issue in the present case was not supported by adequate consideration.

This case involves the termination of the parental rights of Mother and Father over Child. Only Mother appeals the Juvenile Court’s decision. Specifically, the Juvenile Court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the basis of abandonment, persistent conditions, and noncompliance with the permanency plan. In addition, Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to transfer the case and have the issue presented to a jury. Finally, Mother asserts the trial court judge erred when he did not recuse himself. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

This case arises from the termination of parental rights of Mother and Father. Only Mother has appealed the decision of the trial court, terminating her parental rights on the grounds that (1) she abandoned Child by failing to visit, (2) she abandoned Child by failing to provide more than token support, and (3) the conditions which led to Child’s removal still persist. Mother appeals arguing that the State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services failed to carry its burden of proof for these grounds. In addition, Mother argues that the Department of Children’s Services failed to prove that such termination of parental rights is in the best interest of Child. Finally, Mother argues the trial court committed prejudicial error when it allowed the rebuttal testimony of a witness in violation of the sequestration rule. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This cases involves an action for declaratory judgment regarding an easement for the benefit of a landlocked parcel. The lower court found that an easement does exist and that the owners of the servient parcel are not entitled to monetary damages. On appeal, the owners of the servient parcel maintain that the lower court demonstrated bias in its comments from the bench and, further, that it erred in failing to award damages. For the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
 

This case involves the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children, though only Mother appeals the decision of the Juvenile Court. After conducting a hearing, the lower court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the bases of persistent conditions, noncompliance with the permanency plan, and abandonment. On appeal, Mother challenges each of the three grounds given for termination. For the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marco Polo Patten, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: 1) whether the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior bad acts by the Defendant; 2) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's verdict; 3) whether the prosecutor made improper statements during his opening and closing statements; 4) whether cumulative errors prevented a fair trial; 5) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, John A. Lee, was convicted after a bench trial of one count of child abuse of a child under six years old, a Class D felony. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to serve two years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue raised in this direct appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.