APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Keith Dale Thomas, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of first degree murder and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of an offense. He received a total effective sentence of life plus two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel and his appellate counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Steven Douglas Tutt, appeals the Marshall County Circuit Court's order that retired his motion for expungement. We dismiss the appeal.

This case essentially involves a dispute between the owners of adjoining properties in Grainger County. Specifically, the dispute focuses on (1) the ownership of a private road ("the disputed private road"); (2) the easement rights, if any, of the plaintiff Benjamin S. Pressnell with respect to a right-of-way over the property of the defendants Steve Hixon and wife, Betty Hixon; and (3) damages allegedly sustained by Pressnell and another plaintiff by virtue of the Hixons' interference with Pressnell's right to use the disputed private road and the easement. The trial court, following a bench trial, found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

First Tennessee Bank National Association ("the Bank") sued Bad Toys, Inc. and Larry N. Lunan on a note that allegedly was "fully mature, owing and unpaid." The note had been cross collateralized with two other notes payable to the Bank. The three notes and the attendant guaranty agreements and security agreements were executed either by Bad Toys, Inc., Larry N. Lunan, or Susan H. Lunan ("Defendants" or as appropriate "the Lunans"). In addition to other collateral, shares of stock were pledged as collateral for the notes. Bad Toys, Inc. and Larry N. Lunan answered the complaint and filed a counter-complaint in which Susan H. Lunan joined as a counter-plaintiff. The counter-complaint alleged, in part, that the Bank had breached its fiduciary duty to the Lunans by failing to sell the pledged stock and that the Bank either had been grossly negligent or had intentionally caused harm to Defendants by refusing to sell the stock. The Bank filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. Defendants opposed by filing the Lunans' affidavit claiming that the Bank had agreed to sell the shares of stock as soon as they were pledged, even though the Lunans were forbidden by an agreement with other shareholders from selling the stock themselves, and that the Bank failed to sell the shares of stock as it had agreed to do. The Trial Court held the Lunans' affidavit should be stricken, in part, and granted the Bank            summary judgment. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

This case involves a child custody dispute between the parents of two minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the parties an absolute divorce and designated the mother as the primary residential parent. In addition, the court below awarded the parties equal parenting time and provided for an alternating visitation schedule in the Permanent Parenting Plan. The mother subsequently filed a motion requesting the trial court to reconsider the custody arrangement, which the trial court denied. The mother filed this appeal contesting the determination of custody by the Circuit Court of Shelby County. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

The defendants, Cornelius D. Hicks and Troy Lee Springfield, and two codefendants, Bryan T. Oldham and Kenyale M. Pirtle, were charged with aggravated assault, a Class C felony, for firing a gun at the victim, Keiston Campbell, as he drove his car down a Henning street. Pirtle subsequently pled guilty to aggravated assault, and a fifth individual involved in the incident had his case handled in juvenile court. The three remaining defendants, Springfield, Hicks, and Oldham, were tried jointly before a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury, which acquitted Oldham but convicted both Hicks and Springfield of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Hicks as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction, with the sentence suspended and the defendant placed on supervised probation following service of 250 days, to be served consecutively to a sentence for an offense for which he was on probation at the time of the instant offense. Springfield was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years in the Department of Correction, with the sentence ordered to be served consecutively to his sentence for violation of parole. The sole issue Hicks raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Springfield challenges the trial court’s denial of his motions to sever his trial and for judgment of acquittal. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Gregory Morrow, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of possessing 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, possessing 300 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and two counts of possessing marijuana. The appellant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress and raises complaints regarding the application of Rule 41(g) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but we remand for a merger of the appellant’s two cocaine convictions and his two marijuana convictions.

The appellant, Alfonso Martinez, was found guilty by a jury in the Henderson County Circuit Court of felony possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant’s sole issue is the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-424 and 39-17-425 (2003). Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the appellant has waived his issue. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Darry Miller appeals from his Lauderdale County Circuit Court conviction of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance less than 0.5 grams. He claims that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction. We disagree and affirm.

The Defendant, Darrell Wayne Syler, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of rape of a child, one count of attempted child rape, one count of aggravated sexual battery and thirteen counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to an effective term of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting a homemade videotape depicting the Defendant and his wife engaged in sex acts, and that his convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation must be reversed because the State failed to establish one of the statutory elements of that offense. We reduce the Defendant's sentence to an effective term of twenty-eight years, and otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Robert Love Taylor, was convicted by a jury of driving while declared a habitual motor vehicle offender. He was sentenced to four years incarceration and fined $3,000 for the offense. Two motions for new trial were filed

Plaintiff sustained injuries from a fall in the court house and sued the County for maintaining a dangerous stairway. Following trial, the Court entered a Judgment for defendant. We affirm.

This case arises out of an automobile accident. Appellant appeals from a Judgment entered on a jury verdict. The jury found the two Defendants to each be 50% at fault and Plaintiff to be 0% at fault. The jury awarded $0 damages to the Plaintiff. We find that the trial court did not err in its duty as thirteenth juror and that there is material evidence to support the verdict. We affirm.
 

The defendant, Neal Levone Armour, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's revocation of probation. Because the record supports the trial court's actions, we affirm.

The Knox County Criminal Court denied the motion of the defendant, Eric Eugene Gilmore, to set aside his 2001 guilty pleas to a number of charges. We affirm.

The appellant, Memphis Bonding Company, appeals the trial court's order requiring a partial refund to the defendant, Willie James Bassett. Because the governing statute does not permit a refund under the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

The trial court denied Mother's petition to change custody of the parties' minor children from Father to Mother. We affirm.

The petitioner, James Bell, Jr., entered pleas of guilty to a number of offenses in the Shelby County Criminal Court in 1997 and 2000, and subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lake County Circuit Court, asserting that his convictions were void and his sentences illegal. The court denied the petition without a hearing, and this appeal followed. We affirm the denial of the petition, but remand to the Shelby County Criminal Court for a hearing to identify what disposition was intended as to each of the indictments and entry of corrected judgments to reflect those determinations

In 1987 six (6) siblings acquired by intestate succession, a 115-acre tract, mostly flood plain unimproved land bordering North Chickamauga Creek near Hixson, Tennessee. Five (5) of the owners filed a partition action against their brother whose residence adjoined an upland portion of the 115 acres that was not subject to flooding. A consent judgment was entered in 1998 that the entire acreage would be sold and the net proceeds divided equally among the six (6) owners. But the consent judgment also provided that if no offer to purchase for $1,734,150.00 was received, the property would not be sold without unanimous consent or upon further order of the court. Four years later the North Chickamauga Creek Conservancy offered $800,000.00 which was accepted by the plaintiffs, and disdained by the defendant, who apparently wanted the upland tract of 19 acres adjoining his residence as his partitioned share. The court ordered the property sold for partition. We modify as to the real estate commission and affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. The trial court awarded primary residential custody to mother and standard visitation to father. We affirm.

Defendant, Tony Ivens, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual battery. Defendant was fined $3,000 and sentenced to serve two years with all but 90 days to be suspended and served on probation. Defendant filed a motion for new trial or mistrial, alleging that one of the jurors failed to disclose during voir dire that she was related to a staff member of the Monroe County Sheriff's Department. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant appeals. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Sherry Lynn Johnson, was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court placed the Defendant on judicial diversion. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the assault statute and that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. Because the Defendant was placed on judicial diversion, no judgment of conviction has been entered, and the Defendant has no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

In this capital case, the defendant, Robert L. Leach, Jr., was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated rape. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions with the premeditated murder convictions. The jury imposed sentences of death for the two murder convictions. The trial court imposed two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery and aggravated rape convictions, which were ordered to run consecutively to the two death sentences. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Leach’s convictions and sentences. On automatic appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13- 206(a)(1), we designated the following issues for oral argument:1 1) whether the evidence is insufficient to support convictions for premeditated murder and felony murder; 2) whether the trial court erred in prohibiting Leach from presenting a witness to discredit the testimony of Joseph Walker; 3) whether the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury to consider evidence of Leach’s attack on Dorianne Brown to “complete the story”; 4) whether the death penalty is precluded in this case under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because aggravating circumstances were not set out in the indictment; and 5) whether the sentences of death are disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13- 206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed these issues and the remainder of the issues raised by Leach, we conclude that they do not warrant relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(a)(1); Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed.

The Defendant, Derrick Bryant, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Derrick Bryant, No. E2000-01835-CCA-MR3-CD, 2001 WL 1187916 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Oct. 9, 2001). In this post-conviction proceeding, the Defendant alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.