APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted permission to appeal in this case to consider whether the Sixth Amendment entitles the defendant to participate, through counsel, in the determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to seize a sample of the defendant's blood. Because we find that the defendant has no such entitlement, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Plaintiff was an at-will employee of the Defendant when he was terminated for an asserted cause. In this action he alleges that he was wrongfully terminated because the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Handbook afforded him a contractual right of peer review. The motion of the Defendants for summary judgment was granted upon a finding that the Handbook was not an employment contract. We affirm.

This is a boundary-line case. The Defendant's survey evidence was excluded, and reputation evidence offered by the Plaintiff as to the common boundary line was admitted. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner fails to assert a ground of relief entitling him to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant appeals his conviction for false reporting on the basis of insufficient evidence to support the verdict. After review, we conclude the evidence to be sufficient to support the conviction and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The petitioner originally entered an open guilty plea to aggravated robbery and child neglect and
received concurrent sentences of eight years and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively, to be served in incarceration. She timely sought post-conviction relief, which was denied. In this appeal, the petitioner asserts defense counsel was ineffective and, thus, her guilty plea resulted from defense counsel’s ineffectiveness. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, William Romero Padilla, was convicted in the Haywood County Circuit Court of rape of a child and was sentenced to twenty-five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that counsel was ineffective and that “fundamental fairness” dictated that a different prosecutor should have represented the State at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appealed. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a question of valuation of the shares of a withdrawing shareholder from a professional corporation. We reverse the trial court's determination that the shares had no value and hold that the valuation should have been made as of the date of withdrawal. We also hold that the withdrawing shareholder may recover the value of his shares from the sole remaining shareholder who removed the corporation's assets after the notice of withdrawal.

The appellant, William Herbert Stitts, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of two counts of robbery, Class C felonies. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant on each count as a Range II multiple offender to ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to sentences for previous, unrelated convictions. On appeal, the appellant asserts that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of robbery as charged in count one of the indictment, and (2) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Donald W. Rhea, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to robbery and attempted robbery and received a nine-year sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for habeas corpus relief in the Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that his sentence was illegal and that the indictments underlying his conviction were fatally defective. The trial court dismissed the habeas corpus petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this action based on a personal guaranty agreement, the Trial Court determined there were no disputed issues of material fact and awarded summary judgment on the agreement. Defendant has appealed. We affirm.

In a declaratory judgment action by the insurance company, the Trial Court held insured was entitled to recover under the policy and awarded prejudgment interest and imposed bad faith penalty. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The Trial Court in this divorce action awarded child support for the two children of the parties and attorney's fees to the mother. The father appeals. We affirm, as modified.

A mediated agreement provided that Husband would sell his one-half interest in Pigeon Forge property to Wife for $500,000.00, but if the purchase price was not paid in one year, the property would be sold at auction and the net proceeds divided. The property was sold at auction for $244,429.00, net. Wife claims this amount plus $255,271.00 and the trial court agreed.

The Appellants, Michael Dwight Stewart and James Henry Brown, appeal the sentencing decisions of the Davidson County Criminal Court. Stewart pled guilty to aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping and received an effective twelve-year sentence. Brown pled guilty to aggravated rape and received a twenty-four-year sentence in the Department of Correction. In this consolidated appeal, Stewart and Brown raise the single issue of whether the sentences imposed were excessive. After review of the record, the sentencing decisions are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jimmy W. Rogers, was convicted of aggravated assault. In this direct appeal, he raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow him and a co-defendant to compare jury strikes; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting a video tape and an audio tape into evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying him discovery of the victim's medical records; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant him a continuance; (5) whether the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of the victim; (6) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial based on improper comments by the prosecutor during closing argument; (7) whether the trial court erred in its jury instruction; (8) whether the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant; and (9) whether the trial court erred by refusing to suspend the Defendant's sentence pending the appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached by the majority, and the reasoning used in the majority opinion on all issues except its conclusion that enhancement factor (7), that Defendant Brown was motivated by a desire to satisfy his pleasure or excitement, is inapplicable.

A jury convicted the defendant of four counts of child rape and four counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years on each of the child rape convictions and twelve years on each of the aggravated sexual battery convictions, with two of the child rape sentences to run consecutively and all other sentences to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On direct appeal, this Court reversed and dismissed three of the convictions for child rape. We remanded the case for a determination of whether the remaining sentences should run consecutively. Following a re-sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered two of the aggravated sexual battery sentences and the child rape sentence to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-nine years. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. We conclude that the record supports the grounds for consecutive sentencing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(5), and the sentence is "justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offenses" and is "no greater than that deserved for the offenses committed."

J.L. Mac-Tn, Inc. and the State contracted for J.L. Mac's provision of tire shredding services at the various county disposal facilities requiring those services. Subsequent to that contract, the state legislature established new procedures for tire disposal requiring the counties to find an end use for the shredded tires, and eventually prohibiting the land filling of shredded tires. The amount of services required of J.L. Mac under the contract were significantly reduced. J.L. Mac commenced this action seeking damages for alleged breach of the contract for shredding services. The Claims Commission granted summary judgment to the State. From that summary judgment J.L. Mac appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff, who had a pre-existing herniated disk, was rear-ended in a vehicular accident seven weeks after the first injury. A diskectomy was performed six months later. Treating physician equivocated when asked whether the diskectomy was necessitated by the second injury, testifying, "maybe yes; maybe no." Trial court found that Plaintiff's need for surgery was caused by incident and awarded Plaintiff judgment against Defendant for all medical expenses related to the surgery, lost wages and pain and suffering. Plaintiff did not present sufficient proof to establish that incident was cause in fact of need for surgery for physician could not state with reasonable degree of medical certainty that need for surgery was the result of the incident. Further, lay testimony of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's brother was insufficient to prove cause in fact of Plaintiff's need for surgery. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court.

In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Washington County the Appellant, Daniel Bruce Crowe, contends that the Chancery Court erred in finding Mr. Crowe and his attorney in contempt and in its award of attorney fees. We affirm and remand.

This court granted the State of Tennessee's application for an appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The State is seeking reversal of the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court which supplemented the appellate record in the defendant's direct appeal with the transcript of the trial in the case of State v. Courtney Matthews, Montgomery County Circuit Court No. 33791. Although Housler and Matthews were both charged in the homicides of four Taco Bell employees in Clarksville, Tennessee, the pair was tried separately, and the transcript of Matthews' trial was never introduced into evidence at any stage of the Housler trial or at any post-trial proceedings involving Housler. As a result, the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court is REVERSED and VACATED, and the clerk of this court is ORDERED to return to the Montgomery County Circuit Court Clerk the transcript of the trial in State v. Courtney Matthews, Montgomery County Circuit Court No. 33791.

The defendant, Tavarus La'Trent Martindale, was convicted by a jury in the Giles County Circuit Court of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends (1) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of murder in the first degree, (2) that the trial court erred by not excluding the autopsy evidence, and (3) that the trial court's sentencing instructions to the jury were unclear as to the standard for imposing life in prison without the possibility of parole or for imposing life in prison. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff, a private act hospital authority established pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 7-57-601 to -604, seeks a declaration that it has the authority to enter into an exclusive contract for professional imaging services. The defendants, four radiologists who currently have clinical privileges at the Imaging Department of a hospital operated by the plaintiff, filed a counterclaim. We affirm the judgments of the lower courts, holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-57-603 permits the hospital authority to enter into an exclusive provider contract, that the Board of Trustee's decision to close the staff of the Imaging Department did not violate the medical staff bylaws, and that the defendants are not legally or constitutionally entitled to a hearing if their clinical privileges are terminated upon the entry of an exclusive provider contract.

Petitioner, Joseph Taylor, filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was subsequently amended. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because he (1) failed to adequately meet with Petitioner prior to trial; (2) failed to interview and call certain witnesses to testify; (3) failed to request a jury instruction on assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted rape; and (4) failed to object to the classification of Petitioner as a career offender when the trial court sentenced Petitioner for attempted rape. Petitioner also alleges that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to appeal the classification of Petitioner as a career offender for purposes of sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing in accordance with this opinion.