APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell their home and
farm to the defendant. On the scheduled closing date, the defendant refused to purchase the property. The plaintiffs sold the property to a third party for substantially less than the amount the defendant had agreed to pay. In April 2002, the plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the defendant for breach of contract. The defendant argued that he was fraudulently induced into signing the contract, because the parties had a verbal understanding that the contract would not be enforced. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant now appeals. We affirm, finding that the defendant alleges promissory fraud, that evidence of the parties’ verbal agreement is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, and that the evidence submitted by the defendant does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding fraudulent inducement.

The Trial Court dismissed the Complaint on a Motion filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). We vacate and remand because the Motion to Dismiss did not comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
 

This case involves the breach of an employment compensation contract. Under the sales employee’s compensation plan with his employer, he was to earn extra commission for any sales that exceeded his annual quota. In the compensation plan, the employer reserved the right to pay only the standard commission on “windfall” sales. For the fiscal year at issue, the sales employee exceeded his quota. The employer invoked the windfall provision of his compensation plan and paid him only the standard commission on the sales over his quota. The sales employee sued his employer, arguing that he was entitled to the extra commission on the sales over his quota. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiff sales employee. On appeal, the defendant employer argues that the “windfall provision” applies to all sales that were unbudgeted or unforecast and that the plaintiff sales employee’s excess sales fall in that category. We hold that the defendant employer’s interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning of the contract, and affirm the decision of the trial court.

The majority opinion concludes that the defendants’ motion to dismiss is deficient. I agree.
In Willis v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., 113 S.W.3d 706 (Tenn. 2003), the Supreme Court opined that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.06(6), construed in light of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 7.02(1), requires that a motion filed pursuant to 12.06(6) must state “why the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted.” Willis, 113 S.W.3d at 709 n.2 (emphasis added). For example, in the instant case, the motion should have recited, on its face, that (1) the motion was filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.06(6), and (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “in that the claim is for breach of contract but fails to reflect a promise by any of the defendants,” or words to this effect. Having said all of this, I would hasten to add that I do not believe Willis requires that we vacate the trial court’s judgment in the case at bar.

The petitioner, Eddie DePriest, seeks appellate review of the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of habeas corpus relief. We discern no habeas corpus cause of action in the petition
and affirm.

A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, James Franklin Redden, of theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court sentenced him to eight years incarceration as a multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We dismiss the appeal due to the untimely filing of a notice of appeal.

This case arises from the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on interpretation of T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a). Finding that T.C.A. § 36-3-103(a) requires couples to obtain a marriage license for a valid marriage in Tennessee and that Marriage by Estoppel does not apply, we affirm.

This case involves a default judgment. The plaintiffs filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the defendant for intentional infliction of physical injuries. The defendant did not appear, and the plaintiffs obtained a judgment by default. The defendant appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. The circuit court set the case for trial. On the trial date, however, neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared, and the default judgment was reinstated. The defendant filed a Rule 60.02 motion to have the default judgment set aside, based on excusable neglect. The defendant's lawyer attached his own affidavit, which explained that the lawyer was in the midst of closing his law office after thirty-eight years of practice and, in the confusion, failed to put the hearing date on his calendar. The motion to set aside was denied. The defendant now appeals. We vacate and remand to the trial court to consider whether the defendant has a colorable defense to the plaintiffs' claims and to reweigh the pertinent factors in light of that finding.

The defendant, Preston Young, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of probation and imposition of a two-year sentence for his jury conviction of criminally negligent homicide. Because the record is insufficient for our statutorily mandated de novo review of the sentence, we affirm.

The petitioner, Earl E. Haynes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relating to his felony murder conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This is an arbitration case. The plaintiff borrower executed a note in favor of the defendant bank. The note included an arbitration clause, requiring all disputes between the "Borrower(s)" and "Note Holder" to be arbitrated. The term "Note Holder" is defined in the note as the "Lender or anyone who takes [the] Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under [the] Note." The bank transferred the note and the borrower began making payments to a third party. The borrower then filed this lawsuit against the bank and others, alleging fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, promissory fraud, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act. The defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm, holding that under the note, the bank is no longer a "Note Holder" and therefore does not have standing to invoke the arbitration clause.

This is a sales tax case. The plaintiff owns an aluminum sheet and foil manufacturing plant. Located in the plant are two multi-ton roll grinders. In 1987, the defendant commissioner of revenue took the position that the roll grinders and roll grinder supplies were exempt from sales tax, because the roll grinders constituted "industrial machinery," which were exempt. In 1995, however, the department of revenue conducted an audit of the plaintiff and changed its position, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance," which is an exception to the industrial machinery exemption. Accordingly, the plaintiff was assessed for sales tax on roll grinder supplies purchased between 1995 and 1998. The plaintiff paid the assessment under protest and filed the instant lawsuit, seeking to recover the sales tax paid on roll grinder supplies for the audit period. The trial court upheld the decision of the department of revenue, concluding that the roll grinders were "equipment used for maintenance." From that order, the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, finding that the roll grinders fit within the "equipment used for maintenance" exception and that, consequently, roll grinder supplies are subject to sales tax.

The issue in this case is whether the defendant’s notice of appeal was timely filed. The Court of Appeals held that it was not. We disagree. Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04, the thirty-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal was tolled until the trial court issued its decision on the defendant’s post-trial motion to alter or amend. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals to consider the merits of the defendant’s appeal.

The defendant, Roger C. McAnally, appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury in the Henry County Circuit Court for especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; kidnapping, a Class C felony; three counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; theft of property over $500, a Class E felony; and sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, eight years for each aggravated robbery conviction, three years for the kidnapping conviction, and three years for each aggravated burglary conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to a one-year sentence for the sexual battery conviction, for an effective twenty-one-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and kidnapping violate his due process rights because his confinement of the victims was incidental to the robberies. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted this appeal to define "nursing services" as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1) and to determine whether the caretaking services that an injured employee's mother provides are nursing services for which the Workers' Compensation Law mandates the employer compensate her. The trial court found that the mother had failed to carry her burden of proof on the issue of whether she was entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded that the plain meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 contemplates only professional nursing services ordered by the attending physician, and that the mother is not a professional nurse providing professional nursing services. The employee appealed, arguing that the statute provides compensation for a broader range of caretaking services. The appeal was argued before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), but the appeal was transferred to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision, and oral argument was heard by the full Court. We hold that in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1), "nursing services" refers to the services of a professional nurse. Because the mother providing caretaking services here is not a professional nurse, the Workers' Compensation Law does not require the employer to compensate the mother for her services. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's denial of compensation for her services. The question of whether the Workers' Compensation Law should provide compensation when a family member provides care for an injured worker is an issue that must be addressed by the Legislature.

Plaintiff appeals the award of summary judgment to defendant physician based on the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, William J. Parker, Jr., was indicted for driving under the influence and driving on a revoked license. A jury acquitted him of the DUI charge, but found him guilty of driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a sentence of six months, with sixty days to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on probation. In this appeal, the Defendant raises three issues: 1) whether the State’s failure to provide him with a copy of his driving record constitutes a violation of his due process rights; 2) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a sworn affidavit; and 3) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive.  We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the affidavit into evidence. Because we are unable to conclude that the error was harmless, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which finds reversible error in this case due to the erroneous admission into evidence of Mr. Birdwell’s affidavit. While I agree that admission of the affidavit was error, under the particularly unique facts of this case, I conclude that it is harmless error.

The petitioner, Monroe Brown, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish either a void judgment or an expired sentence. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Jason C. Polston, of reckless aggravated assault.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years in the workhouse, suspended except for 60 days to serve on weekends, a $500.00 fine, and 200 hours of community service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress the Defendant’s statement made in a telephone conversation with a police officer because the State did not disclose the statement prior to trial; (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; (4) the trial court erred by failing to charge the defenses of necessity and duress; (5) the trial court erred bydenying the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion; and (6) the trial court erred by ordering the Defendant to serve sixty days in jail. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the Defendant’s telephone conversation with a police officer because the State did not disclose the statement to the Defendant prior to trial in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Therefore, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

Plaintiffs, horse-drawn carriage operators, filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a provision of one section of an ordinance adopted by theMemphis City Council. The trial court elided the provision as an unlawful delegation of the City’s police power and enforced the remainder of the ordinance. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting the trial court erred in its application of the doctrine of elision. Defendants cross-appeal, asserting the trial court erred by finding the elided portion unconstitutional. We affirm.

This litigation arises out of a two-vehicle collision in Hawkins County. Teresa A. Martin ("the plaintiff") and her husband sued the driver of the other vehicle, Johnny L. Drinnon ("the defendant"), seeking damages and charging him with common law and statutory acts of negligence. The defendant answered and filed a counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict, finding the parties equally at fault. Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict and the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The plaintiff appeals, raising, in effect, three issues. We vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.