APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Board of Education of the City of Memphis suspended tenured teacher and assistant principal without pay pending an investigation of child abuse by the Department of Children’s Services. After teacher was reinstated, he sought to recover lost wages under T.C.A. §49-5-511. Trial court found that teacher was entitled to recover but that such recovery should be offset by wages earned during the period of suspension. We affirm as modified herein.
 

James A. Bledsoe and wife, Nannie, sued Randall Buttry and Grange Insurance Company (uninsured motorist carrier) for damages sustained in a motor vehicle crash. The Bledsoe's claim the jury verdict was insufficient and that the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings. We affirm.

The defendant, Eric Matthews, was charged by the Shelby County Grand Jury in two separate indictments with especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated rape, a Class B felony, based on events involving the victim, V.T.,1 that occurred on August 14, 1999, in the Whitehaven area of Memphis. Following his 2003 trial,2 he was acquitted of the rape counts and convicted in both the especially aggravated and aggravated kidnapping counts of the lesser-included charge of kidnapping, a Class C felony.  Applying four enhancement and no mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of five years in the county workhouse. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentencing imposed. Based on our review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions but that the trial court erred by failing to merge the kidnapping convictions into a single judgment of conviction. We further conclude that three of the four enhancement factors were applied in error under the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), which was released after the sentencing was imposed in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, but order that they be merged into a single conviction and modify the sentence imposed from five to four years, to be served in the county workhouse.

Defendant, Steve A. White, appeals the trial court’s order amending Defendant’s judgment to grant restitution to the victim in his case. Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to amend Defendant’s judgment, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for reinstatement of the judgment of conviction as originally entered.

The Trial Court held that the confidential relationship between defendant and deceased voids the transaction because deceased did not have independent advice. On appeal, we reverse.

The defendant, Timothy Wade Davis, was convicted by a jury of four counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Sentences of twenty-two years were imposed for each child rape conviction and ten years for aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Three of the child rape convictions and the especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor were ordered to run consecutively for an effective sentence of seventy-six years at 100%. The defendant appeals his convictions and sentencing and alleges that the trial court erred in the following respects: (1) in failing to suppress the search warrant and the defendant’s statements; (2) by denying the defendant the right to represent himself; (3) by refusing to instruct the jury on insanity; (4) in finding the defendant competent to stand trial; and (5) in regard to sentencing. After review of the issues presented and the record as a whole, we conclude that no reversible error was present and affirm the convictions and sentencing.

The petitioner, Tony Hopkins, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that, following his guilty plea, he was wrongfully sentenced to a fifteen-year sentence as a Range I offender on a Class B felony. After careful review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

I concur in the results and most of the analysis in the majority opinion. However, I believe the differences reflected in the search warrant affidavits in the record would justify suppression of the items seized pursuant to Rule 41(c), Tenn. R. Crim. P. Such a result, though, is not needed, because the record does not reflect that the copies of the affidavits in the record are thoserequired by Rule 41(c) to be identical. On the other hand, even if suppression were required, I believe many  of the defendant’s statements against interest could be admissible.

The petitioner, Corey Cartwright, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. He seeks relief from his Class C felony conviction for possession of less than one-half gram of cocaine with intent to sell and resulting sentence of ten years in confinement. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition without appointing counsel, that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Garner Dwight Padgett, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial after two jurors observed him in custody, by failing to instruct on the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault and assault, and by failing to suppress his confession. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I concur with the majority opinion on all issues except that portion which modifies the sentence to twenty-one years. I agree that the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 542 US ____, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), questions the validity of Tennessee’s sentencing scheme. I agree that prior to Blakely, this Court’s holding should be that enhancement factors (11) and (17) could not be applied, but that the remaining enhancement factors, (2), (6), and (10), would be applicable. However, under Blakely, it is clear that only evidence of prior convictions can be used to enhance a sentence without a jury making a determination of the existence of an enhancement factor, or where the jury determination is waived by the defendant, or where the application of another enhancement factor is “admitted” by the defendant. The term “admitted by Defendant,” while seemingly clear at first glance, has not been conclusively defined by judicial decision. The United States Supreme Court in Blakely may have meant “admitted” in the context of a judicial proceeding such as a guilty plea hearing with the solemnity of a guilty plea. Or, the Court possibly meant an admission by a defendant in testimony at a sentencing hearing. Thus, the meaning of the term “admitted by the defendant” is subject to debate, and is better left to appellate review when that precise issue has been squarely addressed by a trial court and thereafter raised on appeal.

The defendant, Sheridan Armstrong, was convicted of felony murder and aggravated child abuse.  The trial court ordered concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of parole and twenty years, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police and argues that the evidence supporting each conviction was insufficient. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Following Appellees’ default on promissory note secured by a deed of trust, Appellant Bank placed a hold on Appellees’ accounts and instigated foreclosure proceedings. Despite the fact that Appellees cured the default, Appellant Bank continued its hold on accounts and failed to stop publication of foreclosure notice. Although Appellees failed to prove damages, trial court found Bank negligent and awarded nominal damages to Appellees. We reverse.

Bowdoin Grayson Smith (“Father”) and Ginger Lee Marenchin Smith (“Mother”) were divorced in 1996. Mother was granted sole custody of the parties’ four minor children, and Father was granted visitation and ordered to pay child support. Two years later, Father filed a petition for joint custody and later a petition to modify child support. After a hearing, the Trial Court found that Father had failed to prove a material change in circumstances and denied the petition for joint custody; modified the visitation schedule; granted Father telephone and e-mail contact with the children at specified times; found that Mother had proved monthly expenses of $7,500 were reasonably necessary to provide for the support and needs of the children, but that Father would be responsible for paying only $5,000 in monthly child support with Mother responsible for the remainder; and granted Mother attorney’s fees. Mother appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in finding that only $7,500 per month was reasonably necessary for the support of the children and in holding that Father would be responsible for only $5,000 of these expenses. Father raises additional issues claiming the Trial Court erred in dismissing the petition for joint custody and in awarding Mother attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part; modify, in part; vacate, in part; and remand solely for the collection of the costs below.
 

The petitioner, Anthony Randaul, appeals from the Dyer County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for kidnapping, robbery, and sale of cocaine weighing less than one-half gram and resulting sentence of nine years. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Johnson, originally charged with first degree murder, was convicted of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-three years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a preliminary hearing; (3) the trial court erred by permitting evidence of a California police chase involving the defendant; (4) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury; (5) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial require reversal; and (6) the sentence is excessive.  Because the trial court misapplied certain of the enhancement factors, the sentence is modified to twenty-one years. Otherwise, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, James Lee Perry, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner has appealed the dismissal of her petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter was presented to the Court upon the motion of the State of Tennessee, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant was convicted in the Madison County Circuit Court of the first degree premeditated murder of Junecus Bolden. The appellant received a sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises issues regarding the admission of certain testimony and the propriety of the State’s rebuttal closing argument. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Early H. Miles, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post- conviction relief or in the alternative for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner filed his petition outside the statute of limitations for post-conviction purposes. The petition was not filed in the proper court for habeas corpus purposes, and the petitioner did not give any reason in the petition for not applying to the nearest court as required by law. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendants, who are brother and sister, were each convicted by a Cocke County jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced by the trial court to serve 11 months, 29 days on supervised probation. Both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented from which a rational trier of fact could reasonably find both defendants guilty of assault. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Raymond Sunil Tate, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the action of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. The petition does not establish either an expired sentence or a void judgment. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter was presented to the Court upon the motion of the State of Tennessee, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court granted the husband a divorce on the ground of the wife’s adultery and made various rulings regarding the parenting arrangement for the parties’ one year old son, child support, property division, and award of attorney’s fees. The parties have appealed most of the those rulings. Although we affirm the equal sharing of residential placement, we find the six month alternating schedule is not in this child’s best interests. We also find other parts of the plan must be vacated in view of recent holdings by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Therefore, we vacate the parenting plan and remand for entry of a new permanent parenting plan addressing the residential schedule, the designation of primary residential parent, allocation of decision-making authority, and child support. In the interim, we reinstate the trial court’s pendente lite arrangement, as modified, and establish interim support. We affirm the division of property, modify the allocation of debt, and modify the award of attorney’s fees.