APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Cherie Mae Phillips, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received a sentence of three years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendants, George A. Vance and Vincent Vance, of aggravated gambling promotion for operating twenty-nine Free Spin machines in Bristol. The trial court sentenced Defendant George A. Vance to two years of supervised probation followed by four years of unsupervised probation and ordered him to make restitution in the amount of $130,521.00. The court sentenced Defendant Vincent Vance to one year of supervised probation followed by one year of unsupervised probation. On appeal, the Defendants contend that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions because there was no evidence that they knowingly engaged in a gambling enterprise and the Free Spin machines were not principally designed as gambling devices; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting the Defendants from introducing the testimony of a patent attorney concerning the issuance of a patent on the Free Spin machine; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting the Defendants from introducing evidence concerning comparable products, games and promotions similar to the play on the Free Spin machines. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Defendant, Mario McNeal, was convicted by a jury of five counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced to ten years confinement for each of the aggravated robbery convictions and three years confinement for his aggravated assault conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in an effective sentence of ten years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a review of the entire record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a challenge to the Commissioner's franchise and excise tax assessment. On cross-motions for summary judgment the chancellor found for the Commissioner. We affirm.

The petitioner, Raymond Rutter, appeals as of right from the Johnson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. In this pro se appeal, the petitioner contends that he should be granted habeas corpus relief because his judgment of conviction for criminal impersonation of a licensed professional is void. The state contends that the trial court properly dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

Consumer brought products liability suit under theories of negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty for property damage arising out of a fire caused when the consumer's son placed a pillow on top of a halogen torchiere lamp supplied by defendant Sun Lighting, Inc. and sold by defendant The Home Depot, Inc. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants and dismissed the lawsuit. The consumer appeals. Because we find the joint summary judgment motions were properly granted, we affirm the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder of his wife. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and alleges the following errors: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the admission of hearsay testimony and failure to give a curative instruction; (3) the admission of expert opinion that the death was a result of homicidal violence when cause was undetermined; (4) cumulative errors required a new trial; and (5) improper sentencing. After review, we conclude that there is no reversible error and affirm the conviction and sentence.

This appeal involves a dispute among the members of a general partnership. In 1997, a group of the partners sued one of the partners in the Chancery Court for Davidson County for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted a judgment for the defendant partner in 2000. In 2001, the same group of partners filed a similar suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The defendant partner moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata. The trial court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and then granted judgment for the defendant partner on the ground that the 1997 chancery court judgment barred the second state court suit. The plaintiff partners have appealed. We affirm the trial court.

The trial court granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff in this suit to collect on a promissory note. Appellant does not appeal the grant of judgment, but appeals the trial court's certification of that judgment as a final order under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Chris E. Hixson, pled guilty to two counts of theft and three counts of sale of cocaine, all Class C felonies. He was sentenced to two concurrent four-year terms for the theft offenses, and to three concurrent four-year terms for the cocaine offenses, these latter terms to be served consecutively to the terms for the theft offenses, for an effective sentence of eight years. All of these sentences were ordered to be served on community corrections. The Defendant was subsequently convicted of aggravated burglary and sentenced to serve three years on community corrections, consecutive to the sentences imposed for the theft offenses. The effective sentence of eight years was thus unchanged. Subsequent to the burglary conviction, the Defendant violated the terms of his release and was ordered to serve two years day-for-day in confinement, after which he was to be released back into community corrections. It is from this order that the Defendant now appeals, arguing that the two years of continuous confinement constitutes an illegal sentence. The State concedes that the sentence is illegal. We agree. The trial court's judgment is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court.

The petitioner directly appeals the dismissal of his petition of writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the habeas court summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Davidson County for appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. If the habeas corpus court finds the sentence to be illegal, the court must then remand the case to the Rutherford County Criminal Court, where the convictions occurred. On remand to the original convicting court, the petitioner's guilty plea may be withdrawn if concurrent sentencing was a condition of his plea agreement.

Following a bench trial, the Appellant, Jeffrey R. Dickens, was convicted of criminal attempt to commit unlawful photographing in violation of privacy as proscribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-605 (2003), a class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to six months in the Rutherford County Jail, which was suspended after service of eight days periodic confinement. On appeal, Dickens argues that his conviction cannot stand because an attempt to commit a violation of this section is not an indictable offense. Alternatively, he contends that the proof is insufficient to constitute a "substantial step" toward the commission of the attempted crime. After review, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, to be served on probation after service of eighty days' incarceration. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Terry A. Hawkins, presents for review a certified question of law. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). Hawkins pled guilty to DUI, first offense, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days jail confinement, to be suspended after service of forty-eight hours. As a condition of her guilty plea, Hawkins explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of her motion to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test administered by a private hospital in the course of medical treatment. The Appellant argues that the procedures utilized to obtain the results of the test violated both her constitutional right to privacy and due process. On appeal, the State asserts that the question presented is not dispositive and, thus, this court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. After review, we agree that the certified question is not dispositive. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Robert M. Bass, appeals the sentencing decision of the Stewart County Circuit Court following revocation of his community corrections sentences. The trial court's order provides that Bass is to serve eighteen months in the county jail and, upon service of this term, return to community corrections supervision for the balance of his sentences. Bass argues that the trial court is without authority to impose a sentence in excess of one year's confinement in the jail. The State concedes error. We agree and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed medical malpractice action against clinic, treating nurse, and supervising physician for injuries suffered as a result of alleged negligent chemotherapy treatment. Trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that registered nurse was not qualified as an expert on the issue of medical causation, and further noting that the deposition testimony of lone expert physician failed to establish that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
 

Defendant, David Robert Cook, was indicted for one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and one count of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. Following a jury trial, the jury found Defendant not guilty of the indicted offenses but guilty of one count of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to three years imprisonment for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and two years imprisonment for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentence for aggravated assault to run concurrently with his sentence for voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; and (3) the trial court erred in not sentencing Defendant as an especially mitigated offender. The trial court did not err by refusing to grant a mistrial, the transcript of the sentencing hearing is not included in the appellate record and sentencing issues are therefore waived, and the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Although not raised on appeal, we further conclude that the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury that reckless aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. Our supreme court has explicitly held that reckless aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. State v. Rush, 50 S.W.3d 424, 431 (Tenn. 2001). Accordingly, we are obligated to reverse Defendant’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm Defendant’s conviction and sentence for voluntary manslaughter.

The Petitioner, Michael E. Mills, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The issues on appeal in this divorce action are: (1) Whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony in futuro; (2) Whether the trial court was in error in finding wife's IRA of Wal-mart stock was her separate property in its entirety; (3) Whether the trial court erred in failing to make a downward deviation in child support. The trial court awarded to Ms. Hoback as alimony in futuro $500 per month for a ten (10) year period terminating on her death or her remarriage. Wal-mart stock of value of approximately $35,000 was awarded to Ms. Hoback as her separate property. Child support was set at $750 per month upon a finding of ability of the father to earn $60,000 per year, and based upon additional parenting time above 80 days per year granted to the father the Court reduced the month of June child support to $550 and reduced the month of July support to $375 making a downward deviation of $47.92 per month. For reasons stated below, the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, James Gordon Freeman, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was amended by appointed counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Andre Edward Hicks, was convicted after a trial by jury of aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a persistent offender to thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Hicks raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and (2) whether his sentence was proper. After a review of the record, the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, for punching a police officer and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with sixty days to serve before applying for probation. He raises seven issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting a tape recording of the officer's call to dispatch; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard the dispatcher's testimony; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the officer's testimony about her recognition of the defendant; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request to publish a second officer's supplemental report to the jury; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing defense witnesses to be impeached with evidence of other crimes; (6) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by withdrawing his request to cross-examine police officers regarding prior complaints against them of excessive force; and (7) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. We find no reversible error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings and conclude that the defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. We further conclude there was ample evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction for assault. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging that Defendants committed medical malpractice. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s limiting Plaintiff’s voir dire concerning his medical expert, denial of Plaintiff’s renewed motion in limine, refusal to include proposed jury instructions, and refusal to strike a third party opinion from the deposition of Plaintiff’s expert. We affirm the decisions of the trial court.
 

The defendant, JoyLeigh Sandidge, pled guilty to two counts of vehicular assault and one count each of DUI, fourth offense, leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, and failure to yield. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of two years, with the court to make a determination as to alternative sentencing after the defendant had served the mandatory 150 days in jail for her DUI, fourth offense, conviction. Subsequently, the trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of her sentence, and the defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in this determination. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for the defendant to be placed on probation for the remainder of her sentence.