APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Lloyd Earl Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of his application for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, Williams argues that: (1) his six drug convictions are void because he was tried and sentenced in absentia and (2) his class B felony sentences are illegal because the indictments do not specify that the amount of cocaine sold or possessed was 0.5 grams or more. Finding these issues without merit, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Raymond Douglas Myers, Sr., was found guilty by a jury of three counts of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of aggravated arson, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. The trial court merged the convictions for felony murder and conspiracy to commit murder into the three first degree murder convictions. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of parole for each murder conviction, and a consecutive twenty-four year sentence for the aggravated arson conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that Tennessee's first degree murder sentencing statute is unconstitutional, and that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury regarding the State's burden of proof. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court excluded parol evidence and awarded Defendant summary judgment. We reverse.
 

Assignee appeals the judgment of the trial court holding it to be bound to a reclamation of rights provision in the contract between its assignor and a grantor of copyright interests. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, Tennessee buyer, filed complaint in Shelby County, Tennessee circuit court against South Carolina seller for fraudulent, unlawful, and tortious conduct in connection with contract for purchase of antique soda dispensers. Seller filed motion to dismiss, alleging as grounds lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, and trial court granted motion on both grounds. Buyer appeals trial court’s finding that there were insufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction of seller. We reverse and remand.
 

This case involves an antenuptial agreement. Prior to their marriage, the husband and wife entered into an antenuptial agreement which stated that each party waived his or her interest in any property acquired after the marriage in the individual spouse’s name. After a nearly twenty-year marriage, the wife filed for divorce. During the divorce proceedings, the wife argued that the antenuptial agreement should not affect the trial court’s division of property acquired during the marriage. The trial court enforced the antenuptial agreement, awarding all property held in the husband’s name to the husband, regardless of whether it would otherwise have been classified as marital property. The wife appeals. We affirm, finding that the wife waived her interest in the property under the antenuptial agreement and that the evidence does not preponderate against either the enforceability of the agreement or the trial court’s division of property.
 

The defendant, Claud E. Simonton, went to trial initially in November 2002, on charges of driving under the influence (DUI) third offense, and violation of the implied consent law. The jury was unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. On April 2, 2003, the defendant was retried and convicted by the jury of third offense DUI. The jury assessed a $1,200 fine. The trial judge found that the defendant had violated the implied consent law. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve his eleven month, twenty-nine day sentence in jail with release eligibility at 75% service. On appeal the defendant raises three issues. First, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for DUI. Second, the defendant maintains the trial court erred in denying a mistrial after the arresting officer referred to “seizing” the defendant’s vehicle. Finally, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in ordering incarceration for 75% of the sentence imposed. We have examined each issue and determined that the judgment of the trial court must be AFFIRMED.

Appellant seeks relief, under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, from final order setting child support obligations. Finding no extraordinary circumstances, extreme hardship, or excusable neglect, we affirm.
 

Land owner filed complaint alleging trespass and seeking the removal of structures and signs erected by appellants encroaching upon his property. Owner further sought injunction    prohibiting appellants from continued, unauthorized use of roads running across his property. The trial court found that appellants had an easement for use of one of two roads. The trial court’s final order granted owner’s request for attorney’s fees. Both parties raise issues on appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
 

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the post-divorce move by a primary residential parent from Clarksville to Knoxville. Upon receiving notice of the planned move, the non-residential parent petitioned the Chancery Court for Montgomery County to prevent the move or to change custody. The trial court conducted a bench trial and denied the petition. On this appeal, the non-residential parent asserts that the court applied the wrong relocation standards because it mistakenly concluded that the parents had not been spending substantially equal amounts of time with their children. We conclude that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the parents had not spent substantially equal time with the children, and therefore, we affirm the judgment.

The appellant, Marcin Piotr Mikolajczak, pled nolo contendere to a charge of rape. As part of the plea agreement the appellant was sentenced as a standard offender for a Class B felony with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to serve eight years with the Department of Correction at 100% as a violent offender, without probation, split confinement or other alternative sentencing. The appellant now appeals alleging that the trial court erred in not granting alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was stopped for failing to use a turn signal when making a left-hand turn. The officer obtained consent to search her person, vehicle, and motel room. Upon searching her motel room, the officer found cocaine. The defendant filed a motion to suppress that the trial court denied. The defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession of cocaine greater than .5 grams. The defendant reserved a certified question as to whether her consent was valid under the federal and state constitutions. We conclude that the defendant’s consent was voluntarily given and that the evidence was properly admitted at trial. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

I am unable to join with my colleagues in concluding that the defendant’s consent “was obtained during a period of lawful detention.” Finding the search unreasonable under Fourth Amendment protections, I would suppress the evidence.

In this appeal a father seeks review of the juvenile court's refusal to modify his child support obligation. We affirm.

This case involves Rule 11 sanctions. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit challenging the practice of serving meat and drink at political fund raisers, alleging that the practice violates Article X, section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, based in part on the fact that the plaintiff had previously filed similar lawsuits against other defendants upon the same constitutional grounds, and that these prior lawsuits had been dismissed. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants then filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure. This motion was denied. The defendants appealed, and this Court reversed the denial of sanctions and remanded the case to the trial court. On remand, the trial court imposed as a sanction a screening mechanism whereby any complaint filed by the plaintiff within the next two years must be reviewed by a special master to ensure that it is not legally frivolous or duplicative. The plaintiff now appeals that order, claiming that the sanction imposed violates his constitutional rights. We affirm, concluding that the sanction imposed is reasonable and does not deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

This appeal challenges the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's action, re-filed after the expiration of the initial statutory period of limitation. We affirm the trial court and deny Appellant's Motion for Transfer pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-116.

This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a twelve-year-old child. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court placed the child in the custody of her uncle and aunt because she was chronically absent from school. The uncle and aunt later moved to Marion County. After the uncle and aunt decided that they no longer desired to have custody of the child, the Marion County Juvenile Court placed the child in the custody of the Department of Children's Services. Approximately fifteen months later, the Department filed a petition in the Marion County Juvenile Court to terminate the biological parents' parental rights. The juvenile court granted the termination petition after overruling the mother's objection that the petition should not have been filed in Marion County. The child's mother has appealed. We have determined that the order must be reversed because venue for this termination proceeding does not lie in Marion County.

This case involves a dispute over the ownership of certain real property abutting the parcels of two neighboring landowners in Gibson County, Tennessee. The trial court rendered a judgment for Appellee finding that Appellee owned the disputed property. Additionally, the trial court awarded Appellee her attorney’s fees incurred in defending against and counter-suing the Appellant. We affirm the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

Action for Judgment on loan was defended on grounds defendant sold note to plaintiffs. The Trial Court held agreements violated statute of frauds and plaintiff failed to prove loan. On appeal, we reverse.Action for Judgment on loan was defended on grounds defendant sold note to plaintiffs. The Trial Court held agreements violated statute of frauds and plaintiff failed to prove loan. On appeal, we reverse.

Appellant is an inmate of the Department of Corrections serving two life sentences for two first degree murder convictions with sentences imposed in 1978. He became eligible for parole, and on July 3, 2001, a hearing was held before the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. His application for parole was denied on July 3, 2001 and review of parole was set for July of 2011. Final disposition denying parole was entered October 2, 2001. On October 29, 2001, Appellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, which petition was dismissed by the trial court on January 10, 2003. We affirm the trial court Order of Dismissal relative to the merits of the denial of parole but hold that postponement of parole review until July of 2011 was an arbitrary exercise of power by the parole board and, therefore, reverse the Order of the trial court.

The defendant, Matthew Stalcup, pled guilty in the Union County Criminal Court to reckless vehicular homicide, a Class C felony, and driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent for the DUI conviction and prohibited him from driving for one year. After a sentencing hearing for the reckless vehicular homicide conviction, the trial court sentenced him to five years to be served as one year in jail and the remainder suspended upon his serving ten years on supervised probation. The trial court also prohibited him from driving for ten years, ordered that the five-year sentence be served consecutively to the eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence, and ordered that the ten-year driving prohibition be served concurrently to the one-year prohibition. The defendant appeals his sentence for reckless vehicular homicide, claiming (1) that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion, (2) that the trial court erred by denying his request for full probation, (3) that the trial court improperly weighed enhancement and mitigating factors, (4) that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the five-year sentence consecutively to the eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence, and (5) that the trial court's prohibiting him from driving for ten years is excessive. We affirm the sentence, except we conclude that the defendant should be prohibited from driving for five years.

We granted review to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants in this medical malpractice lawsuit. The trial court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that, as a matter of law, no physician-patient relationship existed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. After careful review of the record before us and the applicable authorities, we conclude that there are disputed issues of fact as to the existence of a physician-patient relationship, and we therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Plaintiff filed suit seeking to recover a deficiency on a loan executed by the Defendant and another left owing after foreclosure upon real estate. The Defendant had purchased a parcel of real estate from a company in which he was a director, and had assumed responsibility for repayment of a loan secured by that real estate. The Defendant denied liability, and alleged mutual mistake and negligent misrepresentation surrounding the loan against the lender because the loan documents he signed contained language regarding cross-collateralization involving a separate parcel of real estate formerly owned by the company in which the Defendant was a director, which real estate was sold two days prior to assumption of the loan obligations by the Defendant. Following a bench trial, the Chancellor granted judgment for the Plaintiff for $134,127.65 and attorneys' fees totaling $73,417.37, for a total judgment of $207,545.02. The Defendant appealed. We affirm.

The Plaintiff filed suit for Declaratory Judgment seeking the order of the Court declaring that losses suffered by the insured were not covered losses under a general policy of business insurance. At issue is the interpretation of the insurance contract and a determination as to whether insurance coverage existed where the insured expended money and time fabricating parts for a custom project upon the mistaken belief that it had obtained a sub-contract, but where no such agreement existed inasmuch as the purchase order upon which the insured relied was forged by an employee of the insured. Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by each party. The Trial Court granted the insurance company's motion for Summary Judgment, from which the insured appealed. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Trial Court, and also determine that Declaratory Judgment should be granted in favor of the insurance company, determining that no coverage exists for the loss suffered by the insured.

Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based upon an arbitration provision contained in the parties’ contract. The trial court entered an order staying litigation pending arbitration but found the site provision, providing that all disputes shall be settled by arbitration in Chicago, Illinois, unconscionable. The trial court reformed the parties’ contract so that the arbitration would be governed by Tennessee law and occur in Memphis, Tennessee. Defendants appealed this decision. We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand.