APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jared Singleton, entered pleas of guilt to forgery, a Class E felony, and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. After denying the defendant's request for judicial diversion under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of two years for the forgery and six months for the criminal impersonation. Probation was to be granted after service of 30 days in the county workhouse. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying judicial diversion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the defendant is granted judicial diversion. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of conditions of the probationary term.

The Petitioner, Roger T. Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is an appeal from an Order denying Appellant’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 Motion, which sought relief from the grant of Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant’s attorney failed to set the Motion for hearing until some nineteen (19) months after the entry of the Order granting summary judgment. The trial court found that the attorney’s failure to prosecute resulted in prejudice to Appellee and denied the Rule 60 Motion. We affirm.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, James Lee Foreman, II, of two counts of rape, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to ten years in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that his sentence is excessive. Having determined that we lack jurisdiction in the case, the defendant's appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Carlos Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Williams acknowledges that the instant petition was not timely filed; however, he alleges that a prior petition was timely delivered to the appropriate prison  official for filing but apparently never received by the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk. For this reason, we find it necessary to vacate the post-conviction court's ruling and remand for a determination of whether Williams’ prior petition was timely filed.

This is an appeal of a final decree of divorce primarily as it concerns custody of the parties’ children. The trial court awarded custody to mother and provided for a supervised visitation to father. Father appeals and, in addition to the custody issue, also presents issues pertaining to the trial court’s out-of-court interview with the children and the mental examination of the parties. We affirm.
 

The petitioner, Tony G. Smith, appeals as of right from the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court holding that his petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissing the petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner is seeking relief from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and stalking and his effective twenty-nine-year sentence. The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in its finding that the petitioner did not allege any circumstances that would qualify as an exception to the one-year statute of limitations for filing post-conviction relief. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition

The Defendant, Troy D. Billingsley, pled guilty to Driving After Being Declared an Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender, Felony Driving Under the Influence of an Intoxicant ("DUI") and Failure to Appear in the Circuit Court for Moore County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of fifteen years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence was excessive and contrary to law. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

Following a judicial diversion revocation hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction in accordance with the terms of his plea agreement which had been negotiated at the time Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant without conducting a sentencing hearing. Defendant now appeals his sentence of confinement arguing that the terms of his plea agreement called for a probated sentence in the event his judicial diversion was subsequently revoked. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the terms of his plea agreement did not survive the revocation of his judicial diversion, and the trial court should have conducted a sentencing hearing prior to imposing Defendant's sentence. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in requiring him to report to his probation officer as a condition of bond pending appeal. Following a thorough review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of third offense driving under the influence (DUI) and driving on a revoked license. He contends on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the deputy did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop, and (3) the deputy's mention of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test during his testimony entitled the defendant to a mistrial. Concluding that no reversible error occurred, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Whether properly assigned or not this court may consider plain error upon the record under Rule 52(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Ogle, 666 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1984). Before an error may be so recognized, it must be “plain” and must affect a “substantial right” of the accused. The word “plain” is synonymous with “clear” or equivalently “obvious.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Plain error is not merely error that is conspicuous, but especially egregious error that strikes at the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See State v. Wooden, 658 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). In State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), this court defined “substantial right” as a right of “fundamental proportions in the indictment process, a right to the proof of every element of the offense and . . . constitutional in nature.” In that case, this court established five factors to be applied in determining whether an error is plain:

(a) The record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court;
(b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached;
(c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected;
(d) the accused [must not have waived] the issue for tactical reasons; and
(e) consideration of the error must be "necessary to do substantial justice."

Id. at 641-42. Our supreme court characterized the Adkisson test as a “clear and meaningful standard” and emphasized that each of the five factors must be present before an error qualifies as plain error. State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000).

The Defendant, Latasha Atkins, appeals her jury conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, contending the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wife filed for divorce alleging Husband was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. Trial court granted Wife an absolute divorce, ordered a martial property distribution, and awarded wife alimony and attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. We affirm the distribution of marital property, modify the award of attorney’s fees, vacate the requirement to provide life insurance and remand.
 

Petitioner, Nelson Keith Foster, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, without affording Petitioner an evidentiary hearing. In his petition, Petitioner asserted that he was entitled to relief from his three convictions for violation of the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act (HMVO) due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition because Petitioner had argued in his direct appeal from the convictions that he was entitled to relief because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction trial court.

The defendant, Douglas Marshall Mathis, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, he contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court erred by giving an irrelevant definition of "knowing" as a part of the instructions to the jury; (3) that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were improper; (4) that he was denied the right to a fair and impartial jury; and (5) that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Roger V. Alexander, pled guilty to one count of possession of anhydrous ammonia, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that the trial court should have sentenced him to Community Corrections. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join with the majority in concurring that the Defendant is not entitled to the alternative sentence of Community Corrections. The Defendant is a Range II multiple offender, possessing a criminal history evincing a clear disregard for the law and whose past efforts at rehabilitation have failed. Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, he is not entitled to the presumption in favor of alternative sentencing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6). For this reason, I would affirm.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his second degree murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review of the record, we conclude the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

This case arises out of a breach of contract by the Defendant for a roof Defendant installed on Plaintiff's freezer storage facility. The case was tried before a jury, who found the Defendant had materially breached the contract between the parties and awarded Plaintiff damages in the amount of $5,655.00. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, a motion for additur or new trial. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment but suggested an additur increasing the award to $30,655.00, which Defendant appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal involves a state prisoner who desires to change his name for religious reasons. Even though the prisoner's petition was uncontested, the Davidson County Probate Court declined to permit the prisoner to change his name solely because he had been convicted of a felony. While we have determined that the probate court erred by denying the prisoner's petition solely because he had been convicted of a felony, we have determined that the petition was properly dismissed.

The Petitioner, James K. Robbins, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has not established that the challenged judgment is void or that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Arthur Buford III, was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder. After being sentenced to two consecutive life sentences, the appellant presents the following issues or our review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the introduction of photographic evidence of the crime scene; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (3) whether the trial court properly sentenced the appellant. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.